( 1 ) IN Kolar Town there were four brothers: Shankara Iyer, Srikanta iyer, Narayana Iyer and K. S. Krishnamurthy. In the suit out of which this second appeal arises, Srikanta Iyer who was the plaintiff made the allegations that a partition deed was executed between them on September 7, 1958, and that its registration was unreasonably refused by the Sub-Registrar, an appeal from whose order was dismissed by the District Registrar. So, he instituted a suit for compulsory registration, and that suit ended in a decree in the Court of the first instance which was affirmed by the lower appellate Court. Shankara Iyer who was defendant 1 in that suit appeals, and, on his behalf Mr. Subbanna made three submissions. ( 2 ) THE first was that the Courts below arrogated to themselves the role of a handwriting expert when they made a comparison of the disputed signature of Shankara Iyer with his admitted signatures. It is true that that comparison was made by the Courts below in the context of the plea of Shankara Iyer that although Ext. P-1 which is the disputed partition deed is entirely in his hand-writing, he did not affix his signature to it when he realised that the stipulations and covenants in the documents were so unfavourable and disadvantageous to him that he felt persuaded to abstain from completing the execution of the document. But it should be remembered that the Courts below did not depend entirely upon the comparison of the signatures which they made. ( 3 ) SO, the findings of the Courts below did not rest entirely upon the comparison of the signatures which they made only for the purpose of satisfying themselves whether there was any such great disparity between the signatures as to entail the rejection of the other respectable volume of oral evidence which was both direct and indirect in regard to the execution of the partition deed. Mr. Subbanna cannot, therefore, succeed in his endeavour to establish his contention that the finding of the Courts below is for any reason contrary to law. But Mr. Subbanna urged the argument that even so, the suit was barred by limitation, for the reason that when it was brought in the Court of the first instance, it was instituted only against Shankara Iyer who was the only person impleaded as a defendant at that stage. But Mr. Subbanna urged the argument that even so, the suit was barred by limitation, for the reason that when it was brought in the Court of the first instance, it was instituted only against Shankara Iyer who was the only person impleaded as a defendant at that stage. ( 4 ) IT is not disputed that Narayana Iyer and Krishnamurthy and their mother and sisters were added as defendants after the expiry of the period of thirty days within which under S. 77 of the Registration Act, the suit had to be instituted. But that did not make the suit a time-barred or defective suit since the only person who did not appear before the Sub-Registrar to admit execution of the document was Shankara Iyer and those other persons did not deny execution of the document at any stage. On the contrary, Srikanta Iyer and Narayana Iyer admitttd execution of the document even in the course of their evidence which they gave in the present suit. ( 5 ) THAT being so, since the suit was instituted within the period of 30 days prescribed by S. 77 of the Regisration Act, against Shankara Iyer who was the only person who denied execution of the document when the document was presented for registration in the first instance, it is clear that the plea of limitation has to fail. ( 6 ) MR. Subbanna next contended that the partition transaction is utterly unfair to Shankara Iyer and that he is not bound by it. But, that aspect of the matter is quite extraneous to the present suit in which the only question with which I am concerned is whether Shankara Iyer did execute the document as contended by the plaintiff or whether he did not as pleaded by defendant 1. No other question can properly arise in this litigation. I dismiss this appeal. But, in the circumstances, I direct each party to bear his or her own costs in all the three Courts. --- *** --- .