JUDGMENT 1. THE instant writ petition is directed-against an order passed by the second Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta rejecting the petitioner's application for approval of the order of dismissal of respondent No. 3 from his service under the petitioner on account of his misconduct. 2. BRIEFLY the facts relevant for the purpose of the present Rule are as follows : -The respondent No. 3, Bhajan Chandra Bhattacharjee, was employed as a supervisor in the Petitioner's Company as a casual employee. In course of such employment he was charge-sheeted on 23rd September, 1963 for certain gross misconduct, namely, participation in an illegal strike inciting or instigating other workmen to commence the strike and threatening and intimidating a typist of the petitioner's company and assaulting him on 18th september, 1963 (charge sheet annexed to the petition marked as annexure 'a')on the basis of written complaint made by him on 17th September and 20th September, 1963. It is also stated that by letter dated 20th September, 1963 the entire incident of 18th September, 1963 was reported to the officer-in-charge, Bhowanipore Police station, Calcutta. The respondent No. 3 submitted a written representation by 17th October, 1963 in which he contended that the Management was responsible for the illegal strike and should have come to settlement with the Union. Not being satisfied, the Management, thereafter, decided to hold a domestic enquiry to which due notice was given to the respondent No. 3 but in spite of receipt of such notice he did not attend the enquiry and therefore, the enquiry had to be concluded ex parte. 3. ONE S. K. Chabra, one of the officers of the Company, held the enquiry and submitted a report with the findings that the charges against the respondent No. 3 were established and he recommended his dismissal. The managing Director of the petitioner company on consideration of the report of the Enquiring Officer and the relevant materials agreed with his finding ami dismissed the respondent No. 3. 4. THEREAFTER, the petitioner Company made an application before the second Industrial Tribunal under section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes act, (hereinafter referred to as the act) for approval of the said order of dismissal as at the material time an industrial dispute was pending between the petitioner and its workmen before the Second Industrial Tribunal. Here the respondent No. 3 appeared and filed objection to the said application. Here the respondent No. 3 appeared and filed objection to the said application. The tribunal rejected the application of the petitioner by his order dated 24th march, 1964 on the view that the action of the Management was not taken in accordance with the standing order nor was it supported by any evidence or fact. The petitioner having felt aggrieved by such order has come up to this court and obtained a Rule. This rule is opposed by the workman Bhajan Ch. Bhattacharya, the respondent No. 3. In his affidavit-in-opposition it is admitted that he was charge sheeted and served with a copy of the charges as also a notice of domestic enquiry held by the management but, it is stated, in spite of the notice of the enquiry he could not attend out of fear as the enquiry was held in the manager's Bunglow during the period of strike. He also denies the truth of the allegations of misconduct involved in the charges. It is also submitted that the learned Tribunal rightly re-fused to accord his approval to the application of the petitioner under section 33 (2) (b)of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. THE learned Tribunal, it appears, refused the approval on twofold reasons. First is, that the action of the management was not in accordance with the standing order. I fail to see how this was so. While dealing with the question of existence of any standing order of the Company, the learned tribunal held that admittedly, the company had no standing order but in the absence of any standing order, it was also held, that charge sheet against the workman should be considered in general perspective. By this he undoubtedly meant that even if there was no standing order, the domestic enquiry could still be held in a fair and proper manner and to see whether the charges levelled against the petitioner could be reasonably treated as misconduct. Accordingly, the learned tribunal proceeded on the footing that the domestic enquiry into the alleged charges were justified even if there was mo standing order. It was also never urged before the Tribunal that the charges levelled against the respondent no. 3 did not amount to misconduct. Mr. Accordingly, the learned tribunal proceeded on the footing that the domestic enquiry into the alleged charges were justified even if there was mo standing order. It was also never urged before the Tribunal that the charges levelled against the respondent no. 3 did not amount to misconduct. Mr. Sen Gupta, learned Advocate for the petitioner, relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Agnani (W. M.) v. Badridas reported in 1963 (g)F. L. R. 440, and contended that in the absence of standing order the questico of misconduct will have to be dealt with reasonably and in accordance with commonsense. This case according to the learned Advocate is an authority for the proposition that in absence of standing order it is open to the management to hold the enquiry and deal witih the question of misconduct reasonably and in accordance with commonsense, in the present case, however, this proposition is not disputed at all. The learned Tribunal himself, as already seen, applied this principle but having done so he took the view that the management did not take action in accordance with standing order. This, in my view, constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record and vitiates his judgment. First reason, therefore, must be rejected as invalid. 6. THE second reason given by the learned Tribunal is that the action of the management is not borne out by evidence or facts. Here again, he has exceeded jurisdiction and exercised power as an appellate authority which is not permitted under the law. It is by now well settled that the nature and extent of enquiry permissible under sec. 33 (2) (b) is very limited. All that the tribunal can do, is to see whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out and whether a proper domestic enquiry before dismissing an employee has been held and the impugned order has been passed as a result of such enquiry and also to enquire whether the conditions prescribed by section 33 (2) (b) and the proviso are satisfied or not. When all these conditions have been fulfilled, the Tribunal is not justified in refusing to accord approval to the action by the employer. When all these conditions have been fulfilled, the Tribunal is not justified in refusing to accord approval to the action by the employer. It is also not open to the tribunal while holding the enquiry to assume powers of an appellate authority to go into the question of fact, or question about the adequacy or sufficiency or satisfactory character of the evidence which really may be exercised only by the appellate authority. See in this connection the cases reported in (2) A. I. R. 1961, S. C., 860, (The lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen); (3) A. I. R. 1961, S.C.,. 1165, (Bombay Gas Co., v. Its Workmen), (4) A. I. R. 1960, S. C., 1262 (M/s. Caltex (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen). The learned Tribunal, as I find, fully appreciated these principles in theory but failed to follow them in practice. He went into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence to see if the charges levelled against the respondent No. 3. were established. In so doing he found that the evidence was given in proof of an incident of assault on 17-8-63 and not on 18-9-63 as alleged in the charges and that the charges of threat or intimidation were not supported by any evidence. It also held that charge of general insinuation is made in the charge sheet was also vague and mere participation in the strike did not render a workman liable to diciplinary action for misconduct and the strike could not be said to be malafide. This, in my view, the Tribunal is not entitled to do under the law. . By taking up these matters into consideration the learned Tribunal assumed really the power of an appellate authority with which he is not vested by law. Mr. Ganguly, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3, contended that the Tribunal in disposing of an application under section 33 (2) (b) is entitled to enquire as to whether the charges are established by any evidence. If there is no evidence it would refuse to accord its approval. It is not necessary to examine the correctness of this contention in the present case. It may well be that if there is no evidence at all in support of the charges it may legitimately lead to an inference that the domestic enquiry was malafide and findings against the workman was perverse. It is not necessary to examine the correctness of this contention in the present case. It may well be that if there is no evidence at all in support of the charges it may legitimately lead to an inference that the domestic enquiry was malafide and findings against the workman was perverse. In the present case, however, there is no such finding of the Tribunal. Then again even in considering the facts and assessing evidence or interpreting or construing the charges the Tribunal took an erroneous view of the entire matter. As I find, the charge is not one. The allegations in the charge sheet comprise several charges based on incidents occurring between 14th and 18th March, 1963. Having regard to the true scope, effect and implication of the charges levelled against the workman it cannot be said that there was no evidence in support of any of the charges. From a fair reading of the evidence of the two witnesses adduced on behalf of the management in the domestic enquiry which were all uncontradicted. It is quite clear that such evidence would tend to prove charges of instigating others to join the strike or causing obstruction from performing his duties and also of threat or intimidation. But the learned Tribunal failed to construe the charges or read the evidence correctly while giving his finding that there was no evidence with respect to some of the charges. The Tribunal also proceeded to hold on a mere surmise that the strike could not be said to be malafide. Here again he was entirely wrong. Whether or not the strike was malafide or illegal is a matter of separate reference awaiting adjudication of Tribunal. Therefore, it was not open to the Tribunal to decide the nature of the strike in either way. But the learned Tribunal did not consider the matter from this aspect at all. 7. MR. Ganguly, however, relied cm a decision of the Supreme Court in (5) Shibbanlal Saxena v. State of utter Pradesh and others reported in a. I. R. 1954 S. C. 179, and contended that one of the charges namely, that the incident of assault on 18th September, 1963, not having been established by evidence was really non-existent and as such, the order of dismissal based on other charges even if they are proved would be invalid. I am afraid, I can-not accept the contention. I am afraid, I can-not accept the contention. In this case the order of detention under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 was made by the Executive Authority on two grounds. One of the grounds was found to be irrelevant. It was however, held that the other ground which still then remained could not sustain the order as the detention order depended upon the subjective decision f the Executive Authority and not on an objective judicial test and therefore, if one of these two grounds was irrelevant or wholly illusory, the entire order of detention would be vitiated. This case, in my view, has no application to the proceeding of a domestic enquiry culminat'ng in the order of dismissal of the workman concerned. It is well settled "that the proceeding of a domestic enquiry is quasi-judicial. If therefore, the other charges or any one of them constituting misconduct of the workman are found to be established, than it would be open to the punishing authority to pass order of dismissal or impose such other penalty as it may think fit. This view finds support in a decision of the Supreme Court in (13) State of Orissa v. Bidyabhusan reported in A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 779. While dealing this aspect of the matter Shah J. who delivered the judgment of the Court observed inter alia (page 786 of the report) as follows : - "if the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of the findings of the tribunal were 'unassailable', the order of the Governor on whose powers by the rules and restrictions in determiin-ing the appropriate punishment are placed, was final, and the High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty for as we have already observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent authority on a public servant, if the conditions of the constitutional protection have been complied with, is not justifiable. Therefore, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. Therefore, if the order may be supported on any finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The Court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enquiry officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider that order because in respect of some of the findings but not all it appears that there had been violation of the rules of natural justice. The High Court was, in our judgment, in error in directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the question. " it is true that this case deals with a disciplinary proceeding against public servant but on the principle indicated there is no difference. 8. IN the above view of the matter the second reason given by the learned tribunal for refusing approval cannot also be sustained. I, therefore, quash the order and send back the case to the Tribunal who will now decide the matter afresh on the evidence and materials already on record and dispose of the application in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. 9. THE rule is made absolute- to the extent indicated above but there will be no order as to costs. Let a Writ both in the nature of certiorari and Mandamus issue accordingly. Let a copy of this order be sent down as expeditiously as possible.