JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - This case has been referred to us for decision of the question whether a "grove" is included in the expression "gardens" in Section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act, as amended in Uttar Pradesh. 2. The question arises in these circumstances :-The applicants filed Suit No. 148 of 1965 in the court of the Munsif (City) Bareilly, for the following main relief :- "That a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking any steps, or proceedings for disturbing the peaceful exclusive .possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs over the grove land plots and its Bagh Bahar detailed and mentioned below be passed against the defendants in favour of the plaintiffs." 3. In the plaint, the plaintiffs valued the suit, for purposes of jurisdiction and payment of court-fees, at Rs. 552-30 P. being 30 times the annual revenue payable for the glove land and paid a court-fee of .Rs. 22.50 P. for the relief claimed. Defendant No. 1 filed a written statement in which, amongst other pleas, raised the plea. "That the suit has not been properly valued. The property affected by the suit is worth Rs. 10,000/-. The court has no jurisdiction to try the suit." 4. By his order dated January 25, 1966, the Munsif held that the suit had been undervalued and ordered that. "the plaintiffs shall valuate the trees also standing over the land in suit and shall add the value of the trees to the value of the land. Plaintiffs to apply for necessary amendment by 1-2-1966." 5. Against this order, the plaintiffs have filed this revision. Takru, J., who heard the revision, was of the opinion that the valuation given in the plaint was correct but he has referred this case to us as, in his opinion, a different view has been taken in a Division Bench case of the erstwhile Oudh Chief Court in Mt. Jwala Devi v. Ahmad Hasan, A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 40. 6. In this case, we are concerned with the Court Fees Act as amended in Uttar Pradesh. The manner of computation of court-fees payable on suits of various descriptions is laid down in Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. Sub-sec. Jwala Devi v. Ahmad Hasan, A.I.R. 1938 Oudh 40. 6. In this case, we are concerned with the Court Fees Act as amended in Uttar Pradesh. The manner of computation of court-fees payable on suits of various descriptions is laid down in Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. Sub-sec. (iv-B) (b) provides that, in suits to obtain an injunction, the court-fees shall be payable according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint, provided that such amount shall not be less than one-fifth of the market-value of the property involved in or affected by the relief sought or Rs. .200/- whichever is greater. The first explanation to this sub-section lays down that, when the relief sought is with refer, ence to any immovable property, the market-value of such property shall be deemed to be the value computed in accordance with sub-sec. (v) , (v-A) or (v-B) of Section 7, as the case may be. Admittedly, it is sub-sec. (v) which has to be looked at for computing the market value of the property in the present case. Sub-sec. (v) provides that, in suits for the possession of land, buildings or gardens, the court-fee is to he computed according to the Value of the subject-matter. Clause (1) of sub-sec. (v) la\ s down how the valuation is to he determined if the subject-matter is "land" and clause (11) lays down how the valuation is to be determined where the subject-matter is a building or garden. The plaintiffs have valued the subject-matter according to clause (I) of sub-sec. (v) of Section 7 on the basis that the subject-matter is "land". The contention of opposite-parties is that a grove is included in the expression "garden" in clause (II) of sub-sec. (v) of Section 7 and the plaintiffs should have valued the subject-matter as a garden. We may here point out that, in the Court Fees Act as enacted by the Central Legislature and as in force in some of the other States, the expression used is "land, houses and gardens", while the expression used in this section, as in force in U. P., is "land, buildings or gardens". 7. We think that the substitution of the word "houses" for the word "buildings" and the use of the word "or" for the word "and" in 1 P. do not affect the meaning or scope of the word' "gardens". 7. We think that the substitution of the word "houses" for the word "buildings" and the use of the word "or" for the word "and" in 1 P. do not affect the meaning or scope of the word' "gardens". 8. The words 'land' and 'garden' have not been defined in the Court Fees Act. It has not been disputed before us that the ward 'land', as used in the tenancy laws applicable to this State, includes "groves". The contention of the applicants is that groves arc included in the word 'land' and have to be valued as 'land'. The contention of the opposite-parties is that 'grove' is a garden and must be valued as a garden. .Before considering the decision of the Oudh Chief Court, we would like to notice some cases of other Courts where this controversy has arisen. In Audathodan Moidin. v. Pullambath Mamally, ILR 12 Madras 301 (FB)a Full Bench of the Madras High Court observed :- "The word 'garden' is nowhere defined in Act VII of 1870, but from its occurring in connection with the word 'houses', we arc of opinion that the term refers primarily to a garden in the English sense ornamental or pleasure or vegetable .........." 9. In Kullappa Gruindan v. Abdur Rcrhirn Sahib, A.I.R. 1918 Mad. 805, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that a coconut tope (grove) is not a garden within the meaning of Section 7 (v) of the Court Fees Act. In this 'Cast, Seshagiri Aiyar, J. observed :- "The Act was drafted by an English lawyer and ............... the term 'garden' connotes in the English language that it is either an appendage to the house or is a place which is kept for purposes of pleasure. The fact that the term 'garden' is coupled with the term 'house' shows that what the legislature contemplated is a piece of.ground which is used by the owners of a house as a place of recreation and as one on which vegetables and the like are grown for purposes of home consumption. The definition of the term 'garden' in strouds Judicial Dictionary supports this view. It may be that an enclosed place detached from the house is resorted to by the owner of it for purposes of pleasure. Such a ground would be a garden." 10. The definition of the term 'garden' in strouds Judicial Dictionary supports this view. It may be that an enclosed place detached from the house is resorted to by the owner of it for purposes of pleasure. Such a ground would be a garden." 10. In Mumtaz Begam v. Allilln Unah Khan, A.I.R. 1964 J & K 34, the question, which arose for consideration before the Jammu and Kashmir High Court. was whether an orchard of fruit-bearing trees standing on agricultural land was a garden, as contemplated by Section 7 (v) ()I' the Court Fees Act. After. considering a large number of decisions of the High Courts,. the Division Bench held that an orchard was not a garden and observed: "The term 'garden' connotes a small piece of laud which is usually adjacent to a dwelling house and used for the purpose of growing flowers, vegetables or fruits for human consumption or is kept in order to beautify and added to the grandeur or value of the dwelling house or is otherwise used for pleasure. Agricultural land in which fruit bearing trees have been planted, as in this case, cannot be construed to be a garden in any sense of the term as envisaged in the Court Fees Act." 11. In our opinion, these three cases have correctly defined the word 'garden' and that a 'garden' does not include a grove. 12. We may now consider the decision of the Oudh Chief Court upon which considerable reliance is placed by learned counsel for opposite-parties. In this case, the suit was for possession of a piece of land. The land had been let out for construction of buildings and a building for a tannery had, in fact, been constructed thereon. On a part.of the land guava trees were planted which are said to have constituted a grove. On these facts, it was held that the plot should be valued as 'building and garden' and not as mere land'. The contention of the plaintiff in that case was that the plot should he valued as 'land'. This-was repelled on the ground that. the building and the trees could not be said to be appurtenant to any land and, therefore, a separate court-fee had to be paid on the market-value of the building and the grove. No decision was given on the question whether the expression 'garden' includes a grove. This-was repelled on the ground that. the building and the trees could not be said to be appurtenant to any land and, therefore, a separate court-fee had to be paid on the market-value of the building and the grove. No decision was given on the question whether the expression 'garden' includes a grove. In view of the peculiar facts of that case, it is, in our opinion, no authority for the proposition that "grove" is included in the expression 'garden'. 13. There is one more reason in favour of holding that a grove is not included in a garden. The word 'grove' has not been defined in the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and, by virtue of Section 3(26) thereof, it has the same meaning as is assigned to it under the U. P. Tenancy Act. Sub-sec. (6) of Section 3 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, 1939, defines 'grove land' thus : "3 (6) -'Grove land' means any specific piece of land in a mahal or mahals having trees planted thereon in such numbers that they preclude, or, when full grown, will preclude, the land or any considerable portion thereof from being used primarily for any other purpose; and the trees on such land- constitute a grove." 14. A grove may consist of fruit-bearing trees or of timber trees or of some other type of trees like neem trees. It cannot be argued that a timber grove or a neem grove is a garden. Therefore, a suit for an injunction in respect of a timber grove or a neem grove will have to be valued as 'land', whilst, if the contention of the opposite-parties is correct, a grove of fruit bearing trees would be valued as a garden. We' can see no reason why the two groves in the agricultural area-one of fruit-bearing trees and the other' of non-fruit-bearing trees-should be valued, for purposes of court-fees, in different ways. We think it is proper that all groves should be valued in the same manner for purposes of court-fees. That can only be if all the groves are treated as 'land'. We have already observed that the definition of the word 'land' in the tenancy laws includes 'groves'. For this reason also, the word 'garden' cannot be held to include a grove standing on a plot in the agricultural area. That can only be if all the groves are treated as 'land'. We have already observed that the definition of the word 'land' in the tenancy laws includes 'groves'. For this reason also, the word 'garden' cannot be held to include a grove standing on a plot in the agricultural area. It is clear from the plaint in the present case that the grove in dispute is situate on certain Bhumidhari and sirdari plots in village Sarkara, Tahsil Faridpur, district Bareilly. 15. We are of opinion that the grove in suit was properly valued as 'land' under Section 7 (v) (1) of the Court Fees Act. Accordingly, we allow this revision with costs and set aside the order of the Munsif dated January 25, 1966. The record will be sent back to the trial court at an early date for decision of the suit on merits.