ORDER A.P SEN, J. 1. This petitioner under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is directed against an award of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Court, dated 18.8.1966 made on a reference by the State Government under section 51 (a) of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960, of a dispute concerning the conditions of service of certain weavers employed by the petitioner–Company on a contract basis, for the manufacture of its carpets outside its factory (hereinafter referred to as the "Act", the "management" and the "weavers", respectively). 2. The petition arises in the following circumstances. The management raised an objection before the Tribunal as regards the competence of the reference on the ground that the weavers were in reality not their employees but were independent contractors and therefore, there could be no industrial adjudication of a dispute, if any, relating to their terms of employment as an industrial dispute. The Tribunal by its order dated 23.3.1965, overruled the objection and proceeded to render the impugned award that the weavers were entitled to the benefits of the Provident Fund Scheme, bonus, additional wages and some other benefits which the workmen employed in the factory enjoy. The main challenge before us is to the validity of the Tribunal's order holding the reference to be competent. The correctness of the award is also questioned, but it is not necessary for us in this case to deal with the ultimate award, on the view that we take of the invalidity of the reference. 3. Under section 51 (a) of the Act, the State Government are empowered to make a reference to the Tribunal only of an 'industrial dispute' as defined in section 2 (17), meaning a dispute which touches upon or arises out of the relationship of employer and employee. Now, the question whether the weavers are 'employees' of the management depends on a construction of section 2(13) of the Act, which reads as follows:– "2(13) 'employee' means any person employed in any industry to do any skilled, unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied and includes." The legal connotation of the word 'employed' is well known. It connotes the existence of a jural relationship of master and servant between the employer and the employee. In other words, it involves the concept of employment under a contract of service. 4. It connotes the existence of a jural relationship of master and servant between the employer and the employee. In other words, it involves the concept of employment under a contract of service. 4. The matter relates to a subject which has been discussed in a long line of authorities. We do not propose to make any discussion of authority at all and for a very good reason. The right approach to cases of this kind lies not so much by reference to facts of other cases arising under similar legislation, sometimes under different legislation but by reference to the facts of the particular case and then, in the light of those facts as so found, to apply the well settled principles for the purpose of determining whether a particular contract of employment is a contract of service or for services. The principles are so well settled that we need only re-state them and then, ascertain from the facts of this particular case, whether the weavers fall on one side of the line or the other. The principles are these. The relation of master and servant imports the power in the employer not only to direct what work tae servant is to do, but also the manner in which the work is to be done. The extent of control is apt to vary in different industries and is by its very nature incapable of being precisely defined. In contra-distinction, an independent contractor is to be regarded a, a person carrying on an independent business. 5. The traditional test of supervision and control which distinguishes a contract of service from a contract for services is, however, increasingly becoming un-realistic, in the structure of modern business enterprise which entirely depends on the employment of highly skilled or professional men. Although the test of control still remains, even in an attenuated form, one of the guiding features of the relationship of master and servant, it is no longer one a the only determining factor because in such cases, the right to control may exist in theory only, such control being impracticable or impossible. The recent judicial trend is, therefore, to devise various other tests. The recent judicial trend is, therefore, to devise various other tests. The right approach according to a very eminent English Judge is this under a contract of service, a man is employed as part of the business and his work is done as an integral part of the business whereas under a contract for services, his work, although done for the business is not integrated into it but is only accessory to it. It has been more recently suggested by the English Judges that the matter should be determined by reference to what in common parlance is called economic reality, i.e. whether the person employed as a matter of economic reality bears the financial risk the chance of profit and the risk of loss. 6. Keeping these principles in view, we propose to examine a little more carefully the particular facts of this case. Now, the facts stated in the Tribunal's order dated 23.3.1965, are these. The weavers are employed for making carpets outside the factory on a contract basis. For this, the management land them looms which cannot be utilised for any other purpose. On breach of this condition, they are entitled to take back the looms with the offending carpets thereon. The looms are held by the weavers on trust and they have no right to transfer the same. The weavers work on each of these looms at their respective places and are free to work along with members of their family. In case of repairs or breakage, they have to bear the cost of repairs and replacement. The weavers also execute separate contracts in respect of each carpet, the most important term being that of 'quality control'. If a given carpet is damaged beyond a particular percentage, the entire loss falls on the weaver concerned and the decision of the management in regard to this is final. The other terms are usually to be found in this class of contracts. The payment for work done is on a piece rate basis and the work has to be completed within a stipulated time. If a carpet remains unfinished within the period specified the management have a right to take back the loom with the unfinished carpet and in that event, the weaver concerned is not entitled to claim any payment by way of wages. If a carpet remains unfinished within the period specified the management have a right to take back the loom with the unfinished carpet and in that event, the weaver concerned is not entitled to claim any payment by way of wages. The management have to supply all the materials required and if they fall short, the weavers have a right to ask for more. If a particular carpet is not coming up to the standard or specification required, due to the supply of any defective material, the Weavers are required to report this to the management. 7. On these facts, the Tribunal finds that the weavers are 'employees' within the meaning of the Act. It finds them to be employees under a contract of service, on three circumstances. First of all that one Babu Mistry employed by the management takes a round everyday, so they have supervision and control not only in respect of the work but also the manner in which the work is done secondly, the decision whether the loss to a carpet is due to bad material or un-skillfulness of a weaver rests with the management, and there is no standard for adjudging whether the materials supplied are really good or bad and thirdly on the non-completion of a carpet, the management have a right to resume possession of the loom together with the un-finished carpet and in such a situation, the weaver is not entitled to claim any wages. The Tribunal with regard to control which the management has over the manufacture of carpets by the weavers relies on the testimony of N. A. W. 4 J. M. Pragodaria, Manager of the concern. He states that the management has employed the aforesaid Babu Mistry to visit the weavers daily in examine the quality of the work turned out by them and to determine if the carpets are being turned out according to the designs furnished. 8. We are aware that the question whether or not a particular contract is a contract of service is a question of fact depending upon the terms of engagement, the method of remuneration and the power of controlling and dismissing the worker although none of the factors is by itself conclusive. 8. We are aware that the question whether or not a particular contract is a contract of service is a question of fact depending upon the terms of engagement, the method of remuneration and the power of controlling and dismissing the worker although none of the factors is by itself conclusive. Although the question whether a person is employed as a servant or a contractor is a question of intention and therefore, usually a question of fact nevertheless such a question may also be a jurisdictional fact, as here, where on the facts found by the Tribunal, it had no jurisdiction at all to a adjudicate upon the reference which was not in regard to an industrial dispute. No tribunal of inferior jurisdiction can by its own decision finally decide on the question of existence or extent of such jurisdiction such a question is always subject to review by the High Court. Subjection in this respect to the High Court is an inseparable incident for all tribunals of limited jurisdiction. 9. We are satisfied that the Tribunal has is this particular case asked itself the wrong questions in deciding whether to make the award. Here, the relationship rests on a written document. On a review of the terms of the contract and the evidence on record it has come to a particular conclusion. There was no suggestion before the Tribunal or here, that the document was merely a camouflage or is meant to defeat the law. On the other hand, the parties have proceeded on the basic that it reflects the true nature of their relationship. Under its terms, there is no continuity of employment. The weavers are subject to no direction as to the time they are to devote under the contract of employment. Their contracting to weave certain pieces of carpets at agreed prices is not a contract to serve. The stipulation as to time is one which they as one of the contracting parties, have to fulfill as a term of their engagement. They have full discretion as to the manner of their work. The question whether they are employees or independent contractors is, in this case, primarily one of law on construction of the document. There is no term indicating that they are to work directly under the personal control and supervision of the management. They have full discretion as to the manner of their work. The question whether they are employees or independent contractors is, in this case, primarily one of law on construction of the document. There is no term indicating that they are to work directly under the personal control and supervision of the management. On the contrary, the terms are indicative that they are persons over whom no such control is reserved. 10. We are of the view that nothing really turns on any of the three circumstances mentioned by the Tribunal. So far as the first is concerned, the carpet contract stipulates for quality control and there is nothing wrong for the management to employ a person to keep a check on the carpets under production. Such supervision is for the protection of their own interest as a manufacturer of carpets and this by itself does not involve any element of control as to direct the nature of the work that has to be done or to control the manner in which it is to be carried out. The work to be done is a term of the carpet contract which is in respect of a particular carpet to be produced within a stipulated time. There is also no question of controlling the manner of making a carpet because the weavers are all trained crafts men possessing requisite skill and knowledge in the art of making carpets. They know the job and carry it out in their own way and being skilled crafts-men, they are not subject to any command of the management as to the manner in which the carpets are to be made. The furnishing of designs is also not inconsistent with their contract being a contract for services. It is a matter of common knowledge that the carpet industry has to cater to the individual needs and taste of the intending buyers and carpets have to be made according to the designs selected by them. The other circumstances adverted to are also indicative of a contract for services rather than of a contract of service. The Tribunal has found that the weavers have to bear the entire loss if the damage to a particular carpet is beyond the percentage as prescribed in the carpet contracts and that if a carpet remains un-finished by the stipulated time, they are deprived of the right to payment of their remuneration. The Tribunal has found that the weavers have to bear the entire loss if the damage to a particular carpet is beyond the percentage as prescribed in the carpet contracts and that if a carpet remains un-finished by the stipulated time, they are deprived of the right to payment of their remuneration. As a matter of economic reality, the weavers under the contract, therefore, bear the financial risk i.e., the chance of profit or the risk of loss. From whatever point of view problem is approached, the weavers are nothing but independent contractors and by no stretch of imagination, can they be regarded to be the employees of the petitioner-Company. The Tribunal, therefore, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the reference and its resultant award being a nullity must be quashed. 11. We accordingly set aside the award of the Tribunal and quash the proceedings before it in reference. The petitioner shall have its costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 100, if certified.