M. L. Garg v. Labour Court At Meerut — 1969 DIGILAW 119 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This writ petition came up for hearing before us upon a reference made by a learned single judge. 2. The facts leading upto the petition, are as follows. Opposite party No. 2 to this petition, the Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd., Shamli (hereinafter called the Company), is a public limited company. It owns a sugar mill at Shamli in district Muzaffarnagar and carries on the business of manufacture and salt of sugar. Petitioner No. 1, Sri M. L. Garg was employed in the cane department of the Company designated as cane manager. On October 27, 1959 the Company passed an order dismissing Sri M. L. Garg from its service. Sri M. L. Garg placed the matter of his dismissal before the Chini Mill Mazdoor Union, Shamli and the Executive Committee of the Union, in its meeting held on April 12, 1960, unanimously decided to fight it out. In pursuance of that decision the Secretary of the Union addressed a letter dated April 23, 1960, to the General Manager of the Company demanding reinstatement of Sri M. L. Garg. The Company replied to the letter saying that there was no question of reinstatement as Sri M. L. Garg had been responsible for certain irregularities in the cane department and the Company had lost confidence in him. Then, upon an application made by the Union on April 27, 1960, conciliation proceedings were held for resolving the dispute, but they proved unsuccessful. Eventually, the State Government referred the following matter of dispute to the Labour Court, Meerut, on November 25, 1960, under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 : "Whether the employers terminated the services of their workman, Sri M. L. Garg son of Sri Kashmiri Dass, Cane Manager, vide the order dated 27-10-1959 (Annexure) legally and/or justifiably? If not to what relief is the workman concerned entitled ?" The reference was, however, rejected by the Labour Court by its award dated February 22, 1962, on the ground that the dispute referred to it was not an industrial dispute. If not to what relief is the workman concerned entitled ?" The reference was, however, rejected by the Labour Court by its award dated February 22, 1962, on the ground that the dispute referred to it was not an industrial dispute. he petitioners, Sri M. L. Garg and workmen of M/s. Upper Doaba Sugar Mills Ltd., Shamli, have challenged the award by means of this writ petition and have prayed that the award be quashed and the Labour Court, Meerut, opposite party No. 1, be directed to decide the dispute referred to it by the State Government. 3. It has firstly been contended by Sri Asif Ansari, learned counsel for the petitioners, that under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act the Labour Court could not enquire into the validity of the reference and it was bound to proceed on the footing that there was an industrial dispute. This contention ignores the distinction between the factual existence of a dispute and the nature of a dispute. A distinction which has, been made clear by the Supreme Court in The State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 53. Keeping in view that distinction, the Labour Court herd that the Company was not entitled to challenge the factual existence of the dispute or the expediency of making the reference and determined only whether the dispute amounted to an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. The question whether the dispute that occasioned the reference possessed the character of an industrial dispute was a question which the Labour Court was not only competent to decide but bound to decide inasmuch as it pertained to its jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute. That jurisdiction depended not upon the mere fact of a reference having been made by the State Government but also upon the fact that the dispute to which the reference related was an industrial dispute. Determination of the latter fact was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of adjudication and the Labour Court could not assume that power merely on the basis of the reference and regard the reference itself as conclusive. 4. Determination of the latter fact was a condition precedent to the exercise of the power of adjudication and the Labour Court could not assume that power merely on the basis of the reference and regard the reference itself as conclusive. 4. The controversy as to the power of a Labour Court or Tribunal to esquire into the question whether the dispute referred to it is an industrial dispute must be regarded as settled by the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Management of Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. Madras v. The Workers, AIR 196 Supreme Court 569"- where Gajendragadkar, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Court observed : "It is also true that even if the dispute is tried by the Industrial Tribunal at the very commencement the Industrial Tribunal will have to examine as a preliminary issue the question as to whether the dispute referred to it is an industrial dispute or not, and the decision of this question would inevitably depend upon the view which the Industrial Tribunal may take as to whether tine action taken by the appellant is a closure or a lockout. The finding which the Industrial Tribunal may record on this preliminary issue will decide whether it has jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute or not. If the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a closure, there would be an end to the proceedings before the Tribunal so far as the main dispute is concerned. if, on the other hand, the finding is that the action of the appellant amounts to a lockout which has been disguised as a closure, then the Tribunal will be entitled to deal with the reference. The finding which the Tribunal may make on this preliminary issue is a finding on it jurisdictional fact that it is only when the jurisdictional fact is found against the appellant that the Industrial Tribunal would have jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute. This question is also not in dispute." 5. Attention may also be drawn to the case of The Bombay Union of Journalists v. The 'Hindu' Bombay, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 318 where an Industrial Tribunal had by its award rejected a reference on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute under reference and the award was uphold by the Supreme Court. 6. Attention may also be drawn to the case of The Bombay Union of Journalists v. The 'Hindu' Bombay, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 318 where an Industrial Tribunal had by its award rejected a reference on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute under reference and the award was uphold by the Supreme Court. 6. We may also refer to the following cases decided by the High Courts, although in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court it is not necessary to do so. In Bengal Club Ltd. v. Santi Ranjan Somaddar, A.I.R. 1956 Calcutta 454 it was held that if a dispute is not and cannot be an industrial dispute the Government cannot act under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the Tribunal cannot adjudicate upon it, and further that the Tribunal has not only the power to examine its jurisdiction but also the duty to do so before entering into the reference, if the point is raised. A similar view was expressed in Kaleswari Handloom Factory v. The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1958 Madras 108, Management of Badjampura Salt Factory v. Workers (cartmen), A.I.R. 1930 Andhra Pradesh 378 and The Management of Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., Karnal v. Workmen of Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., Karnal, A.I.R. 1967 Punjab 320. 7. In the instant case the Company had challenged the validity of the reference specifically on the ground that the dispute concerning which it was made was not an industrial dispute. The Labour Court was, therefore, not only possessed of the jurisdiction to decide that objection but was bound to decide it, and if it came to the conclusion that the dispute did not partake of the nature of an industrial dispute it could not proceed to adjudicate upon it. The first contention of Sri Asif Ansari is, therefore, unsustainable. The next contention of Sri Asif Ansari is that in determining whether the dispute referred by the State Government was an industrial dispute the Labour Court applied certain principles and tests which are fundamentally incorrect and its finding, therefore, suffers from a manifest error of law. This contention of the learned counsel is, in our judgment, well founded. 8. The next contention of Sri Asif Ansari is that in determining whether the dispute referred by the State Government was an industrial dispute the Labour Court applied certain principles and tests which are fundamentally incorrect and its finding, therefore, suffers from a manifest error of law. This contention of the learned counsel is, in our judgment, well founded. 8. The main question in controversy before the Labour Court was whether the dispute to which the dismissal of Sri M. L. Garg gave rise became transformed into an industrial dispute on account of being taken up by a Union of the Company's workmen or by an appreciable number of such workmen. In order to establish that the cause of Sri M. L. Garg was espoused by a union, the workmen i-lied upon the facts that upon the matter being put before the Chini Mill Mazdoor Union, Shamli, the Executive Committee of the Union considered it in a meeting and unanimously decided to fight it out, that the Secretary of the Union demanded from the Company reinstatement of Sri M. L. Garg, and that on the refusal of the Company to do so the Union moved for conciliation proceedings. According to the Company, however, these facts did not prove the espousal of the cause of Sri M. L. Garg by the Union and did not convert the dispute into an industrial dispute because: firstly, Sri M. L. Garg was not a member of the Union at the time of his dismissal and the Union had no authority to sponsor the dispute; secondly, the general body of the Union had not authorised the officers of the Union to take up the matter; and thirdly, there was no community of interest between the members of the Union and Sri M. L. Garg. The Labour Court upheld all the above grounds taken by the Company, but to us it appears that none of them was sustainable. We will deal with these grounds in the order in which they have been stated. 9. The Labour Court upheld all the above grounds taken by the Company, but to us it appears that none of them was sustainable. We will deal with these grounds in the order in which they have been stated. 9. In paragraph 13 of the written statement (Annexure 'I' to the writ petition) filed on behalf of the Company before the Labour Court it was pleaded that "Sri M. L. Garg was not a member of the Union espousing the dispute, if t; y, on the date the cause of action arose and the said Union had no authority, to espouse the cause of termination of services of Sri M. L. Garg." The plea was amplified by the Company in its supplementary preliminary objection (Annexure 'M' to the writ petition) to the proceedings before the Lagour Court. In paragraph 1 of the objection it was said that the dispute between the Company and a union of persons employed by the Company espousing the cause of Sri M. L. Garg would not amount to an industrial dispute because "there must be community of interest between the workmen sponsoring the case of Sri M. L. Garg on the date of the termination of the services of Sri Al. L. Garg." Again, in paragraph 2 of the objection it was stated that "Sri Al. L. Garg was not a member of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Union on the elate of termination of his services and the cause of Sri M. L. Garg's dismissal was taken up by the said Union subsequent to the dismissal of Sri Garg." Some words in this paragraph seem to be missing but it clearly mentions the fact that "Sri M. L. Garg became a member of the Union after his dismissal." Paragraph 3 of the objection reiterates that, on the date of his dismissal, Sri Al. L. Garg was not a member of the Union which espoused his cause, adding that the Union "is no more interested in his cause." The position that emerges from the written statement and the supplementary preliminary objection of the Company is that the Company admitted that the dispute arising out of the dismissal of Sri M. L. Garg had been taken up by the Union but the dispute had not become an industrial dispute because Sri M. L. Garg was not a member of the Union at the time of his dismissal. It was never alleged or suggested by the Company that Sri M. L. Garg was not a member of the Union on the date of the reference made by the State Government or that he was not a member of the Union on the date on which it involved to take up the matter of his dismissal and to fight it out. The finding of the Labour Court too is that Sri Al. L. Garg was not a member of the Union on the elate of his dismissal although he became a member thereof subsequently. The exact date on which Sri M. L. Garg became a member has not been mentioned in the award but it has been stated that "from the register of membership for the year 1960-61 it appears that he joined the Union this year." By the expression of 'this year' the Labour Court evidently meant the year 1960-61. Since the interference by the State Government was made on November 25, 1960 it may reasonably be inferred that Sri Al. L. Garg was a member of the Union on the date of reference. We may also note that it was not urged before us on behalf of the Company that even on the date of reference Sri M. L. Garg was not a member of the Union and all that was contended on this aspect of the controversy was that he was not a member on the date of his dismissal. 10. The question, therefore, is whether on account of the fact that Sri M. L. Garg was not a member of the Union on the date of his dismissal the dispute could not partake of the nature of an industrial dispute even if the Union chose to take it up. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court to which we will presently refer the answer to the question is not at all in doubt. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court to which we will presently refer the answer to the question is not at all in doubt. In The Bombay Union of Journalists v. The 'Hindu', Bombay, A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 318 their Lordship observed : "In each case in ascertaining whether an individual dispute has acquired the character of an industrial dispute the test is whether at the date of the reference the dispute was taken up or supported by the Union of the workmen of the employer against whom the dispute is raised by an individual workman or by an appreciable number of workmen." The principle laid down in the above observation was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen, 1962 (1) Labour Law Journal 409. The fact that Sri M. L. Garg was not a member of the Union on the date of the termination of his services was, therefore, a matter of no consequence, and what had to be seen was whether the Union had taken up the cause of Sri M. L. Garg and the individual dispute concerning him had thus assumed the nature of an industrial dispute on the (late of reference. The validity of a reference has to be determined with reference to the state of things existing at the time of the reference, and if on that (late a dispute possesses the characteristics of an industrial dispute the reference would be competent irrespective of the fact that on the date of the arising of the dispute the individual in relation to whom the dispute originally arose wag not a member of the Union that sponsored it. We may also refer in this connection to the decision of a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Workmen of Jamadoba Colliery of M/s. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Employers in relation to Jamadoba Colliery of MIs. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Jamadoba, A.I.R. 1968 Patna 277 . In that case it had been found as a fact by the Industrial Tribunal that that branch of the Trade Union which sponsored the cause of the dismissed workman came into existence after his dismissal and that he became a member of the same thereafter. Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. Jamadoba, A.I.R. 1968 Patna 277 . In that case it had been found as a fact by the Industrial Tribunal that that branch of the Trade Union which sponsored the cause of the dismissed workman came into existence after his dismissal and that he became a member of the same thereafter. Relying on the principles laid down in the above mentioned decisions of the Supreme Court, Narsinham, C. J. with whom the other learned judge constituting the Bench agreed, said : "On these principles there seems no special reason why, in this case, it could not be held that the dispute regarding the validity of dismissal of workman Tulsi became an industrial dispute on the 19th December, 1963, the date on which the reference was made. Before that date a union of the workers of Jamadoba Colliery had come into existence, the workman had become a member of the union and his cause had been espoused by the union. I am unable to find any principle in support of the view taken by the Tribunal that the union itself must have been in existence prior to the date of dismissal, and that the workman should have been a member of that union prior to that date." The learned Chief Justice also referred in his judgment to the following words of caution uttered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugandhi) v. M/s. Dharam Pal Prem Chand (Saugantihi), A.I.R. 1966 Supreme Court 182 : 'It is well known that in dealing with industrial disputes, industrial adjudication is generally reluctant to lay clown any hard and fast rule or adopt any test of general or universal application. The approach of industrial adjudication in dealing with industrial disputes has necessary to be pragmatic, and the tests which it applies and the considerations on which it relies would vary from case to case and would not admit of any rigid or inflexible formula." In the light of what has been laid clown by the Supreme Court and agreeing with the view expressed in the Patna case mentioned above, we hold that the first ground of challenge to the validity of the reference had no substance and the Labour Court erred in taking it into account and basing its conclusion thereon, 11. The second ground taken by the Company and relied upon by the Labour Court for its finding was equally devoid of substance. In dealing with this ground we must first point out that in paragraph 2 of the preliminary objection (Annexure 'M' to the writ petition) filed by the Company before the Labour Court it was admitted that "the cause of Sri M. L. Garg's dismissal was taken up by the said Union subsequent to the dismissal of Sri Garg." In view of this admission there was no force in the contention that the general body of the Union had not authorised the officers of the Union to take up the matter of Sri M. L. Garg's dismissal. Whether the general body of the Union had or had not authorised its officers to take up the matter was wholly immaterial if the Union had itself taken it up. Indeed, it seems to its that after having made the above admission in what may be regarded as its pleading it was not open to the Company to raise the controversy that the cause of Sri M. L. Garg had not been espoused by the Union. The Labour Court ignored or overlooked this admission altogether and gave it number of reasons for accepting the contention of the Company. None of the reasons can, however, be said to be sound and the concluston reached by the Labour Court on their basis is on the face of it incorrect. Let its examine the reasons. 12. The Labour Court has firstly adverted to the fact that there was no evidence to show that the complaint made by Sri M. L. Garg had been investigated before the Executive Committee of the Union passed its resolution dated April 12, 1960. No evidence to that effect was at all necessary. The question before the Labour Court was whether the Union had actually chosen to espouse the cause of Sri M. L. Garg, and it was not it matter of any relevance whether it had conducted an enquiry into the correctness or otherwise of the complaint made by Sri M. L. Garg. It has then been observed by the Labour Court that there was no evidence that the reply of the Company to the letter dated April 23, 1960 was put up before the Union for consideration and for deciding whether it was or was not satisfactory. It has then been observed by the Labour Court that there was no evidence that the reply of the Company to the letter dated April 23, 1960 was put up before the Union for consideration and for deciding whether it was or was not satisfactory. In the Labour Court meant that there should have been evidence showing that the reply was considered and regarded as unsatisfactory we may repeat that whether an enquiry was or was not made could have no bearing on the question before the Labour Court. Again, whether or not any steps were taken by a union to satisfy itself regarding the justice of the cause that it decides to espouse or regarding the desirability of espousing it is not a matter to be enquired into by a Labour Court for deciding whether an individual dispute became converted into an industrial dispute, and all that the Labour Court is concerned with in that decision is whether there was in fact an espousal by a union of the employer's workmen. Of course, the espousal which can transform an Individual dispute into an industrial dispute must be an act of the Union. In the instant case not only was a resolution that the matter relating to the dismissal of Sri M. L. Garg be fought out passed by the Executive Committee of the Chini Mill Mazdoor Union, Shamli, but latter demanding reinstatement of Sri M. L. Garg was addressed to the Company's General Manager by the Secretary of the Union, and an application (Annexure 'A') for reference of the dispute to a Conciliation Board for settlement was made by the Union. In these circumstances there could be little doubt about the fact that the Union had really taken up the dispute and made it a collective dispute. 13. The Labour Court has not regarded the action taken by the Executive Committee of the Union as an action on behalf of the Union and it has found force in the contention of the Company that the Executive Committee was not competent to take the decision which it did and the resolution passed by it and the action taken thereon were "without jurisdiction". We think that here again the Labour Court has fallen into a palpable error. We think that here again the Labour Court has fallen into a palpable error. It has noted that "the Executive Committee is provided Under the Constitution of the Union for the management of the Union; the control of its funds and the execution of its policy", but it has apparently regarded the above objects of constituting the Executive Committee as insufficient for empowering it to take up the cause of a workman and to fight it out. It has quoted in its award the powers which the Executive Committee is authorised to exercise under the constitution of the Union; and since they do not include an act like the passing of the resolution dated April 12, 1960; it has concluded that the said resolution was in excess of the powers of the Executive Committee. This, in our view, is a too narrow and an incorrect view of the powers and functions of the Executive Committee which have to be determined in the light of the objects for which the Executive Committee was constituted. The various specific powers of the Executive Committee quoted in the award of the Labour Court from the constitution of the Union are not exhaustive of its powers and they do not exclude the exercise of other powers which are necessary for carrying out the objects of constituting the Executive Committee. The words "management of the Union" and "execution of its policy" are, in our opinion, wide enough to cover the resolution passed by the Executive Committee. We find support for our view on this matter in the Division Bench decision of the Mysore High Court The Management of the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen of the Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1967 Mysore 172 The Bench stated the position in regard to the powers of an Executive Committee of a Trade Union as follows:- "How does it Trade Union Act ? A Trade Union cannot act in person. It can act only through agents. Its principal agents are its Executive Committee. In a registered Union, the position of the Executive Committee is roughly and rigorous to that of the Board of Directors of a limited company : Vide Trade Union Law and Practice by H. Vester and A. H. Gardner (1958 Edition) at page 62. It can act only through agents. Its principal agents are its Executive Committee. In a registered Union, the position of the Executive Committee is roughly and rigorous to that of the Board of Directors of a limited company : Vide Trade Union Law and Practice by H. Vester and A. H. Gardner (1958 Edition) at page 62. Section 2 (a) of the Indian Trade Unions Act 1926 defines the term 'executive' to mean the body, by whatever named called, to which the management of the affairs of a Trade Union is constructed. Therefore, the executive of a Trade Union has a right whenever required to raise an industrial dispute unless the constitution of the Union has restricted that right." And dealing with the facts of that case the Bench observed : "Therefore, the Executive Committee of the Union to which the management of the affairs of the Union is entrusted passed a resolution on 26th January, 1960 authorising its office-bearers to demand reinstatement of the said Ramchandran. On the basis of the said resolution, the matter was taken up by the Secretary of the Union and on his representation made on behalf of the Union, the Government have referred the dispute to the Labour Court. Therefore, in our judgment, the said resolution of the Executive Committee and the action taken thereon amounts to the Union espousing the cause of the individual work- man, the said Ramchandran and consequently, what was an individual dispute at its inception has developed into an industrial dispute." 14. In the present case there is nothing to indicate that the general body of the Union took exception to the resolution passed by its Executive Committee. On the other hand, we have the fact that in pursuance of the resolution the Secretary of the Union wrote a letter to the General Manager of the Company demanding reinstatement of Sri M. L. Garg and, later, an application purporting to be on behalf of the Union was made for referring the dispute to a Conciliation Board for Sc, clement. These texts make it obvious that the Executive Committee had the power and was regarded by the Union as having the power to pass the resolution that it did. The Union also implemented the resolution of its Executive Committee by initiating proceedings for conciliation. Reference may here be made to Tata Iron and Steel Co. These texts make it obvious that the Executive Committee had the power and was regarded by the Union as having the power to pass the resolution that it did. The Union also implemented the resolution of its Executive Committee by initiating proceedings for conciliation. Reference may here be made to Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Raj Kishore Prasad, A.I.R. 1966 Patna 407 where in relation to the facts of that case, Narsimham, C. J. with whom the other learned judge constituting the Bench agreed, observed : "Here the very fact that the Union took up the cause of these workmen both before the Conciliation Officer and before the Industrial Tribunal would, in the absence of any rebutting evidence, indicate that the said Union which represented a large number of workmen had taken up the cause." We may note that in the instant case the President of the Union joined Sri M. L. Garg in filing a written statement before the Labour Court and claiming his reinstatement. 15. We may also observe that the proper function of the Labour Court was not to examine meticulously whether on the strict terms of the constitution of the Union it could be said that in passing the resolution of April 12, 1960 the Executive Committee was acting within the scope of its powers. What the Labour Court had to find out was whether the resolution and the action taken in furtherance of it did in reality represent the attitude and will of the Union, and with respect to that there could hardly be any doubt. A hypertechnical view of the powers of the Executive Committee to take up a case on behalf of the Union was, in our opinion, out of place. It would be pertinent in this connection to refer to Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. U. P. State Industrial Tribunal, A.I.R. 1960 Supreme Court 1328 where, in dealing with the objection that the Union which had sponsored the case of the workman concerned was not a registered union, the Supreme Court observed : "Then it was urged that the association which sponsored the case of respondents 3 to 5 was an unregistered body and that made the reference invalid. Both the courts have held, and rightly, that it is not necessary that a registered body should sponsor a workman's case to make it an industrial dispute. Both the courts have held, and rightly, that it is not necessary that a registered body should sponsor a workman's case to make it an industrial dispute. Once it is shown that a body of workmen, either acting through their union or otherwise had sponsored a workman's case it becomes an industrial dispute." This case furnishes an example of how the matter should be viewed by a Labour Court. The position in the present case was, however, clear and was also as we have noted above, a matter of admission, and the Labour Court was obviously mistaken in holding that the dispute arising out of the dismissal of Sri M. L. Garg had not been taken up by the Chini Mill Mazdoor Union, Shamli. 16. We now come to the third and the last ground on the basis of which it was urged before the Labour Court on behalf of the Company that there was no industrial dispute. The ground was that there was no community of interest between the members of the Union and Sri M. L. Garg. For a proper considers- Lion of this ground it was necessary for the Labour Court to first decide issue No. 1 which was framed by it in the following term : "Whether Sri Garg was a workman within the meaning of the U. P. Indus- trial Disputes Act, 1947, and the terms and conditions of his employment were governed by the Standing Orders ?" Although the dispute connected with the dismissal of Sri M. L. Garg could be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act even if Sri M. L. Garg was not a workman as defined in the Act or the Standing Orders did not apply to him, the answer to the above issue could certainly have a bearing in the determination of the question whether any community of interest existed between Sri M. L. Garg and the members of the Union. The Labour Court did not, however, decide issue No. 1, although it made certain observations touching that issue. The Labour Court did not, however, decide issue No. 1, although it made certain observations touching that issue. The relevant passage of the award of the Labour Court may be quoted "That Sri Garg was a workman and the Standing Orders applied on him is the subject-matter of issue No. I but it is not necessary to go into that question here and it is sufficient to state that there is absolutely no evidence of the fact that during the period Sri Gary worked as Cane Manager from about December, 1949 to 27th October, 1959, the provisions of the Standing Orders were in fact applied on him. On the other hand evidence is there to the contrary and Sri Garg himself admits that no cards or tickets etc., under the Standing Orders were issued to him. When that is not proved the contention of Sri Garg cannot be accepted and I have come to the conclusion that that community of interest which is necessary to establish the nexus is wanted here." This, in our opinion, was not a proper and satisfactory way of dealing with the matter and no finding on any part of the issue can be regarded as having] been really given by the labour Court. At any rate, from the mere fact that the terms and conditions of the services of Sri M. L. Garg were not governed by the Standing Orders of the Company it could not be concluded that there could be no community of interest between him and the members of the Union. Community of interest is dependent upon many factors and may arise in various ways, and employees who are subject to the Standing Orders of an employer may have a community of interest also with a co-employee who is not governed by the said Standing Orders. We may further note that the Labour Court has not found that the Union does not include among its members. employees to whom the Standing Orders are not applicable. We do not think it proper to say anything more on this aspect of the case because, in our opinion, the question of community of interest between Sri M. L. Garg and the members of the Union should be decided only after a clear finding on issue No. 1 has been-recorded. 17. We do not think it proper to say anything more on this aspect of the case because, in our opinion, the question of community of interest between Sri M. L. Garg and the members of the Union should be decided only after a clear finding on issue No. 1 has been-recorded. 17. In support of its conclusion regarding the absence of community of interest between Sri M. L. Garg and the members of the Union the Labour Court has also referred to the fact that there was a gap of over five months between the termination of the services of Sri H. L. Garg and the resolution of the Union about taking up his case and fighting it out. In taking this factor into account the Labour Court relied on Shamsuddin v. State of Kerala, 1961 (1) Labour Law Journal 77 In that case the Kerala High Court certainly expressed the opinion that an individual dispute could not be regarded as having developed into an industrial dispute unless there was a community of interest between the aggrieved employee and his associates at the time the event causing the dispute happened. It would, however, be seen that this opinion rested upon the view that the material time for determining whether a dispute was an individual dispute was not the date of reference but the date of the act complained against. This view is obviously in conflict with what has been laid down by the Supreme Court in The Bombay Union of Journalists v. The 'Hindu', Bombay and Indian Cable Co. Ltd. V. Its Workmen-". The basis of the decision of the Kerala High Court has, therefore, been taken away and it cannot be considered as having laid down the correct law. It cannot he urged that although the material (late for determining whether dispute is an industrial dispute is the (late of reference the material (late for determining the existence of facts which impart to it the character of an industrial dispute, viz., whether a union of employees or considerable section of them took up the dispute and whether those who took it up had any community of interest with the employee in respect of whom the dispute originally arose is the (late of the original of the dispute. What furnishes reason for reference is the condition of things prevailing at the time of the reference and it is a matter of no significance as to when that condition of things came to exist. The Labour Court was, therefore, wrong in being influenced by the fact that there was a gap of over five months between the dismissal of Sri M. L. Garg and the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Union for taking up his case. 18. The Labour Court has also recorded a finding that the case of Sri M. L. Garg was not sponsored by an appreciable number of workmen of the Company having a community of interest with him. One of the considerations that weigh- ed with the Labour Court in giving that finding was that there could be no community of interest because Sri M. L. Garg was employed to do supervisory work whereas those who sponsored his cause were employed to do works of clerical, skilled, or semi-skilled nature. Whether Sri M. L. Garg was a workman, whether the Standing Orders of the Company governed the terms and conditions of his service, and whether those who sponsored his cause were also interested in or affected by the issue involved in the dismissal of Sri M. L. Garg were matters to be considered in deciding the question of community of interest. The decision on issue No. I framed by the Labour Court would, therefore, have been of importance in the determination of this question, but that issue was left undecided. The result obviously is that the finding recorded by the Labour Court cannot be said to have been properly recorded. 19. From the above discussion it is clear that most of the premises on which the Labour Court based its conclusion on the question whether the dispute under reference was an industrial dispute were wrong and some of the considerations that it took into account were not relevant. Its approach to the questions before it was faulty and it ignored an important admission by the Company on a vital matter. It also omitted to decide issue No. 1 although the decision of that issue had a bearing on the question raised before it. The award of the Labour Court thus suffers from manifest error of law and it has to be quashed. 20. It also omitted to decide issue No. 1 although the decision of that issue had a bearing on the question raised before it. The award of the Labour Court thus suffers from manifest error of law and it has to be quashed. 20. before closing the judgment we have to notice that Sri Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the Company, contended before its that, even apart from other reasons, as there was nothing to show that the Union or any considerable section of the Company's workmen ever gave any threat of strike the dispute remained an individual dispute and never developed into an industrial dispute. Reliance for this contention was placed on the following observations of the Supreme Court in Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, U. P.. A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 532 which dealt with a case under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act "The object of the Act is the prevention of industrial strife, strikes and lockouts and the promotion of industrial peace and not to take the place of the ordinary tribunals of the land for the enforcement of contracts between an employer and an individual workman. Thus viewed the provisions of the Act lead to the conclusion that its applicability to an individual dispute as opposed to dispute involving a group of workmen is excluded unless it requires the general characteristics of an industrial dispute, viz., the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them make common cause with the individual workman, and thus create conditions contemplated by Section 3 of the U. P. Act which is the foundation of State Governmental action under that Act." Sri Shanti Bhushan interpreted the observations as requiring two separate conditions to be satisfied before an individual dispute can acquire the characteristics of an industrial dispute: (1) Workmen as a body or considerable section of them make common cause with the individual workman; and (2) they create conditions contemplated by Section 3 of the Act. This, to our mind, is not a correct reading of the observations. Their Lordships were dealing with the controversy whether a dispute between an employer and a single workman falls within the definition of 'Industrial Dispute' as used in the Act and they referred to Section 3 in order to explain the true meaning of the expression. This, to our mind, is not a correct reading of the observations. Their Lordships were dealing with the controversy whether a dispute between an employer and a single workman falls within the definition of 'Industrial Dispute' as used in the Act and they referred to Section 3 in order to explain the true meaning of the expression. As we understand, whether their Lordships intended to lay down was that it was only when the workmen as a body or a considerable section of them make common cause with an individual workman that the conditions contemplated by Section 3 of the Act arise, and not that the arising of the said conditions has to be established as another separate and independent fact before an individual dispute can be regarded as having become an industrial dispute. The word "thus" in the observations makes this intention clear. Proof of any threat of strike was, therefore, not necessary. And even if such proof was necessary, the determination shown in the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Union to fight out the matter of Sri M. L. Garg's dismissal was quite sufficient. 21. For the reasons discussed above we allow this writ petition, set aside the award of the Labour Court, and direct the Labour Court to dispose of the reference afresh in accordance with law. We, however, make no order as to costs of the proceedings in this Court.