( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the Order of the Civil Judge, mangalore, South Kanara, passed in MA. No. 21 of 1965. ( 2 ) THE respondent filed OS. 256 of 1964 for cancellation of a registered deed of sale dated 20-8-1943 against the present petitioner and others. The present petitioner, during the course of the suit, filed an application under Or. XXIII, R. 3 read with S. 151 CPC. praying that a decree be drawn up in terms of the compromise, according to which the suit was to be dismissed as having been settled out of Court. The plaintiff-respondent contended that there was no agreement as set up by the present petitioner that he had not received the sum of Rs. 500 as mentioned in the endorsement to the memo of compromise and that the document had been brought about fraudulently and by misrepresentation. According to the respondent, his signatures were taken on a paper as also a printed form of vakalat representing that an adjournment of the suit was to be obtained and his signatures were required on them. The learned Munsiff recotded the evidence and came to the conclusion that the suit had been settled out of Court and the same was accordingly required to be dismissed. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff then preferred a CMA. 21 of 1965 in the Court of the principal Civil Judge, Mangalore, SK. The learned Civil Judge took a different view, allowed the appeal and set aside the decree passed by the learned Munsiff and directed him to take the suit on file and proceed with the suit in accordance with law. The defendant-petitioner has app-roachad this Court in revision. ( 4 ) MR. Holla the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner has contended that the learned Civil Judge had exceeded his jurisdiction inasmuch as he had gone into the investigation of allegations relating to fraud and misrepresentation and that it was not within his competence to do so in view of the words contained in Or. XXIII, R. 3 CPC. Or. 23, r. 3 provides for adjustment of suit by comprmise. XXIII, R. 3 CPC. Or. 23, r. 3 provides for adjustment of suit by comprmise. R. 3 reads as follows:"where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit. "the plain wording of this rule requires that there should be proof to the satisfaction of the Court that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by an agreement, and further that such agreement should be lawful. I have heard at length arguments by the learned Advocates appearing for both the parties about the scope of this rule. Many of the decisions which were cited by Mr. Holla, Western E. C. v. Kailash, AIR. 1040 Bom. 60. Qadri Jahan v. Fazal, AIR. 1928 All. 494. Husain v. Radha, AIR. 1935 All. 137. Harban Singh v. Bawa Singh, AIR. 1952 Cal. 73. Kuppswami v. Pavanammal, AIR. 1950 Mad. 728. Krishnan v. Rayarappa, AIR. 1959 Ker. 130. and puttolal v. Sumasinghji, AIR. 1963 Raj. 63. lay down that if the allegations of fraud or misrepresentation are incidental to an admitted agreement having been arrived at between the parties, it is not within the competence of the Court to enquiry into such incidental matter but leave the parties to a separate suit to get an adjudication on the question whether the admitted agreement was voidable. As against these decisions, Mr. U. L. Narayana rao has placed reliance on the decisions in Misrilal v. Sobhachand, AIR. 1956 Bom. 569. Pannalal v. Kishanlal, AIR. 1952 Nag. 84. and kalapa v. Sitaram, AIR. 1955 All. 187. in which a contrary view has been taken. The latter decisions lay down that while enquiring into the questions required to be investigated into under R. 3, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the agreement set up is a valid agreement not vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion which might render the agreement voidable. 187. in which a contrary view has been taken. The latter decisions lay down that while enquiring into the questions required to be investigated into under R. 3, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the agreement set up is a valid agreement not vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation or coercion which might render the agreement voidable. ( 5 ) THOUGH it is not necessary for the decision of this case to decide which of the two conflicting views is acceptable I would however indicate my views on the question, since no decision of this Court on the point has been brought to my notice by the Advocates. The object of the rule is to enable the Court to give effect to a lawful agreement or compromise in respect of the whole or part of the claim in the suit, if the parties put forward such agreement or compromise before the suit is decided on merits by the Court. The agreement or compromise pecrd under this rule would result in the passing of a decree in accordance with the terms of the compromise in so far as they relate to the suit. It should therefore follow that a decree passed in terms of the compromise or agreement must be 'conclusive of the rights of parties ' and executable without further objection by any of the parties as being inherent in the decree itself. The words "where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court", with which the rule opens impose, in my opinion, an obligation on the Court to be satisfied that the suit has been genuinely adjusted in whole or in part. If one party to the suit sets up an agreement or compromise whose terrse are lawful and the other party to such alleged agreement or compromise denies it or alleges that it has been brought about by fraud, undue influence, coercion or misrepresentation as vitiating the agreement or compromise and if, during the course of the enquiry as to the allegations made by the party disagreeing with the agreement or compromise the Court 's satisfied that the agreement or compromise is vitiated, I dd not think that the rule intoads the recording of such compromise, because, it cannot be said in such a case that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part to the satisfaction of the Court. The agreement or compromise contemplated by this rule is intended to put an end to the whole litigation by an amicable settlement according to the party's own free will and consent; it is not intended either to sow the seeds of fresh litigation or to leave the contentions raised by the parties to a further suit; undoutedly in the latter event the object of the rule to put an end to the litigation by passing a decree in terms of agreement or compromise would stand frustrated. On a careful consideration of the decisions cited at the bar by both the Advo'cates, I am of the opinion that the words " proved to the satisfaction of the Court " are comprehensive enough and indeed seem ot have been intended to empower the Court to go into the merits of the allegations set up by the party denying or disagreeing with the terms of compromise or agreement and dec de them, so that the parties get full justice in the suit in which a decree in terms of the compromise is to be passed under the rule. Where the Court finds during the course of the enquiry that the alleged agreement or compromise is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation etc. , it cannot be said legally that an agreement has been arrived at. The agreement contemplated under the rule envisages the two parties coming to certain terms voluntarily and of a free will so as to put an end to the litigation pending between them in the court. I am in respectful agreement with the observation found at p. 1295 of Mulla's Commentary on the Code of Civil Procedure, Volume II, thirteenth Edition-" The words ' where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part ' clearly show that the Court has power under this rule, where an agreement or comprimise is denied, to decide whether, as a fact, the alleged agreement or compromise was made and if it is satisfied that it was made, to record it. If it decides that the agreement of compromise is vitiated, it can reject it and proceed to dispose of the suit on merits. ( 6 ) IN spite of my view that it is competent to the Court to go into the question as td whether the alleged agreement is vitiated by fraud etc. If it decides that the agreement of compromise is vitiated, it can reject it and proceed to dispose of the suit on merits. ( 6 ) IN spite of my view that it is competent to the Court to go into the question as td whether the alleged agreement is vitiated by fraud etc. , i wanted to find out whether, in fact there had been an agreement or compromise in this case as alleged by the defendant, and therefore requested Mr. Holla to read to me the order of Civil Judge, the depositions of the plaintiff and the defendant. I have come to the conclusion after going through these depositions and the order, that it is not necessary for the disposal of this petition to go into the disputed question as to whether the Court has competence under R. 3 to find out whether the agreement set up by one of the parties was in fact vitiated by fraud, undue influence, misrepresentation etc On facts, the learned appellate Judge has come to the conclusion that there was no agreement as alleged by the defendant. That is also my conclusion, as I shall presently point out. For these reasons, this petition is dismissed with costs. --- *** --- .