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1969 DIGILAW 100 (KER)

PARAMESWARAN PILLAI NEELAKANTA PILLAI v. KESAVAN NAIR GOPALAKRISHNAN NAIR

1969-06-02

M.MADHAVAN NAIR

body1969
Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the 3rd defendant-judgment-debtor against whom the suit has been decreed on July 9,1959. There was no appeal against that decree which has therefore become final as regards him. Subsequently, the 5th defendant got the decree passed ex parte against him set aside. The suit was then decreed as against him on February 28, 1961 but on appeal it was set aside and suit remitted for fresh disposal; and thereafter the suit was again decreed on February 12, 1963, as against the 5th defendant making him liable for costs of the plaintiff since the original decree of 1959. The plaintiff took out execution on 27th August 1963 to realise the costs awarded against defendants 3 and 5 respectively. The 3rd defendant contended that as he was no party to proceedings had after July 9, 1959, the decree dated February 12, 1963, is non est as regards him and therefore the execution petition, filed on, August 27, 1963, is as concerns him barred by time. The Subordinate Judge upheld the contention and held execution against the 3rd defendant barred; but, on appeal, the District Judge has reversed him and held execution to be in time. Hence this second appeal. 2. Art.182 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which is relevant to the instant case, read: The decree against the 3rd defendant is dated July 9, 1959, and if the execution petition is governed by clause (1) of Art.182, it would certainly be barred. But I am afraid that clause (1) cannot govern a case coming under clause (4) as the latter is a particular provision in relation to the former which is general. When a decree is set aside in part as regards one of the defendants as also when thereafter the suit is decreed against that defendant, the decree does get amended. But I am afraid that clause (1) cannot govern a case coming under clause (4) as the latter is a particular provision in relation to the former which is general. When a decree is set aside in part as regards one of the defendants as also when thereafter the suit is decreed against that defendant, the decree does get amended. In Mahijibhai Mohanbhai Barot v. Patel Manibhai Gokalbhai (A. I. R.1965 S. C. 1477) a Bench of five learned judges of the Supreme Court have unanimously held the removal of the name of an appellant he died during pendency of the appeal from the appellate decree to be an amendment of that decree within the meaning of the clause (4), If that be so, the setting aside of a decree as regards one of the defendants and the subsequent passing of decree as regards him must both be amendments of the decree within the meaning of that clause. 3. Counsel for appellant contended that such amendments are of no consequence as regards persons who were not parties thereto. I am afraid, this contention has to be overruled on the analogy of the dictum in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey (A. I R.1932 P. C. 165) that the expression "where there has been an appeal" in clause (2) of Art.182, meant only the institution of some appeal against the decree and it mattered not whether the contestant was a party to that appeal or whether the appeal itself was competent. Likewise must then be the significance of the expression "where the decree has been amended" in clause (4). Therefore the question here is: Has the decree been amended subsequent to its passing on July 9,1958? The clear answer to it is that the decree has been amended when part of it was set aside as against the 5th defendant, and lastly when it was extended to the 5th defendant. It follows that the period of limitation for execution in this case has to be reckoned under clause (4) of Art.182, Limitation Act, 1908, from February 12,1963. The execution petition filed in the same year has then to be held in time. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed hereby, without any order as to costs.