JUDGMENT This is an appeal filed by the plaintiff in Title Suit No. 3 of 1961 on the file of the Sub-Judge I, Imphal against his judgment and decree dated 22-1-1965 declaring that the appellants and the persons mentioned in the plaint A schedule, represented by the appellants under Order 1, Rule 8, Civil P. C., are the actual tenants of the plaint schedule land of about 70 paris (about 175 acres) situate in Pangei and dismissing their suit for declaration of their full title to the suit land and for the further declaration that the registered sale deed dated 10-7-1953 executed by late Chand Khan the fifth defendant in the suit in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother Santi Devi and the mutation of the suit land in their names are void. 2. The case of the appellants briefly stated is thus: When the British Government took over Manipur State after the rebellion of 1891, the former granted the plaint schedule land of about 70 Paris situate in Pangei village to one Hafiz Fateh Shah and his brother Sheriff Shah in recognition of their services rendered during the rebellion. The land was mutated in their names. Hafiz Fateh Shah and Sheriff Shah belonged to West Punjab (now in West Pakistan). They engaged the ancestors of the appellants to reclaim the suit land on condition that the suit land would revert to them and their ancestors as owners of the land, occupied by each of them, in case of relinquishment of the suit land by Hafiz brothers and their heirs. 3. The appellants ancestors reclaimed the suit land at great expense. They paid lousals (rents) upto 1947 to the original owners of the suit land. 4. Hafiz Fateh Shah died issueless many years back. Hafiz Sheriff Shah died in 1929. After their death, their heirs used to realize rents for the suit land by coming to Manipur occasionally till Pakistan was separated from India in 1947. After 1947 the heirs of Hafiz brothers, if any, took no interest in the suit land. Nor did they make any attempt to get the suit land mutated in their names or to realize rents. 5. After 1947 the heirs of Hafiz brothers, if any, took no interest in the suit land. Nor did they make any attempt to get the suit land mutated in their names or to realize rents. 5. The Manipur State Council passed a resolution No. 13 of 1949 dated 7-9-1949 to cancel the patta standing in the name of Hafiz Sheriff Shah for land in excess of 10 paris, since, according to the customary law prevailing in Manipur, no person could possess more than 10 paris of land. (Vide Ext. A/1). Notices to show cause why the patta should not be cancelled were issued to the parties concerned and the patta for the excess land was cancelled. 6. The then Chief Commissioner Shri Himmat Singh Maheswari passed an order on 2-11-1950 directing the S. D. C. to take over the excess land (Vide Ext. A/2). Under the directions of the Manipur Government, the Deputy Commissioner was taking steps for its disposal. But, in the meanwhile the third respondent Benoy Krishna Bhattacharya appeared on the scene and moved the Government for mutation of all the lands in the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother Late Shanti Devi on the plea that they had acquired the suit land in exchange of their own lands in East Pakistan with the heirs of Hafiz Sheriff Shah. But, the Government rejected his claim in mutation case No. 1049 of 1953 and this fact was communicated to the appellants under the orders of the S. D. C., I. E. T. dated 8-10-1953 in Misc. Case No. 391 of 1953. (Vide Ext. A/8). 7. But, later on the Government of Manipur changed its attitude and ordered under letter No. R/4/52 dated 24-5-1952 that it was not fair not to recognise the title of Hafiz Sheriff Shah and his heirs to the land and to confiscate it. The holders of the pattas or their legal heirs were allowed to dispose of their lands to the actual tenants. Under the said letter of the Government of Manipur the Deputy Commissioner ordered the appellants, who were the actual tenants, to pay a sum of Rs. 60,000/- towards the price of the suit land. But, as the appellants were very poor, they could not pay such a large sum. Under the said letter of the Government of Manipur the Deputy Commissioner ordered the appellants, who were the actual tenants, to pay a sum of Rs. 60,000/- towards the price of the suit land. But, as the appellants were very poor, they could not pay such a large sum. The deceased fifth defendant Chand Khan posed himself as an agent of Hafiz Sheriff and executed a registered sale deed dated 10-7-1953 for Rs. 10,000/- in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother. (Vide Ext. B/3). On the basis of the registered sale deed, the third respondent moved the Deputy Commissioner for the mutation of the suit land in the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother in mutation case No. 305 of 1954. The mutation was granted on 22-7-1954 (vide Ext. A/9). The appellants preferred C. C. Revenue Appeal case No. 74 of 1954 before the Chief Commissioner. But, it was dismissed on 27-9-1954 (vide Ext. A/10). Thereafter the appellants filed Civil Suit No. 4 of 1955 in the Court of the District Judge against the respondents 1 to 4, their mother and the fifth defendant for a declaration that the order of Manipur Government under letter No. R/4/52 dated 24-5-1952 in violation of the Council Resolution No. 13 of 7-9-1949 was null and void and that all proceedings culminating in the mutation of the pattas of Pangei lands in the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother were also void and inoperative. But, the District Judge dismissed the suit on 19-9-1956. The appellants preferred First Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1956 in this Court. This Court also ultimately dismissed the appeal on 30-8-1956. (Vide Ext. A/11). 8. Subsequently, the appellants filed an application on 19-3-1958 before the Deputy Commissioner of Manipur to cancel the mutation of the suit land in the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother and to revert the pattas in the names of Hafiz brothers on the strength of the observations made by this Court in the First Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1956. The application was forwarded to the S. D. C., I. E. T. who registered the case in petition case No. 6400 dated 27-3-1958 and dismissed it. (Vide Ext. A/12). The appellants preferred Revenue Appeal case No. 12 of 1959 in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner. The application was forwarded to the S. D. C., I. E. T. who registered the case in petition case No. 6400 dated 27-3-1958 and dismissed it. (Vide Ext. A/12). The appellants preferred Revenue Appeal case No. 12 of 1959 in the Court of the Deputy Commissioner. It was transferred to the Additional Deputy Commissioner, who dismissed the appeal (vide Ext. A/13). The appellants preferred C. C. Revenue Appeal case No. 30 of 1959 in the Court of the Chief Commissioner, Manipur. But, he too dismissed it on 25-9-1959 (vide Ext. A/14). 9. The deceased fifth defendant had no right to sell the suit land to the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother. The latter were never in possession and enjoyment of the same. But, the appellants have always been in possession and enjoyment of the suit land as tenants of Hafiz brothers. The heirs of late Hafiz Sheriff Shah took no interest in the suit land for over 12 years, after the partition of India and Pakistan was completed by 1948. They relinquished the suit land from the beginning of 1961. According to the terms of the reclamation of the suit land, the appellants have now become the owners of the same. 10. So, the appellants filed the suit in the lower Court (i) praying that the appellants should be allowed to sue as representatives of the villagers of Pangei mentioned in Schedule A, (ii) for declaration that the appellants have title to the suit land as it was relinquished by the heirs of Hafiz Sheriff Shah and (iii) for declaration that the sale of the suit land by the fifth defendant Chand Khan to the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother and its mutation in their names by the Deputy Commissioner on 22-7-1954 in mutation case No. 305 of 1954 are void. 11. The respondents 1 to 4 filed written statement denying the plaint allegations. Their main contentions are, firstly, that late Chand Khan was the power-of-attorney holder of the heirs of late Hafiz Sheriff Shah, secondly that the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother exchanged their properties in East Pakistan with the heirs of late Hafiz Sheriff Shah for the suit land and other properties and obtained a registered sale deed for the suit land from the power of attorney holder viz. 5th defendant, thirdly, that the plaint allegation that there was relinquishment of the suit land by the heirs of Sheriff Shah is not true, fourthly that the appellants have no right to get the suit land mutated in their names, and fifthly that, in any event, the present suit is barred by constructive res judicata under Section 11, Civil P. C. and also by O. 23, R. 1(3), Civil P. C. as the appellants had previously filed Title Suit No. 2 of 1960 and withdrew the same without obtaining the orders of the Sub-Judge for filing a fresh suit. 12. On the above pleadings the lower Court framed the necessary issues and gave inconclusive findings by holding that it was not possible to state whether the heirs of Hafiz Sheriff Shah relinquished their right to the suit land in favour of the appellants or not, that it was not possible to decide whether the appellants have got any cause of action and that it was not possible to declare the mutation of the suit land in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother as void. But ultimately the Sub-Judge held that the appellants are entitled to an equitable relief that they are the tenants of the suit land to whom the heirs of Hafiz Sheriff Shah were permitted by the Manipur Government to sell the land. So, he granted a declaration to that extent and dismissed the suit regarding the other reliefs claimed by the appellants. Hence the present appeal. 13. Before formulating the points, which were argued and which arise for determination, it is necessary to refer to the plaint allegations and the judgment of this Court dated 30-8-1956 in the previous First Civil Appeal case No. 21 of 1956 filed by the appellants against the iudgment of the District Judge in Civil Suit No. 4 of 1955 which was dismissed by him. Ext. A/11 is a certified copy of the judgment of this Court. The same was reported in Nar Bahadur Gurung v. Anil Krishna Bhattacharya, AIR 1957 Manipur 25 . The pleadings of both the parties in the above case and in the present case with reference to the facts of the two cases, leading upto the year 1954, are the same. A/11 is a certified copy of the judgment of this Court. The same was reported in Nar Bahadur Gurung v. Anil Krishna Bhattacharya, AIR 1957 Manipur 25 . The pleadings of both the parties in the above case and in the present case with reference to the facts of the two cases, leading upto the year 1954, are the same. The appellants claimed the following main reliefs: "(a) a declaration that the sale transaction of the suit land between Chand Khan and the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother on the strength of a power-of-attorney, which had not been duly proved, was a fraudulent one and that as such it was invalid and inoperative, and (b) a declaration that the order of the Government of Manipur contained in letter No. R/4/52 dated 24-5-52 setting aside the Council Resolution No. 13 dated 7-9-49 was null and void and that all proceedings culminating in the mutation of the pattas of Pangei land in the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother were void and inoperative." This Court gave the following findings: (i) Firstly, there was no proof that there was a customary law in Manipur, at the time of the grant made to Hafiz and his brother, that nobody should hold land more than 10 paris in extent. Even if there was such a customary law, the Government could grant more than 10 Paris in extent. So, resolution No. 13 dated 7-9-49 based on the customary law could not be said to be ultra vires of the Constitution of India. (ii) Secondly, the succeeding Government of Manipur was not bound to confiscate the suit land. (iii) Thirdly, under Rule 15 in Chapter I of Part II of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation (1 of 1886) the appellants, who were in possession of the suit land, had merely a chance of obtaining a settlement of the same. But, they had no right to claim the settlement. (iv) Fourthly, the alleged power-of-attorney authorising the fifth defendant Chand Khan to sell the suit land to the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother was neither produced nor proved. So, he was not competent to sell the suit land to them. As such, the alleged sale of the suit land to the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother was void. So, he was not competent to sell the suit land to them. As such, the alleged sale of the suit land to the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother was void. (v) Lastly, under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, one cannot claim any and every kind of declaration, which one likes. It must be shown that ones legal character or right to any property is denied or is in danger of being denied. Simply because it was found that the respondents did not get valid title to the suit land, it did not mean that the mutation of the suit land in their names should be set aside. For, if the respondents filed any suit to evict the appellants or to recover any rent from them, the appellants could show that the respondents had no title to the suit land and that they were not their landlords. But, this did not entitle them to bring a suit for declaration in respect of the title of the landlords. Denial of the right of the respondents could not affirm any right of the appellants. Nor did the right claimed by the respondents imply a denial of any right of the appellants. So, the appellants were not entitled to any declaration that the alleged sale deed obtained by the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother was void or that the mutation of the suit land in their names was void." 14. The points, which were argued in, the present appeal and which arise for determination are: (i) Whether the claim of the appellants, that they acquired title to the suit land on account of its alleged relinquishment by the heirs of Hafiz Sheriff Shah is true and is barred by the provisions of Section 11 and Order XXIII, Rule 1, sub-rule (3) C.P.C.? (ii) Whether the claim of the appellants that they perfected their title to the suit land by adverse possession is true and valid? (iii) Whether the registered sale deed dated 10-7-1953 executed by the deceased fifth defendant in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother is true and valid? (ii) Whether the claim of the appellants that they perfected their title to the suit land by adverse possession is true and valid? (iii) Whether the registered sale deed dated 10-7-1953 executed by the deceased fifth defendant in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother is true and valid? (iv) Whether the mutation of the suit-land in the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother effected by the orders of the Deputy Commissioner dated 22-7-54 in mutation case No. 305 of 1954 is liable to be set aside and whether the names of the appellants have to be mutated in their place? (v) To what relief are the parties entitled? 15. POINT (I):- There is no evidence to prove the appellants case regarding the terms of reclamation of suit land. A perusal of the present plaint filed by the appellants goes to show that they do not know who the heirs of Hafiz brothers were. Throughout they alleged that the heirs of Hafiz brothers, if any, did not take interest in the suit land after the partition of India, which took place in 1947. Even P.W. 2 (Nur Bahadur Gurung) deposed in his evidence that he did not know who the heirs of Hafiz brothers are. So, it is difficult to believe his further evidence that one of the heirs of Hafiz brothers came to Imphal and gathered all the tenants round him and told that the heirs had no interest in the suit land. 16. Besides, this plea is barred, firstly, by constructive res judicata and secondly, by the provisions of Order XXIII, R. 1, sub-rule (3) C.P.C. It is the case of the appellants that the original pattadars Hafiz Fateh Shah and Hafiz Sheriff Shah told the ancestors of the appellants, who were asked to reclaim the land, that the lands would revert to them as owners, in case the suit land was relinquished by Hafiz brothers or their heirs. Vide para 3 of the plaint. But, this case was not set up in the previous Civil Suit No. 4 of 1955. No doubt neither party produced a certified copy of the plaint in Civil Suit No. 4 of 1955. This Court observed in its judgment in First Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1956 that the plaint was very meagre, that it lacked in details and that it was incomplete and defective. No doubt neither party produced a certified copy of the plaint in Civil Suit No. 4 of 1955. This Court observed in its judgment in First Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1956 that the plaint was very meagre, that it lacked in details and that it was incomplete and defective. So, this Court reproduced in its Judgment elaborately all the facts of the case, which were not only pleaded by both the sides, but, also, which were apparent in the suit. Paragraphs 1 to 13 in the judgment of this Court contain the pleadings and the facts of the case. But, the present plea that there was an agreement between the appellants ancestors and Hafiz brothers that the suit land would revert to the appellants or their ancestors, in case it was relinquished by the original pattadars namely, Hafiz brothers or then heirs, was not set up. In the previous Civil Suit No. 4 of 1955 the appellants alleged that the suit land reverted to the Government and that they were entitled to settlement from the Government. So, they should have set up the present plea also in their plaint. Explanation IV to Section 11 C.P.C. lays down that any matter, which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in the former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. The illustrations 1 and 4 at page 63 of Volume I C.P.C. by Mulla, 13th edition also clearly bring out the proposition that a ground of attack, which should have been taken in the prior suit but not taken, is barred by constructive res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties. Vide also in this regard Allunni v. Kunjusha, ILR 7 Mad 264, Devendranath v. Nagendranath, ILR 60 Cal 1158 : (AIR 1933 Cal 900), Raja Chattar Singh v. Roshan Singh, AIR 1946 Nag 277 and Jawaharlal v. Chhaganlal, AIR 1959 Raj 197 . So, the present plea is barred by constructive res judicata. 17. Vide also in this regard Allunni v. Kunjusha, ILR 7 Mad 264, Devendranath v. Nagendranath, ILR 60 Cal 1158 : (AIR 1933 Cal 900), Raja Chattar Singh v. Roshan Singh, AIR 1946 Nag 277 and Jawaharlal v. Chhaganlal, AIR 1959 Raj 197 . So, the present plea is barred by constructive res judicata. 17. Also, it may be noted that after the disposal of the First Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1956 on 30-8-1956 the appellants had filed Title Suit No. 2 of 1960 on the file of the lower Court for the same relief, namely, for declaration that the mutation of the suit land in the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother was void. Ext. B-12 is a certified copy of the plaint therein. They alleged therein that they were tenants of Hafiz Sheriff Shah and his heirs. But they subsequently filed a petition under Order VI, Rule 17 C.P.C. to permit them to make amendments in the plaint to show that they were not "tenants", but that they became "owners" on account of verbal contract between the ancestors of the appellants and Hafiz brothers that the appellants ancestors and the appellants should become owners on relinquishment of the suit land by Hafiz brothers or their heirs. Ext. B-11 is a certified copy of that petition. But, the petition was dismissed. Later on, they filed a petition under Order XXIII, Rule 1 C.P.C. to permit them to withdraw the same. But, the lower Court passed an order (vide Ext. B-10 dated 22-9-60) that permission could not be granted and the Court "struck off" the plaint. Ext. B-11 is a certified copy of that petition. But, the petition was dismissed. Later on, they filed a petition under Order XXIII, Rule 1 C.P.C. to permit them to withdraw the same. But, the lower Court passed an order (vide Ext. B-10 dated 22-9-60) that permission could not be granted and the Court "struck off" the plaint. So, the present suit for the same claim is barred by sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XXIII C.P.C. which runs as follows:- "Where the plaintiff withdraws from a suit, or abandons part of a claim, without the permission referred to in sub-rule (2), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim." At page 1287 of Volume II of Mullas C.P.C., 13th edition it is stated that if the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second must be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first one. The expression "subject-matter" means a series of acts or transactions, alleged to exist, giving rise to the relief claimed. In the State of Madras v. C. P. Agencies, AIR 1960 SC 1309 it was held that the expression "cause of action" refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the Court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour. Inasmuch as no permission was obtained by the appellants to withdraw the previous suit based on the same cause of action and on the same subject-matter of the suit, they could not file the present suit based on the same cause of action and subject-matter of suit viz., relinquishment by the Hafiz brothers. For the above reasons I find point (i) against the appellants. 18. POINT (II):- The plea of the appellants raised by this point is a new one. In the plaint there is no plea that the appellants perfected their title to the suit land by adverse possession. Their main plea was that they got title to the suit land by virtue of its relinquishment by the owners and their heirs. 18. POINT (II):- The plea of the appellants raised by this point is a new one. In the plaint there is no plea that the appellants perfected their title to the suit land by adverse possession. Their main plea was that they got title to the suit land by virtue of its relinquishment by the owners and their heirs. They proceeded on the footing that they continued to be as tenants of Hafiz brothers and their heirs. In para 15 of their plaint they stated that they applied on 19-3-1958 for cancellation of mutation of the suit land in the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother and to mutate the same in the names of the original pattadars viz., Hafiz brothers. In paragraph 22 of their plaint they stated that the cause of action for the suit arose in the beginning of 1961, when the heirs of Hafiz Sheriff Shah relinquished the suit land by taking no interest in it for 12 years from 1947. The suit was filed in 1961. The date of cause of action was mentioned for the purpose of relinquishment and not for adverse possession. 19. It may be noted that in 1950 and 1951 the Government took over the suit land and collected rents from the appellants and paid them to the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants were forced by the Government to pay the rents and that, therefore, the payment of the same does not interrupt the running of the period of adverse possession of the suit land. But, the appellants should have resisted and withheld payment of the rents. So, the fact that they paid rents, through the Government, does not stop the running of the period of limitation. 20. Besides, in view of averments of the appellants in their plaint that they continued to be as tenants of Hafiz brothers and their heirs, mere non-payment of the rent for a number of years does not create any title in the appellants. Vide Tiruchurna Perumal v. Sangavien, (1881) ILR 3 Mad 118, Rungo Lall Mundul v. Abdul Guffoor, (1879) ILR 4 Cal 314, Poresh Narain Roy v. Kassi Chunder Talukdar, (1879) ILR 4 Cal 661 and Tatia v. Sadashiv, (1883) 7 Bom 40. Vide Tiruchurna Perumal v. Sangavien, (1881) ILR 3 Mad 118, Rungo Lall Mundul v. Abdul Guffoor, (1879) ILR 4 Cal 314, Poresh Narain Roy v. Kassi Chunder Talukdar, (1879) ILR 4 Cal 661 and Tatia v. Sadashiv, (1883) 7 Bom 40. Also the appellants must show by their conduct that they gave up the tenancy, that they denied the title of the heirs of Hafiz brothers and that they openly enjoyed the land in their own rights and not as their tenants. But, there is no such proof. Vide (1881) ILR 3 Mad 118, Tarini Mohun Mozumdar v. Gunga Prosad Chukerbutty, (1887) ILR 14 Cal 649, Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, AIR 1915 PC 96, Bhaiganti v. Himmat, AIR 1917 Cal 498, Gopal Chandra Das v. Satya Bhanu Ghoshal, AIR 1926 Cal 634 and Sidik Haji Yacub v. Mahomed Faruk, AIR 1926 Sind 71. I find point (ii) in the negative. 21. POINTS (III) AND (IV):- These two points are connected. These points were already decided by this Court in the First Civil Appeal No. 21 of 1956 on 30-8-1956. This Court held in para 31 of the judgment that the alleged power-of-attorney, said to have been executed by the heirs of Hafiz brothers authorising him to sell the suit land to the respondents, was neither produced nor proved and that, therefore, he was not competent to sell the land to them. But, after the disposal of the above appeal, the respondents 1 to 4 produced in the lower Court in the present suit Exts. B-15 and B-16 certified copies of powers-of-attorney. Ext. B-15 is a certified copy of special power-of-attorney dated 23-2-1952 executed by the heirs of Sheriff Shah in favour of the third respondent stating that the heirs entered into a contract with the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother for exchange of their properties and authorised the third respondent to manage the suit land etc. Ext. B-16 is a certified copy of general power-of-attorney dated 3-3-52 said to have been executed by the same heirs in favour of the third respondent to collect rents and manage the suit land. They show that the powers-of-attorney were registered by the Sub-Registrar of Sargodha in Punjab in West Pakistan and that certified copies of the same were attested by the First Secretary of the High Commission of India in Karachi on 4-8-1960. The respondents also produced Ext. They show that the powers-of-attorney were registered by the Sub-Registrar of Sargodha in Punjab in West Pakistan and that certified copies of the same were attested by the First Secretary of the High Commission of India in Karachi on 4-8-1960. The respondents also produced Ext. B-4 another certified copy of the special power-of-attorney executed by the heirs of Sheriff Shah in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 on 3-3-52. Neither they nor the original powers of attorney were produced before the disposal of the First Civil Appeal 21 of 1956. The production of certified copies does not improve the matter. Under Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court shall presume that every document purporting to be a power-of-attorney, and to have been executed before and authenticated by a notary public or any Court, Judge, Magistrate, Indian Consul or Vice-Counsel, or representative of the Central Government was so executed and authenticated. But, Exts. B-4, B-15 and B-16 do not show that they were so executed and authenticated. They simply show that they were registered by the Sub-Registrar in Sargodha of Punjab in West Pakistan. The originals were not produced and no presumption of their genuineness under Section 85 of the Indian Evidence Act can be drawn. Vide D. Sardar Singh v. Pissumal Harbhagwandas Bankers, AIR 1958 Andh Pra 107. The statements in powers-of-attorney have to be proved like any other statements. Vide Siva Pratap Bhattadu v. Commr. of Income-Tax, Madras, AIR 1924 Mad 880 and Salimatul Fatima v. Kovleshpoti Narain Singh, (1890) ILR 17 Cal 903. So, the finding of this Court in Civil First Appeal 21 of 1956 that the deceased fifth defendant had no authority to execute the sale deed in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother and that the same relied on by the latter has no legal effect still holds good. 22. The appellants contention that the mutation of the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother made in mutation case No. 305 of 1954 on 22-7-54 was also negatived by this Court in First Civil Appeal 21 of 1956. So, this contention of the appellants also fails. 23. 22. The appellants contention that the mutation of the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother made in mutation case No. 305 of 1954 on 22-7-54 was also negatived by this Court in First Civil Appeal 21 of 1956. So, this contention of the appellants also fails. 23. After the first Appeal 21 of 1956 was disposed of, the only fresh events which came into existence are that the appellants filed a case No. 6400 before the Sub-Deputy Collector, Imphal East, for mutation of their names on 27-9-1958. Ext. A-12, certified copy of his order, shows that he dismissed this petition on 16-1-59 on the ground that the judgment of this Court in First Civil Appeal 21 of 1956 negatived their claim to mutation. The appellants filed an appeal before the Additional Deputy Commissioner in Revenue Appeal 12 of 1959. But, it was dismissed on 13-4-59. Vide Ext. A-13. Ext. A-14 shows that their further appeal before the Chief Commissioner in C. C. Revenue Appeal No. 30 of 1959 was dismissed on 25-9-59. 24. The appellants learned counsel argued that as against their names in the revenue records as tenants of suit land, the names of the respondents 1 to 4 and their mother were mutated to show that the latter were the landlords, that their right was affected and that, therefore, they are entitled to a declaration that the mutation of the respondents names is void. He relied on the passage at page 4447, Volume V of Fields Evidence Act 1967 Edition in support of his contention regarding the declaratory relief. S. 34 of the Specific Relief Act (Act 47 of 1963) corresponds to Section 42 of the previous Act. The new Section 34 reproduces the old section. But the illustrations to the old section were dropped. So, the scope of both the sections is the same. The appellants are entitled to their legal character that they are the tenants of Hafiz brothers and their heirs. The lower Court granted a declaration to that extent. As rightly pointed out by this Court in First Civil Appeal 21 of 1956, the wrong mutation of the suit land in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 does not in any way affect the legal character of the appellants right to the suit land. The lower Court granted a declaration to that extent. As rightly pointed out by this Court in First Civil Appeal 21 of 1956, the wrong mutation of the suit land in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 does not in any way affect the legal character of the appellants right to the suit land. It does not come into conflict with their tenancy rights, as mutation in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 does not amount to Appellant denial of their tenancy. When the respondents file any suit for their eviction from the suit land, the appellants can show that they are not the landlords. The same reasoning adopted by this. Court still holds good. In fact, the contentions of the appellants are also barred by res judicata, inasmuch as they were the same in the previous First Appeal, which negatived the same. 25. The present suit is nothing but a fresh one in a new garble without any fresh cause of action or subject-matter of suit. I find the points (iii) and (iv). against the appellants. 26. POINT (V):- In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.