JUDGMENT R.L. Gulati, J. - The petitioner is a dealer in tobacco which is a commodity liable to Central Excise Duty under the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. He keeps a ware-house at Maunath Bhanjan in the district of Azamgarh. In this ware-house he stores tobacco. 2. On December 19, 1964 a party of the officers of the Excise Department, headed by the Deputy Superintendent of the Central Excise, Allahabad, carried out a surprise check of the petitioner's ware-house and found that between December 17 and December 19, 1964, the petitioner had removed from the ware-house 350 bags of biri tobacco without paying excise duty and in the same period had brought into the ware-house, in an unauthorised manner, 171 bags of biri tobacco which were found to be in excess of the stock shown in his books of accounts. The petitioner's statement was recorded at the spot wherein he admitted these irregularities. The excess stock was seized.,Later, on 8th of February, 1965 a notice was issued to the petitioner to show cause as to why excise duty should not be levied upon 350 bags of tobacco which were found short and why the stock found in excess should not be confiscated. The petitioner submitted a written explanation on 13th material on the record demanded from the February, 1965 in which he admitted the shortage to the extent of 179 bags, but denied the excess of 171 bags. The Collector Central Excise after considering the material on the record demanded from the petitioner excise duty of Rs. 40,294.36 on 350 bags of tobacco and ordered the confiscation of 171 bags of tobacco which were found to have been brought into the ware-house in an unauthorised manner. He also imposed a penalty of Rs. 2,000/-. It was further ordered that the confiscated stock of 171 bags be released to the petitioner on payment of a further fine of Rs. 5,000/-. The petitioner appealed to the Central Board of Excise and Customs, New Delhi, but his appeal was dismissed on April 3, 1967. The petitioner then preferred a revision petition to the Union of India which was also rejected on November 30, 1967. The petitioner- has now moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for writs of certiorari and mandamus. 3. The petitioner then preferred a revision petition to the Union of India which was also rejected on November 30, 1967. The petitioner- has now moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution praying for writs of certiorari and mandamus. 3. The principal contention raised before us is that the petitioner's statement recorded on the 19th December, 1964 was a confession which could not be used in evidence against him by reason of the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Mr. H. N. Seth, learned counsel for the opposite party, in reply has made the following submissions : (a) That an excise officer is not a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. (b) That the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act would not apply to the instant case as the proceedings before the Collector are not judicial proceedings before a court. (c) That the petitioner's statement is an admission and not a confession. (d) That the decision rendered against the petitioner is not based merely on his statement but is supported by other evidence and material on the record. 4. We propose to examine the last contention of Mr. Seth first, because if he is right in that contention then it would not be necessary to go into the remaining contentions. 5. We find that before taking the impugned action against him the petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated 8th February, 1965 by the Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad. This notice sets out in clear terms the charges against him and calls upon the petitioner to render an explanation and to produce such evidence as he may like in support of his defence. The notice further states that the petitioner should indicate in the written explanation whether he would wish to be heard in person. 6. We further find that the petitioner submitted' a written explanation dated February 13, 1965 and was also granted an opportunity of oral hearing. In the written explanation the petitioner admitted the shortage of 179 bags in the following words : "Thus there were actually 179 bags biri tobacco weighing 7019 kgs. short in my ware-house and not 350 bags weighing 12,832.60 kgs. as reported by the Preventive Officers." 7. In the written explanation the petitioner admitted the shortage of 179 bags in the following words : "Thus there were actually 179 bags biri tobacco weighing 7019 kgs. short in my ware-house and not 350 bags weighing 12,832.60 kgs. as reported by the Preventive Officers." 7. With regard to the charge of having brought into the ware-house in an unathorised manner 171 bags of tobacco the petitioner's written statement contains the following admission : "I admit the irregularity that out of 171 bags, some bags have double marks and some have marks of those bags which ought to have been cleared according to weighment register." 8. Then we find that a personal hearing was granted by the Collector Central Excise on 22nd October, 1965 and at the time of the hearing it was admitted on behalf of the petitioner that there was a shortage of 179 bags of tobacco for which the petitioner offered to pay excise duty. 9. As regards the excess of 171 bags of tobacco, the Collector found that on some of the bags there were no marks at all and on some there were duplicate marks and on others marks and numbers were found of such bags which had already been cleared from the ware-house under a clearance application of the petitioner. The Collector specifically asked the petitioner's counsel if he could co-relate the excess stock to any particular T. P. 2 permit under which the tobacco was brought into the ware-house. The petitioner's counsel was unable to do so. An explanation was, however, offered on behalf of the petitioner that because of long passage of time marks and numbers on the bags had disappeared and when asked by the Collector as to how old these consignments were, no satisfactory reply could be given. Then the petitioner's attention was specifically drawn to the admission made by him in his statement recorded at the time of the surprise check and the petitioner's counsel pleaded that on account of nervousness the petitioner had signed the statement without thinking what he was doing. Then the petitioner's attention was specifically drawn to the admission made by him in his statement recorded at the time of the surprise check and the petitioner's counsel pleaded that on account of nervousness the petitioner had signed the statement without thinking what he was doing. This explanation has been disbelieved by the Collector on the ground that the petitioner was a literate man, who appeared to be mentally alert and that if he was nervous at the time of the seizure, he could have, immediately thereafter, represented to the superior officers of the Department protesting against the statement taken from him, but he did nothing of the kind until his goods were detained and he was asked to pay the excise duty. In the absence of any immediate protest, the Collector refused to believe the petitioner's allegation that his statement was not voluntary. The Collector has further taken into consideration the fact that it was not the first offence committed by the petitioner. He has cited three previous instances where the petitioner had been found guilty of similar defaults and was fined. The Collector goes on to say that the petitioner appears to be a habitual offender, who has no respect for the law at all. He, therefore, recorded a finding that the removal of the tobacco by the petitioner was deliberate and since the previous punishments awarded to him were lenient and had not the desired affect, he imposed a penalty of Rs. 2,000/-. 10. It is plain that the statement of the petitioner recorded on December 19, 1964 was more of the nature of an explanation rendered by the petitioner at the spot rather than a confession made by him, His allegation that the statement was recorded under coercion of undue influence has not been substantiated by him and the Collector cannot be said to have committed any error in not believing the same. 11. Apart from this, we find that the ultimate action taken against the petitioner is not based upon his statement alone. It is supported by other material on the record which is both relevant and cogent. 11. Apart from this, we find that the ultimate action taken against the petitioner is not based upon his statement alone. It is supported by other material on the record which is both relevant and cogent. The petitioner's own admission that the he had removed 179 bags of tobacco without paying excise duty - an admission contained in his written explanation dated 13th February 1965 and repeated before the Collector at the time of the hearing of the case, and his failure to co-relate 171 bags of tobacco found to be in excess with any of the permits granted to him for bringing in tobacco from outside is, in our opinion, enough material upon which the action taken against him can be justified. 12. As regards the actual quantity of tobacco removed by the petitioner with-out payment of the excise duty and the quantity of tobacco brought in by him to make good the deficiency, the same is a question of fact which has been gone into by the Collector in the first instance and thereafter by the appellants authority. The petitioner had sufficient opportunity to prove his allegations concerning the merits of the case and he having failed to prove the same cannot be allowed to re agitate the matter before us in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The irregularities were admittedly there and the onus lay upon the petitioner to explain those irregularities. His explanation having been rejected, it was open to the excise authorities to draw an adverse inference against him. 13. There is another rather minor point which was faintly urged on behalf of the petitioner. It was submitted that the excise authorities should have established by chemical examination that the biri tobacco in question was different from the sample kept by the department of the tobacco brought to the ware-house against the permit to establish the charge of smuggling. It was further alleged that the tobacco contained in 171 bags was of the same variety as the other tobacco lying in the ware-house. It was further alleged that the tobacco contained in 171 bags was of the same variety as the other tobacco lying in the ware-house. A similar contention appears to have been raised in appeal which was rejected by the Central Board of Excise and Customs by saying, "that the similarity of variety is not material and conclusive because bin tobacco, as is the case here, would normally be the same and its identity can be established only on the basis of the distinguishing marks and numbers on the packages. There were admittedly found to be different. Though there was a further enquiry into the matter, the appellants could not establish the identity of the tobacco." We are of the opinion that this is the correct approach. A chemical examination might have been necessary if the charge against the petitioner was that the smuggled tobacco was not biri tobacco but was a tobacco of a different variety. We find no force in this contention of the petitioner. 14. In view of what we have stated above, the legal question based upon the admissibility of the petitioner's admission of December 19, 1965 loses all force, because even if that statement is excluded, there is enough material on the record to justify the action taken against him. 15. Since, however, we have heard the arguments on this question at great length, we might as well deal with it briefly. 16. We are of opinion that the statement made by the petitioner is not a confession made to a police officer. In State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, A.I.R. 1962 SC 276, the Supreme Court held that a Customs Officer was not a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. Their Lordships expressed the opinion that the expression `police officer' was not confined to the personnel of police force, but, however, it did not have such a wide meaning as to include persons on whom certain police powers were conferred. A Customs Officer is not primarily concerned with the detection and punishment of crimes, but is mainly interested in the detection and prevention of smuggling of goods and of safeguarding the recovery of the customs duties. He is more concerned with the goods and custom duty than with the offender. A Customs Officer is not primarily concerned with the detection and punishment of crimes, but is mainly interested in the detection and prevention of smuggling of goods and of safeguarding the recovery of the customs duties. He is more concerned with the goods and custom duty than with the offender. On this analogy it can be said that an Excise Officer is not a `Police Officer' because he is not primarily concerned with the detection and prevention of crimes but is mainly concerned with the levy and collection of excise duty and it is in that connection that he has been invested with the powers to confiscate goods and to impose fines, whenever an attempt is made to evade excise duty. 17. The later decision of the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1964 SC 828 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is easily distinguishable. In that case the Supreme Court held that an excise officer by virtue of the special powers conferred upon him under the Bihar and Orissa Act was a police officer because for the purpose of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure he was deemed to be an officer Incharge of a police station and was empowered to investigate without the order of a Magistrate any offence punishable under the Excise Act. A confessional statement made to such an officer was held to be barred in the trial of the person concerned by reason of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. As we shall presently show, although somewhat similar powers have been conferred upon a Central Excise Officer under Section 21 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, that provision does not come into play upon the facts in the instant case. Another point of distinction is that was a case of regular trial by a judicial Magistrate, who had convicted the accused under Section 47 (a) of the Excise Act and had sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine of Rs. 2,000/-. The question that arose there was as to whether a confession reported by the Excise Inspector who had investigated the case was admissible during the trial by reason of the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. 18. The instant case is different. 2,000/-. The question that arose there was as to whether a confession reported by the Excise Inspector who had investigated the case was admissible during the trial by reason of the provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. 18. The instant case is different. Here the petitioner has not been tried by a Magistrate and no question therefore would arise as to whether the scaled confessional statement made by him was admissible or not. Here the action has been taken against the petitioner by way of confiscation of goods and imposition of fine by the Collector Central Excise himself under the appropriate powers conferred upon him. 19. It was argued that under the Central Excise and Salt Act (Act No. 1 of 1944) also an Excise Officer had the power of investigation into an offence analogous to 7, the powers of a police officer. 20. Chapter III of the Act deals with the powers and duties of the officers. Section 13 empowers a Central Excise Officer duly empowered by the Central Government to arrest any person whom he h reason to believe to be liable to punishment under this Act, and under Section 19 every person so arrested has to be forwarded to the nearest Central Excise Officer empowered to send the arrested person to a Magistrate or if there is no such Excise Officer available, to the nearest police station. Under Section 21 a Central Excise Officer has been empowered to exercise powers of an officer Incharge of a police station when investigating a cognizable case. It is plain, however, that the power of investigation is exercisable by the Excise Officer only when a person has been arrested and has been forwarded to him under Section 19 of the Act. In such a stiuation a confession recorded by the Excise Officer may be hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act and may not be admissible in evidence at the trial of the person concerned, but in the instant case, the petitioner was not arrested and therefore the powers of the Excise Officer to investigate like a police officer did not come into play at all. There was no trial of the petitioner by a Magistrate as the action taken against him was merely departmental. 21. For these reasons the decision in Rajendra Kumar v. State, A.I.R. 1966 Alld. There was no trial of the petitioner by a Magistrate as the action taken against him was merely departmental. 21. For these reasons the decision in Rajendra Kumar v. State, A.I.R. 1966 Alld. 42 on which also the petitioner relies is clearly distinguishable. 22. Mr. H. N. Seth, learned counsel for the respondents is also right, in our opinion, in this contention that Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act applies only to judicial proceedings before a court. That is plain from Section 1 of the Indian Evidence Act itself which provides : "It shall extend to the whole of India ...... and applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any court including courts-Martial .........but not to affidavits presented to any court or officer, nor to preceedings before an arbitrator," 23. In State of Mysore v. Shivabasappa Shivappa Makapur, A.I.R. 1963 SC 375 the Supreme Court held that "Domestic Tribunals exercising quasi judicial functions are not courts and therefore they are not bound to follow the procedure prescribed for trial of actions in courts nor are they bound by strict rules of evidence." In the instant case action has been taken against the petitioner under Rule 151 of the Central Excise Rules, 1954, which rule empowers the excise authorities to confiscate goods and to impose fine. Proceedings of this nature are not judicial proceedings before a court and the Indian Evidence Act therefore, would not apply to them. That being so, we are not satisfied that the statutory provisions of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act will apply. 24. For all these reasons we find no force in this writ petition and the same is dismissed with costs.