JUDGMENT : G.K. Misra, J. - The Appellant has been convicted u/s 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life. 2. The Appellant was the Husband of the deceased. The prosecution case is that he killed the deceased during night of 13-2-1967. The defence is one of denial. The learned Sessions Judge held that the death was homicidal and that the accused killed the deceased. 3. Mr. Sahu does not assail the finding that the death was homicidal. The Doctor (p.w. 8) on post mortem examination found 2 incised wounds-one on the neck and the other on the face. Both the injuries were ante-mortem. Injury No. 1 was definitely fatal and death would have been instantaneous. We have therefore no doubt that the death was homicidal. 4. The only question far consideration is whether the accused killed the deceased. There are no eye-witnesses to the occurrence. The learned Sessions Judge based the conviction of the accused on the extra judicial confession and other circumstantial evidence. He also relied an the judicial confession (Ext. 12) and statement of the accused in the committing Court. We do not place any reliance an the judicial confession as sufficient time was not given to the accused far cool reflection. We also do not place any reliance an the statement of the accused in the committing Court which was to the effect. 'She was wayward and disobedient to my order and when I protested against her action she came to beat me. So I killed her'. The confession, so made, cannot be accepted in part. If at an it is to be taken into consideration, the whale must be taken into consideration. We accordingly do not place reliance on the statement in the committing Court as amounting to a confession. 5. The accused made an extra judicial confession before his mother (p.w. 1), his maternal uncle (p.w. 2) and two bead men of the village (p.ws. 3 and 4). The substance of the extra judicial confession, as gathered from the evidence af p.w. 1, runs thus: The accused replied that his wife had gone same where in the night. When she returned be asked her where she had been. As she replied that it was none of his concern he became angry and struck his wife. This is what the accused said. When she returned be asked her where she had been. As she replied that it was none of his concern he became angry and struck his wife. This is what the accused said. The accused said that with the big Tangia i.e. M.O. II be struck at the neck of the deceased and with the small Tangia M.O. I he struck at the face at the deceased. The other witnesses p.ws. 2 to 4 make substantially similar statements. This extra-judicial confession has been retracted. The anus is therefore an the prosecution to prove that the extra-judicial confession was voluntary and true. That the extra-judicial confession is voluntary is clear from the evidence of the mother (p.w. 1) herself. She says that no pressure was put on the accused when be made the confession. The headmen did not terrorize or threaten the accused. In his statement u/s 342, Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused admits to have made such an extra judicial confession. He however took the plea that being threatened of assault by the police he made the extra-judicial confession. This part of the defence plea has not been proved by the accused. Clearly this is also fantastic as the confession was made in the morning after the night of murder while the police came to the village 2 days after. We have therefore absolutely no doubt in our mind that the extra-judicial confession is voluntary. As the confession has been retracted, it requises general corroboration even though in this case there is corroboration in material particulars. The confessional statement says that the accused gave two strokes with two Tangias. The medical evidence corroborates that this version inasmuch as there are two injuries-one at the neck and the other on the face, exactly as narrated in the confessional statement. The evidence of the mother that during the night the accused and the deceased slept together in the adjacent room and the presence of the two Tangias inside the room corroborate the complicity of the accused in the crime. We accordingly hold that the extra judicial confession is also true. Law is well settled that if the confession is voluntary and true, a conviction can be based thereupon. 6. Apart from the extra-judicial confession, the circumstances of the case clearly point out that the accused must have been the murderer and nobody else. We accordingly hold that the extra judicial confession is also true. Law is well settled that if the confession is voluntary and true, a conviction can be based thereupon. 6. Apart from the extra-judicial confession, the circumstances of the case clearly point out that the accused must have been the murderer and nobody else. As is found out from the evidence of p.w. 1 in the evening, the accused and the deceased bad a quarrel as the accused told the deceased that she was not free to go anywhere she liked. The deceased retaliated and struck the accused with her bangles. Out of anger the accused had left the house to the place at a distance of half a mile where be was tying the cows of p.w. 2. The evidence of P.W. 1 shows that both the accused and the deceased slept together. In the early morning the accused left the house for the place, where the cows were tied, without intimating anybody about the death of the deceased. There can hardly be any doubt that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused inside the bed room. It is difficult to visualize that somebody else entered the room after the accused left the house early morning to the place where the cows had been tied. 7. Thus both on the extra-judicial confession and on the circumstantial evidence, we hold that it is the accused who killed his wife. 8. Mr. Sahu next contended that in the facts and circumstances of this case the offence would be one u/s 304, Indian Penal Code. He places reliance on Exception 1 to Section 300, Indian Penal Code which runs thus: Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control, by grave J and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The provisos are not relevant here. It would be noticed that the word 'provocation' is qualified by two adjectives, namely, 'grave' and 'sudden'. Mere grave provocation would not be enough, nor mere sudden provocation. The provocation must be both grave and sudden. It has been repeatedly held that the test must always be applied in relation to an ordinary man of the particular society in which be lives. Mere grave provocation would not be enough, nor mere sudden provocation. The provocation must be both grave and sudden. It has been repeatedly held that the test must always be applied in relation to an ordinary man of the particular society in which be lives. Here the accused is an aborigin who is easily inflammable. That is a fact which we keep in view. On the other hand, we cannot also overlook the fact in the aborigin society the women very free. They do not observe the restrictions customary among higher classes, in moving about. Here the evening incident did not arouse grave and sudden provocation in the accused. The murder took place about 3 to 4 hours after that incident. On the basis of the statement in the extra-judicial confession, all that we notice is that the deceased replied that it was none of the concern of the accused to question why she had gone out during night. In the society, to which the accused and the deceased belong, the females are very free, and at any rate such an answer from a wife would not create a reaction in the ordinary person in that society so as to lead to grave and sudden provocation. If at all, the accused must have carried the grudge arising out of the evening incident. In such a case the provocation would not be grave and sudden, but would be the outcome of premeditation and calculation. The law on the point has been clearly laid down in M.K. Nanavati v. State. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on the point. We reject the contention that the offence is one u/s 304, Indian Penal Code. 9. The appeal has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed. Ray, J. 10. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed