JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - This second appeal has been referred to us by a learned Single Judge of this Court because it involves an intricate question regarding limitation, which calls for an authoritative decision. 2. The Appeal arises out of a suit-for the recovery of damages for malicious prosecution. A criminal complaint was filed against the plaintiffs by the defendant on 8-2-1950. On 29-12-1950 the plaintiffs were acquitted by the Magistrate, but the defendant filed a revision against this acquittal order, which was not dismissed until 31-8-1951. The present suit for damages was instituted on 20-8-1952. 3. The relevant Article of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 is Article 23, which prescribes a period of one year for filing a suit for compensation for malicious prosecution. The question that calls for determination is whether this one year should be 'computed from 29-12-1950, when the plaintiffs were acquitted by the Magistrate, or whether it should run from 31-8-1951, when that order of acquittal was confirmed by the dismissal of the revision. If limitation is calculated from the order of acquittal itself (29-12-1950) , the suit filed on 20-8-1952 will clearly be beyond time. The courts below have decided this point in favour of the plaintiffs and have decreed the suit, treating it as within time, having been filed within one year of the date of the dismissal of criminal revision. 4. Article 23 lays down that the point of time from which the one-year period of limitation begins to run is "when the plaintiff is acquitted, or the prosecution is otherwise terminated". The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that at any rate in cases where a definite order of acquittal is passed, time will begin to run from the actual order of acquittal, irrespective of whether any appeal or revision is filed against that order. 5. There appears to be no Allahabad ruling dealing with a case of acquittal. Both Madan Mohan Singh v. Ram Sundar Singh, 1930 ALJ 885 and Bhagat Rai v. Mst. Gurai Dulaiya, AIR 1938 Allahabad 49 relate to cases of discharge and are authority for the proposition that in such cases, if a revision is filed against the discharge order, limitation will run front the date of dismissal of the revision application, not from the actual date of discharge. Gurai Dulaiya, AIR 1938 Allahabad 49 relate to cases of discharge and are authority for the proposition that in such cases, if a revision is filed against the discharge order, limitation will run front the date of dismissal of the revision application, not from the actual date of discharge. The argument, as set forth in the first of these cases, is as follows : "Of course as soon as the order of discharge was passed the prosecution in the Magistrate's court terminated. If no further proceedings are taken the prosecution must be deemed to have terminated on that date. But if, as a matter of fact, the matter is taken up in revision to a higher authority which has power of interference and proceedings sanctioned by the Code of Criminal Procedure are being pursued, the prosecution can no longer be said to have finally terminated. Its final termina-nation would be only when the proceedings in revision have come to an end in favour of the discharged person." 6. It is difficult to see how any logical distinction can be drawn between cases of acquittal and cases of discharge, so far as the limitation for filing a suit for damages for malicious prosecution is concerned. But in this same ruling (1930 A. L. J. 885) it was observed : "Moreover in a case where the prosecution ended in acquittal the language of Article 23 leave no room for argument, as it provides specifically that limitation is to run from the date of acquittal. It is not, therefore, necessary to consider when the prosecution 'terminated; It is only in cases which ended otherwise than in acquittal that it falls to be considered as to when the prosecution terminated." 7. These remarks however are clearly obiter, since the learned Judges were not dealing with a case of acquittal at all; and it is further to be noted that a subsequent passage in the same judgment seems to propound an entirely different view. This passage runs : "One may take the case of a Government Appeal from an acquittal as an illustration. The order of acquittal terminates the prosecution for the time being. The filing of an appeal does not ipso facto vacate that order; and yet while the appeal is pending it can herdly be said that the prosecution has terminated." 8. This passage runs : "One may take the case of a Government Appeal from an acquittal as an illustration. The order of acquittal terminates the prosecution for the time being. The filing of an appeal does not ipso facto vacate that order; and yet while the appeal is pending it can herdly be said that the prosecution has terminated." 8. This contradiction was noted in the subsequent ruling (A. I. R. 1938 All. 49) and it was noted that the earlier decision was "not to be taken as an absolute authority for the proposition that the period of limitation for a suit for compensation for malicious prosecution must begin to run from the date of an acquittal." 9. These Allahabad cases, therefore, afford little or no guidance for the decision of the question with which we are dealing. To interpret the wording of Article 23 in the manner suggested in Madan Mohan Singh's case means drawing an illogical and pointless distinction between suits for damages based on acquittal and suits for damages based on discharge. , Furthermore such an interpretation will in many instances give rise to hardship, for when the plaintiff is obliged to institute the suit without waiting for the appeal or revision against the acquittal to be decided, he may find that he has wasted his time and money if the appeal or revision eventually succeeds and the acquittal order is set aside. Of course, when the words of a statute are unambiguous and are capable of bearing only one meaning, the question as to whether anomaly and hardship will result therefrom has scarcely any relevance. But where two interpretations are possible, we should lean towards the one that avoids anomaly and hardship. We are therefore inclined to adopt the view expressed by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Soora Kulasekara Chetty v. Tholasingam Chetty, A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 349. In that case, refer-ring to Article 23 of the Limitation Act, their Lordship observed : "The wording 'when the plaintiff is acquitted' cannot be divorced from the words 'or the prosecution is otherwise terminated.' In our opinion the Article provides that time shall run when the plaintiff is acquitted or when the prosecution comes to and end in some other manner. If the acquittal is followed by other proceedings the prosecution is terminated not by the acquittal but by the order passed in the subsequent proceedings". If the acquittal is followed by other proceedings the prosecution is terminated not by the acquittal but by the order passed in the subsequent proceedings". 10. This same view, it may be noted, was followed by the Oudh Chief Court in Bhikham Singh v. Darshan Singh, A.I.R. 1942 Oudh 489. 11. Our conclusion is that the phrase used in Article 23 fixing the point of time from which the period of limitation begins to run as "when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated", must be construed as equivalent to "when the prosecution of the plaintiff is terminated by acquittal or otherwise"; and termination of the prosecution by acquittal should be deemed to occur only when all appeals and revisions that may have been filed against the basic order of acquittal have been finally disposed of. This interpretation obviates the necessity for making an illogical distinction between cases of acquittal and cases where the prosecution is terminated by discharge; and it has the further merit of avoiding the possibility of hardship for the plaintiff by permitting him to wait until his acquittal has been placed beyond doubt before he files his suit for compensation for malicious prosecution. 12. Judged from this point of view, the present suit is within time, having been filed less than a year after the rejection of the revision, which had the effect of finally confirming the plaintiff's acquittal. No other points has been pressed. This second appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.