Parshava Properties Ltd. v. Workmen Represented By Rohtas Quarries Mazdoor Sangh
1969-07-04
KANHAIYAJI, U.N.SINHA
body1969
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment U.N.Sinha, J. 1. This writ application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners, who are Parshva Properties Limited. (The petitioners will henceforth be described as the management). The prayer in this writ application is that an award given by an arbitrator, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure 1, may be quashed. In paragraph 3 of the application it has been mentioned that the award had been given by opposite party No. 2 on the 7th September, 1968 and it had been published in the Bihar Gazette on the 24th September, 1968. 2. The relevant facts stated In the application are as follows: It is mentioned that on the 25th March, 1958 as agreement had been entered into between the management and the workers represented by Rohtas Quarries Majdoor Sangh, Dalmianagar, of which item No. 6 runs as follows:- - "The management agrees to give only Privilege Leave of 15 days with full wages to all Quarry workers other than permanent employees in place of 7 days in accordance with Sec. 51 of Mines Act, 1952 ." A dispute regarding interpretation of this item arose and the matter was referred for arbitration under Sec.1Q-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. The reference was in the following terms:- - "Interpretation of Item No. 6 of the agreement dated the 25th March, 1958 as agreed in the memorandum of settlement dated the 4th February. 1966." On this reference, the arbitrator, Sri I. Prasad heard the contending parties and the award under consideration was given. 3 The learned arbitrator has come to the conclusion that his interpretation of Item No; 6, quoted above, is that the workers are entitled to get one days leave for every 15 (16?) days attendance. 4. Before I refer to the reasons given by the learned arbitrator, the relevant provisions of law may be quoted. In the year 1958 the relevant provision of law was Sec. 51 of the Mines Act. 1952 (Central Act No. 35 of 1952). As admitted by the parties, the portions of Sec. 51 which governed the case then, were in these words:- - "51.
In the year 1958 the relevant provision of law was Sec. 51 of the Mines Act. 1952 (Central Act No. 35 of 1952). As admitted by the parties, the portions of Sec. 51 which governed the case then, were in these words:- - "51. Annual leave with wages.-- (1) Every person employed in a mine who has completed a period of twelve months continuous service therein shall be allowed, during the subsequent period of twelve months, leave with full pay or wages based on the average pay or wages for the twelve months immediately preceding the leave, as provided in Sec. 52, and such leave shall be calculated at the rate of (i) .............................. (ii) if he is an employee paid by the week, or a loader, or other person employed below ground on a piece rate basis, seven days for such period of twelve months." (2) The twelve months continuous service referred to in Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been completed-- (a) .............................. (b) in the case of a person employed - above ground on a piece rate basis or in the case of any other person who is paid by the month, week or day, if he has during the said period of twelve months put in not less than two hundred and sixty-five attendances at the mine." This Mines Act of the year 1952, as it was in existence in 1958, underwent substantial change and the relevant provision is incorporated now in Sec. 52. As admitted by the learned counsel for the parties, the provisions of Sec. 52 which have been taken into consideration by the learned arbitrator, read as follows:- - "52(1) Every person employed In a mine who has completed a calendar years service therein shall be allowed, during the subsequent calendar year, leave with wages, calculated.-- (a) .............................. (b) in any other case at the rate of One day for every twenty days of work performed by him. (2) A calendar years service referred fo in Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been completed.-- (a) .............................. (b) in the case of any other person if he has during the calendar year put in not less than two hundred and forty attendances at the mine." Now I refer to the mistake of calculation made by the learned arbitrator.
(2) A calendar years service referred fo in Sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been completed.-- (a) .............................. (b) in the case of any other person if he has during the calendar year put in not less than two hundred and forty attendances at the mine." Now I refer to the mistake of calculation made by the learned arbitrator. He has stated in the award that in accordance with Sec. 51 of the original Mines Act of 1952, the workers were entitled to only seven days leave in a year. That is to say, the workers used to get seven days leave if they completed two hundred sixty-five days of attendance in a year. Then the learned arbitrator says that "this was calculated at the rate of one day leave for every 38 days attendance put in by the worker." Then the learned arbitrator has stated that since the agreement had increased the leave to 15 days, it must be deemed that the workers used to get one days leave on the basis of 19 days attendance put in by them. Then the learned arbitrator has proceeded under Sec. 52 of the Act, after amendment, and has stated that the workers are deemed to have completed one calendar year if they have put in not less than 240 days attendance, and "in view of the above said agreement if a worker has put in 240 days attendance in a year, he will be entitled to get 15 days leave". That is to say, according to the learned arbitrator, workers would get one days leave for every 16 days attendance. It is on this basis that the learned arbitrator has given his award which has been challenged in this Court. 5 According to the learned Advocate-General appearing for the management, the learned arbitrator has intermixed the agreement with the provisions of Section 52, as it now stands, which he should not have done. It has been argued that the learned arbitrator has erroneously stated that when the management had agreed to give fifteen days leave in place of seven days leave, in the year 1958, the arrangement was on the footing that the workers would put one days leave for every 19 days attendance.
It has been argued that the learned arbitrator has erroneously stated that when the management had agreed to give fifteen days leave in place of seven days leave, in the year 1958, the arrangement was on the footing that the workers would put one days leave for every 19 days attendance. Learned Counsel for the workers has argued, on the other hand, that, the interpretation put upon the agreement in question by the learned arbitrator is correct and that is why the management had followed this calculation in the years 1960 and 1961. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the contention put forward on behalf of the management is valid and the conclusion of the learned arbitrator is erroneous in law. It is not possible to hold that when the agreement was entered into it was on the footing that the workers became entitled to one days leave for every 19 days of attendance. No material has been placed before us for arriving at such a conclusion. As the Act stood in 1958, these workers were entitled to seven days leave if they had put in not less than 265 days attendance in the last twelve months. Only this number of days was increased to fifteen days for the application of Sec. 51 of the Mines Act. It is not possible to hold that the parties had contemplated that the workers would get one days leave for every 19 days of attendance instead of one days leave for every 38 days attendance, when the agreement was made. No doubt, Sec. 52 of the Act, as it now stands, has made substantial change in the relevant provision of law, but the learned arbitrator was wrong in making his calculation on the basis that because now the workers are entitled to get one days leave for every 20 days of work performed by them, 15 days of leave, agreed upon by the parties in 1958, can be altered on the footing that at that time the management had agreed to grant one days leave for every 19 days of attendance. It is not possible to accept the learned arbitrators reasoning, that, in 1958, the workers were entitled under the law to one days leave for every 38 days attendance. At that time, the workers were entitled to 7 days leave at the most.
It is not possible to accept the learned arbitrators reasoning, that, in 1958, the workers were entitled under the law to one days leave for every 38 days attendance. At that time, the workers were entitled to 7 days leave at the most. By the agreement in question this period was increased to 15 days, Nothing more can be deduced from the agreement. The learned Advocate-General has drawn our attention to Sec. 49 of the Act, as it now stands, and has argued that it is open to the workers either to keep the agreement alive or to give a goby to it and be governed by the Act as it now stands. However, this aspect of the matter does not call for a decision, as the question before this Court is whether the learned arbitrator has interpreted Item No. 6 of the agreement in accordance with law or not. What the management may have done in the years 1960 and 1961 can hardly be relevant for the interpretation of the agreement in question, as the learned arbitrator had not been asked to interpret item No. 6 of the agreement on the basis of the conduct of the parties. In my opinion, the only interpretation that can be put upon the agreement in question is that the workers will be entitled to 15 days leave and no more, if they have worked , for not less than 240 days in the previous calendar year, as in the case made out by the management in paragraph 11 of this writ application. 6. For the reasons given above, the award given by the arbitrator must be quashed by a writ of certiorari. The application is thus allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs of this Court. Kanhaiyaji, J. 7 I agree.