JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This is a special appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge by which he dismissed a writ petition filed by the appellant, Sri A. N. Saxena, for quashing an order passed by the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Uttar Pradesh, respondent No. 1. 2. A society known as the Jan Sewak Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Kanpur, was formed under the Cooperative Societies Act, with the object, inter alia, of buying and acquiring land by lease, exchange or otherwise for the benefit of the members of the Society. The appellant claiming to be a member of the Society, which is respondent No. 3, applied to the Society for the allotment of a plot of land. The application was disallowed by the managing committee of the Society on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to allotment under the Bye-laws of the Society. The dispute between the petitioner and the Society went up before the Assiitant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, for arbitration under Rule 115 of the Rules framed under the Cooperative Societies Act. The controversy between the appellant and the society before the Assistant Registrar was whether the appellant was a member of the Society and that is still the controversy between them. Membership of the Society is governed by the provisions of bye-laws 4 and 5 of the Society and they are as follows : "4. The membership of the Society shall be open to all Officers of Government serving or retired, of good character, sound mind-residing or intending to reside in Kanpur, who own no houses or land and are not members of any other Housing Society operating within Kanpur Corporation. Further the following classes of Officers may also with the Registrar's special permission obtained individually in each case be admitted as members. (a) Officers who own houses within the area of operation of the society but whose houses are situated in insanitary surroundings or are too small for their needs and are incapable of being adequately extended or improved. (b) Officers who own land within the area of operation of the society but that land is either not situated in a desirable locality or is too small to permit the building on it of a house of reasonable size. (c) Officers whose ancestral home is in Kanpur and who are at present residing elsewhere. 3. (b) Officers who own land within the area of operation of the society but that land is either not situated in a desirable locality or is too small to permit the building on it of a house of reasonable size. (c) Officers whose ancestral home is in Kanpur and who are at present residing elsewhere. 3. Nominees and heirs of the deceased members shall also be eligible for admission and they shall exercise the right of membership, but minor nominees and heirs shall exercise the right of membership only through their guardians. The membership of the society shall consist of- (a) those who join the application for registration, and (b) those who are subsequently elected as members according to those bye-laws". 4. The appellant who holds the office of the Regional Director in the National Productivity Council at Kanpur, claimed that he was an officer of Government and had also joined the application for registration of the Society, and he was, therefore, a member of the Society both under bye-law 4 and bye-law 5. The Society denied the claim of the appellant. The Assistant Registrar found that the appellant was one of the signatories to the application for registration of the Society and his case, therefore, fell under clause (a) of bye-law 5. The order passed by the Assistant Registrar, however, was that while the appellant would remain member of the society he would not be entitled to avail any plot unless submits a categorical certificate from the Secretary Ministry of Industries, Government of India declaring the plaintiff as gazetted officer of the Central Government within one month from the receipt of the judgment failing which the defendant society shall be fully authorised to allot the plot to a qualified member. The Assistant Registrar observed that the action of the managing committee disallowing the application of the appellant was quite justified. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies. The appeal came up for hearing on November 25, 1965. The Society did not put in appearance on that date and the appeal was heard in its absence. The Deputy Registrar allowed the appeal holding that the appellant was entitled to get the plot allotted to him as provided under the Bye-laws of the Society. The appeal came up for hearing on November 25, 1965. The Society did not put in appearance on that date and the appeal was heard in its absence. The Deputy Registrar allowed the appeal holding that the appellant was entitled to get the plot allotted to him as provided under the Bye-laws of the Society. That ex parte order was, however, set aside by the Deputy Registrar, on an application made by the Society to the effect that it had no knowledge of the date of hearing of the appeal. Then the Deputy Registrar disposed of the appeal by order dated June 27, 1966, the concluding portion of which was as follows : "Considering all that has been dis-cussed above I review my order dated 25-11-1965 and revise the order of arbitrator and hold that Sri Saxena does not fulfil the qualification of members according to bye-law 4. Therefore, he can neither claim for membership of the society nor for allotment of any plot of land from the society. He is not a member of the Jan Sewak Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Kanpur." 5. It was against the above order that the writ petition was directed. 6. Before the learned single Judge it was first urged on behalf of the appellant that under the Rules framed under the Cooperative Societies Act the Deputy Registrar can review his order dated November 25, 1965 only within six months of the passing of that order, and the impugned order was, therefore, invalid. The learned Judge held that the order dated November 25, 1965 was reviewed by the Deputy Registrar on the date on which he set aside that order and not on the date on which he passed the impugned order, and since the setting aside was done within six months the Deputy Registrar had not acted in contravention of the Rules. Sri S. N. Kakker, learned counsel for the appellant, did not challenge before us the correctness of the view taken by the learned single Judge in regard to this matter. 7. The next point urged before the learned single Judge was that the interpretation placed by the Deputy Registrar on bye-law 4 of the Bye-lays of the Society was manifestly incorrect. 7. The next point urged before the learned single Judge was that the interpretation placed by the Deputy Registrar on bye-law 4 of the Bye-lays of the Society was manifestly incorrect. This contention involved consideration of two questions : (i) whether bye-law 4 applied even to those person who were covered by bye-law 5 and (ii) whether even under bye-law 4 the appellant was a member of the society. The Assistant Registrar found that the appellant had signed the application for registration of the Society and his position was, therefore, that of a member of the Society under bye-law 5 (a) , although in spite of that finding the Assistant Registrar ordered that the appellant would not be entitled to allotment of any plot unless he submitted within one month of the order a certificate from the secretary, Ministry of Industries, Government of India, to the effect that he was a gazetted officer of the Central Government. The Deputy Registrar did not go into the question whether the applicant had signed the application for registration of the Society, but, proceedings on the assumption that he had done so, held that the appellant could not even then be a member of the society because he had still to fulfil the qualification laid down in bye-law 4. The learned single Judge had, therefore, to determine also bye-law 4 controlled bye-law 5 (a) with the result that no person could be a member of the Society unless his case fell under bye-law 4. This question the learned Judge has omitted to consider but, we think, it is this question which first calls for an answer. 8. Obviously, bye-laws 4 and 5 have to be construed harmoniously and effect has to be given to both of them without bringing them into conflict. Bye-law 4 enumerates the persons to whom membership of the society "shall be open", and bye-law 5 provides as to who will be the persons of whom membership of the Society "shall consist". It is, therefore, bye-law 5 and not bye-law 4 which is exhaustive of the persons who are members of the society. Bye-law 5 divides such persons into two categories; (i) those who join the application for registration and (ii) those who are subsequently elected as members according to the Bye-laws. It is, therefore, bye-law 5 and not bye-law 4 which is exhaustive of the persons who are members of the society. Bye-law 5 divides such persons into two categories; (i) those who join the application for registration and (ii) those who are subsequently elected as members according to the Bye-laws. Persons belonging to the first category become members of the Society irrespective of any other thing and they need not fulfil the qualification mentioned in bye-law 4, because if that were so clause (a) of bye-law 5 would be altogether redundant and meaningless. It is only those belonging to the second category mentioned above who have to qualify for membership under bye-law 4. Such persons have to be elected according to the Bye-laws and it is to them that the provisions of bye-law 4 apply. Persons falling under clause (a) of bye-law 5 acquire the status of a member not as a result of any election nor at any future point of time, but simultaneously with the Bye laws coming into force or, in other words, simultaneously with the coming into existence of the Society. On the other hand, persons falling under clause (b) of bye-law 5 are those who are "subsequently elected" in accordance with the Bye-laws after the Society has come into existence. Properly constructed, bye-law 4 is relevant only for the purpose of clause (b) of bye-law 5 i.e. for the purpose of determining who can be subsequently elected as members. The words "shall be open" in bye-law 4 speak of the future and clearly shows that the said bye-law prescribes the requisite qualifications for those who can acquire membership after the enforcement of the Bye-laws and it is not meant to apply to those who automatically acquired membership by the mere fact of having joined in applying for registration of the society. If the appellant's case falls under clause (a) of bye-law 5, he is a member of the Society whether or not he qualified for membership under bye-law 4. It may be that he was allowed to join in applying for registration of the Society because it was thought that he fulfilled the qualification mentioned in bye-law 4 and he too represented that he fulfilled that qualification. It may be that he was allowed to join in applying for registration of the Society because it was thought that he fulfilled the qualification mentioned in bye-law 4 and he too represented that he fulfilled that qualification. But whether he actually possessed that qualification or not became a matter of no consequence once he did join in making the application for registration of the society, and the controversy whether he could or could not join cannot now be raised. The words of clause (a) of bye-law 5 are unqualified in their terms and they confer the status of membership on all those who join the application for registration irrespective of any other consideration. Even if the appellant or the other signatories to the application for registration were under the impression that the persons joining the application should possess the qualification mentioned in bye-law 4, that impression would not affect the interpretation of the Bye-laws. At any rate, no dispute about the membership of person joining the application for registration of the Society can be raised after the registration of the Society. The interpretation placed by the Deputy Registrar on bye-laws 4 and 5 was, therefore, manifestly erroneous. 9. As we have said above, the Deputy Registrar did not record any finding on the question whether the appellant had joined the application for registration of the society and the question has, therefore, to be decided by him. Sri S. N. Kacker submitted that the Assistant Registrar had recorded a clear finding in favour of the appellant on that question and that finding was not challenged by the society. He also drew our attention to the fact that in paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit filed in this court on behalf of the Society it has been admitted that the appellant signed the application for registration of the Society and urged that in view of this admission we may issue a suitable direction on the footing that the appellant had joined in the application for registration of the Society. Since however, the Deputy Registrar did not record a finding on the above question the proper thing in our opinion would be to direct him to record a finding and dispose of the appeal afresh. 10. Since however, the Deputy Registrar did not record a finding on the above question the proper thing in our opinion would be to direct him to record a finding and dispose of the appeal afresh. 10. In connection with the claim of the appellant that he is an Officer of Government, it will be noticed that both the Assistant Registrar and the Deputy Registrar thought that in order to qualify for membership under bye-law 4 the appellant had to be a gazetted officer of the Government. In taking this view they were clearly mistaken.,The learned single Judge, however, observed that "It is that the Arbitrator as well as the Deputy Registrar have held that the petitioner is not a gazetted officer of the Government but a perusal of their orders shows that they have not laid any emphasis on the word 'gazetted' so as to bring about any distinction between a gazetted officer on the one hand and an officer on the other", and then he proceeded to say that there was no material to show that the National productivity Council was a Government Department. We are not able to agree that the Assistant Registrar and the Deputy Registrar looked at the matter from the correct point of view and applied the right standing for judging whether the appellant is an officer of Government. The Assistant Registrar had, his order, said that the appellant would not be entitled to allotment of any plot unless he submitted within one month it categorical certificate from the Secretary, Ministry of Industries, Government of India, declaring the appellant as a gazetted officer of the Central Government. It was this part of the order of the Assistant Registrar which was in question in appeal before the Deputy Registrar. Obviously, therefore, he had to determine the legality of propriety of the order and he could not base his appellate order on the consideration that the appellant had not complied with the order of the Assistant Registrar. The Deputy Registrar went to the length of saying that the "failure of Sri Saxena to submit the required certificate from the Ministry of Industries reveals that he is not Gazetted Officer of the Government", and that "it automatically rejects his claim for the original membership in the society." Erroneousness of this method of approach is patent. The Deputy Registrar went to the length of saying that the "failure of Sri Saxena to submit the required certificate from the Ministry of Industries reveals that he is not Gazetted Officer of the Government", and that "it automatically rejects his claim for the original membership in the society." Erroneousness of this method of approach is patent. Failure to comply with the order appealed against cannot itself be a ground for the rejection of the appeal. Furthermore, it is not open to a Court or a tribunal determining a matter judically to insist on a particular mode or proving that matter and to exclude all other modes of proof, unless there is a law requiring to do so. It may certainly draw such inference from the non-production of particular kind of proof as the circumstances justify but it cannot say that no other kind of proof, whatever its probative value may be, will be entertained by it. This will particularly be so when it is not within the power of the persons concerned to obtain the proof that he is directed to produce. The Ministry of Industries was not bound to issue a certificate to the appellant that he was an officer of the Government. Quite apart from that, the issue of such a certificate or the refusal to do so by the Ministry of Industries could not be conclusive of the matter, and it had to be ultimately decided by the Assistant Registrar and in appeal by the Deputy Registrar. It will further be remembered that the order of the Assistant Registrar required the appellant to produce a certificate of his being a Gazetted Officer. Surely, if he was not a gazetted officer no such certificate could be issued to him. The claim of the appellant to membership on the basis of being an officer of Government has also, therefore, to be re-examined by the Deputy Registrar, if it is found by him necessary to do so. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs and the judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside. The order of the Deputy Registrar is also set aside and he is directed to dispose of the appeal filed by the appellant against the order of the Assistant Registrar afresh.