( 1 ) THESE two appeals raise common questions which could be disposed of by a common judgment. The appellants are the plaintiffs. The defendant in the two suits brought by them is the Municipal Committee of the City municipality, Gulbarga, established under the provisions of the Hyderabad district Municipalities Act of 1956. ( 2 ) THE plaintiffs are merchants in Gulbarga who bring into the municipal limits various articles. Their prayer in the two suits was for a declaration that the levy of octroi by the Municipal Committee, which it imposed under the provisions of the Hyderabad District Municipalities act, which will be referred to as the 'act', was an illegal levy and for the refund of octroi collected from them. In the suit out of which RSA. No. 677 of 1965 arises, the plaintiff claimed a refund of Rs. 1,514-79 P. and in the other suit (RSA. No. 677/1965) the plaintiff claimed a refund of Rs. 730. The Munsiff gave the plaintiffs the decrees they sought, which, however, were reversed by the Civil Judge in the appeals preferred by the Municipal committee. So, the plaintiffs appeal. ( 3 ) THE first impeachment of the imposed levy was that it was made in disobedience to statutory provisions. But, Mr. Appa Rao made a statement that the pronouncement of this Court in Veerappa Gundappa Kandur v. The Municipal Committee, Gulbarga, (1965) 2 Mys. L. J. 551 makes unavailable to the plaintiffs that contention. So, Mr. Appa Rao did not ask me to say that the impost made by the City Municipal Committee invites the criticism that it was not made in conformity with statutory provisions. Mr. Appa Rao, therefore, made before me a very restricted submission that the octroi had been collected from the plaintiffs on articles not falling within Schedule 'd' to the Act. It is indisputable that S. 109 of the Act bestowed competence on the Municipal Committee to levy octroi only on those goods of which there is an enumeration in Schedule 'd' to the Act and Mr. Appa Rao's contention was that the Committee had recovered from the plaintiffs, octroi on goods other than those catalogued in that schedule. Mv attention was asked to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint, out of which RSA. Appa Rao's contention was that the Committee had recovered from the plaintiffs, octroi on goods other than those catalogued in that schedule. Mv attention was asked to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint, out of which RSA. No. 677/1965 arises, in which the plaintiff stated that although seven items such as copra, sago, poppy seeds, kismis, kaju, betel nuts and newspapers, a number of other items are not found in Sch. 'd'. The Municipal Committee was unauthorisedly collecting octroi on all those articles. ( 4 ) THE plaint in the other suit also contains a similar averment. So, mr. Appa Rao's contention is that the plaintiffs are entitled to a refund of the octroi collected on those articles specified in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint. ( 5 ) THE Civil Judee was of the opinion that the articles to which there was a reference in the plaints were within Schedule 'd' as they were edibles on which the Municipal Committee had the competence to impose octroi. Schedule 'd' does authorise the Municipal Committee to levy octroi on edibles and that part of the Schedule which speaks of edibles on which octroi could be so imposed consists of clauses (a) to (s ). Clause (p) of that part of the Schedule reads: schedule 'd' articles maximum Rates of Octroi Leviable edibles: - (p) All kinds of food and drink not specifically provided for (cannedtinned, bottled, boxed or cartoned ). Mr. Appa Rao did not dispute that all the articles to which there was a reference in the plaint, except newspapers, are undoubtedly edibles and he is right in making that concession. But the serious argument presented by him was that although those articles are articles of food within the meaning of the expression occurring in clause (p) of the clauses appearing under the caption 'edibles', they are not liable to the levy of octroi since that clause authorises the levy of octroi only on articles of food to which that clause expressly refers, and which are brought into the municipal limits of the Municipality in receptacles and containers to which that clause speaks. The submission placed before me was that unless an article of food was canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartoned, no octroi could be imposed and since the articles brought into the municipal limits by the plaintiffs were brought in a loose condition and not in any container or receptacle, they stand exempted from payment of Octroi. Before proceeding to consider this submission made by Mr. Appa Rao, it should be observed that the newspapers to which paragraph 6 of the plaint In RSA. No. 677/65 refers, are not of course edibles. But in the notice issued by the Municipal Committee by the plaintiffs under S. 83 of the Act, there is no allegation that any octroi had been collected from them in respect of newspapers brought into the Municipal limits. It should also be observed that although seven items were mentioned in that notice as the items in respect of which the Municipal Committee had illegally collected octroi from the plaintiffs, those seven items are not all the items which were referred to in the plaint. While the notice referred to items such as copra, khaskas, zeera, betel nuts, coffee powder etc. , paragraph 5 of the plaint spoke of copra, sago, coffee seeds, khismis, kaju, betel nuts, newspapers nd a number of other articles. So the only two items which are to be found both in the notice and in the plaint are copra and betel nuts. I should therefore keep aside the allegation in the plaint which speaks of the illegal levy of octroi on the other items to which there was no reference in the statutory notice issued under S. 83 of the Act. So what 1 should investigate is whether the claim for the refund of Octroi collected on copra and betel nuts is sustainable claim. ( 6 ) IT is clear from the language of clause (p) appearing under the heading 'edibles' in Schedule 'd' to the Act, that, in respect of articles of food and drink, not expressly enumerated in that Schedule and which therefore fall within that residuary clause octroi could be levied by the Municipal Committee only if those articles of food and drink were brought in cans, tins, bottles, boxes and cartons. That that is so is clear from the words 'canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartoned' appearing within brackets in that clause. Any other view would make that part o? That that is so is clear from the words 'canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartoned' appearing within brackets in that clause. Any other view would make that part o? the clause unmeaning and it is a familiar canon of construction that no part of a Schedule such as schedule 'd' should be overlooked or ignored and especially in a taxing statute, the interpretation of which has to be made in favour of the subject. Although it is clear from the elucidation made in Bangalore Woollen, cotton and Silk Mills Ltd, v. Mysore Spinning and Manufacturing Co, ltd. , AIR 1962 SC 562 that the effect of a residuary provision such as one which is contained in clause (p) is to incorporate in the Schedule all those articles to which that clause refers, notwithstanding there being no express enumeration thereof, it is abundantly clear on a proper construction of the clause that no article of food or drink can be subjected to octroi under its provisions unless they are canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartoned articles. There can be little doubt that copra and betel nuts and even the other articles to which the plaints in these two cases refer, say newspapers, are articles of food and Mr. Appa Rao did not ask me to say that they are not. That being so, if those articles brought into the municipal limits, had been canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartoned, they would have of course, been subject to the payment of octroi. ( 7 ) MR. Appa Rao asserts on behalf of the plaintiffs that they were not brought in that condition bv the plaintiffs into the municipal limits and mr. Krishna Rao appearing for the Municipal Committee asserts that there is no statement in the plaints that they were not so brought or that they were brought in a loose condition as suggested by Mr. Appa Rao during the argument. Krishna Rao appearing for the Municipal Committee asserts that there is no statement in the plaints that they were not so brought or that they were brought in a loose condition as suggested by Mr. Appa Rao during the argument. It was said on behalf of the plaintiffs that since the Act authorises the levy of octroi only on goods conforming to the description contained in clause (p), it was incumbent on the Municipal Committee, to plead and prove that the articles of food in respect of which the Municipal committee levied octroi were brought in the containers such as those to which clause (p) refers and that it was the duty of the plaintiffs to make an averment that they were not brought in such containers. It became necessary for Mr. Rao to advance that argument before me for the reason that in the plaints produced in these cases, the plaintiffs did not state that the goods in respect of which octroi had been collected were not canned, tinned or cartoned goods. All that was stated in the plaints was that in respect of certain articles such as those to which clause (p) refers, the municipal Committee had made an illegal recovery. ( 8 ) IT is easy to understand why the plaint was prepared in that way since the principal complaint made in the plaint as one can see on their perusal is that the impost was not preceded by adherence to relevant statutory provisions. Although that condemnation of the impost is no longer now before me, what is obvious is that the stress of the criticism of the impost was that there was disobedience to stautory provisions and in that context the plaintiffs not unnaturally did not put forward any pleading, that even if the octroi had been properly imposed, the goods in respect of which octroi had been collected, did not conform to the description contained in clause (p)' so, it was that Mr. Appa Rao who had to admit that the plaintiffs did not specifically state in their plaints thai the articles on which octroi was levied were not canned, tinned, botteld, boxed or cartoned articles, asked me to say that the duly to put forward and plead that they were canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartoned, was on the Municipal Committee and not on the plaintiffs. ( 9 ) BUT, I do not accede to the contention for the reason that the octroi was collected by the Municipal Committee when those articles were brought by the plaintiffs and so their claim for refund can succeed only if the plaintiffs prove that what was collected from them was not recoverable under the provisions of the Act, that the articles on which octroi was levied were not within the enumeration of Schedule 'd' and that when the articles were brought into the municipal limits, they were not brought in the condition to which clause (p) refers. There was no plea to that effect, and no one produced any evidence, about it. So the Courts below had to decide on the imperfect pleadings produced before them which contained no averment that octroi had been levied on articles of food which had not been canned, tinned, bottled, boxed or cartoned. ( 10 ) ON behalf of the Municipal Committee, the suits brought by the plaintiffs were resisted on the ground thai the articles which had been subjected to octroi were fully within the enumeration of Schedule 'd' and that was all that the Municipal Committee was required to state in its defence of the claims made against it in the form in which they were made in the plaints. The discussion so far made leads to the conclusion that since the plaintiffs who were bound, in their suits for the refund of the octroi paid by them, to demonstrate that octroi was recovered with respect to goods not within the Schedule did not even say so, their suits were bound to fail. There is also another reason which impels the same conclusion. ( 11 ) ALTHOUGH in more than one part of their plaints, the plaintiffs did state that the Municipal Committee had recovered octroi in respect of articles not falling within the Schedule 'd', they produced no evidence about the measure of recovery of octroi made by the Municipal Committee in respect of each of those articles they referred. As I have already observed, there was a discrepancy between the statutory notice under S. 83 and the plaints produced before the Court, since some of the items which were in the notice were not in the plaints and since also some of the items in the plaints were not in the notices. As I have already observed, there was a discrepancy between the statutory notice under S. 83 and the plaints produced before the Court, since some of the items which were in the notice were not in the plaints and since also some of the items in the plaints were not in the notices. That being so, even if the plaintiffs notwithstanding the imperfections in the plaints would make a claim for refund of the octroi, it was incumbent upon them to produce proof as to the precise amount of the octroi which was not recoverable, but which was nevertheless collected. The sums of money claimed by the plaintiffs in their plaints represented the aggregates of octroi collected from them in respect of the items specified in the plaints and in the notices and so, it becomes extremely difficult for anyone to make an identification of that part of those sums of money in respect of which octroi could not have been recovered. ( 12 ) I do not consider this to be a case in which I should accede to the request of Mr. Appa Rao that there should now be a remand of these suits for an investigation of that question especially since the plainiffs did not, as I have already observed in the earlier part of this judgment, make an averment that the goods were not brought into the municipal limits in condition to which clause (p) refers. I, therefore dismiss these two appeals, but make no direction, in regard to costs. --- *** --- .