JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This is a plaintiffs' appeal and is directed against the decree passed by Shri R. S. Misra, Additional Civil Judge, Hamirpur, dated 18-7-1959 by which he affirmed the decree passed by an Assistant Collector 1st Class, Hamirpur dated 11-7-1958. 2. The suit, giving rise to this appeal was filed by the plaintiffs-appellants under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The relief claimed was for the ejectment of the defendants-respondents and one Dassi from plot No. 4120 measuring 1.1.96 acres situate in village Kharehta, district Hamirpur and for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 4,000/- by way of damages. Having failed before the trial court and the first appellate court, the plaintiffs have filed the instant appeal in this Court. 3. During the pendency of the second appeal one of the defendants-respondents, Dassi, died. Admittedly no steps were taken to implead his heirs and the suit as also the second appeal against him stand abated. 4. It is contended by Mr. K. P. Singh, the learned counsel for the defendants-respondents, that inasmuch as the appeal has abated against Dassi, the decree of the first appellate court, in which the decree of the trial court has merged, has become final between Dassi and the plaintiffs-appellants. Learned counsel further submits that the result of the decree of the first appellate court having become final with regard to Dassi is that Dassi had been declared to be the Sirdar of the land in dispute and that now if the decree of the first appellate court is reversed, there will be two conflicting decrees, which the law does not permit and for that reason the second appeal has become incompetent. Learned counsel placed reliance upon the following words occurring in Section 209 of the Act : "shall be liable to ejectment on the suit, in cases referred to in Clause (a) above, of the bhumidhar, Sirdar or asami concerned, and in cases referred to in clause (b) -shall also be liable to pay damages." 5. The argument of Mr. K. P. Singh is that it is only a Bhumidhar or Sirdar or Assami, who can bring a suit under Section 209(a) of the Act and and no other person. The argument of Mr. K. P. Singh is that it is only a Bhumidhar or Sirdar or Assami, who can bring a suit under Section 209(a) of the Act and and no other person. It is pointed out that inasmuch as the effect of the decree passed by the first appellate court in which the decree of the trial court is merged is to declare Dassi as the Sirdar, the plaintiffs-appellants cannot now maintain the suit as against other defendants-respondents also. In our judgment the submission in well founded. 6. Mr. V. K. S. Chaudhary, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants, has strenuously contended that in a suit for the ejectment of trespassers, each and every defendant has a separate liability for being ejected and that in such a case it is not necessary to implead all the trespassers. He has placed reliance upon several cases. 7. The first case on which he places reliance is Peria Perumal Muthirian v. Pichan alias Karupan Muthirian, 8 Indian Cases 268. It was held in that case that in an action for effiectment against several trespassers, the death of one of the defendants, whose legal representatives were not brought on record within the time allowed by law, does not cause the suit to abate against the surviving defendants. The right to sue survives against them so far as their interests are concerned. 8. The next case on which reliance is placed is the single Judge decision of Mukerji, J. in Manak Chand Singh v. Khubi, A.I.R. 1928 Alld. 555. In that case the learned Judge was dealing with the provisions of Section 34 of the North Western Province Tenancy Act, 1901. The learned Judge held that there is nothing in the language of Section 34, to preclude any one of several persons, occupying land without the permission of the landlord, from being sued for paying the compensation of fair rent. 9. The third case on which the reliance is placed is Shibban v. Allah Mehar, A.I.R. 1934 Alld. 716 where Sulaiman, C. J. and Mukerji, J. held that in a suit for possession and injunction against trespassers the mere fact that one of the trespassers has died and his heirs have not been brought on the record does not make it impossible to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs against the trespassers who are before the Court. 10. 10. The fourth case on which the reliance is placed is Raja Himanshudhar Singh v. Sri Ram Hitkari, 1963 ALJ 546. It was held in that case that if a plaintiff claims that he is the owner of a property in the wrongful possession of A, he can maintain a suit for A's ejectment notwithstanding the fact that another person, say B, also claims the same right as against A and that B is not necessary party in the plaintiff's suit and the plaintiff's suit cannot fail on the ground that he is not a party to it. 11. The last case on which reliance is placed is the Full Bench decision of this Court in Habibur Rahman Khan v. Pooran, 1966 ALJ 281. It was held in that case that under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, abatement comes into effect automatically on the expiry of the period prescribed for making a substitution application. The learned Judges held that in the circumstances of that case the order of the trial court rejecting the prayer for setting aside the abatement against D was right. 12. In our opinion all the cases mentioned above are distinguishable and clearly none of them deals with a case which was brought under Section 209 of the Act. 13. It is true that normally a suit can be brought against any one of the several trespassers and it would not fail only because some of the trespassers have been excluded from the array of the defendants. It is also conceivable that a suit against the remaining trespassers would not abate only because one of the trespasser defendant has died and his heirs have not been impleaded. The question, however, is whether in a suit under Section 209 of the Act where the law specifically provides that the suit must be brought by a Bhumidhar, Sirdar or Assami, the appeal can still be maintained when the trial court and the first appellate court have held that the deceased trespasser defendant had become Sirdar of the land in dispute thus ousting the claim of the plaintiff-appellant to maintain the suit. The cases referred to above do not deal with this point and, therefore, we cannot derive much assistance from them. 14. Mr. K. P. Singh has placed reliance upon Rani Dhandei Kuer v. Fat ma Zuhra, A.I.R. 1939 Alld. 698. The cases referred to above do not deal with this point and, therefore, we cannot derive much assistance from them. 14. Mr. K. P. Singh has placed reliance upon Rani Dhandei Kuer v. Fat ma Zuhra, A.I.R. 1939 Alld. 698. In our opinion that case is also clearly distinguishable not being one against trespassers. 15. In view of the circumstance that the decree of the first appellate court in which the decree of the trial court merged had ,become final in favour of Dassi, who was held to be Sirdar of the land in dispute thus excluding the present plaintiffs-appellants from being so if the decree is now reversed against other defendants-respondents, two inconsistent decrees would come into effect. It is settled rule of law that in a case like this if the appeal cannot succeed without bringing into existence of two conflicting decrees, the appeal itself would be rendered incompetent. It cannot be denied that if there is a litigation in future between the plaintiffs-appellants and the heirs of Dassi, the decision recorded by the first appellate court and the trial court holding Dassi to be a Sirdar of the land in dispute would operate as res judicata between the parties. 16. For the reasons mentioned above we are satisfied that inasmuch as Dassi's heirs have not been brought on record, the instant second appeal against the remaining defendants-respondents has become incompetent. It is, therefore, dismissed, but we direct the parties to bear their own costs.