JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - The petitioner was recorded as bhumidhar over all the subdivisions of plot No. 118. At the time of Partal, six sets of persons were found to be in possession over the various sub-divisions of the plot, and they were so recorded. During consolidation proceedings, these six sets of persons filed separate objection. That led to the constitution of six cases, namely, Nos. 325, 326, 327, 329, 330 and 377. All these cases were contested by the petitioner. He alleged that he was the bhumidhar. All the objectors claimed sirdari rights on the basis of adverse possession. So, the only question whether they had matured title by adverse possession, arose in all the six cases. All of them were disposed of by a single order by the Consolidation Officer, who upheld the petitioner's case. He repelled the plea of the objectors of acquisition of title by adverse possession. The objectors filed five appeals. Sumai and Kalu did not file an appeal. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) reversed the findings of the Consolidation Officer and held that the objectors had matured title by adverse possession for over six years. He directed that they be recorded as sirdars. He further observed that though Sumai and Khlu had filed no appeal in respect of plot Na 1189, they would also be governed by his order, because the circumstances were one and the same for all those persons. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed six revisions, which were dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The findings of the Settlement Officer were confirmed. 2. Aggrieved, the petitioner has come to this Court. He has filed only one writ petition here. For the respondents, a preliminary objection was taken that the writ petition was not maintainable. Reliance was placed upon Ram Shanker v. State of U.P., 1967 RD 37 . There, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that where 13 revisions were filed and all of them were dismissed, the petitioner should have filed at least 13 writ petitions and he could not have raised the whole matter in one writ petition. As the order in the 12 revisions became final, there could be no interference in the 13th case. The writ petition was dismissed on that ground. The judgment is brief. As the order in the 12 revisions became final, there could be no interference in the 13th case. The writ petition was dismissed on that ground. The judgment is brief. It is not clear whether the points in controversy were identical in all the 13 cases or whether only some of the questions were common. In the present case, all the six cases were against the petitioner. They related to the various sub-divisions of the same plot. On facts as well as on law, the controversy was identical in all the six sets of cases. They have been disposed of as one proceeding by one order. The Settlement, Officer himself gave the benefit of his order to the non-appealing parties. Under the circumstances, it will not be proper to disentitle the petitioner from agitating the matter on the merits in this Court. Further, in Mall Singh v. Laksha Kumari Khaitan, 1968 ALJ 210, a Full Bench of this Court has held that where the right to relief arises from the same act or transaction with common questions of law and fact, or where the persons are jointly interested in the cause of action, joinder of more than one person can be permitted under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case, the petitioner has joined the various objectors as respondents. In my opinion, there is no defect in the frame of the petition. Since, in substance, the matter in dispute constitutes one single record, a single petition would be competent. 3. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, A.I.R. 1955 SC 233, the Supreme Court has observed that proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution are not to be governed by the technical rules of English procedure relating to the issue of writs there. 4. In Arbind Kumar Singh v. Nand Kishore Prosad, A.I.R. 1968 SC 1227, the Supreme Court has held that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ to bring up for consideration a proceeding concerning civil rights is a civil proceeding. It may be mentioned that the same view was taken by this Court in the Assistant District Panchayat Officer v. Jai Narain, 1967 ALJ 232. 5. The view taken by this Court in Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Co. It may be mentioned that the same view was taken by this Court in the Assistant District Panchayat Officer v. Jai Narain, 1967 ALJ 232. 5. The view taken by this Court in Khurjawala Buckles Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, AIR 1965 Allahabad 517 that the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 226 of the Constitution is neither civil nor criminal, must be deemed to be overruled. This decision cannot in view of these Supreme Court decisions be said to hold the field any longer. The decision in that case that Section 141, C. P. C. would not apply, proceeded on the basis that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution was an extraordinary jurisdiction, and was neither civil nor criminal. If a proceeding under Article 226 is a civil proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable in relation to it would be a civil jurisdiction, to which Section 141, C. P. C. may well be attracted. The Full-Bench in Mall Singh's case2 mentioned above, has specifically held that Order 1. Rule 1, C. P. C. is applicable to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution involving civil rights, because it is a proceeding in a court of civil jurisdiction. Under Order 2, Rule 3. a plaintiff can unite several causes of action in the same suit. Here. the cause of action of the various objectors was the same against the petitioner. The petitioner, who was in the position of a plaintiff in relation to the writ petition could join the various causes of action in a single proceeding. under Order 2, Rule 3, C. P. C., if similar questions of fact and law arise and if it is not otherwise impro per or inconvenient to permit him to do ' so. There is nothing on the facts of this case, which may render such a joinder improper or inconvenient to either of the two parties. The joinder being permissible in law, the institution of a single petition against the various objectors would only mean the joinder of the causes of action against them in one proceeding. Consequently, the petition cannot be dismissed as incompetent. 6. On the merits, the question was whether the respondents had matured title by adverse possession for over six years. It is admitted that the various sub-divisions of plot No. 118 are situate more or less inside or on the river bank. Consequently, the petition cannot be dismissed as incompetent. 6. On the merits, the question was whether the respondents had matured title by adverse possession for over six years. It is admitted that the various sub-divisions of plot No. 118 are situate more or less inside or on the river bank. They are subject to the fluvial action of the river. The Settlement Officer found that in the rainy season when the river is in spate. the land in dispute is generally under water. Consequently, only Rabi crops are grown on this land. The cultivation is stopped during the Kharif period due to the rising of the water level of the river. The Settlement Officer as well as the Deputy Director held that the respondents had been in possession for more than six years by cultivating the Rabi crops in each of these years. They have treated the respondents' possession to be continuous, because they were in possession year after year. 7. For the petitioner, this view has been challenged on the basis of a decision of this Court in Kapildeo Rai v. Har Narain Ahir, 1965 RD 50 . That was also a case where the land in dispute was situate by the side of a river, which was subject to its fluvial action. The land was capable of cultivation only for a part of the year, because it was submerged under water during the rainy season. Gangeshwar Prasad, J., held that the principle that a land seasonally submerged under water by a river every year, reverts to the possession of the owner, was applicable to agricultural land governed by the U. P. Tenancy Act; because, the principle is based upon the true concept of possession and dispossession. He observed that for time to run against the rightful person, it was necessary that the wrong doer must have been in possession. The benefit of the doctrine of constructive possession not being available to a person wrongfully obtaining possession, he could not be regarded as having continued in possession even while the land was under water. Since the submersion of the land under water had the effect of restoring the possession to the rightful owner, the possession of the person, who had wrongfully occupied the land, must be regarded as having come to an end. 8. On this view with which with respect, I agree. Since the submersion of the land under water had the effect of restoring the possession to the rightful owner, the possession of the person, who had wrongfully occupied the land, must be regarded as having come to an end. 8. On this view with which with respect, I agree. the position would be that the possession of the respondents over the land in dispute came to an end, the moment the land was submerged under the river. During the period it remained submerged, it will be deemed in law to be in the possession of the rightful owner. The trespasser would not be deemed to be in possession during that period. Consequently, his possession would get interrupted. It cannot be said that simply because a trespasser had cultivated the land for six years during one season, while the land was under water during the other season each year, he had matured title by continuous possession for over six years. On the facts as found by the courts below, the respondents could not be deemed to have matured title. 9. The petition. therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the Settlement Officer and the Deputy Director of Consolidation are set aside and that of the Consolidation Officer restored. The petitioner would be entitled to his costs, one set, in all Courts.