JUDGMENT 1. THESE three Rules raised a short question, they arise out of three pre-emption proceedings, which were started under the following circumstances : 2. ONE Krishnamoyee had four annas share in the occupancy raiyati holding of Khatian No. 15 of Mouza jashpur, the remaining 12 annas share belonging to two brothers Debendra and Nagendra. Krishnamoyee sold two annas, out of her four annas share in the above jote, to one Probhas Chandra pal on March 31, 1942 and thereafter her remaining two annas share in the said jote devolved by inheritance on hem Chandra Dutta. Probhas sold the above property, purchased by him from krishnamoyee, to Bidyut Dey and his father Hrishi on September 29, 1956. It appears that Debendra made a gift of his six annas share in the above jote to the sons of his brother nagendra on January 25, 1946, and thereupon the three sons of Nagendra acquired a total share of twelve annas in the said jote. On January 31, 1956, they sold their above share to one sakhi. Eventually the three pre-emption applications, relevant for consideration in these proceedings, were filed by Hem (Misc. Case No. 109 of 1957), bidyut and his father Hrishi on August 14, 1957 (Misc. Case No. 73 of 1957) and sakhi on January 28, 1957 (Misc. Case no. 14 of 1957). 3. THE learned Munsif appears to have taken up all the three cases together and, by his judgment, dated march 13, 1953 allowed the Miscellaneous cases of Hem and Sakhi and dismissed the petitioner's Miscellaneous case. Against this decision, three appeals were taken by the present petitioner and the said appeals were eventually dismissed by the learned subordinate Judge. The petitioner has now came up against this appellate judgment to this court. 4. THE matter, in substance, is short and simple. It is unquestionable that the petitioner's purchase, by which he clamed the right of pre-emption in respect of Sakhi's purchase, was subject to the right of pre-emption of Hem. This is quite apparent as Hem was a co-sharer at the time. It is true that Hem's predecessor krishnamoyee was the vendor of the petitioner's vendor in respect of the said property, but that was no bar even to Krishnamoyee's exercising right of pre-emption in respect of the petitioner's purchase as the statute (section 26f) only debars the vendor from preempting the sale, made by him. It is true that Hem's predecessor krishnamoyee was the vendor of the petitioner's vendor in respect of the said property, but that was no bar even to Krishnamoyee's exercising right of pre-emption in respect of the petitioner's purchase as the statute (section 26f) only debars the vendor from preempting the sale, made by him. The vendor is not prevented by the statute from pre-empting a sale, made by his or her transferee or purchaser. There would not have been, therefore, any bar even to Krishnamoyee's applying for pre-emption of the petitioner's purchase and a fortiori there would be no such bar against Hem. Obviously, also, as we have already indicated above, the petitioner's purchase was subject to Hem's right of pre-emption and if, therefore, Hem be allowed to pre-empt the petitioner's purchase, -and, in the circumstances before us there is no reason for denying him that right, - the petitioner's application for pre-emption of Sakhi must fail. Hem's right of pre-emption is, therefore, an overriding right and, once that right is exercised, the other right would vanish, in this view We hold that the courts below were right in dismissing the petitioner's application for pre-emption. 5. WE, accordingly, affirm those decisions said discharge those Rules.