BY THE COURT : This is plaintiff’s second appeal against the Judgement and the decree dated 27 th of April 1962, passed by the District Judge Bikaner, upholding the Decree and the Judgment of the Civil Judge Churu Dated 25 th of April, 1960. 2. The facts giving rise to this litigation are as follows :- In the year 1943 his Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner visited the Town of Churu and it so appears that at that time in order accord a royal reception to the visiting dignitary, the inhabitants of the time were allowed to construct the gates. The Plaintiff’s House is known as Aushdhalaya and is situate in the Katla Bazar Churu. The entrance of this House is through the open land, which was claimed by the Plaintiff as owned by him and this open land connects the Plaintiff’s House with the Main Bazar. At the point where this land meets the main bazar, the Plaintiff’s Father had constructed a new Gate on 15-12-1943. Thereafter, the Plaintiff’s Father made an application to the revenue authorities to sell the open land to him but the final orders for the sale of the land to the Plaintiff’s Father were not made by the revenue authority and the papers were kept in abeyance. It so appears that thereafter dispute arose regarding the ownership of the open land on which the gate was constructed by the Father of the Plaintiff and litigation started in the revenue courts which ultimately culminated in the order of the revenue board directing the plaintiff’s father to demolish the Gate. This order is dated 31 st January, 1949. After this order was passed the State of Bikaner was merged into Rajasthan and the matter was agitated before the Board Of Revenue for Rajasthan, but the Plaintiff’s Father could not succeed in his attempts. In 1953 Plaintiff Shashi Kumar S/o Pandit Shant Sharma who was then a minor filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge Churu, praying that it may be declared that the disputed gate was on the land which belong to him and his father and other relations who were impleaded as defendants No. 6 to 10 in that suit. He also prayed for a declaration that the State of Rajasthan and the Board of Revenue i.e., Defendant No. 1 and 2 had no right to direct the removal of the Gate and that they may be restrained by permanent injunction from interfering with the Plaintiff’s possession over the said gate and the land which was used by the Plaintiff and his relations to go to their House. 3. The Suit was contested by the State of Rajasthan and also by the Defendants No. 3 to 5 who are neighbours of the Plaintiff and who were interested in the Land which, according to them was owned by the State. 4. the Trial Court dismissed the suit on a preliminary issue but on appeal the appellate court remanded the suit with a direction that issues may be framed on the basis of the pleadings and thereafter the suit may be decided after recording the evidence for the parties. The trial court then framed as many as nine issues and allowed the parties to lead evidence. After the trial the plaintiff’s suit was dismissed by the trial court holding that the land on which the gate was constructed by the Plaintiff belonged to the Government. An appeal was filed against the said Judgment and decree of the Trial Court before the District Judge Bikaner who by its Judgement dated 27 th of the April 1962 dismissed the appeal. It is against this Judgment and the decree of the lower appellate court that the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal before this Court. 5. While deciding the Appeal, the Learned District Judge before whom only two questions were argued, held, after scrutinizing the evidence on the record, that the Land on which the Gate was constructed by the Plaintiff’s Father belonged to the Government and as such the Plea of the Plaintiff that the revenue authorities had no right to decide the dispute relating to this land was rejected by the Learned Judge. The question relating to the ownership of the Land which is purely a question of fact was also decided by the two courts below in favour of the respondents and therefore I am of the opinion that in this Second Appeal the Learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be permitted to agitate that question. 6. The question relating to the ownership of the Land which is purely a question of fact was also decided by the two courts below in favour of the respondents and therefore I am of the opinion that in this Second Appeal the Learned Counsel for the appellant cannot be permitted to agitate that question. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that it was only the town municipality of the Churu which could agitate the question of the removal of the Gate and not the revenue authorities because under the Bikaner State Municipal Act, 1923 the Land on which the Gate was constructed by the Plaintiff’s Father in the year 1943 was a public Street, which, by virtue of Section 51(f), vested in the Municipality and therefore the revenue authorities had no jurisdiction to ask for the demolition of the Gate and since the Municipality has not taken any action against the Plaintiff or his Father for the removal of the Gate, the Order of demolition cannot be upheld and in that event the Court’s below should have decreed the Plaintiff’s Suit regarding the issuing of a permanent injunction against the State and the revenue authorities from interfering with the right of the Plaintiff of keeping the Gate intact on the land in dispute. 7. Section 51(f) of the Bikaner State Municipal Act 1923 (Act No. VI of 1923) lays down that all public streets, land or other property transferred to the Board by his Highness Government or acquired by the Gift, purchased or otherwise for local public purposes shall vest in the Municipal Board, Mr. Mundra appearing on behalf of the Appellant could not however show that the land on which this Gate has been constructed has by any order or notification been transferred to the Board by his Highness Government. His Arguments is that this Land should be taken as a public street and as such it vested in the Municipal Board by Virtue of the provisions of Section 51(f) of Bikaner State Municipal Act. His Arguments is that this Land should be taken as a public street and as such it vested in the Municipal Board by Virtue of the provisions of Section 51(f) of Bikaner State Municipal Act. In this connection, my attention was drawn by Learned Counsel to the Plan (Ex.P-10) which shows the point ‘Ka’ where the Gate was constructed and the Land at the Point ‘Ka’ which is lying vacant is surrounded on both sides by the shops abutting on the main Bazar and behind these shops the entire building is the building owned by the Plaintiff and his other relations. From this Plan it is quite evident that the open land which is held to be the Government Land by the Two Courts below is used by the residents of the Building known as Aushdhalaya which belongs to Shant Sharma, the Father of the Plaintiff, and at the entrance, the i.e. at point ‘ka’ the Gate was constructed by Shant Sharma. Since it is not a thoroughfare which is used by the public at large and the land is exclusively used by the owners of the Building belonging to Shant sharma, it is difficult for me to accept the contentions of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that it should be taken as a public street which vested in the Municipal Board. It may also be mentioned here that this Case was never placed before the two courts below by the Plaintiff in this manner that the Land was the Public Street. On the contrary, the Plaintiff claimed this Land to be belonging to his Family. I therefore do not find any merit in this argument of the Plaintiff-Appellant’s Counsel that the Land being a public street vested in the Municipality and as such the revenue authority could not asked the plaintiff’s father to demolish the Gate which was constructed for a temporary purpose in the year 1943 when the Maharaja visited the Town. 8. I therefore do not find any merit in this argument of the Plaintiff-Appellant’s Counsel that the Land being a public street vested in the Municipality and as such the revenue authority could not asked the plaintiff’s father to demolish the Gate which was constructed for a temporary purpose in the year 1943 when the Maharaja visited the Town. 8. Learned Counsel for the Appellant next urged that the matter was finally decided by the revenue minister of the Bikaner State who refused to order for the demolition of the Gate till the question of selling the disputed land was taken up by the authority when the Sale was permitted by the State Government, this order according to learned Counsel was the final order and it could not have been taken in appeal to the revenue board of the State of Bikaner and as such the Order of demolition of Gate was without jurisdiction passed by the board of revenue. I am afraid, I cannot permit this question to be agitated before this Court in Second Appeal, especially when it was not at all urged before the first appellate court in spite of the fact that a plea was taken in the memorandum of appeal. The perusal of the judgment of the first appellate court makes it clear that only two grounds were urged before that court, namely (1) that the land on which the gate was erected belong to the Plaintiff and his family and (2) that the revenue authorities had no right to decide this matter as, according to the plaintiff, it was within the province of the Municipal Board Churu. Learned Counsel for the Appellant could not give any reason as to why appellant did not urge this ground before the first appellate Court when it was specifically raised in the memo of appeal. It will not be a sound practice if the negligent litigant is allowed to agitate a question in the second appeal for the first time if for no reason or rhyme he left to urge that ground before first appellate court even after mentioning that point in the memo of appeal as one of the grounds to be urged before that court. I, therefore do not permit Mr. Mundra to raise this point for the first time in second appeal. 9. I, therefore do not permit Mr. Mundra to raise this point for the first time in second appeal. 9. For the reasons mentioned above I do not find any life in this Appeal and it is therefore dismissed with the Cost. 10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant at the end urged to allow him under section 18(2) of the High Court ordinance to file an appeal before the Division bench. This not a fit case in which leave can be granted. This prayer is therefore rejected.