NAEAYANA PAI, J. ( 1 ) MESSRS. New India Corporation named as the petitioner in these four writ Petitions, appears to be the trade name or the name and style under which the deponent of the affidavit V. V. Iyer, is trading. According to the affidavit, except for some period between 1954 and 1958, during which there were others trading with him in partnership, for the rest oi the period, he was trading alone as sole proprietor of the trade and business. ( 2 ) THESE four Writ Petitions are occasioned by the four notices served on the petitioners by the Director of Enforcement Directorate, Ministry of eefence, Government of India, calling upon the petitioner to show cause why adjudication proceedings as contemplated by S. 23-D of the Foreign exchange Regulation Act, 1947, should not be instituted against him for or in respect of four alleged contraventions by him of specified provisions of the said Act, Ss. 4 (1), 5 (1) (a), 5 (1) (d) and 9. The petitioner has presented these petitions almost immediately after the service of the said notices and he prays in each case for the issue of a writ of prohibition, prohibiting the Director of Enforcement impleaded as the 1st respondent from initiating adjudication proceedings against him. ( 3 ) IN support of the prayer, the principal contention raised Is that ss. 23 and 23-D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act are invalid as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is on this basis that it is contended that the proposed adjudication proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction and should not therefore be permitted to be even initiated. As the validity of the statute itself is questioned the Union of India has been impleaded as the 2nd respondent. ( 4 ) SO far as the merits of the case stated in the several notices are concerned, nothing is stated except that the alleged contraventions are said to have taken place several years ago and that to ask the petitioner to search for papers relating to a few of the several transactions he had entered into years ago would, in effect, result in extreme harassment to the petitioner. ( 5 ) IN the common counter-affidavit filed on behlf of the respondents, it is stated that the plea of invalidity of Ss. ( 5 ) IN the common counter-affidavit filed on behlf of the respondents, it is stated that the plea of invalidity of Ss. 23 and 23-D of the Act raised by the petitioner is no longer available, the Supreme Court having upheld their validity in the case in Shanti Prasad Jain v. Director of Enforcement air. 1962 SC. 1964. reiterated by the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in The union of India v. Sukumar Pyne AIR. 1966 SC. 1206. Regarding the plea of alleged harassment, it is stated in the counter-affidavit that in the circumstances such a plea is not available and that in any event, the Directorate will furnish the petitioner with whatever clarification he may require to enable him to defend himself in the adjudication proceedings. ( 6 ) THE only question for consideration is the alleged invalidity of ss. 23 and 23-D of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act. ( 7 ) BRIEFLY stated, the case of the petitioner is that the impugned sections provide for two different procedures to punish the alleged contraventions of the provisions of the statute,-one under the normal Code of criminal Procedure and the other by way of adjudication by the Director of Enforcement in accordance with the special rules prescribed therefor, that the Director of Enforcement is the common authority both for the purpose of initiating adjudication proceedings under S. 23-D and regular prosecution pursuant to sub-section (3) of S. 23, and that the statute is utterly devoid of any guidance to the Director in the matter of making a choice between the two procedures. This situation, according to the argument on behalf of the petitioner, is one which comes directly within the principles stated by the Supreme Court in the case of The State of West bengal v. Anwar Ali AIR. 1952 SC. This situation, according to the argument on behalf of the petitioner, is one which comes directly within the principles stated by the Supreme Court in the case of The State of West bengal v. Anwar Ali AIR. 1952 SC. 75, ( 8 ) PORTIONS of S. 23 which are relevant to the argument are: "23 (1) If any person contravenes the provision of section 4, section 5, section 9, section 10, sub-section (2) of section 12, section 17, section 18-A or section 18-B or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, he shall-" (a) be liable to such penalty not exceeding three times the value of the xoreign exchange in respect of which the contravention has taken place, or five thousand rupees, whichever is more, as may be adjudged by the Director of Enforcement in me manner heremaiter provided, or (b) upon conviction by a Court, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fane, or with both. "23 (3) No court shall take cognizance- (a) of any offence punishable under sub-section (1) except upon complaint in writing made by the Director of Entorcement, provided that where any such offence is the contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule, direction or order made thereunder which prohibits the doing of an act without permission, no such complaint shall be made unless the person accused of the ottence has been given an opportunity of snowing that he had such permission. S. 23-D (1) which is relevant to the argument reads:-"23-D (1 ). For the purpose of adjudging under clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 23 whether any person has committed a contravention, the director of Eniorcement snail hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner after giving that person a reasonable opportunity of being heard and if, on such inquiry, he is satisfied that tne person has committed the contravention, he may impose such penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of tne said section 23: provided that if, at any stage of the inquiry the Director of enforcement is of opinion that having regard to the circumstances of the case, the penalty which he is empowered to impose would not be adequate, he shall, instead of imposing any penalty himself, make a complaint in writing to the court. " ( 9 ) THE manner in which adjudication proceedings under S. 23-D should be held is prescribed under what are called the Adjudication Proceeding and appeal Rules, 1957. Among other things, the rules provide that in taking evidence the Director is not bound to observe the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The rules also provide for regulation of the procedure of the appellate Board constituted under S. 23-E. They conclude with savings to the effect-"rule 12. Savings-Nothing in these rules shall be considered as preventing the Director from making a complaint in writing to the court under the proviso to sub-section (1) of S. 23-D of the Act instead of imposing any penalty himself. " ( 10 ) THE argument, is, first that sub-section (1) of S. 23 itself enables recourse being had to one of the two different procedures; second, that the choice between the two has to be made at the very inception when the director of Enforcement considers that there is a contravention of any of the provisions of the statute mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of S. 23, calling for action being taken, third that a complaint by the Director of Enforcement under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of S. 23 is quite different from a complaint which he may make under the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 23d. and that the two are different is obvious from the fact that a complaint under Section 23 (3) (a) has in certain cases necessarily to be preceded by the previous opportunity mentioned in the proviso to S. 23 (3 ). ( 11 ) WE may at once state that it is not the contention that if S. 23d (1) alone is taken into account, there is anything in it to render it invalid as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Indeed, no such contention can at all be raised in view of the express decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Prasad Jain (1 ). In paragraph 7 of the judgment which occurs at page 1768 of the report, their Lordships state :" It is not disputed by the appellant that the subject matter of the legislation, viz. , Foreign Exchange, has features and problems peculiarly its own, and that it forms a class in itself. In paragraph 7 of the judgment which occurs at page 1768 of the report, their Lordships state :" It is not disputed by the appellant that the subject matter of the legislation, viz. , Foreign Exchange, has features and problems peculiarly its own, and that it forms a class in itself. A law which prescribes a special procedure for investigation of breaches of foreign exchange regulations will therefore be not hit by Art. 14 as it is based on a classification which has a just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. The vires of S. 23 (1) (a) is accordingly not open to attack on the ground that it is governed by a procedure different from that prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure. That indeed is not controverted by the appellant. That being so, does it make any difference in the legal position that S. 23d provides for transfer by the Director of Enforcement of cases which he can try, to the Court ? We have not here, as in State of West Bengal v. Anwar ali (1952 SCR. 284) a law, which confers on an officer an absolute diseretion to send a case for trial either to a Court or a Magistrate empowered to try cases under a special procedure. S. 23d confers authority on the very officer who has power to try and dispose of a case to send it on for trial to a Court, and that too only when he considers that a more severe punishment than what he is authorised to impose, should be awarded. In a Judicial system, in which there is a hierarchy of Courts or Tribunals presided over by Magistrates or officers belonging to different classes, and there is a devolution of powers among them graded according to their class, a provision such as S. 23d is necessarv for proper administration of justice. While on the one hand a serious offence should not go without being adequately punished by reason of cognisance thereof having been taken by an inferior authority, the accused should on the other hand have in such cases the benefit of a trial by a superior Court. That is the principle underlying S. 349 of the Crl. While on the one hand a serious offence should not go without being adequately punished by reason of cognisance thereof having been taken by an inferior authority, the accused should on the other hand have in such cases the benefit of a trial by a superior Court. That is the principle underlying S. 349 of the Crl. P. C. , under which Magistrates of the second and third class, are empowered to send the cases for trial to the district Magistrate or sub-divisional Magistrate, when they consider that a more severe punishment than thev can inflict is called for. In our view the power conferred on the Director of Enforcement under s. 23d to transfer cases to a Court is not unguided or arbitrary, and does not offend Article 14, and Sec. 23 (1) (a) cannot be assailed as unconstitutional. "this paragraph, Mr. Venkatesh Iyer for the petitioner says, confines its attention to the position as under S. 23d. In the siuation contemplated by s. 23d, he concedes as he has to, the proviso to the sub-sec. (1) thereof contains the clearest guidance to the Director of Enforcement in making the choice between continuing his adjudication proceedings to their conclusion or sending the case to a Magistrate by means of a complaint. The distinction however, which he wants to make is that the complaint referred to in the proviso to S. 23d (1) is quite different from the complaint under the proviso to Section 23 (3) (a ). ( 12 ) IT seems to us that even this argument has been made unavailable by the same ruling of the Supreme Court. In the immediately preceding para 6 of the same page 1768, their Lordships observe :"it will be seen that when there is a contravention of S. 4 (1), action with respect to it is to be taken in the first instance by the director of Enforcement. He may either adjudge the matter himself in accordance with S. 23 (1) (a), or he may send it on to a Court if he considers that a more severe penalty than he can impose is called for. "this observation, in our opinion, clearly means that in every case, the first step that the Director of Enforcement is required by the statute to take is to institute adjudication proceedings. "this observation, in our opinion, clearly means that in every case, the first step that the Director of Enforcement is required by the statute to take is to institute adjudication proceedings. He is empowered or authorised by the statute to make a complaint to the Magistate functioning under the Code of Criminal Procedure, only if he considers that a more severe penalty than he can impose is called for, and such an opinion he can entertain according to the express provision contained in the statute, only when the stage in the adjudication proceedings referred to in the proviso to S. 23d (1) is reached. If the only officer on a complaint by whom alone a Criminal Court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under sub-sec. (1) of S. 23 is the Director of Enforcement and if the said officer is empowered to make such a complaint only if he considers that his own powers of punishment are inadequate to meet the situation or the gravity of the offence, and the statute makes provision for the manner in which he can come to entertain such an opinion, then, there can be no doubt whatever that the first step which the Director of Enforcement is required by the statute to take is to institute adjudication proceedings under S. 23d. The fact that the proviso to S. 23 (3) provides for a further safeguard before a complaint is made does not mean that the said safeguard dispenses with the safeguard of an initial adjudication provided under S. 23d (1 ). Indeed, the opportunity contemplated by the proviso to s. 23 (3) need not necessarily be afforded by means of the issue of a notice, but can also be afforded in the course of an adjudication under S. 23d (1 ). ( 13 ) IT is also not correct, in our opinion to say that S. 23 (1) by itself provides for two procedures. That section merely formulates and imposes penalties in respect of offences mentioned therein. In other words, the contraventions of sections specified therein are made punishable offences by it. ( 13 ) IT is also not correct, in our opinion to say that S. 23 (1) by itself provides for two procedures. That section merely formulates and imposes penalties in respect of offences mentioned therein. In other words, the contraventions of sections specified therein are made punishable offences by it. That the said sub-section does not provide for a minimum sentence in the case of an adjudication by the Director while providing for a maximum sentence in the case of a prosecution before a Magistrate is the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Durga prasad (2 ). The said case followed and applied the previous decision in the case of Shanti Prasad Join (1 ). ( 14 ) WE are therefore, of the opinion that the contentions now raised by the petitioner are fully concluded against him by the said two rulings of the Supreme Court. ( 15 ) ALL the four writ petitions are thereforre dismissed. The petitioner will pav the costs of the respondents-one set, which we fix at a lumpsum of Rs. 200. 00. --- *** --- .