JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - Plaintiff No. 1 alone preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Sambalpur, confirming the decision of the Munsif, Bargarh, to Title Suit No. 4 of 1960 dismissing the suit for redemption of a mortgage. 2. Plaintiffs filed the suit for redemption of 1.16 acres of land described in Schedule Ka of the plaint. The property originally belonged to Satyabadi Sahu who as the father of Plaintiff No. 3 and husband of Plaintiff No. 2. Plaintiffs averred that Satyabadi on 25.9.1953 had given the suit property in usufructuary mortgage to Defendant-Respondent No. 1 for Rs. 250/- and after the death of Satyabadi on 14-9-1955, Plaintiffs 2 alto 3 inherited his property. Plaintiffs 2 and 3 thereafter on 26-3-1959, sold the suit property to the Appellant, Plaintiff No. 1, for Rs. 700/- by a registered sale deed Ext. 4. The Defendant asserted that there was no such mortgage as alleged by the Plaintiffs, but the Defendant purchased the suit property from the said Satyabadi in the year 1953 for Rs. 500/. As the sale deed by which he purchased the property from Satyabadi was lost, he approached Satyabadi and thereafter Plaintiffs 2 and 3 to execute a fresh sale deed in his favour, but they on some pretext or other deferred the matter and did not execute any such sale deed. He asserted that the Plaintiffs, taking advantage of the' death of Satyabadi, cooked up this case on a false claim. 3. The trial Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit on the ground that attestation of the mortgage in accordance with law was not made; and that the Plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of a subsisting mortgage, and that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to adduce secondary evidence of the contents of the mortgage deed without calling for the original from the mortgagee by taking recourse to Section 66 of the Evidence Act. The lower appellate Court confirmed the decision of the trial Court mostly, on the same reasoning. 4. Mr. Rahenoma challenged the decisions of the Courts below as incorrect in law. Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Defendant, Respondent No. 1, takes up a preliminary point by stating that Ext. 1 admittedly is a copy of a copy of the alleged mortgage deed. He therefore contends that the original of Ext. 4. Mr. Rahenoma challenged the decisions of the Courts below as incorrect in law. Mr. Misra, the learned Counsel for the Defendant, Respondent No. 1, takes up a preliminary point by stating that Ext. 1 admittedly is a copy of a copy of the alleged mortgage deed. He therefore contends that the original of Ext. 1, which is alleged by the Plaintiffs to be the mortgage deed in question, admittedly having not been registered as required under the law, the said document as such shall not affect any immoveable property comprised therein, or shall not he received in evidence of any transaction affecting such property, as provided u/s 4 of the Registration Act. The original document itself not being admissible, secondary evidence of the same cannot be adduced in evidence. In support of his contention be cited the decision in Muhammnd Din v. Allahditta 95 (1926) Indian Cases 444, wherein it has been held that "Secondary evidence may be offered of primary evidence only when the primary evidence itself is admissible." He next cited the decision in AIR 1927 214 (Nagpur), where the relinquishment of interest in the property was done by an unstampted and unregistered document and as such it was found to be inadmissible in evidence for the purpose for which registration was necessary u/s 49 of the Registration Act. So it was held that: The admitted existence of a writing precludes the proof of the fact of the relinquishment by any secondary evidence as the primary evidence is itself inadmissible. There is yet another decision to support this view which is reported in Moolchand and Another Vs. Lachman and Another. All these decisions go to show that the original document of mortgage not being registered is inadmissible in evidence, in a suit of this nature, and as such secondary evidence of the same cannot be adduced in evidence. Hence the original of Ext. 1 which is alleged to be the mortgage deed in question, being admittedly an unregistered document,,secondary evidence of the same is not admissible in evidence. Thus Ext. 1 being inadmissible in evidence, the Plaintiffs' suit is bound to fail. 5. Mr. Rahenoma cited a decision of this Court in Purusottam Das and Another Vs. S.M. Desouza and Another. This decision is of no avail for Mr. Thus Ext. 1 being inadmissible in evidence, the Plaintiffs' suit is bound to fail. 5. Mr. Rahenoma cited a decision of this Court in Purusottam Das and Another Vs. S.M. Desouza and Another. This decision is of no avail for Mr. Rahenoma because it is clearly distinguishable on facts and does not also answer the, above preliminary point raised by Mr. Misra. The suit in the said decision proceeded on the basis of an admission of the Defendants mortgagees, that they were in possession of the suit rand on the basis of an unregistered mortgage deed. Their Lordships were of the view that the documents being unregistered the same could Not be used for the purpose of enforcing the mortgage itself under the document, and that the terms of the mortgage documents themselves are not admissible in evidence to prove the nature of the interest acquired therein, but they utilised the document only for certain collateral purposes. Moreover, in that decision their Lordships were not required to express any opinion regarding a preliminary point as raised by Mr. Misra above. That being so, that decision is no answer to the point 'raised by Mr. Misra, and is of no avail for Mr. Rahenoma, the learned Counsel for the Appellant. 6. In this view of the matter, the Plaintiffs' case is bound to fail. The appeal thus has no merit, and is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs of this Court. Final Result : Dismissed