BHARGAVA, J.—These three revision petitions are being dealt with together as the petitioner is common to them and they also raise common questions of law and fact. 2. In the court of the Munsif, Alwar, the plaintiffs-non-petitioners filed separate suits for ejectment against the defendants-non-petitioners who were described as tenants of one Shivlal deceased from whom they claimed to have purchased the suit property. The defendants in their written statements denied that they held the property as tenants of Shivlal. They stated that they were in possession of the suit property since the time of their ancestors and were permanent tenants of the land and had constructed houses on it at their own costs. They further pleaded that Shivlal had no right to transfer the suit property to the plaintiffs in each case as he was the muafidar or jagirdar whose jagir had been resumed by the State of Rajasthan under the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act of 1952 (hereinafter called the Act of 1952) and thus the ownership of the suit property vested in the State. They also stated that the alleged sale in favour of the plaintiffs was fictitious. 3. The trial court did not frame any issue on the plea taken by the defendants viz., that the ownership of the suit property had become vested in the State of Rajasthan because of its resumption under the Act of 1952. The trial proceeded when in the suit out of which civil Revision No. 458 of 1967 has arisen, defendants made an application for framing an additional issue. The court acceded to their request and framed additional issue No. 9 on the point whether the ownership of the suit property, due to its resumption, vested in the State and the alleged sale in favour of the plaintiffs was unauthorised. On this issue too, the defendants closed their evidence and the plaintiffs are now required to lead evidence in rebuttal. The other two cases were also ripe for arguments. It was at this stage of the cases that the petitioner-Urban Improvement Trust, Alwar made an application under Order 1 rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded as a party. The other two cases were also ripe for arguments. It was at this stage of the cases that the petitioner-Urban Improvement Trust, Alwar made an application under Order 1 rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for being impleaded as a party. The learned Munsiff rejected the application in each case holding that the simple suit for ejectment cannot be allowed to be converted into a suit for title and if the petitioner wanted an adjudication of its title to the suit property it could file a separate suit. It is against these orders that the present revision applications have been filed. 4. Under Order 1 rule 10(2) of the Code a person may be added to a suit: (i) when he ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, that is when he is a necessary party. (ii) when without his presence the question in the suit cannot be completely decided, that is when he is a proper party. 5. The question of addition of parties under the said rule is generally one of judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case subject to provisions of or. 1 rule 1 and or. 2 rule 3. The rule has been enacted to prevent multiplicity of suits and conflict of decisions though it is not the only consideration in impleading parties. 6. In these cases learned counsel has urged that Shivlal was a jagirdar and his jagir including the suit property was resumed under the Act of 1952 and thereafter, it vested in the State. Thereafter under the provisions of sec. 43 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act of 1959 (hereinafter called the Act of 1959), a notification was issued by the State whereby these properties along with other properties were placed at the disposal of the petitioner. After the vesting of the property in the State, Shivlal had no right left to transfer it to the plaintiffs. It is pointed out that the presence of the petitioner before the court is necessary to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the question whether the petitioner or the plaintiffs is the owner of the land. It is urged that the power of adding parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. 7. It is pointed out that the presence of the petitioner before the court is necessary to enable it effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the question whether the petitioner or the plaintiffs is the owner of the land. It is urged that the power of adding parties can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. 7. On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiffs has vehemently urged that by adding the petitioner, controversies which are foreign to the scope of the suit, would be introduced and the trial in all the cases which had now become mature for disposal, would be reopened. It is pointed out that the suits were instituted in the years 1962 and 1963 and the petitioner applied to be impleaded as a party about four years after their institution. It is pointed out that in the present suits the only question to be tried between the parties is whether the defendants are the tenants of the plaintiffs they having purchased it from Shivlal and have a right to a decree for ejectment against them. It is also pointed out that the suit property consists of buildings and house sites and could not have been resumed by the State as provided in sec. 23 of the Act of 1952. It is also pointed out that even if the suit property was resumed its ownership vests in the State of Rajasthan and not in the petitioner. The effect of the notification relied upon by the petitioner is only to place the property at the disposal of the petitioner and not of vesting its ownership in it. It is contended that all these questions will have to be determined by the court if the petitioner is added as a party to the suit which are clearly beyond the scope of the present suit. 8. It may be stated at the outset that it is not the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Urban Improvement Trust is a necessary party in the suits. He, however, says that the petitioner is a proper party whose presence before the court is necessary in order to enable the court to effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 9. He, however, says that the petitioner is a proper party whose presence before the court is necessary in order to enable the court to effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. 9. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner relied on (Pasumarthi) Subbaraya Sastri vs. Mukkamale Seetha Ramaswami(l), G.Krishna-swami Naidu vs. Municipal Council Bellary(3), Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum(3) and Sampatbai vs. Madhusingh Gambhirji(4). On the other hand learned counsel for the plaintiffs non-petitioners has placed reliance on Uttam Gulabrao Sakhare vs. Champetrao Gulabrao Gawande(5), Mst. Singar Kanwar vs. Dhoop-chand(6), a judgment in Civil Revision No. 94 of 1964 decided on 18-1-68 (Anju-man monia and S.P. Mohinia vs. Shri Murad Mohammed and 7 others, Mt. Bindru vs. Sada Ram(7), Kone vs. Kishenlal(8), M. Abdul Razack vs. S. Mohammad Shah(9), Motiram Roshanlal Coal Co. (P) Ltd. vs. District Committee, Dhanbad(IO), Mujta Bai vs. Mahbub Rehman(11), Srila Sri Subramaniya Desika Ganana vs. R. Ananth Krishnaswami Naidu(12), Pravat Chandra Giri vs. Amulya Chandra Bha-duri(13), Chamiar Kunchelan vs. Kandan Damodran(14), Lodal Mollah vs. Kally Dass Roy(15) and Gagan Behari Patnaik vs. Rameshwar Lal(16). It is however not necessary to refer to all the decisions relied on by the parties and it would be sufficient to refer only to those which relate to suits for ejectment. 10. In (Pasumarthi) Subboraya Sastris case(l) where the plaintiff brought a suit to eject the defendant from a site and to remove a pile erected by him thereon and the plea of the defendant was that the land belonged to the Municipal Council, that he put up a pile with its permission and that the Municipal Council was a necessary party to the suit, it was held that: "The Municipality was a necessary party to the suit and not having been made one, in spite of objection taken from the start, the suit must be dismissed." In this case the learned Judge mainly relied upon Umed Mal vs. Chand Mal (17) and the observations made by Dicey on Parties to an Action, R. 113. This case was referred in Uttam Gulabrao Sekhares case (5) and Mudholkar J. as he then was, distinguished it and held that: "Where in an ejectment suit instituted by the plaintiff as landlord against the defendant in actual jurisdical possession of the house, the defendant pleads that the house in question belonged to a third party and not to the plaintiff, and the title of the third party is disputed by the plaintiff, though the third party is proper party to the suit, his joinder was not necessary to enable the plaintiff to obtain the relief which he claimed against the defendant," 11. In Lodai Mollahs case (15) it was held per Field J. that — "Where a person sued for rent sets up the title of a third party, and alleges that he holds under, and pays rent to him, such third party ought not to be made a party to the suit so as to convert a simple suit for arrears of rent into one for the determination of the title to the property in respect of which the rent is claimed. Such a suit raises only two issues, viz., (1) Does the relation of landlord and tenant exist between the plaintiff and defendant? (2) Are the alleged arrears of rent due and unpaid? And these are questions in which the plaintiff and defendant are alone concerned, and no third party claiming a title adverse to the plaintiff can properly be made a party to the trial of these issues. Sec. 28 of the Civil Procedure Code is not imperative, but allows a discretion to be exercised; and in such a suit it is better both in the interests of Government and for the proper adjudication of the question of title, that it should be tried by a competent Court in a suit directly framed and brought for that purpose." 12. In Srila Sri Subramaniys Desika Gananas case (12) it was held that : "In an ejectment suit on basis of lease deed, prima facie, persons claiming adverse rights to the plaintiffs title should not be made parties in the absence of special circumstances." 13. In Srila Sri Subramaniys Desika Gananas case (12) it was held that : "In an ejectment suit on basis of lease deed, prima facie, persons claiming adverse rights to the plaintiffs title should not be made parties in the absence of special circumstances." 13. In Pravat Chandra Giris case (13), following the decision in Lodai Mollahs case (15), it was held that: "A third party ought not to be made a party to a suit for rent so as to convert a simple suit for arrears of rent into one for the determination of the title to the property in respect of which the rent is claimed." 14. In Mst. Singar Kanwars case (6) it was held that: "In a rent suit where the defendant admitted the execution of rent note but pleaded that he executed it under undue influence and that one H. was the real landlord, it was held that H. was not necessary party." Lodai Mollah (15), Pravat Chandra Giri (13) Srila Sri Subramaniya Ganana (12) and N.T. Palamsamy Chettiar by agent V.D. Secterama Mudaliar vs. Momera Chettiar (18), were relied upon for the said view. 15. In Gagan Behari Patnaiks case (16) it was held that: "A simple suit for rent should not be converted into a complicated title suit. There are some well known exceptions to the aforesaid dictum, viz., cases where a third party claims a share of the rent sued for, or where a third party is alleged to be a transferee from the tenant with the landlords consent, or where the defendant in a suit for rent by the lessee against the sub-lessee pleads payment to a third party with the ownerss consent. Subject to the various exceptions, some of which have been illustrated above, a suit for rent should not be converted into a complicated title suit and a third party claiming a title rival to that of the plaintiff-landlord is not a necessary party. It may be noted that the petitioner in that case had already filed a separate suit claiming that he was the real owner of the disputed property. 16. Similar view was taken in Chamiar Kunchelans case (14). 17. It may be noted that the petitioner in that case had already filed a separate suit claiming that he was the real owner of the disputed property. 16. Similar view was taken in Chamiar Kunchelans case (14). 17. A review of the above decisions would show that they fall in three categories, viz., (1) that the third party is a necessary party, (Pasumarthi) Subbaraya Sastris case (1), (11) the third party is not even a proper party (Lodel Mallahs case (15) and other cases which have followed it (iii) that the third party is a proper party (Uttam Gulabraos case (5)). However, to my mind the question whether the third party claiming title to the property in a suit for ejectment is a proper party or not, would also depend upon the nature of the plaintiffs title. In cases where there is a contractual relationship of landlord and tenant and the defendant has been inducted into possession of the suit property as tenant by the plaintiff and the rule of estoppel contained in sec. 116 of the Evidence Act operates against the tenant no question of impleading a third person as a party setting up title to the suit property can arise because any enquiry about the title of a third party would be completely shut out by reason of the rule of estoppel and in such cases the third person would not be a proper party within the meaning of order 1 rule 10(2) C.P.C. However, in cases where the plaintiff claims title to the suit property on the basis of inheritance, assignment etc. and the tenant has not attorned to him and the above mentioned rule of estoppel does not operate against him and it is open to him in the suit to set up the title of a third person, such third person in appropriate cases can be regarded as a proper party whose presence before the court will be necessary to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. In such cases there would be no question of converting a simple suit into a suit of title and no controversy beyond the scope of the suit would be introduced as after his joinder the main evidence in the suit and the main enquiry will remain the same as before his addition. In such cases there would be no question of converting a simple suit into a suit of title and no controversy beyond the scope of the suit would be introduced as after his joinder the main evidence in the suit and the main enquiry will remain the same as before his addition. In Lodal Mollahs, case(15) Field J. observed:— "But it is clear that, in cases falling under this head, there may be a further defence; there may be a denial of the facts which constitute the derivation, or denial of the assignment, or of the adoption, or of the validity of either; or of the plaintiff being the heir of the original person from whom he professes to derive title by inheritance. It is clear that it is only as regards this further matter of defence that the rights of third parties can come into question. The effect of an assignment, or of an adoption, or of a claim founded on inheritance, may be to deprive of the property, and so of the rents and profits, of some other person who, but for such assignment or adoption or of a claim founded on inheritance, would be entitled thereto. This class of cases may be further divided into (a) cases where the defendant has attorned to the plaintiff; and(b) cases where the defendant has not attorned to the plaintiff, (a) Where the plaintiff claims by a derivative title, and the defendant is not thereby stopped from showing that the title is really not in the plaintiff but in some other person; see the cases of Rogers vs. Pitcher (6 Taun., 202), Glaridge vs. Mackenzie (4 M. and G., 143) and Gregory vs. Doidge (3 Bing., 474). In this last case a person had occupied lands under A. Upon As death this person entered into an agreement to pay rent to D, and paid one shilling as an acknowledgment of Ds title being ignorant that D had no title to the property. It afterwards turned out that D had no title, and it was held, that such person might show in answer to a suit for rent that D had really no title. Ordinarily, a tenant who had attorned would not set up this defence unless some person had satisfied him of a better title and prohibited him from paying rent to the plaintiff. Ordinarily, a tenant who had attorned would not set up this defence unless some person had satisfied him of a better title and prohibited him from paying rent to the plaintiff. There is no plausible reason why this third person should be made a party to the suit for rent, and it is really for his own interest that he should not be a party. If he is a party, he will be bound by the adjudication upon the question of title, and this adjudication may be based upon scanty materials and insufficient investigation, which are not uncommon when the subject-matter of the claim itself is inconsiderable. If he is not a party, he has the chance of the tenants plea being successful, and so of himself stepping into the place of landlord without personal litigation. If the tenants plea is unsuccessful, he can litigate the question of title himself with better preparation and with expereince gained from the contest at which he looked on without being a patty." 18. It would appear from the above that it was on the ground of expediency that it was held that the third person need not be joined as a party in such a suit because it is in his own interest that he should file a separate suit for the proper adjudication of his own title. At the same time it has been clearly observed that the question of rights of third parties do come in such cases because the effect of an assignment, or of an adoption, or of a claim founded on inheritance my be to deprive of the property, and so of the rents and profits, of some other person. 19. The power of the court to add parties under Order 1 rule 10(2) came up for consideration by the Supreme Court in Razia Begams case(4). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held inter alia that: "In a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject matter of a litigation." 20. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held inter alia that: "In a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject matter of a litigation." 20. Bearing in mind the above principle and the views expressed in the various decisions quoted above, I am of the view that in suits for ejectment falling under the second category noted by me, a third person claiming title in himself can be a proper party and the court would not be exercising its discretion improperly to implead him as a party for the complete and effectual determination of the points involved in the suit. 21. The next question is whether the present cases call for any interference with the discretion exercised by the court below even though the reason given by that court is not wholly sound. For more than one reason I am not inclined to interfere with the lower courts discretion. Firstly, I am not satisfied with the bonafides of the petitioner in making the applications for being added as party in the lower court because as mentioned earlier, these suits were filed as back as 1962 and 1963 and the petitioner submitted its applications in 1967 and sometime earlier also got some documents executed in its favour by the defendants which shows that its object is to help the defendants in defeating the suit of the plaintiffs and not the vindication of its own rights. The suits were filed as back as 1962 and 1963 and no reason has been shown why applications for being added as a party were, made as late as 1967, when suits had become ripe for arguments. Secondly, the suit property is situated in the city of Alwar and is in possession of the defendants. It seems to me rather doubtful although I express no opinion on this question how buildings and house sites situated in the city of Alwar could be resumed in the resumption proceedings taken against Shivlal under the Act of 1952. Thirdly, the parties are added very often to avoid multiplicity of suits and conflict of decisions. It seems to me rather doubtful although I express no opinion on this question how buildings and house sites situated in the city of Alwar could be resumed in the resumption proceedings taken against Shivlal under the Act of 1952. Thirdly, the parties are added very often to avoid multiplicity of suits and conflict of decisions. But here I am told that Shivlal had transferred houses and lands situated in the same locality known as Shivlalpuri to different persons under various transfer deeds and many of them have filed suits against persons in occupation of those properties. There are about 40 suits pending in the court below of similar nature. In case the petitioner is added party in these suits, it will have to be added as party in all the pending suits also and in each suit separate enquiry will be made regarding the title of the petitioner which instead of avoiding multiplicity of suits will lead to multiple enquiries in all the suits. On the other hand if the petitioner files a separate suit in which all the transferees and the persons in occupation of those lands can be impleaded as defendants because there would be a common question of law and facts to be determined, the controversy will be determined once for all in that one enquiry. For the above mentioned reasons no interference is called for with the order passed by the court below. 22. The revision applications are rejected, but without costs.