( 1 ) THE offence with which the petitioner was charged was that he used indecent language and behaved indecently towards P. W. 1 Laxmana and p. W. 2 Sheenappa in the premises of a Government hospital in Udupi, and that he had therefore committed an offence punishable under S. 92 (1) (o) of the Mysore Police Act, 1963. ( 2 ) THERE are at least two reasons why the conviction of the petitioner by the Magistrate is liable to be set aside. The first is that an offence is committed under Sec. 92 (1) (o) of the Mysore Police Act (Mysore Act No. 4 of 1963) only when the act to which that clause refers is committed in contravention of a notification in the Official Gazette by which the provisions of sub-section (1) of S. 92 are extended to a local area. That clause reads:"92. Punishment of certain street offences and nuisances (1) In any local area to wmch the Government by notification in the official Gazette from time to tune extends this sub-section or any clause thereof, whoever, contrary thereto,- x x x x x (o) wilfully and indecently exposes his person, uses indecent language or behaves indecently or riotously or in a disorderly manner in a street or place of public resort, or in any public office; x x x x x shall be punished with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees, provided that imprisonment in default of payment of such fine shall not exceed eight days notwihstanding anything in S. 67 of the Indian penal Code. " ( 3 ) SO, what is essential for the prosecution to establish in order to sustain a charge under this clause is that the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of this section had been extended by Government by a notification in the official gazette to a particular local area, and that some act was committed by the accused in contravention of that notification. That that is so is clear from the words "whoever contrary thereto" with which sub-sec. (1) concludes. But the prosecution produced no notification which could be said to have been contravened even if the evidence given by P. Ws. 1 and 2 could be believed. I do not accede to the argument of Mr. That that is so is clear from the words "whoever contrary thereto" with which sub-sec. (1) concludes. But the prosecution produced no notification which could be said to have been contravened even if the evidence given by P. Ws. 1 and 2 could be believed. I do not accede to the argument of Mr. Public Prosecutor that it was the duty of the accused to defend the charge on the ground that no notification under sub-sec. (1) of S. 92 had been promulgated. On the contrary, the burden was on the prosecution to prove the promulgation of a notification to which S. 92 (1) refers to produce evidence that there was a contravention of that notification. Since the prosecution produced no evidence in proof of that essential ingredient which was so necessary to sustain the charge, the prosecution has to fail. ( 4 ) MOREOVER, the charge-sheet which was produced before the Magistrate merely stated that the accused had used indecent language or had behaved indecently. The language employed by the accused was not set out in the charge-sheet and the words supposed to have been used by the accused as stated by P. W. 1 in his evidence are not the same as those stated by P. W. 2. While according to P. W. 1, the accused called P. Ws. 1 and 2 as 'bevarshies', PW. 2 stated that he also called them "sons of prostituteg". That evidence given by P. W. 2 does not receive corroboration from the evidence of PW. 1, and, having regard to the variation in the evidence of these two witnesses and the fact that the charge-sheet itself did not set out the words employed by the accused, no dependence could have been placed by the Magistrate on the evidence given by P. Ws. 1 and 2 with respect to the language stated to have been employed by the accused. Although the charge-sheet stated that the accused had used indecent language or had behaved indecently, no evidence was produced that there was any indecent behaviour. All that the witnesses stated was that the accused used indecent language. So, unless there was trustworthy evidence that the language employed by the accused was indecent in the sense that it was obscene and so transgressed the rules of public decency, no conviction was possible in the present case. All that the witnesses stated was that the accused used indecent language. So, unless there was trustworthy evidence that the language employed by the accused was indecent in the sense that it was obscene and so transgressed the rules of public decency, no conviction was possible in the present case. ( 5 ) MOREOVER, P. W. 3 Vittala Madivala who was called to give evidence and who is supposed to have been present at the time of the incident did not corroborate the testimony of P. Ws. 1 and 2. All that he stated was that the accused said something loudly and went away. He gave no evidence about the words used by the accused. Further, P. W. 3 stated that he was not aware that the accused had abused P. Ws. 1 and 2. This feature of the evidence of PW. 3 assumes importance for the reason that according to the Magistrate P. W. 3 was the only independent witness but he did not corroborate the testimony of P. Ws. 1 and 2. ( 6 ) SINCE what 1 have said so far ensures the success of this revision petition, it is not necessary for me to discuss the further question whether that part of the Government hospital in which the incident is said to have happened was a public office or a place of public resort within the meaning of clause (o) of S. 92 (1) of the Mysore Police Act. I allow this revision petition and set aside his conviction and the sentence imposed on him. The fine if paid will be refunded. --- *** --- .