JUDGMENT _ The petitioner is the tenant of field survey numbers 22/1, 22/3 and 24/1 having a total area of 3 acres 17 gunthas at village Nandrakoli, taluq Chikhali, district Euldana. These fields are owned by respondent No.2 Narayan, hereaiter referred to as the landholder. On 28-3-1963 he filed an application seeking to exercise his right of resumption of these fields for personal cultivation under section 39-A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, hereafter referred to as the Tenancy Act. He states in his application that he had served notices, but they were refused by the petitioner. The Naib-Tahsildar who dealt with. the case held on the basis of the endorsements on the envelopes which were produced that the notices were validly served and that in view of the fact that the disputed land was the only land owned by the landholder he was entitled to resume the entire land for personal cultivation. 2. Against this order the petitioner filed an appeal. The Special Deputy Collector, Buldana set aside the order of the Naib-Tahsildar on the short ground that Since the landholder had come to own the land as a result of the partition dated 20.6-1959 his application was not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 38 (7) as amended by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) (Amendment) Act, 1963. The landholder filed a revision application against this order before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. 3. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal referred to a decision of this Court in Smt. Salubai v. Chandu and others1 and held by an Older passed on 15.12.1965 that the land-holders claim was not hit by the provisions of Section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act. The landholder filed a revision application against this order before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. 3. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal referred to a decision of this Court in Smt. Salubai v. Chandu and others1 and held by an Older passed on 15.12.1965 that the land-holders claim was not hit by the provisions of Section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act. In Salubais case this Court held that the claim for resumption made by landlords who had pre-existing fights in the family property as members of all undivided Hindu family and who became owner of land by partition of Joint family property whether effected after 1-8-1953 or not in respect of lands held by protected lessees from the date prior to the date of such partition were not hit by the provisions of section 38 (7) of the tenancy Act as amended by Maharashtra Act No. 44 of 1963 which came into force on 16-12-1963 and that section 38 (7) of the Act was not a bar to the making of an application for possession of the land after terminating the tenancy of the tenants holding the lands which were partitioned. it was further held in that case referring to the addition of the words for partition in section 38 (7) by amendment by Maharashtra Act No. 44 of 1963 that addition of these words must be confined to that class of partition where the landlord gets a right in the property for the first time as a result thereof and does not include a landlord who has a pre-existing right in the property as owner because such landlord could not be said to be acquiring land as a result of partition. This decision was binding on the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal when the Tribunal decided the revision application on 15th December 1905. The Tribunal, therefore, set aside the order of the appellate authority and remanded the appeal back to the appellate authority for a decision on merits. This order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was not challenged by the tenant further. 4. After remand the appellate authority rejected the appeal and held that since the land in dispute was the only land of the landholder and he had no other source of income and that the total land was less than one-third of a family holding the Naib-Tahsildar was justifird in allowing the landlord to resume the land. 4. After remand the appellate authority rejected the appeal and held that since the land in dispute was the only land of the landholder and he had no other source of income and that the total land was less than one-third of a family holding the Naib-Tahsildar was justifird in allowing the landlord to resume the land. The appeal, therefore, came to be rejected. The tenant then filed a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal against this appellate decision. Before the Tribunal the only point which was raised was that since the application filed by the landholder under section 38 of the Tenancy Act was rejected on 16-1-1963, he was not entitled to make an application under section 39-A of the Tenancy Act. Obviou8ly having regard to the words of section 39-A this contention was without any merit and it was rightly rejected by the Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected the revision application. The petitioner has now filed this petition challenging the order passed by the Revenu5 Tribunal. 5. The contention which is now raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the decision in Saluhais case, on the basis of which the Tribunal had held that even though the landholder had come to own the land in dispute as a result of the partition his application was maintainable, is vitiated because the decision in Saluhais case bas now been overruled by the Full Bench of this Court in Smt. Radhabai Mohanlal Kalal v. State of Maharashtra. It is held in this case that section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act as amended by Act No. 44 of 1963 covers partitions of every kind. In that case the landholder had come to own the land as a result of a partition on 22-6-1969 and she applied for restoration of land for personal cultivation relying on the decision in Saluhais case and it wag held by this Court that the application was not maintainable. It is not disputed that the decision in Salubais case was expressly over-ruled by the Full Bench. It is not disputed that the decision in Salubais case was expressly over-ruled by the Full Bench. The learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, contends that it must now be held that the application filed by the landholder which was held to be maintainable by the order of the Tribunal dated 15th December 1965 should be rejected and that the orders which were passed by the revenue authorities granting this application under section 39-A of the Tenancy Act are all liable to be set aside in view of the decision of the Full Bench in Radhabais case. It is not possible for me to accept this contention. 6. As already stated the question whether the application for resumption filed by the landlord was maintainable or whether it was hit by the provisions of section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act came to be finally decided by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by the order dated 15th December 1965. The jurisdiction which the Revenue Tribunal was exercising while deciding the revision application before it was the jurisdiction of the last forum created by the provisions of the Tenancy Act and there was no further remedy under the Tenancy Act which the tenant could avail of for challenging that decision. So far as the provisions of the Tenancy Act were concerned therefore the decision of the Revenue Tribunal that the application of the landlord was not hit by section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act was final. The only remedy for the tenant was to approach this Court by an application under Article 227 of the Constitution. The petitioner, however, did not avail of that remedy. The question which therefore arises is whether a question which stood finally decided between the parties by the earlier decision of the Revenue Tribunal in accordance with the construction which was placed on section 38 (7), of the Tenancy Act by this Court in Salubais case can be reopened merely because the decision of this Court in Salubais case has been overruled subsequently in Radhabais case. In my opinion, the answer to this question must be in the negative. The decision that the application was not hit by section 38 (7), whether right or wrong, would bind the parties to the decision on the principle of res judicata. In my opinion, the answer to this question must be in the negative. The decision that the application was not hit by section 38 (7), whether right or wrong, would bind the parties to the decision on the principle of res judicata. This decision had the effect of putting an end to the controversy about the maintainability of the application in view of the provisions of section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act and that controversy cannot be now reopened merely because at a. subsequent point of time a different construction has been placed by this Court on section 38 l7) of the Act. The nature and the scope of the principle of res judicata, apart from the provisions of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, have been set out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Satyadhyan Ghosal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi.3 In para. 7 of their judgment their Lordships have observed: "The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res is judicata, it shall not be adjudged again primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter whether on a question of fact or a question of law-has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher Court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceeding between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by Courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where section 11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by Courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original Court as well as any higher Court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct." In my judgment having regard to these observations it must be held that the decision of the Tribunal given on 15-12-1965 that the application by the landlord was not hit by section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act had become final between the parties and that question cannot be allowed to be canvassed again by the tenant. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, contends that the proceeding which was initiated on the application made on 28.3.1963 was still pending and since the question in the instant case relates to the correctness of the order passed at the earlier stages of the same proceeding the principle of res judicata is not attracted. In my view merely because a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed by the petitioner the proceeding initiated on the application by the landlord under section 36 cannot be 88.id to be pending. The proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are in the nature of original proceedings in which the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction as a. Court of appeal or revision, but it exercises its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. [See Sumatibai v. Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal4 and Jagannath v. Gulabrao5]. The proceeding initiated before the Tahsildar came to be finally disposed of under the Tenacoy Act as a result of the order of the Revenue Tribunal. Even otherwise in my view it is now well established that an order passed at an earlier state of a proceeding in res judicata at a subsequent stage of the same proceeding if that order is a final order which determines the controversy between the parties. Even otherwise in my view it is now well established that an order passed at an earlier state of a proceeding in res judicata at a subsequent stage of the same proceeding if that order is a final order which determines the controversy between the parties. If any authority is necessary it is to be found in the following observations made by the Supreme Court in Satyadhyans case in paragraph 8 of the judgment: "The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court, whether the trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to reagitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings." If finally the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal as the last forum in the hierarchy of the authorities created under the Tenancy Act has finally decided the matter by its earlier order dated 15-12.1965 that the provisions of section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act did not bar the application of the landholder no infirmity is created in that decision which binds the parties to it merely because subsequently a different view has been taken by this Court and the tenant cannot agitate the same question at a subsequent stage of the litigation. As held by the Supreme Court in Mohanlal v. Benoy Krisna6 even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties to it and the correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing on the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. 8. A reference may also be made to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar Prahlad v. Seth Gendalal Motilal Patni.7 In that case which arose under the provisions of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals and Alienated Lands) Act 1 of 1951, the Claims Officer had on an application under section 19 of the said Act made by the mortgagor against whom a final decree for sale was passed held that he had jurisdiction to determine the debt and gave a finding that the debt was a secured debt within the meaning of the Act and directed the mortgagee to submit a statement under section 22 of the Act. In appeal by the mortgagee the Madhya Pradesh Board of Revenue following a decision of the Nagpur High Court in Ramkisan v. Board of Revenue, M. P.8 held that the Claims Officer had no jurisdiction to decide the question whether there was a secured debt and that the civil Court alone was competent to decide that question. In execution proceeding the civil Court held that there was a secured debt within the meaning of section 19 read with section 17 (1) of the Act due to the mortgagee notwithstanding the decree passed by the High Court. Subsequently on 3-10-1955 the decision in Ramkisans case was overruled by the High Court in Jethalal Bhowanji v. Prabhakar9 and it was held that the Claims Officer bad jurisdiction to decide whether a debt was a secured debt. The mortgagee then filed on 23-1-1958 a statement of his claim. On behalf of the mortgagee it was contended that the debt stood discharged as the mortgagee bad failed to file a statement as ordered earlier by the Claims Officer. The Claims Officer accepted this contention but this order was set aside by the Commissioner in appeal. The mortgagors petition having been dismissed by the High Court he appealed to the Supreme Court. The question before the Supreme Court was whether because the earlier decision on the basis of which the Board of Revenue has set aside the Claims Officers order was overruled the order of the Claims Officer was revived and it was held that since the decision of the Board of Revenue had become final between the parties the order would not stand revived. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "But the order of the Claims Officer holding that there was a secured debt was set aside in appeal by the Board of Revenue. Any proceeding consequent upon that adjudication was, in view of the judgment of the Board of Revenue, unauthorised. That decision of the Board of Revenue became final between the parties. Any proceeding consequent upon that adjudication was, in view of the judgment of the Board of Revenue, unauthorised. That decision of the Board of Revenue became final between the parties. It cannot be contended that because in another proceeding the High Court of Nagpur expressed the view that the judgment on which the Board of Revenue relied was erroneous the direction of the Claims Officer requiring the mortgagee to file his statement of account was revived, and if the directions of the Claims Officer were not complied with, the debt due to the mortgagee was discharged." In my view these observations apply with full force to the instant case. Merely because in Radhabais case the decision in Salubais case was over-ruled the order by which the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal had held following the decision in Salubais case that the landlords application was not hit by section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act is not rendered ineffective. That order had become final between the parties and the binding character was not affected by the fact that the decision in Salubais cafe was subsequently overruled. The decision on the question whether section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act barred the landlords application or not cannot be termed as an interlocutory order. An issue which fell for determination between the parties was finally decided by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and as already stated at subsequent stage of the same proceeding the same question could not be permitted to be agitated again. As observed by the Supreme Court the res is judicata and, therefore, cannot be adjudged again. The contention, therefore, that the landlords application was not maintainable in view of the provisions of section 38 (7) of the Tenancy Act as now interpreted in Radhabais case cannot, therefore, be accepted. 9. It is then contended that the notice under section 39-A was never served on the petitioner and yet a relief has been granted to the landholder. It may be noted that this question regarding service of notice was not raised at the revisional stage before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal and the finding which is given on the basis of the evidence of the postman and the endorsements on the envelopes that the petitioner must be taken to have been validly served under a notice under section 39-A of the Tenancy Act cannot now be permitted to be challenged at this stage. 10. 10. The result, therefore, is that this petition fails and is rejected with costs. Petition rejected.