Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by defendants 1 to 3 in a suit for declaration of title and possession, or, in the alternative, for recovery, of landed property. 2. The plaint schedule describes the suit property as 10 acres in the 138 acres 30 cents being R. S. No. 48 of Keezhur amsom. But, at the trial he confined his claim to 7 acres 20 cents which is marked as plot 'A' in Ext. Cl, the commissioner's plan, which plot only will therefore be referred to hereinafter as the suit property. Plaintiff claims the suit property to belong to the Kavut Parambil Ganapathi Devaswom, whose uralers are defendants 4 to 7, from whom he claims to have obtained a lease evidenced by the Marupat Ext. B35 (Copy is Ext. Al) executed by himself on February 23, 1948. It recites lease of 20 acres of land and its prior possession to have been with plaintiff under an oral lease of the year 1935 (1110 M. E.) The plaintiff alleges to have been obstructed by defendants 1 and 2 when he put up a shed on the property in 1953, which culminated in proceedings under S.145 Crl. P. C. before the First Class Magistrate, Tellicherry, who declared the letter to be in possession of the suit property and a Criminal Revision Petition preferred by him against that order to have failed in the High Court. He has therefore instituted this suit. The defendants 1 to 3 contended the entire R. S. No. 48 to have belonged to the Keezhur Edom, (tarvad) and been allotted to the 3rd defendant's tavazhi in partition under the final decree Ext. B126 dated January 2, 1946, and delivered to him through Court on February 26, 1948, as evidenced by the delivery report Ext. B129. Soon thereafter 3rd defendant had to institute O. S. No. 96 of 1948 against one Mayan who trespassed on a part of th6 Survey number, immediately west of the suit plot, under cover of a lease from the uralers of the Devaswom, the present defendants 4 to 7 who were made co-defendants therein. That suit was decreed for possession with damages and mesne profits, by the subordinate judge on 30th September 1953, and the appeal by defendants 4 to 7 was dismissed by the District Judge, on November 7, 1956 (vide Exts. B127 and B130). That suit was decreed for possession with damages and mesne profits, by the subordinate judge on 30th September 1953, and the appeal by defendants 4 to 7 was dismissed by the District Judge, on November 7, 1956 (vide Exts. B127 and B130). Defendants 1 to 3 assert that the entire R S. no. 48 was in th3 direct possession of the Edom before the partition suit, and with DW.12, the receiver appointed in the suit, during the suit, and with the 3rd defendant after date of Ext. B129 The 3rd defendant demised 35 acres in the Survey Number as per Ext B43 dated July 22,1949, to DW. 6, who assigned parts thereof on July 28, 1950, as per Exts. B44 and B45 to Vasurnathi Amma and Lakshmikutty Amma, from whom defendants 1 and 2 have obtained assignments on November 18,1953 as per Exts. B46 and B47 and entered possession. They denied the plaintiff to have possession of the property or any right thereto. The Subordinate Judge held the Devaswom to have no title to the property, found its title with the 3rd defendant, and possession with the plaintiff even before date of Ext, Al and decreed possession to the plaintiff with mesne profits. On appeal, the District Judge affirmed it. Defendants 1 to 3 have come up in second appeal. 3. Obviously this is a suit of the nature contemplated by Art.47 of the Limitation Act, 1908, where the prayer has to be for recovery of the property. The decree passed by the Courts below is for recovery of property. Though in the plaint an allegation of possession with the plaintiff and a prayer for declaration of his possession have been made, it is admitted that, on cancellation of the stay issued in the revision case, the defendants 1 and 2 plucked cashewnuts worth Rs. 250/-from the suit property. That is clear admission that, following the order of the Magistrate under S.145 Crl. P. C., the defendants 1 and 2 have entered possession of the suit property. This suit must therefore be reckoned as one for recovery of landed property from the possession of defendants 1 to. 3. The plaintiff can succeed only on proof of a valid title to the property. 4. No document of acquisition of the suit property is in proof. Ext. This suit must therefore be reckoned as one for recovery of landed property from the possession of defendants 1 to. 3. The plaintiff can succeed only on proof of a valid title to the property. 4. No document of acquisition of the suit property is in proof. Ext. B128 is an extract from the Settlement Register prepared at the re-survey had about the year 1930. It shows that 138 acres 30 cents of unassessed land, comprised in old Survey Numbers 110 and 132, was re-surveyed as R S. No. 48 and settled in the name of Keezhur Edathil Kunhikrishnan Vazhunnavar, then karnavan of 3rd defendant's tarward. Ext. B62 is a copy of the register of the old settlement had about the year 1900. It shows that S. No. 110, 88 acres 4 cents in extent, and S. No. 132, 61 acres 45 cents in extent had been registered as unassessed lands in the name of Thazhe Edathil Nambiar, who is the senior member of the 3rd defendant's tarward. In the same Register S. No. 109 and several others are seen settled in the name of Kavut Parambil Ganapathi Devaswom Udama Keezhur Edathil Kunhambu Vazhunnavar. Keezhur Edom is admittedly the 3rd defendant's tarwad. These entries make clear that properties of the Devaswom were settled and registered separately from the properties of the Keezhur Edom and also that neither S. No. 110 nor S. No. 132 belonged to the Devaswom. As observed by the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Maharaja Bahadur (AIR. 1951 SC. 288) entries in the Settlement Register are prima facie evidence of title. When no better evidence of title is forthcoming they can well be accepted as proof of title. In this case, they are further corrborated by the decision between the 3rd defendant and the Ganapathi Devaswom in O.S. 96 of 1948 that the latter has no title to RS. No. 48 which belongs to the former only. That finding even if it may not operate as res judicata against the plaintiff binds his lessor on his right to grant a lease to plaintiff. Counsel for respondent-plaintiff relied on Ext. B72 which is a draft-pattah (Karadu-Pattayam) in the name of Kavut Parambil Ganapathi Devaswom Udama Keezhur Edathil Kunhikrishanan Vazhunnavar. It includes R. S. No.55/3, 56 cents, shown to be comprised of 20 cents of Old Survey No. 99/8 and an unspecified area in Old Survey No. 110. Counsel for respondent-plaintiff relied on Ext. B72 which is a draft-pattah (Karadu-Pattayam) in the name of Kavut Parambil Ganapathi Devaswom Udama Keezhur Edathil Kunhikrishanan Vazhunnavar. It includes R. S. No.55/3, 56 cents, shown to be comprised of 20 cents of Old Survey No. 99/8 and an unspecified area in Old Survey No. 110. Whether this has been followed in the fair pattah, is not shown here. But even if it has been, it would not show that the entirety of Old Survey No. 110, much less the suit property, ever belonged to the Ganapathi Devaswom. I accept the concurrent finding of the Courts below that the title to the suit property is vested with the 3rd defendant's tavazhi, and not with the plaintiff or his lessors as claimed by him. 3rd defenant is admittedly the karnavan of his tavazhi. 5. The material question, decided in the Courts below and canvassed in this Court, is of possession of the suit property. The Courts below have concurred to find possession with the plaintiff; and, as a finding of fact concurrent, it is normally unchallengeable in second appeal. But counsel for appellants contends that that finding has been arrived at overlooking certain material evidence on record and has to be reviewed in this second appeal. That has to be heard and determined. The plaintiff claims, and that is supported by defendants 4 to 7, that he has been in possession of the suit property under an oral lease since 1935. The recital to that effect in the marupat executed by him in favour of defendants 4, 6, and 7 cannot advance his case any further than the plea. As dealings of landed properties of a Devaswom by its uralers can seldom be oral, it requires strong evidence in support before it can be accepted by court. The plaintiff, as PW.1, has sworn to his oral lease having been affirmed by annual rent receipts since 1936: "Till 1948 I paid rent. I gave direct to the uralers. I paid at the rate of Rs 15/-. Devaswom had counter foil receipts. I had got receipts from 1111 onwards at Rs..15/-year. Receipts were with me. There were 12 receipts." He has neither produced any of the receipts, nor sought to prove them through counterfoils kept by the Devaswom. I gave direct to the uralers. I paid at the rate of Rs 15/-. Devaswom had counter foil receipts. I had got receipts from 1111 onwards at Rs..15/-year. Receipts were with me. There were 12 receipts." He has neither produced any of the receipts, nor sought to prove them through counterfoils kept by the Devaswom. He admits candidly: "There is no document to show my possession before the marupat." His story of rent-receipts therefore convinces little. He has examined six witnesses as PWs. 2 to 7. PW. 2 is the son of a lessee of the land adjoining north of the suit property. He swore in chief examination: "I am in possession of 7 acres in RS. No. 48. It is under Keezhur Edom. My father Keloth Chozhan Krishna Kurup obtained the lease orally. It was in 1935. Even at that time I used to go to the property. The southern boundary of that property is road. On the south of the road the plaintiff is in possession. In the year we got possession the plaintiff was also there. From that year till now the plaintiff is in possession of the property on the southern side of the road." But in cross-examination, he admitted categorically: "I used to see the plaintiff from 1953 once or twice in a year when I used to go to my property.... First time I went was 12 years ago...." and in re-examination: "For getting work done there I began to go only 12 years ago." He was swearing in 1961. According to the age given by him, he was only about 10 in 1935, the date of the oral lease to his father. He admits: 'My father is alive. I know about the oral lease from what my father told me.... Father can give evidence in Court." Obviously his statement as to the oral lease was hearsay and therefore no evidence. His testimony is clear that he could have, if at all, seen the plaintiff at the spot only since 1953 that too very rarely, once or twice a year. It is hardly convincing as evidence of a neighbour's possession. PW. 3 is an assignee in 1957 of the late Madathi Kunhi who claimed to be a lessee of a small plot to the east of the suit property under the Devaswom. It is hardly convincing as evidence of a neighbour's possession. PW. 3 is an assignee in 1957 of the late Madathi Kunhi who claimed to be a lessee of a small plot to the east of the suit property under the Devaswom. Swearing in June 1961, he deposed even in chief-examination: "On the west of my property the plaintiff is in possession. He is seen in possession from 10 to 15 years ago." Even if full credit is given to this statement it does not refer to possession before 1946. It avails little in this suit instituted in June 1956 to establish title with plaintiff. PW. 4 is a lessee under the plaintiff as per the marupat Ext. A21 dated January 31, 1955, of 4 acres of the suit property at its north. The document recites: He has testified: " I had cultivated on pun am the plaint schedule property. I had executed a registered kachit for that. It is Ext.A21 ... The plaintiff planted cashew in the property cultivated by me on punam." Punam cultivation is well-known to be fugitive cultivation of land overgrown with bushes or jungle, after clearing the growth. The expression " ImSpsh< That certainly cannot be a reference to the plaintiff who claims to be lessee of the Devaswom. His admission of tenants of the Edom being all around his sister's leasehold clearly negatives plaintiff's possession of the suit property. P. W. 7 came to the locality only in 1952 and spoke of plaintiff's possession thereafter only: "I saw plaintiff, in possession for the first time in 1953." Thus, there is little evidence to support the plaintiff's case of possession since 1935 (1110 M. E.) or at any time before 12 years of this suit. 6. Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff adverted to the evidence as to the existence of cashew trees 20 to 25 years old on the suit property and the lack of evidence that they had been planted by defendants 1 to 3 or their predecessors-in-interest. But there is no proof that they were planted by the plaintiff or anybody under whom he claims. There is only the interested assertion of the plaintiff that he was in possession of the property from 1935 and had planted cashew trees thereon, supported by the equally interested testimony of his lessor who asserts falsely a rival title to the property. There is only the interested assertion of the plaintiff that he was in possession of the property from 1935 and had planted cashew trees thereon, supported by the equally interested testimony of his lessor who asserts falsely a rival title to the property. If positive proof is lacking as to who planted the trees on the property the presumption can only be that it was by or at the instance of its owner. The 3rd defendant as dw.11 has claimed the entire property to have been in direct possession of his tarwad. Though some marupats executed by tenants of the Devaswom in regard to bits of the survey number have been produced by the plaintiff, none of the lessees under them has been cited in the case. Strictly speaking, it is irrelevant to this case whether those leases relating to plots other than the suit land are in effect. Counsel for plaintiff pointed out that the plan Ext. A37 prepared by the receiver appointed in the criminal proceedings, and the plan prepared by a commissioner deputed in this case to make local inspection of the suit property show most of the plots around the suit property to be in possession of tenants under the Devaswom. The observation of the Supreme Court in Anil Behari Ghosh v. Latika Bala Dassi (AIR. 1955 SC. 566) is that even a judgment of the Criminal Court is not evidence in a civil proceeding on the identical question. The statements as to neighbours in a plan prepared by the receiver in the Criminal case cannot command more credit than the judgment in that case. Nothing on record shows that the commissioner deputed in this suit was directed to ascertain the identity and status of persons in possession of plots around the suit property. Commissions are normally issued only to make a local inspection of the suit property. Any act of a commissioner beyond scope of his deputation is ultra vires and therefore of no significance in law. No enquiry was had in this suit as to the possessors or occupants around the suit property. The statements as to the occupants around the suit property in the aforesaid plans cannot therefore command credit. However those plans themselves show that the land adjoining north of the suit property is in possession of a tenant of the 3rd defendant's Edom. pw. The statements as to the occupants around the suit property in the aforesaid plans cannot therefore command credit. However those plans themselves show that the land adjoining north of the suit property is in possession of a tenant of the 3rd defendant's Edom. pw. 2 has sworn to that effect and stated even in his chief examination that his father has been holding it since 1935. Pw.6 has sworn that plots around the leasehold of his sister, which according to the aforesaid plans include the suit property, are in possession of tenants under the Edom. Hence even if some plots adjoining the suit property are in possession of tenants the Devaswom which is not in proof here it cannot show that the cashew trees on the suit property were planted by the plaintiff or by some tenant of the Devaswom. There is thus no proof of plaintiff's possession of the suit property beyond 12 years of the suit. The plaintiff has therefore failed to prove a title with him to recover the property from the appellants. 7. Counsel for plaintiff pressed into service S.2E of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1967 as amended by the Act V of 1969, which reads: "Certain persons occupying lands believing to be tenants to be deemed tenants. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, or in any contract, custom or usage, or in any judgment, decree or order of court, any person who on the llth day of April, 1957, was continuously in occupation of the land of another for not less than two years on the basis of a registered lease deed and continued to be in occupation of such land on the date of publication of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill 1968, in the Gazette shall be deemed to be a tenant, notwithstanding the fact that the tenancy was created by a person not competent to do so." and urged that as the plaintiff is claiming possession since 1948 under a registered marupat he has to be deemed a tenant even if the uralers were not competent to grant a lease of the suit property. The contention is that the expression "a person not competent to do so": that is 'a person not competent to grant the lease' would include an impostor and a trespasser on the land who granted a lease, and that the section, being a beneficial social legislation, must be given the widest construction possible. Apart from the admission in the plaint filed on June 16,1956 that defends ants 1 and 2 have entered possession following the Magistrate's declaration in their favour, which negatives possession with plaintiff in 1957 and after, and the lack of a registered lease to them a registered marupat executed by the lessee alone, without the junction of the lessors, may not satisfy the section the above contention, I am afraid, betrays a misconception of the import of the section. The expression 'tenant' is a relative term, which has no significance unless correlated to another. No one can be a tenant in himself: one can be a tenant only in relation to another who is the landlord. Two persons are referred to in the Section, the person in occupation and the person who owns the land. If the person who incompetently granted a lease is a stranger, the so-called lessee can only be a tenant of the stranger and therefore not a tenant within the definition of the Act. When it is said that a "person ...in occupation of the land of another... on the basis of a registered lease deed ...shall be deemed to be a tenant" it means obviously that he shall be deemed to be a tenant of him whose land he holds. The person who executes the registered lease must therefore be the proprietor of the land or his or its representative, and the expression "not competent to do so", must necessarily relate to him. I am well aware of the necessity of understanding the rule of law in a dynamic sense and therefore of the need to interpret legislations calculated for the use and development of resources in developing countries in a manner consistent with its economic purpose and social intent, and further of the fact that it is lack of adequate recognition of this principle that caused the amendments to Art.31 of our Constitution and the introduction of the much controversial Ninth Schedule to it. The instant legislation, the Act V of 1969, is doubtless a measure designed for the development of a healthy agricultural economy in the State. But equally imperative and salient is the obligation of a lawyer in a democratic State to keep a proper balance between competing interests, public and private, social and individual, in the light of the current social developments, and to ensure that the minimum safeguards of liberties in a democracy are not destroyed in the name of rapid social progress. It is difficult to think that S.2E intended to assure any legality to trespasses by aggressive intruders on properties of law-abiding citizens. Agrarian reforms only assure protection to tenants and avoid manoeuvres to camouflage tenancies: they are not measures to sanctify rank violations of the legal order. To adopt the style of justice Murphy in Chatwin v. United States (326 U. S.455), 'the broadness of the statutory language does not permit me to tear the words out of their context, using the magic of lexigraphy to apply them to claims lacking any derivation of interest from a lawful proprietor which is the very essence of tenancy. I adopt the observations of Justice Learned Hand in Cabell v. Harkham, cited in Legal Theory by Friedmann, "Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." Identical appears to be the rule even in ancient India given by Brihaspati and cited in Vyavahara Nirnaya: [Decisions are not to be rendered on mere letter of the code. In judgments without considerations of aptness or propriety, miscarriage of justice arises.] The Supreme Court has cautioned: "It is well -settled that a limited interpretation has to be made on words used by the legislature in spite of the generality of the language used where the literal interpretation in the general sense would be so unreasonable or absurd that the Legislature should be presumed not to have intended the same." Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Company Ltd.v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills, Ltd. (A. I. R.1960 S. C. 695 at 701).. The expression 'not competent' in the Section is of ambiguous import. It is well-known that in this State quite a good number of property transactions by karnavans and managers of joint families are challenged on the ground of voidability under restrictions on their powers by statute or personal laws. Decisions of this Court have held that a karnavan is incompetent to make an improvident lease (vide Muhammed v. Ramakrishna Iyer 1958 K. L. J. 577). S.33 of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act 1933-1958 and the Kerala Nambudiri Act 1958 and several other statutes make karnavans incompetent to execute leases without adequate necessity or benefit and the written consent of the majority of major members of the tarwad. Leases within the mischief of such laws are ordinarily set aside at the instance of junior members and the property restored to the tarwad. In my opinion, such and similar leases are the leases contemplated by the S.2E. The expression "not competent to do so" has therefore to be understood in a restricted sense, unequated with lack of inherent authority or power, but equated with non-compliance with the restrictions on power to demise land. Cases of absolute want of inherent power or authority to grant a lease of land are not therefore within the ambit of S.2E. Otherwise, a total stranger on property, a mere impostor, or a rank trespasser thereon, can grant a lease to some other and thereby confer a lawful title thereto under cover of the present section. I feel no doubt that the legislative intent or purpose of S.2E is not to make unlawful transactions lawful, but only to make transactions that are voidable, which are perforce valid until actual avoidance, continuously valid if it was followed by possession for the period prescribed in the Section. I feel no doubt that the legislative intent or purpose of S.2E is not to make unlawful transactions lawful, but only to make transactions that are voidable, which are perforce valid until actual avoidance, continuously valid if it was followed by possession for the period prescribed in the Section. The section does nothing more than make that which is valid initially, valid for ever. Transactions which are void ab initio and therefore non est in law are not validated by S.2 E. I would therefore construe the expression 'a person not competent to do so' in S.2E to mean only a person who has an interest in that land which confers inherent power on him to grant a lease, but has not the competence to do so for want of satisfaction of certain conditions restricting his power imposed by statute or common law. The plaintiff in the instant case cannot therefore claim the benefit of S.2E of the Act and cannot be deemed to be a tenant of the 3rd defendant to which statute he has no pretensions at all. 8. In the result, the plaintiff is found to have no title to recover the property from the defendants. The second appeal is allowed and in reversal of the decree of the Court below the suit in dismissed. Costs here follow the event.