Judgment Anwar Ahmad, J. 1. This application in revision on behalf of the plaintiff is directed against an order dated the 16th December 1966, passed by the Munsif, First Court, Patna, rejecting his application for permission to withdraw the arrears of rent deposited by the opposite party. 2. The petitioner instituted the suit (Title Suit No. 294 of 1964) on the 23rd November 1964 for the eviction of the opposite party from holding No. 83 Circle No. 177, Ward No. 26, at Chowk, Patna city, on the ground of personal necessity and non-payment of rent. The opposite party did not dispute the relationship of landlord and tenant for the rate of rent claimed by the petitioner. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the petitioner filed an application under Sec.11A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act The Court, by its order dated the 18th July, 1966, directed the opposite party to deposit the arrears of rent from the 10th December 1963 to June 1966 at the rate of Rs. 72 per month without prejudice to the rights of the parties to lead evidence in regard to the arrears of rent and payment of rent etc. with a direction that, in case the deposit was made in pursuance of this order, the petitioner would not be at liberty to withdraw the amount of rent for the period 10th December 1963 to June 1966. 4. As staled above, the order restraining the petitioner from withdrawing the amount forms part of the order passed by the Court below on the 18th July 1966 on an application of the petitioner under Sec.11A of the Act, wherein the only prayer of the petitioner was that the opposite party be directed to deposit the rent from the 10th December 1963 to May 1966. In the rejoinder filed by the opposite party to this application, naturally enough, no objection was raised to the withdrawal of the amount by the petitioner. The petitioner also had not applied for its withdrawal, as, till then, the amount had not been deposited. The petitioner made a prayer for the permission of the Court to withdraw the amount in his application dated the 15th December 1966. The petitioner also had not applied for its withdrawal, as, till then, the amount had not been deposited. The petitioner made a prayer for the permission of the Court to withdraw the amount in his application dated the 15th December 1966. No objection was raised by the opposite party to the withdrawal of the amount by the petitioner, although a copy of the application of the petitioner had been served on the lawyer for the opposite party and the original filed in Court bears the signature of his lawyer. 5. In the impugned order, which was passed on the 16th December 1966, the learned Munsif observed that  "the order dated 18-7-66 was dictated on the ijlas in presence of the lawyers for the parties." It was also held that, as no objection was raised about the restraint put on the petitioner while the order was being passed, there was no reason to review or recall the order dated the 18th July 1966 and justice required that the same must continue. There is, however, nothing on the record to show that the petitioner was given an opportunity to make his submission on the point. The mere fact that, at the time the order was dictated, no objection was raised could not be a ground to divest the petitioner of his right to have his say in the matter before the Court made its mind and passed an order to his detriment. It is a principle of natural justice that, before an ad- verse order is passed against a person, he must be given an opportunity to make his submission. As this was not done, the order dated the 18th July 1966 must be held to be void and without jurisdiction (vide Sangram Singh V/s. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 , at p. 429). 6. The way in which the order was passed was also against the scheme of the section itself. Sec.11A of the Act may be split up into two parts. Under the first part, the landlord may file an application for an order on the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent and the rent falling due every month thereafter. If the tenant fails to deposit the amount as directed by the Court, his defence against ejectment would be struck out. Under the first part, the landlord may file an application for an order on the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent and the rent falling due every month thereafter. If the tenant fails to deposit the amount as directed by the Court, his defence against ejectment would be struck out. In case the amount is deposited, the second part gives an option to the landlord to apply to the Court for permission to withdraw the same. The section, therefore, contemplates two different applica- tions by the landlord for two different reliefs, namely, one for the deposit of the rent and the other for the withdrawal of ;the same and, consequently, one composite order with regard to both the reliefs is not envisaged by it. It cannot be disputed that, on both these occasions, he must be given an opportunity to place his case before the Court and each ap- plication must receive separate consideration by the Court. It will be useful to quote the following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sangram Singhs case, AIR 1955 SC 425 :- - ".....there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of pro- cedure are grounded cm a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participat- ing in them. ... a party must be heard in a Court of law, or at any rate be afforded an opportunity to appear and defend himself, unless there is express provision to the contrary, is, we think, beyond dispute. See the observations of the Privy Council in Balakrishna Udayar V/s. Vasu- deva Ayyar, AIR 1917 PC 71 at p. 74, and especially in T. B. Barrett V/s. African Products Ltd., AIR 1928 PC 261 at p. 262, where Lord Buckmaster said :- - no forms or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants defence. Also Hari Vishnus case, AIR 1955 S¬ 233, which we have just quoted. Also Hari Vishnus case, AIR 1955 S¬ 233, which we have just quoted. In our opinion, Wallace, J., was right in Venkatasubbiah V/s. Lakshminarasim-ham, AIR 1925 Mad 1274, in holding that One cardinal principle to be observed in trials by a Court obviously is that a party has a right to appear and plead his cause on all occasions when that cause comes on for hearing. and that  It follows that a party should not be deprived of that right and in fact the Court has no option to refuse that right, unless the Code of Civil Procedure deprives him of it." 7. There may be cases in which the landlord may apply only for a direction on the tenant by the Court for deposit of rent but the tenant does not choose to deposit the same. In such cases, there will be no occasion for the landlord to apply for permission of the Court to withdraw the amount. If the order restraining the landlord from withdrawing the rent is made a part of the order directing the tenant to deposit the rent, such an order will, in many cases, become in-fructuous. It is well known that a Court should always guard itself from passing an infructuous order. 8. The intention of the Legislature, in enacting Sec.11A in the Act by Sec.12 of the amending Act (Act 16 of 1955) was that no tenant should be allowed to continue in possession of the rented premises unless he is made to pay the arrears of rent and the rent falling due every month thereafter. Section 11A has been inserted exclusively for the benefit of the landlord. During the pendency of the suit for ejectment, the money so deposited shall as a rule be made available to the landlord so that he may get its benefit. 9. I am conscious of the fact that the petitioner did not come to this Court against the order passed on the 18th July 1966. Nonetheless, as the order dated the I8th July, 1966 was premature, I can, as is a well- settled rule of this Court, interfere with that order in the present application which has been filed against the order dated the 16th December, 1966. Nonetheless, as the order dated the I8th July, 1966 was premature, I can, as is a well- settled rule of this Court, interfere with that order in the present application which has been filed against the order dated the 16th December, 1966. The impugned order is tainted with illegality inasmuch as the Court has refused to consider on merits the petitioners application dated the 15th December 1966, to which even a rejoinder was not filed. 10. The result, therefore, is that the application in revision is allowed, the impugned order is set aside, and the case is sent back to the learned Munsif to reconsider the application of the peti tioner dated the 15th December, 1966 on merits in the light of the observations made above. There will, however, be no order as to costs.