JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - These four appeals arise out of orders of learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 74, 75, 76 and 77 of 1965. Those appeals were filed by the trustee of the deity Sri Jagannath Swami situate a Athagada in the district of Ganjam in respect of its properties in villages Ustapada, Ranipada, Amonia and Konkorada. The deity possessed properties which admittedly fell within the definition of a 'trust estate' as that expression is defined in Section 13-A(e) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (herein after referred to as the Act). The notifications abolishing such estates were issued in the year 1955 by which time Section 3-A as it now stands, was not a part of the Statute. The provision under which the estates were abolished is Section 3 of the Act which applies to all categories of estates. Chapter V of the Act contains provisions for assessment of compensation in respect the estates notified for abolition. While in the case of estates general the provision is for payment of lump sum cash compensation, an exception wag made in Section 28(2) that in respect estates held under trust or other legal obligation and dedicate exclusively to charitable or religious purposes of a public nature without any reservation of pecuniary benefit to any individual instead of paying a lump sum compensation, the compensation was to be assessed as a perpetual annuity equal to such the income of the estate and paid to the intermediary. In accordance with this provision, the annuity was calculated in respect of the disputed estates which admittedly fan in the category estates referred to in Section 8(2), and it is being paid to the Appellant. 2. In 1956, the Act was amended and Section 3-A was introduced. Sub-section (1) thereof flays that without prejudice, to the powers u/s 3, the State Government may be notification declare that the intermediary interests of all inter mediaries or a class or classes of intermediaries in the whole or part of the State have passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. It would therefore be seen that while Section 3 deals with vesting notification in respect of individual specified estates, Section A refers to a general notification whereby the intermediary interests of a class or classes of intermediaries vest in the State. 3. It would therefore be seen that while Section 3 deals with vesting notification in respect of individual specified estates, Section A refers to a general notification whereby the intermediary interests of a class or classes of intermediaries vest in the State. 3. In 1963, an important amendment beneficial to a particular class of intermediaries, namely, holders of trust estates was made by introducing a new Chapter "Chapter II-A" entitled "Special Provisions for Public Trusts". Section 13-A which is the first section in this Chapter defines certain expressions including "trust estate". A trust estate had been defined in Clause (e) as meaning an estate, the whole of the net income whereof under any trust or other legal obligation has been dedicated exclusively to charitable or religious purposes of a public nature without any reservation of pecuniary benefit to any individual. It is manifest that estates falling under this definition are the same as the "Estates" dealt with u/s 28(2) of the Act. It is the admitted case of the parties that the disputed estates answer the definition of a "trust estate" as that term is defined in Section 13-A (e of the Act. Section 13-B says that a vesting notification shall have effect subject to the provisions f this Chapter Section 13-C deals with constitution of tribunals and Section 13-D provides for claims and references to the Tribunal. Section 13-D may be quoted: 13-D. Claims and references. (1) The trustee in respect of a trust estate shall upon the issue of a notification u/s A, make an application into prescribed form and manner to the Tribunal within three months from the date of such notification claiming that the estate is a trust estate. xx xx xx xx Section 13-G deals with disposal of claims and references and provides that the Tribunal constituted u/s 13-C is to decide whether an estate in respect of which an application is made before him or a reference is made before him is or is not a trust estate. Then comes Section 13-1 which is important and may be quoted: 13-I-Effect of orders passed u/s 13-G.-(I) All estates declared under this Chapter to be trust estates by the Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may be, shall be deemed to have been excluded from the operation of the vesting notification and never to have vested in the State in pursuance thereof. (2) An estate which is not declared to be a trust estate in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter shall for all purposes of this Act stand vested in the State in pursuance of the said notification with effect from the date of the order of the Tribunal or of the High Court, as the case may be It would thus be apparent, that u/s 13-D it is only the trustee of an estate in respect of which a notification u/s 3-A is issued, that can make an application under this Chapter. Admittedly, by the time the disputed estates were notified, Section 3-A was not a part of the Statute and a notification had therefore to be issued u/s 3. Notwithstanding, therefore, the admitted fact that the Appellant's estates were trust estates, he could not have made an application claiming the benefits under Chapter II-A even if Chapter II-A would have been in force at the time these estates were notified. But as already indicated, Chapter II-A itself came into existence long after wards in the year 1963. Hence the occasion for the Appellant to make any such application also did not arise. That apart, Section 13-D prescribes a period of three months from the date of such notification to make an application under this Chapter. That period also has long passed. There is nothing in the Act to revive cases already closed or to give retrospective effect to any of the provisions of Chapter II-A. In no view of the case, therefore, has the Appellant any right to claim at this belated stage the benefits of Chapter II-A. 4. It was, however, contended by Mr. Ramdas that Chapter II-A, having been enacted for the benefit of trust estates, a beneficial construction must he given to the various provisions of this new Chapter and therefore estates notified u/s 3 also should be entitled to make applications under Chapter II-A. It is jointed out that the purpose of both the Sections 3 and 3-A being the same, namely, to notify an estate for being vested in the State, it should make no difference whether a notification is issued either u/s 3 or u/s 3-A. He particularly invited our attention to Section 5 which deals with consequences of vesting of an estate in the State. That section, as it originally stood before the 1956 amendment, only referred to the publication of a notification under Sub-section (sic) of Section 3 whereafter certain consequences were to follow. After the 1956 amendment, whereunder Section 3-A was first introduced, there was consequential amendment to Section 5, whereby it is provided that after the publication of the notification either under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 or Sub-section (1) of Section 3-A, certain consequences mentioned therein would ensure. It is argued that it as obviously a pure accident that Chapter II-A did not make any reference to notifications issued u/s 3 and confined itself only to notifications issued u/s 3-A. We are unable to accept this contention, although it is equally difficult for us to appreciate why the Legislature has made a distinction between notifications issued u/s 3 and u/s 3-A, and why, if in any particular case, the authorities choose to issue a notification u/s 3 and not u/s 3-A in respect of a trust estate, that trust estate should be deprived of the benefits of the provisions of Chapter II-A. In this connection, we would refer to the argument advanced by Mr. Ramdas on the vises of Clause (b) of Section 13-K(b). That sub-section says that nothing in Chapter II-A shall be deemed to debar the State Government from vesting any trust estate by the issue of a notification u/s 3. The resultant position therefore is that if there are two trust estates nothing would prevent Government from notifying one of the estates u/s 3 and the other u/s 3-A The one notified u/s 3 will not be entitled to avail itself of the beneficial provision of Chapter II-A while the other notified u/s 3-A would be entitled to thee benefits. No guide lines have been laid down in the Statute to indicate under what circumstance Government would notify 80 trust estate either u/s 3 or u/s 3-A. It appears to have been left to the decision of the Executive to choose either of the two courses. This is provision prima facie appears to be discriminatory and therefore void. But it is not necessary to pronounce a final opinion on this question, because a decision on this question does not appear to be material so far as the present case is concerned. This is provision prima facie appears to be discriminatory and therefore void. But it is not necessary to pronounce a final opinion on this question, because a decision on this question does not appear to be material so far as the present case is concerned. Whether Section 13-K(b) is valid or otherwise, so far as the Appellant is concerned, his estates had been notified years back u/s 3 and not u/s 3-A of the Act and he is therefore not entitled to claim any of the benefits under Chapter II-A. 5. In this view of the matter, we find no merit in these appeals which are dismissed, but in the circumstance, without costs. S. Acharya, J. 6. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed