JUDGMENT Pandey, J.- 1. This is a defendant's appeal against the lower Court's decree for specific performance of a contract dated 20 February 1957 whereby she was said to have undertaken to re-convey the immoveable property purchased by her by a sale deed dated 19 February 1957. 2. The material facts appearing in the pleadings and evidence, which are not now in contest, may be shortly stated. In Chanduabhata, a ward of Bilaspur town, there is a row of houses known as Jacob Chawl, which was formerly owned by one J. A. Jacob, who had, by conversion, became a Hindu. He died in 1944 leaving behind him surviving his widow Laxmibai (plaintiff) and children, including a minor son Surya Prakash. One of the blocks of the Jacob Chawl was occupied by D. P, Jagota D.W. 2, a money-lender, who had advanced several sums of money to Laxmibai. She needed Rs. 3,000 more for expenses, inc1udmg those required for the betrothal of her daughters. She obtained that amount from D. P. Jagota D.W. 2 by executing in favour of the latter's wife, Susnila Devi (defendant), a sale deed Ex. D-5 dated 19 February 1957 for a consideration of Rs. 14,000 in respect of three of these blocks. One of these blocks was, as shown, in occupation of D. p. Jagota D. W. 2 himself as a tenant. Subsequently, he effected repairs and made some improvements in these blocks, two of which were in occupation of tenants who had attorned to the transferee. Finally, on 1 September 1964, Laxmibai sent to Sushila Devi a registered notice Ex. P- 12-A to say that she (Laxmibai) was ready and willing to pay Rs. 14,000 and demanded, pursuant to the terms of an Tkramama executed in her favour, a re-conveyance of the property sold by her. In reply Ex. P-14 dated 5 September 1964 sent by a lawyer, it was stated that the sale deed effected an outright sale for full consideration without any condition for conveying back the property by resale. Nothing was, however, said about the lkrarnama mentioned in the notice of demand. 3. According to Laxmibai, the transferee Sushila Devi had executed the lkrarnama Ex. P-1 dated 20 September 1957 whereby she promised to re-convey, within 10 years from the date of sale, the house property sold to her by the deed Ex. P-5 dated 19 September 1957 upon payment of Rs. 3. According to Laxmibai, the transferee Sushila Devi had executed the lkrarnama Ex. P-1 dated 20 September 1957 whereby she promised to re-convey, within 10 years from the date of sale, the house property sold to her by the deed Ex. P-5 dated 19 September 1957 upon payment of Rs. 14,000. This she did not do in spite of demands made in that behalf orally as well as by the registered notice Ex. P-12-A. Laxmibai, therefore, initiated on 16 December 1964 the action, out of which this appeal arises, for specific enforcement of the contract for re-conveyance as well as for compensation for breach of the contract and future mesne profits from the date of suit. 4. The claim was resisted mainly on the ground that there was no agreement to re-convey the property as alleged by the plaintiff. It was pleaded that Sushila Devi's signature on the Ikrarnama Ex. P-1 was a forged one. According to her, the Ikrarnama was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. She further pleaded that Laxmibai never asked her to accept Rs. 14,000 and re-convey the property and that, in any event, she was estopped from claiming such re-conveyance because she had, without any objection, allowed the property to be entered in the municipal records as belonging to Sushila Devi, asked her tenant G. R. Verma to attorn to Sushila Devi and failed to protest when the latter remodel1ed the blocks, made additions and alterations and effected major repairs at a cost of more than Rs. 20,000. 5. The Court of first instance found in favour of Laxmibai on all paints in controversy and passed, as already indicated, a decree for specific performance of the contract as well as for mesne profits from 3 September 1964, which were directed to be ascertained in execution proceedings. 6. The main question for consideration in this appeal is whether Sushila Devi executed the lkranama Ex. P-1 dated 20 February 1957. On this point, there is the direct evidence of V. P. Lazrus P. W. 5 and Babulal P. W. 6 (brother in-law and agent of Laxmibai) against the denial made in the witness-box by D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 and his wife Sushila Devi D. W. 3. There is nothing in the character of the evidence itself of V. P. Lazrus P. W. 5 and Babulal P. W. 6 that might discredit them. There is nothing in the character of the evidence itself of V. P. Lazrus P. W. 5 and Babulal P. W. 6 that might discredit them. The Lower Court considered the criticism levelled against their evidence and, speaking generally, we agree with the view it took in regard to it. We would, therefore, refer only to the points sought to be made before us in regard to the infirmities in the evidence taken as a whole and other considerations brought to our notice as contra-indicative of the genuineness of the Ikrarnamu Ex. P-1. 7. It is argued that while the executant of the Ikrarnama Ex. P-1 is Sushila Devi Jagota, she has been described in the body of the document as Sushila Bai in a situation in which the epithet' Bai' is regarded as ignoble, if not altogether derogatory, amongst the Punjabis. In the region from which this case comes, the epithet' Bai' is regarded as respectful and is often added after the names of respected ladies. The practice is so widespread that no one thinks of taking any exception to it. Even in other documents, Ex. P-11, Ex. P-13 and Ex. D-15 (top), the name of the defendant appeals as Sushila Bai. The very fact that, in order to assail the document as un-genuine, such a point had to be raised speaks for itself. What is more, it appears to us that, if the documents were fabricated, the signature was more likely to have closely agreed with the name appearing in the body of the Ikrarnam. In our opinion, this difference is, if anything, a circumstance in favour of its genuineness. 8. It is next urged that, when the sale deed had been executed on 19 February 1957, the recita1s in the lkrarnama dated 20 February 1957 to the effect that, on that date, the promisor had obtained in her name a registered sale deed was factually incorrect and indicated its un-genuineness. We are unable to accept this contention though we agree that the recitals are not strictly correct. Although the sale deed was executed on 19 February 1957, it could not be registered on that date. It was, however, got registered on the next day. On the morning of that day, but before registration, the Ikrarnama was executed and therein the promisor was said to have taken on that day (Aj) a registered sale deed in his name. Although the sale deed was executed on 19 February 1957, it could not be registered on that date. It was, however, got registered on the next day. On the morning of that day, but before registration, the Ikrarnama was executed and therein the promisor was said to have taken on that day (Aj) a registered sale deed in his name. Obviously the recitals, which took into account the registration that was to be effected on that very day, are inexact but are not so far inaccurate as to show, without more, that it was a fabricated document. 9. The further criticism is that, if there were an agreement to re-convey, it would have been incorporated in the sale deed itself or, at any rate, in a simultaneously executed document. If D. P. Jagota D. W. 2, who made the bargain in the name' of his wife, did not want a mortgage by conditional sale, he would not get the condition to re-convey incorporated in the sale deed. Nay, to contra-indicate the suggestion that there was such a mortgage, he may not like even to get a document like the Ikrarnama executed simultaneously. After all, the question whether a given transaction is a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale out and out with a condition for repurchase has, inspite of numerous authorities bearing on the point, remained a vexed question to this day. In this situation, we are unable to regard the execution of a separate Ikrarnama for re-conveyance on the following day as a circumstance against its genuineness. 10. Our attention has been drawn to the earlier statement of Laxmibai, which she made in revenue proceedings taken against her for diverting the land to non-agricultural purposes, to the effect that the three quarters had been mortgaged with possession for Rs. 7,000, though the writing was taken for Rs. 14,000 [Ex. D-16]. Having regard to the prevailing misconception about the nature of the such transaction, it is not surprising that she regarded this transaction as a mortgage with possession. As we would show hereafter, she was not alone to suffer from such a misconception. In regard to the amount actually advanced, D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 admitted that the receipts produced were renewed documents. That being so, there may be truth in her statement that the amount actually advanced was much less, may be Rs. 7,000. As we would show hereafter, she was not alone to suffer from such a misconception. In regard to the amount actually advanced, D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 admitted that the receipts produced were renewed documents. That being so, there may be truth in her statement that the amount actually advanced was much less, may be Rs. 7,000. In any event, this part of the statement is hardly of any significance when regard is had to the fact that she candidly stated that the document taken mentioned the consideration to be Rs. 14,000. 11. Babulal P. W. 6 did not remember if he had stated on 29 January 1960 in proceedings before the Rent Controlling Authority as follows: "There are three houses. It was a conditional sale deed for 10 years. But was not written in the sale deed. It was an oral talk" [Ex. D-10] our attention is particulary drawn to that portion of this statement wherein Babulal P. W. 6 disclosed that the talk was oral. As pointed out by the lower Court, it related to the talk at the time of sale and that explains why the witness added that the condition was not incorporated in the sale deed. The witness was not asked whether it was subsequently reduced to writing obviously because that was not necessary for the purposes of the party cross-examining him. In the circumstances, we do not regard this statement as really contradicting or discrediting Babulal P. W. 6. 12. Against all this, there are several considerations which clearly point to the document being a genuine one. In the last paragraph, we have referred to the earlier statement of Babulal P. W. 6 which he made in 1960 in the proceedings before the Rent Controller. There Babulal further stated as follows: "The repairs were in September and October 1957. ** ** ** ** ** ** I went to see daily to find out how much more amount we will be required to pay in case of redemption Jagota had taken oral permission for repairs from Laxmibai." Sushila Devi had then examined him as her own witness. D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 admittedly kept quiet even after knowing all that Babulal P. W. 6 had stated there about the transaction being a conditional sale deed for 10 years and the like. D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 admittedly kept quiet even after knowing all that Babulal P. W. 6 had stated there about the transaction being a conditional sale deed for 10 years and the like. D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 adopted the same attitude when, on 18 September 1962, Laxmibai had stated to his knowledge that the transaction was a mortgage with possession [Ex. D-16]. 13. D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 stated in his evidence (paragraph 14) that the had maintained an account of the expenses incurred by him in repairs and reconstruction and that that account was taken away by Babulal P. W. 6 who was said to have represented that he wanted to know what amount was being spent thereon. Unless Laxmibai continued to have some kind of subsisting right in respect of the three blocks, neither Babulal P. W. 6 would have asked for the account nor D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 would have made over that account to him. 14. S. C. Bhaskar P. W. 2, an advocate, who had appeared on behalf of Sushila Devi in the diversion proceedings referred to above, stated on 2 Novembers 1962 after seeing the lkrarnama Ex. P-1 dated 20 February 1957 that "it was a conditional sale deed which will be valid after ten years, that is, after 20-2-67". The witness added that he had made that statement under instructions received from D. P. Jagota D. W. 2. It is true that D. P. Jagota D. W, 2 denied that he had given any instruction to S. C. Bhaskar P. W. 2 as claimed by the latter but, in our view, that is a highly interested self serving disclaimer which can carry no weight against the wholly disinterested testimony of the advocate supported by his statement according to the instructions given to him. The significance of this admission cannot be minimised when regard is had to the fact that in relation to this transaction, D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 has been acting as his wife's agent from the very beginning [Paragraph 12]. 15. We have already noticed that, in the reply Ex. P.-14 dated 5 September 1964 given to the notice of demand Ex. P.12A dated 1 September 1964 expressly grounded on the Ikrarnama Shushila Devi did not say anything about the Ikrarnama. 15. We have already noticed that, in the reply Ex. P.-14 dated 5 September 1964 given to the notice of demand Ex. P.12A dated 1 September 1964 expressly grounded on the Ikrarnama Shushila Devi did not say anything about the Ikrarnama. It is needless to say that, if that lkrarnama were a forged document, Sushila Devi would have behaved differently. 16. The evidence led in this case shows that Rs. 11,000 was due to D. P. Jagota D. W. 2 on account of earlier loans and the sale was made for Rs. 3,000 more which laxmibai needed. There is nothing to show that any estimate of the fair price was made or there was any bargaining on that account. This itself would contra-indicate an outright unconditional sale, particularly when the amount actually advanced appears to have been considerably less than Rs. 14,000 and the annual return in the shape of rents from the three blocks, as they existed, was over Rs. 1,000. Even in 1957, this must re regarded as too well-paying. 17. Our attention has been drawn to the recitals in the sale deed Ex.D-5 to the effect that the houses were in a dilapidated condition. In support of these recitals, we have been taken through the evidence led to show what repairs and improvements were made in the three blocks. We find from the testimony of Shushila Devi herself that, except re-plastering the blocks,' changing the doors and windows that were affected by white ants and repairing a back wall, all others were alterations or improvements many of which were effected after the notice of demand Ex. P-12A dated 1 September 1964 [Sushila Devi D. W. 3, paragraphs 4 to 8 and 12]. We do not, therefore, accept that the recitals regarding the blocks being in a dilapidated condition are correct. As shown, they were in actual occupation of tenants who admittedly paid rents totalling Rs. 86 per month without any repairs at all. For reasons, which are obvious, none of them was examined by Sushila Devi to show that the blocks were in a dilapidated condition. Indeed, one of those tenants, V. P. Lazrus P. W. 5, who was examined by Laxmibai on another point, was not even questioned in this sense in cross-examination. 86 per month without any repairs at all. For reasons, which are obvious, none of them was examined by Sushila Devi to show that the blocks were in a dilapidated condition. Indeed, one of those tenants, V. P. Lazrus P. W. 5, who was examined by Laxmibai on another point, was not even questioned in this sense in cross-examination. We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission that the repairs required by the dilapidated blocks contra-indicated an agreement to re-convey the blocks for the original consideration without providing for the cost of repairs. 18. This takes us to a comparison of the signature of Sushila Devi on the Ikrarnama Ex. P-1 with the admitted ones on Exs. P-4, P-5, P-6, P-7 and P-8. In this connection, we have been taken through the evidence of the hand writing expert C. T. Bhanagay P W-1, who opined for the reasons given by him that the disputed signature was that of Sushila Devi, and the evidence of M. B. Dixit, D. W.-1, who gave a contrary opinion for the reason disclosed by him in his deposition. The learned advocate for Sushila Devi has artfully referred to the several dissimilarities which even C. T. Bhanaiay P. W.-1 admitted as existing between the disputed and admitted signatures of Sushila Devi and made the point that, if the signature is disputed, the dissimilarities more than similarities are usually regarded as important. However, it was readily conceded before us that the opinion of experts is not conclusive and that it can rarely take the place of substantive evidence: Ishwari Prasad Vs. Mohammad Isa AIR 1963 SC 1128 , and Shashi Kumar Vs. Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 529 . The best that can be said about the opinion of any handwriting expert is that it is the evidence of only general tendencies usually exhibited in the handwriting and its weakness consists in the fact that such tendencies are affected, or liable to be affected, by the state of mind of the writer influenced by several factors like self consciousness, hurry or a desire to conceal. Therefore, as pointed cut in the case of Shashi Kumar Vs. Subodh Klimar (supra), before acting on such evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated by direct or circumstantial evidence. Therefore, as pointed cut in the case of Shashi Kumar Vs. Subodh Klimar (supra), before acting on such evidence, it is usual to see if it is corroborated by direct or circumstantial evidence. Upon a comparison of the signatures, we find that the disputed signature is not so different from the admitted signatures as to be regarded as one not made by the maker of the latter. Differences are no doubt there but, in that sense, even the admitted signatures differ from each other. For example, the admitted signature on the Wakalatnama Ex. P-8 is as much different from another admitted signature on Ex. P-5 as the disputed signature is from the one on Ex, P-8. An examination of these signatures shows that those made on forma] documents are well formed perhaps because they are made with greater care. That is also the case with the one in dispute here. What is, however, important is that, according to both the experts. the disputed signature is normally written and is free from any sign of simulation or attempted disguise or forgery. It is equally clear from the evidence of M. B. Dixit, D. W-1 (paragraph 12) that there was no model before the maker of the disputed signature. It is difficult to accept that some one was able to forge the signature of Sushila Devi without showing any sign •of forgery and, in that endeavour, made without any model before him, a signature so closely resembling the genuine one in several respects. We regard this part of the evidence of the expert as supporting our view that the disputed signature is also one that was made by the maker of the admitted signatures. We may add that this view receives strong support not only from the direct evidence of V. P. Lazrus P. W-5, who was rightly regarded as disinterested and independent and Babulal P. W-6 but also from the several circumstances noticed by us in the foregoing paragraphs 12 to 16. In this connection, we may also mention that D. P. Jagota D. W-2, who has been dealing with the property in dispute as his wife's agent from the very beginning, never, at any time before the filing of the suit, repudiated the Ikrarnama as a forged document although he was already aware, and made aware, of its existence. In this connection, we may also mention that D. P. Jagota D. W-2, who has been dealing with the property in dispute as his wife's agent from the very beginning, never, at any time before the filing of the suit, repudiated the Ikrarnama as a forged document although he was already aware, and made aware, of its existence. For all these reasons, we hold, agreeing with the lower Court, that Sushila Devi executed the Ikrarnama Ex. P. 1. 19. It is next argued that the expression "Bainama Ki Rakam" in the Ikrarnama Ex, P-1 includes expenses which Sushila Devi incurred in effecting repairs and making improvements. We are unable to accept this contention and it is really refuted by the full recitals which, freely translated, reads as follows:- "Today, by a registered stamp I have got M written (the afore said property) for Rs. 14,000 in my favour and covenant that, if the aforesaid amount of sale be paid in full in ten years, then (I) will return the (property transferred by) sale deed. If the money be not returned in time, then this sale deed will be regarded as Pakka (final)." The recitals clearly show that the amount required to be paid for re-conveyance was the aforesaid amount of sale, namely, Rs. 14,000. 20. In view of what v. e have said in the last paragraph, the further contention that Laxmibai should have offered more than Rs. 14,000 and her offer of Rs. 14,000 and no more, was, therefore, not indicative of her readiness and willingness to pay the amount she had to pay under the contract must be rejected... … … 21. The further submission that, in order to prove that Laxmibai was ready and willing to pay Rs. 14,000 she should have deposited the amount in Court is not well founded. There is, besides the plaint averment, her evidence to show not only that she had tendered the amount but also that she was always ready and willing to pay it. That apart, Sushila Devi. by her reply Ex. P-14, denied that she was liable to re-convey the property on receiving the amount. It is well settled that a formal tender is not required when it appears from the evidence that the party to whom it would have been made would have refused to accept the money: Venkataravnim Vs. Subadrayamma, AIR 1923 PC 26. by her reply Ex. P-14, denied that she was liable to re-convey the property on receiving the amount. It is well settled that a formal tender is not required when it appears from the evidence that the party to whom it would have been made would have refused to accept the money: Venkataravnim Vs. Subadrayamma, AIR 1923 PC 26. The law in regard to readiness and willingness was considered by the Privy Council in Ardeshir Vs. Flora Sassoon, AIR 1928 PC 208. Their Lordships observed: "Although so far as the Act is concerned, there is no express statement that the averment of readiness and willingness is in an Indian suit for specific performence as necessary as it always was in England [S. 24 (b) is the nearest], it seems invariably to have been recognised, and, on principle, their Lordships think rightly that the Indian and the English requirements in this matter are the same." The pre-existing law is now enacted in section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the relevant part of which reads: "Specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person- … … … … … … (c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation-For the purpose of clause (c),- (i) where a contract involves the payment of money, it is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the defendant or to deposit in Court any money except when so directed by the Court; (ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. " In this case, not only there was no direction requiring Laxmibai to deposit the money in Court but, as we have indicated earlier, Sushila Devi, by repudiating the contract itself, prevented or waived earlier performance of that part of the contract by Laxmibai. 22. " In this case, not only there was no direction requiring Laxmibai to deposit the money in Court but, as we have indicated earlier, Sushila Devi, by repudiating the contract itself, prevented or waived earlier performance of that part of the contract by Laxmibai. 22. The only other ground urged in support of this appeal is founded on section 20(2) (b) of the new Act corresponding to section 22 of the old Act which reads: "The following are cases in which the Court may properly exercise a discretion not to decree specific performance: … … … … (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff". It was argued that Sushila Devi had spent a large sum of money in effecting repairs and making improvements and it would involve a great hardship upon her if she be required to re-convey the property. Apart from the consideration that the amount so spent has not been properly proved, we consider that there is no merit in this contention. We have already noticed that the sale in favour of Sushila Devi did not appear to have been made for the proper market price. Secondly, she knew all the while that she had bound herself to re-convey the property upon demand and payment of Rs. 14,000. If, with this knowledge, she, on her own, subsequently invests money in effecting repairs and making improvements, it cannot be said that this is a case of hardship that she did not foresee at the time of the contract. Finally, she appears to have made many improvements even after the notice of demand Ex. P-12-A dated 1 September 1964 obviously in an endeavour to defeat the claim for specific performance. Where the party, knowing its liability under the earlier contract, brings about a hardship of this kind on itself, the Court will not regard that as a consideration in favour of refusal of specific performance. For principle, we may refer to Haradhan Deb Vs. Bhagabati Dari AIR 1914 Cal. 137 (DB), where their Lordships observed: "Where the hardship had been brought upon the defendant by himself, the Court will not consider that as a circumstance in favour of the refusal of specific performance." (Page 140) 23. For principle, we may refer to Haradhan Deb Vs. Bhagabati Dari AIR 1914 Cal. 137 (DB), where their Lordships observed: "Where the hardship had been brought upon the defendant by himself, the Court will not consider that as a circumstance in favour of the refusal of specific performance." (Page 140) 23. Our attention was drawn to the terms and conditions of the sale deed Ex. D-5 whereby damages payable, in case of loss of property or any part thereof owing to action taken by a person having better title, included cost of repairs and improvements. Apart from the consideration that those covenants are not limited in duration to the time during which re-conveyance of the property could be had, they are not attracted in the present case and nothing more need be said about them. 24. No other ground was argued in support of this appeal which must fail in the view taken by us. 25. The result, therefore, is that this appeal is dismissed with all costs throughout on the defendant Sushila Devi. Hearing fee according to schedule.