ORDER : J.B. Mehta, J. The petitioner Overseer challenges in this petition the order of the competent authority, dated March 18, 1965, stopping three increments and stopping the petitioner at the efficiency bar and the order of the State Government communicated on November 4, 1965, to the effect that the State Government saw no reason to modify the order passed against him as a result of the departmental inquiry. It is the case of the petitioner that he had made a complaint against the Executive Engineer and the Deputy Engineer at Bhachau for making large payments to the contractors and, therefore, the petitioner was mala fide transferred by the order, dated May 18, 1962, to Bhuj. The petitioner made representations to the authorities against this transfer as his wife was ill and he was in difficult financial circumstances. Thereafter the competent authority having ordered a charge sheet to be issued to the petitioner and having appointed the Executive Engineer as the inquiry officer, the inquiry officer issued a charge sheet to the petitioner on October 5, 1962. As the petitioner objected to the Executive Engineer being the inquiry officer in view of his complaints against him) another inquiry officer Mr. Shaikh issued a fresh charge sheet on May 31, 1963, in respect of five charges at Annexure `E.' The oral inquiry was held on August 2, 1963, after the petitioner's reply was received. As the petitioner asked for copies being supplied because at the time of the previous inquiry he was told that he would be given copies after they were ready, the copies were supplied on August 14, 1963, the petitioner alleged that there was tampering with the evidence and he wanted to see the original inquiry papers. Thereafter the petitioner complained about this tampering to the authorities. The inquiry officer however informed him on September 7, 1963, that his complaint in this connection was rejected and that the inquiry was ordered to be immediately completed. The original and the copies were shown to him and he was told that those copies would be supplied if he so desired. The petitioner reiterated his complaint about tampering. Thereafter the inquiry officer informed him that it was not necessary to supply the original for the purpose of comparison as requested by the petitioner. The original and the copies were shown to him and he was told that those copies would be supplied if he so desired. The petitioner reiterated his complaint about tampering. Thereafter the inquiry officer informed him that it was not necessary to supply the original for the purpose of comparison as requested by the petitioner. He also intimated him that if he needed further time for study before giving a statement, proceedings would be held on with or 12th. If he so requested and failing which, it would be presumed that he wanted to avoid the same. It is the case of the competent authority that the petitioner had thereafter disassociated himself from the inquiry; while the petitioner's case is that he heard nothing further in this connection. The petitioner received order of the competent authority on March 18, 1965, informing him that out of the five charges, three were duly proved and in view thereof the competent authority ordered stoppage of three increments with permanent effect and also imposed a ban on his crossing the efficiency bar. The petitioner's wilful absence for the period from June 7, 1962 to June 5, 1963 was ordered to be treated as extra-ordinary leave without pay and allowance. The petitioner immediately informed the competent authority that the final order was served on him without serving any show cause notice and that he should be provided with the copies of the findings of the inquiry officer and with the copies of the confidential memorandum and that the order passed against him was in contravention of the relevant rules. This order has been confirmed by the State Government and, there. fore, the petitioner challenges these orders in this petition. 2. At the hearing Mr. Mankad vehemently argued amongst his other points that as ne show-cause notice whatever was issued to the petitioner, the impugned order contravened R, 55A of the Bombay Civil Service, Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules referred to as the `rules' and that in any event, no such order should have been passed without giving a copy of the inquiry report in order to enable him to exercise his right of representation envisaged under R. 55A. 3. 3. Rule 33 of the Rules provides that without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force the following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed upon any member of subordinate service: (i) Censure. (ii) Withholding of increments or promotion including stoppage at an efficiency bar. (iii) Reduction to a lower post on a fixed pay or a time.scale or to lower stage in a time scale. (iv) Recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government by negligence or breach of orders. (v) Fine. (vi) Suspension. (vii) Removal from the civil service of the Crown which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment. (viii) Dismissal from the civil service of the Crown which ordinarily disqualifies from future employment. 4. Rule 49 in Appendix I covers seven penalties out of these eight penalties as it excludes the penalty of fine. Rule 55 in Appendix I provides as under: "Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Inquiries Act, 1950, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of a service (other than an order based on facts which led to his conviction in a criminal Court) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The grounds on which it is proposed to take action shall be reduced to the definite form of charge or charges, which shall be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and on any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing, orders on the case. He shall be required within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held. He shall be required within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. If he so desires, or if the authority concerned so directs, an oral inquiry shall be held. At that inquiry oral evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted and the person charged shall be entitled to cross-examine the witnesses to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish provided that the officer conducting the inquiry may for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing refused to call a witness. The proceedings shall contain a sufficient record of the evidence and statement of the findings and the grounds thereof." 5. The second part of Rule 55 provides for eases where this rule may not be applied. 6. In the third part it is provided that this full procedure of a full-fleged regular inquiry prescribed in Rule 85 need not be followed in the case of a probationer discharged in the circumstances described in explanation 2 under Rule 49. In such cases it will be sufficient if the probationer is given an opportunity to show cause in writing against the discharge after being apprised of the grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and his reply duly considered before orders are passed. 7. Thereafter Rule 55A which is material runs as under: Without prejudice to the provisions of R. 55, no order imposing the penalty specified in Clauses (i), (ii) or (iv) of Rule 49 (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a criminal Court or by Court Martial, or an order suspending him for promotion to a higher post on the ground of his unfitness for the post) on any Government servant to whom these rules are applicable shall be passed unless he has been given an adequate opportunity of making a representation that he may desire to make and such representation, if any, has been taken into consideration before order is passed. Provided that the requirements of this rule may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing be waived where there is difficulty in observing them and where they can be waived without injustice to the officer concerned. Provided that the requirements of this rule may for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing be waived where there is difficulty in observing them and where they can be waived without injustice to the officer concerned. It is, therefore, clear from those three rules that out of eight punishments which are contemplated in Rule 33 or 7 punishments which are contemplated in Rule 49 for the three major punishments of dismissal, removal, or reduction, a full-fledged inquiry is contemplated in Rule 55. In the cases of three other punishments, viz., those specified in Rule 49 (1), (2) or (4) Censure, withholding of increments or promotion, including stoppage at an efficiency bar, and recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused Government by negligence or breach of orders, the limited safeguard of Rule 55A is provided guaranteeing the right of effective representation before the order imposing any of three penalties is passed. As for the other remaining categories of punishment i.e. suspension and fine, there is no provision regulating the procedure and such penalty will by governed by the ordinary principles of natural justice and fair play. 8. In the present case, therefore, the matter has to be looked at from the point of view of safeguard which is statutorily provided in Rule 55A before imposing any of the three relevant penalties. Rule 55A in terms provides that no order imposing any of the three penalties shall be passed unless the delinquent has been given an adequate opportunity of making a representation that he may be desirous to make and such representation, if analysis taken into consideration before the order is passed. The proviso only enacts that the requirements of the rule may for sufficient reasons to be recorded be waived where there is difficulty in observing them and where they can be waived without injustice to the officer concerned. Therefore, R. 55A creates a statutory right of an adequate opportunity of making representation before any of the three penalties is imposed by the competent authority and a duty is cast on the competent authority to take into consideration the representation made before any such order is passed. The right of representation must mean a right to make a representation against the penalty proposed to be imposed. The right of representation must mean a right to make a representation against the penalty proposed to be imposed. This would naturally require the competent authority to give a notice indicating to the delinquent concerned his intention to impose the particular penalty. In order to enable the delinquent to make effective representation it is necessary for him to know the first impression of the competent authority. Unless the delinquent knows what is passing in the mind of the competent authority, this statutory right of representation would be an empty formality as he cannot make an effective representation so as to convince the competent authority. It may be that the opportunity to make such representation may be oral or even in writing and it may be before the competent authority or even his delegate, but the statutory requirement of R. 55A is that no such penal order as regards any of the three penalties can be passed by the competent authority unless the delinquent was given an adequate opportunity to make his representation. Therefore, in this context the requirement of R. 55A could only be satisfied if a show cause notice was given indicating the proposed penalty to the parson concerned. 9. Mr. Shelat, however, relied upon the decision in Suresh Koshy v. University of Kerala, A.I.R. 1969 S C 198 at p 201 where their Lordships pointed out that the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under which it functions. Further proceeding at p. 202 their Lordships approved the observations of Lord Harman J. in Byrne v. Kinematograph Renters Society Ltd., 1958-2 All E R 579 as under:- "What, then, are the requirements of natural justice in a case of this kind ? First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made ; secondly that be should be given an opportunity to state his case ; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. First, I think that the person accused should know the nature of the accusation made ; secondly that be should be given an opportunity to state his case ; and thirdly, of course, that the tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there really is anything more." Their Lordships held that in the case before them there was a fair inquiry against the appellant; the officer appointed to inquire was an impartial one and he could not be said to have been against the student. The charge against the student was made known to him before the commencement of the inquiry. The witnesses who gave evidence against him were examined in his presence and lastly, he was given every opportunity to present his case before the inquiry officer. In these circumstances their Lordships held that there was no breach of the principles of natural justice, merely because the Vice Chancellor who had issued the show cause notice on the basis of the report of the enquiry officer did not supply a copy of the report to the concerned student before he was called upon to make his representation against the provisional decision taken by him. Their Lordships pointed out that the student concerned had not even applied for such a report and his grievance that he could not make proper representation without looting into the report was an afterthought. Their Lordships further proceeding at page 204 pointed out as under: "There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by the provisions in Article 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that Article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Law may or may not prescribe such a course. Even if a show cause notice is provided by law, from that it does not follow that a copy of the report on the basis of which the show cause notice is issued should be made available to the person proceeded against or that another inquiry should be held thereafter." Mr. Law may or may not prescribe such a course. Even if a show cause notice is provided by law, from that it does not follow that a copy of the report on the basis of which the show cause notice is issued should be made available to the person proceeded against or that another inquiry should be held thereafter." Mr. Shelat relied upon the last observations of their Lordships and pointed out that to introduce the concept of a show cause notice in R. 55A would be to import the concept of two stages of inquiry which had become the settled concept of Article 311. Mr. Shelat also argued that even though the report of the inquiry officer was not supplied, their Lordships did not hold it to be a contravention of the principles of natural justice. It should be kept in mind that their Lordships pointed out in this decision that the statutory rules made no provision as to how the Vice-chancellor was to act in these matters. Besides, the concerned student had not asked for a copy of the inquiry report on the ground that he would have difficulty in making a representation without looking into the report of the inquiry officer. This decision would not help us to solve the present problem whether the relevant rules of natural justice are embodied in the statutory R. 55A. 10. Mr. Mankad in this connection relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Maharashtra v. Bhaishanker, 10 Guj LR 851 at pp. 853-854; A.I.R. 1969 S C 1302 at pp. 1303-1304. Their Lordships held that non-supply of the copy of the report of the inquiry officer even when not asked foe amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, for if the report was in his favour, in the representation to the Government, the applicant could have utilised the reasoning to dissuade the Inspector General from coming to a contrary conclusion; while if the report was against him, he could utilise the same to dissuade the authority from accepting the report of the inquiry officer. Besides, the authority having report before it of the tentative conclusion arrived at by the inquiry officer, it was bound to influence him and in depriving the applicant of copy of the report ha was handicapped in not knowing what material was influencing the T. G. P. Their Lordships relied upon the decision in Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : A.I.R. 1964 S C 364, to the effect that the enquiry report along with the evidence recorded constitute the material on which the Government has ultimately to act. That is the only purpose of the enquiry held by competent officer and the report he makes as a result of the said enquiry. Their Lordships further pointed out that it was true that the question whether reasonable opportunity has or has not been afforded to the (Government servant must depend on the facts of each case, but it would be in very rare eases indeed in which it could be said that the Government servant is not prejudiced by the non-supply of the report of the enquiry officer. It is true that these observations of their Lordships are in the context of Article 311 where the report must be supplied even though not asked for in order to give an opportunity to the concerned Government servant to make his representation against the action proposed to be taken by the Government. A copy of the report should be supplied when asked for or even otherwise is not a question which should be resolved at this stage, in the context of the present R. 55A when the punishment sought to be imposed is one of the three minor punishments as compared to the major punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction falling under Article 311 of the Constitution. The material question, however, is whether such penalty can be imposed under R. 55A without any notice whatever giving any indication to the delinquent concerned as to the proposed penalty and the grounds thereof so that the delinquent could make effective representation by dissuading the competent authority from taking such action or by disabusing him of his first impressions. The material question, however, is whether such penalty can be imposed under R. 55A without any notice whatever giving any indication to the delinquent concerned as to the proposed penalty and the grounds thereof so that the delinquent could make effective representation by dissuading the competent authority from taking such action or by disabusing him of his first impressions. Once the statutory rule creates a safeguard of a right of making a representation and a duty on the competent authority to take that representation into account before imposing the penalty, it is implicit in this right of the delinquent and the duty on the competent authority that it must give a notice to the delinquent to show cause against this proposed penalty by informing him as to what is passing in his mind. The facts of the present case are very eloquent. The petitioner had complained against the Executive Engineer and the Dy. Engineer and even when he was transferred his case was that of a mala fide transfer because of his earlier complaint. When he was charge sheeted, the delinquent immediately protested against the same Executive Engineer holding inquiry against him, against whom he had made serious allegations. Thereafter the inquiry was taken away from him and a new inquiry officer was appointed. New charge sheet which was given by the new inquiry officer Mr. Shaikh contained in all five charges and had mentioned at the end that the delinquent was further called upon to state why the above charges if proved should not be considered as good and sufficient grounds for imposing upon him any of the punishments specified in R. 33 of the Rules, and that any representation that he might make with regard to the action taken against him would be considered by the competent authority before the final order of punishment was passed. At the time of the inquiry a disputes ensued as to whether there was tampering of the inquiry record or not and the petitioner began to agitate his grievance before the authorities. The petitioner was replied ultimately that it was ordered that the inquiry officer should proceed with the inquiry and at once, supply the copies. At the time of the inquiry a disputes ensued as to whether there was tampering of the inquiry record or not and the petitioner began to agitate his grievance before the authorities. The petitioner was replied ultimately that it was ordered that the inquiry officer should proceed with the inquiry and at once, supply the copies. Thereafter the inquiry officer asked the petitioner that he would get copy and the matter would be adjourned on 11th and 12th if he wanted to file a statement, otherwise he would presume that he was avoiding the same. Thereafter the petitioner did not hear anything further for a period of 15 months and thereafter the impugned penalty order was served on him on March 18, 1964. This order mentions that out of five charge, only three charges were proved and the penalty of stop, page of three increments and the stoppage of the petitioner at the efficiency bar had been ordered. The petitioner therefore, immediately replied that he was never served with any show cause notice and he should be provided with a copy of the report of the inquiry officer and the State Government's confidential memorandum referred to in the order. From these facts it is obvious that at the commencement of the inquiry, the inquiry officer had mentioned five charges and had intimated the petitioner that he would be liable to suffer any of the eight punishments mentioned in R. 33. Merely because the petitioner got the opportunity to meet these charges by taking part in the oral inquiry, it does not mean that the requirement of R. 55A were complied with. The petitioner could never have known as to what charges were considered as proved and as to what was the punishment which the competent authority was intending to impose. It is only when the petitioner would be informed of these two things that he should have a real opportunity of making representation to disabuse the competent authority of his first impression or to convince him that the charges proved were not grave enough which would warrant the proposed penalty. 11. Mr. Shelat argued that the first charge sheet should be taken as the combined charge sheet and a show cause notice as it indicated all the penalties. 11. Mr. Shelat argued that the first charge sheet should be taken as the combined charge sheet and a show cause notice as it indicated all the penalties. If R. 55A has any meaning and if that statutory safeguard is not to be treated as an empty formality, it should be held that the competent authority must give a notice disclosing to the petitioner the proposed penalty and the grounds thereof. As pointed out by their Lordships in the State of Orissa v. Dr. Miss Bina Pani Dei, A.I.R. 1967 SC 1269 at p. 1271, order by the State to the prejudice of a person in derogation of his vested right may be made only in accordance with the basic rules of justice and fair play. The deciding authority, it is true is not in the position of a Judge called upon to decide an action between contesting parties and strict compliance with the forms of judicial procedure may not be insisted upon. He is however under a duty to give the person against whom an inquiry is held an opportunity to set up his version or defence and an opportunity to correct or controvert any evidence in the possession of an authority which is sought to be relied upon to his prejudice. For that purpose the person against whom an inquiry is held must be informed of the case he is called upon to meet and the evidence in support thereof. The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed; it need not be shown to be super added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power. If the essentials of justice be ignored and an order to the prejudice of a person is made, the order is a nullity. That is a basic concept of the rule of law and importance thereof transcends the significance of a decision in any particular case. 12. It is true that these observations were made in the context of an administrative order of a compulsory retirement passed on certain disputed date of birth and when the concerned officer was not given the report of the inquiry officer who conducted into the inquiry of the correct date of birth. The decision, however, is very clear that the duty to act judicially follows from the wide amplitude of this power to pass an order involving such serious consequences and that even in such an administrative order the essentials of justice could not be ignored. In Suresh Koshi's case, A.I.R. 1969 S C 198 even it is could (sic) that at least those minimum principles which are essentials of justice and a fair play must be observed. If, therefore, right of representation is a statutory safeguard of R. 55A, such a right must carry this essential minimum requirement of the notice to the delinquent concerned as to the proposed penalty and of the grounds thereof. Merely stating at the outset the number of grounds and a number of penalties which the delinquent was liable to suffer if any of those charges would be proved would hardly be in consonance with this statutory requirement of a right to make an effective representation which could convince the authority not to impose the penalty. Mr. Shelat in this connection finally relied upon the decision of Dua J. (as he then was) in Gangaram v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1959 Punj 643, where the learned Judge pointed out that reduction in rank was not the same thing as withholding of increments which is merely an instance of loss of prospects of earning more than what the employee may be earning at the time. If a reasonable notice to meet the charges levelled against the petitioner was in fact given during the course of the inquiry then if the proposed action to be taken against him is merely of withholding of increments, he would not be entitled to the right conferred by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution, nor would failure to give such second notice violate any rule of natural justice. Mr. Shelat ignores the fact that at page 645 the learned Judge has clearly pointed out that the penalty of withholding increment is covered by para. 1713 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code and this para did not require any show cause notice. 13. It is in that context that it was held that this penalty did not contravene Article 311 (2) and there was no violation of any principle of natural justice. This decision could not help Mr. Shelat when we have to apply R. 55A which creates a statutory right of making an effective representation before the penalty is imposed and which, therefore, necessarily carries with it the right to have a show cause notice as to the particular penalty envisaged in E. 55A and the grounds on which it is sought to be imposed. Therefore, on this short ground this petition must succeed as on admitted facts the competent authority has straightway passed the impugned order without giving any show cause notice to the petitioner proposing this penalty at any stage of the inquiry in order to enable him to make an effective representation why such penalty should not be imposed on him. Therefore, this petition is allowed and both the impugned orders of the competent authority as well as of the State Government in question are quashed. It is clarified that it will be open to the competent authority to impose the penalty in question after issuing the relevant show cause notice on the basis of the inquiry papers. Rule accordingly made absolute with costs. Petition allowed.