Rangarajan, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal for which special leave under section 417 (3) was granted against the acquittal of the respondent under sections 7 and 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act1954 (hereinafter to be REFERRED TO as the Act ). ( 2 ) THE case of the prosecutions is that on 28th November, 1961 at 9. 45 AM, two Food Inspectors of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi went to the Hotel Airlines where the accused-respondent was working as the Manager. One of the Inspectors purchased 12 ounces of Dhania powder for which he paid 00. 75 Paise. The other Inspector took a sample of 12 ounces of Red Chillies against the payment of 00. 94 P from the store-room of the Hotel where those commodities had been stored for preparation of eatables. Each sample of the commodity was divided in three parts and kept in three clean and dry bottles. The bottles were sealed in the presence of two witnesses; one sealed bottle was given to the accused and yet another set was sent to the Public Analyst on the same day. Both these samples were declared to be adulterated by the Public Analyst. Both these cases, which were subject matter of two separate complaints, were consolidated and disposed of by a common trial. The accused was acquitted as against which the above two appeals have been filed. Both these appeals (No. 100-Dand 101-D of 1964), therefore, may be disposed of by a common judgment. ( 3 ) THE short ground on which both the cases were thrown out was that these articles, Red Chillies and Dhania powder, were kept in the hotel for being used in the preparation of eatables and no sample of any eatable wherein the commodities were used had been taken. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Punjab High Court in Delhi Municipal Corporation vs. Hukam Chand (Cr. Appeal No. 137-D of 1961) that there being no storing of these commodities for the purpose of sale no offence had been committed. Section 2, sub-section (v) of the Act defines "food" as including any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition or preparation of human food. Appeal No. 137-D of 1961) that there being no storing of these commodities for the purpose of sale no offence had been committed. Section 2, sub-section (v) of the Act defines "food" as including any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition or preparation of human food. Sub-section (xiii) of section 2 defines "sale" as the sale of any article of food, whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption or use, or for analysis, and includes an agreement for sale, an offer for sale,. the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article and includes also an attempt to sell any such article. Section 7 of the Act reads as follows : "7. Prohibition of Manufacture, Sale, etc. of certain Articles of Food- ( 4 ) NO person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute- (I) any adulterated food; (II) any misbranded food ; (III) any article of food for the sale of which a licence is prescribed, except in accordance with the condi- tions of the licence; (IV) any article of food the sale of which is for the time being prohibited by Food (Health) Authority in tctor would come within the purview of the Act even though the personi concerned from whom such sample is taken is not one who ordinarily sells the commodity or commodities purchased by the Food Inspector. He goes further to contend that even a single sale of such an article to the Food Inspector would be sufficient. In support of this contention he not only relies upon the above said decision of the Supreme Court but what has en held to that effect by some other High Courts as well. He relied upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor v. V. Nagabhushnam. The prior view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was over-ruled and it was stated that it need not be proved that the article was sold as an article of food. He relied upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor v. V. Nagabhushnam. The prior view of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was over-ruled and it was stated that it need not be proved that the article was sold as an article of food. The view of the same High Court in re V. Govinda rao was that the mere storing of the adulterated article by a hotel-keeper who was not dealing in that article (ghee in that case) to be served along with meals or to be used in the preparation of eatables would not constitute an offence under section 7. But this view was considered by the same High Court, in The Public Prosecutor. Andhra Pradesh v. Kollipara Subba Rao as being no longer good law after the above said decision of the Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the accused, on the other hand, has drawn our attention to a decision of the Division Bench of this High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 16-D of 1965 : Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shri Prahlad Singh, to which my learned brother was also a party to that case. The Division Bench no doubt held that the sale of ground-chillies from the stall of the hotel-keeper, to a Food Inspector, which was alleged to be adulterated, would not be punishable since it was only stored for use in the preparation of eatables, no sample of the edible articles themselves having been taken by the Food Inspector. This decision no doubt is in favour of the accused-respondent but a reading of the same clearly shows that the present aspect of the matter was not argued before the Division Bench. All that was stated there was, by referring to section 7, that sale of adulterated food was prohibited; it was further stated that the sample should be of the prepared food and not of one of the ingredients that went into the making of the said food. The above said decision of the Supreme Court was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. The above said decision of the Supreme Court was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. It having been held by the Supreme Court that any sale of food article to a Food Inspector for analysis amounts to a sale within the meaning of section 7 read with section 2 (xiii) if it happens to be an article of food, as defined by the Act, it would come within the mischief of the said Act and is punishable. The Division Bench did not consider this aspect of the matter, which is now being argued before us, and hence this decision is of no assistance to the respondent- accused. Several High Courts had taken the view that a mere storage of an adulterated article of food not meant for sale as much would not come within the ambit of the Act and is not punishable. It is needless to cite all these decisions which took such a view prior to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court. In re Pudukodu lswara Subramanya Iyer, Naraindas v. State (5) in re v. Gobinda Rao already noticed are some of the decisions which took such a view. Even after the said decision of the Supreme Court not only the Division Bench took the same view (the decision of the Supreme Court not being specifically brought to the attention of the Division Bench) but also by the Punjab High Court in Rameshwar Dass Radhey Lal v. The Stater ). In the latter case also the decision of the Supreme Court was not noticed. Our attention has also been invited to the decision of the Kerala High Court in Food Inspector (Health Officer) Calicut Corporation v. C. Gopalan and another where Raghavan, J. held that a tea-vendor selling sugar to the Inspector and also accepting the price for the said sample from the Food Inspector did not commit anyoffence even though the sample was found to be adulterated. His Lordship REFERRED TO to the above decision of the Supreme Court as well as of the Gujarat High court in The State of Gujarat v. Asandas Kimmatrai and observed that in view of the said decisions, particularly of the Supreme Court, even one act of sale (to the Food Inspector) would come within that section. His Lordship REFERRED TO to the above decision of the Supreme Court as well as of the Gujarat High court in The State of Gujarat v. Asandas Kimmatrai and observed that in view of the said decisions, particularly of the Supreme Court, even one act of sale (to the Food Inspector) would come within that section. His Lordship then went on to hold, differing from also the said decision as of the Allahabad High Court in Municipal Board, Faizabad v. Lal Chand that if the said sample sold to the Food Inspector came from a larger quantity intended for sale it would fall within the expression "storing for sale" in section 7 but the said principle would not apply to a tea-vendor preparing tea as a beverage and the Food Inspector purchasing sugar from him. Raghavan, J. made the following observations in this. connection:- "if the Food Inspector purchases sugar from them (accused persons) it was like a purchase of sugar by him from a private individual from his house. Such a purchase cannot be a purchase under the Act which will make the vendor liable for an offence under the Act. " ( 6 ) HAVING given the matter our deep consideration, we are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by Raghavan, J. We have to respectfully dissent from that view for the reason that section 10, relevant portion of which has already been extracted, does not control section 7 in any manner. We are in respectful agreement with such a view taken by P. B. Mukharji, J. in Shipping and Clearing (Agents) Private Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta and another where his Lordship observed as follows :- "before discussing the authorities it will be convenient to dispose of an argument on section 10 (2) of the Act on this point. The argument is based on section 10 (2) of the Act, which reads as follows any Food Inspector may enter and inspect any place where any article of food is manufactured, stored, or exposed for sale and take samples of such articles of food for analysis". Mr. Banerjee argues that the words "for sale" in section 10 (2) of the Act governs all the foregoing words "manufacture, store or expose". Therefore, he says that the word store in section 7 and section 16 should also be read there with the words added "for sale". Mr. Banerjee argues that the words "for sale" in section 10 (2) of the Act governs all the foregoing words "manufacture, store or expose". Therefore, he says that the word store in section 7 and section 16 should also be read there with the words added "for sale". The reason for his saying so is that section 10 (2) according to him should control the meaning and the interpretation of section 7 and section 16, because section 10 confers the powers of Food Inspector to inspect places. It is, therefore, natural to suppose that he will only be given the power to inspect such places for the purpose of the Act on this point, and therefore, according to Mr. Banerjee the store must be a store "for sale". ( 7 ) IT is difficult to accept that argument. In the same statute if the words used are sometimes "stores" and sometimes "stores for sale" then it will not be appropriate to think that Parliament was using the words "for sale" at randum, recklessly and negligently. Parliament was aware of the two expressions : one "store" simpliciter and another "store for sale" and if it was not using the same expression throughout then it can only be deliberately with purpose. It will, therefore, be not right to ignore the deliberate use and import of such expression. Section 7 of the Act as quoted above does not significantly use the words "lor sale" after the word "store". In that very same section, section 7, the words "for sale" are used but they are tagged with the word manufacture and not with the word store So again in the section 16 (1) (a) of the Act, which we have just quoted, there again the words for sale are attached to the word manufacture and not to the word store . This court does not, therefore, feel justified to qualify the unqualified word store in section 7 and section 16 of the Act and bring the word store within the same limitations as the word manufacture which is manufacture only for sale and no -other kind of manufacture. This court does not, therefore, feel justified to qualify the unqualified word store in section 7 and section 16 of the Act and bring the word store within the same limitations as the word manufacture which is manufacture only for sale and no -other kind of manufacture. There is good reason to insist that in the case of manufacture lo be an offence such manufacture has to be for sale because other kinds of manufactures are exempt for the simple reason that such manufacture may be for scientific experiments and for the technical reasons when in the course of manufacture of some other articles alloys and adulterations are used. Nor is section 7 or section 16 the only section to note this difference, in the definition section 2 (xi) in defining the word premises the statute used these very words stored for sale . We, therefore, consider that the absence of the words for sale in section 7 and section 16 of the Act was deliberate and intentional and the intention is that the storing will be an offence by itself whether it. is for sale or not. The language of section 7 and section 16 in its plain reading and connotation points to that interpretation. In addition the contrast with other sections of the same Act where the words for sale have been used also justified that conclusion. ( 8 ) NOT only the internal indications in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and its various sections cited above lead to this construction, but also the whole history and the context of this legislation of food adulteration makes the point abundantly clear. Section 25 of the the present Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 repeals certain Acts and statutes. For instance, section 462 (2) of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 which dealt with food adulteration within the municipal limits of Calcutta expressly used the words store for sale . It was not an unqualified store that was mentioned in that statute. Sub-sections 3 and 4 of section 462 of that Calcutta Municipal Act made it clear that ignorance of the adulteration was not an excuse and "that there was a presumption in favour of manufacturing and storing as being for the purposes of sale. It was not an unqualified store that was mentioned in that statute. Sub-sections 3 and 4 of section 462 of that Calcutta Municipal Act made it clear that ignorance of the adulteration was not an excuse and "that there was a presumption in favour of manufacturing and storing as being for the purposes of sale. There again, there was the Bengal Food Adulteration Act, 1919, by section 5 whereof originally only sale or manufacture was affected but there was no mention of storing as such. But subsequently by an amendment which turned the section into section 6 (1) the significant words storing for sale were introduced. In spite of these legislative examples and models on the same point of store for sale the present Parliamentary statute in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 made deliberate departure and dropped the words for sale in connection with the word store . Therefore, storing is itself an offence under sections 7 and 16 of the present Parliamentary statute. Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The language and the policy of this Act make storing an offence and do not confine it only to the case where the storing is for sale. " ( 9 ) SINCE the Supreme Court has decided that a sale of a food article under compulsion to a Food Inspector is one which comes within the mischief of this Act, there can be no escape from this position merely on the ground that the person from whom such article of food was purchased by the Food Inspector does not sell such article by itself but only uses the same in the preparation of other eatables or beverages. It seems to us that the correct position of law has been stated by the Allahabad High Court, in more than one decision. In Nagar Swasth Adhikari. Municipal Corporation Agra, v. Rughlinath Singh Tripathi, J. observed with reference to a contention that the milk, of which sample was taken by the Food Inspector, was notfor sale, that the accused in that case could have refused to accept the price offered by the Food Inspector for the sample. ( 10 ) THE acquittal was set aside and the accused was convicted. To a similar effect is the earlier decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, already REFERRED TO to in Municipal Board, Faizabad v. Lal Chand Surajmal and another. ( 10 ) THE acquittal was set aside and the accused was convicted. To a similar effect is the earlier decision of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, already REFERRED TO to in Municipal Board, Faizabad v. Lal Chand Surajmal and another. In that ca. se the Food Inspector took a sample of milk from a tea vendor and paid him the price of it. When the sample was found to be adulterated an offence punishable under the Act was held to be made out. There again the observation was made that it was open to the tea-vendor to tell the Food Inspector that he was not going to sell that milk, though the Food Inspector may take a sample of the same, but he would not accept the price of it. If the tea-vendor had refused to sell the milk and had declined to accept the price of it there would be no sale within the meaning of section 7, read with section 2 (xiii) of the Act. A similar view was taken by Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. in The Chairman, Jugsalai Notified Area Committee v. Makhram Sharma. There also it was a question of buying a milk from a tea-vendor which was found to be adulterated. It was observed that if the vendor had declined to take the price and thus did not transfer title in the goods sold no action could be taken against him under the Act. It seems to us that this is the view which accords fully with the object of the Act, the evil sought to be remedied and the remedies provided for the said evil (adulteration of foodstuffs ). ( 11 ) RAGHAVAN, J. in the Kerala case REFERRED TO to the fact that it is open to that person who was not dealing with a particular article not being bound to sell it to the Food Inspector and to his being able to refuse to sell the said article. In this view, Raghavan, J. went on to observe, further that if the accused in those circumstances unwarily or ignorantly sold the article to the Food Inspector, the law should not make him liable. As we have said above, we respectfully dissent from this view because this is a consideration which would not help us to hold that no offence was committed. As we have said above, we respectfully dissent from this view because this is a consideration which would not help us to hold that no offence was committed. Technically speaking all the requirements of the Act were made out once there was a sale, though involuntarily, of an article of food, as defined in the Act, to the Food Inspector by the person concerned accepting the price also. Technically the same would be a sale within the meaning of section 7 read with section 2 (xiii) of the Act; otherwise it would give rise to loopholes in the matter of working the said Act. The Supreme Court having held that a sale by the person concerned to the Food Inspector of an article, which was later found to be adulterated, is a sale within the meaning of the said Act and hence punishable, we can find no logic for taking out of the Act cases, like those on hand. But this would be a reason for taking a lenient view of the matter; it seems to us that it would be difficult to escape the conclusion that by such a sale an offence under the Act is committed. In this view we feel constrained to set aside the acquittal of the accused-respondent in both the cases and convict him under section 7 read with section 16 of the Act. ( 12 ) SINCE we have found that the above is only a technical offence within the meaning of the Act, we consider that the ends of justice would be met by imposing a small amount of fine of Rs. 5. 00 in each of the two cases, on the respondents; in default he will undergo simple imprisonment for one week in each case. ( 13 ) BEFORE taking leave of this case, we would like to permit ourselves a few observations. In the above said Patna decision, Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. observed that though a technical offence had been committed, it was a sheer waste of courts time and public money for the Food Inspector to have taken the said sample of milk from the tea-vendor, who only made tea but did not sell the milk as such. In the above said Patna decision, Shambhu Prasad Singh, J. observed that though a technical offence had been committed, it was a sheer waste of courts time and public money for the Food Inspector to have taken the said sample of milk from the tea-vendor, who only made tea but did not sell the milk as such. We have found that a case of the present description is technically punishable since if the accused had known the correct legal position he could have refused to accept the price; he would then not have committed any offence. Persons, who are charged with the duty of working the Act would do well to make a distinction between persons, who sell the very articles in question in the normal course of their business, and those who do not but merely use them in very small quantities in the preparation of beverages and eatables. The ultimate aim and object of the Act is no doubt to put an end to adulteration of any article of food, but this is a result which could well be achieved by concentrating upon the sale of adulterated articles of food sold as such and are injurious to health but keep away from petty traders, like tea-vendors and makers of eatables, who are themselves obliged to buy those ingredients and use them in very small quantities for the preparations they make. For instance, in the case of a tea-vendor, who does not sell milk as such but merely adds a little amount of milk to tea, it may be wholly inappropriate to purchase a sample of milk from such a person in order to get him convicted under the Act on the ground that the milk with him, is adulterated by the addition of water. We are sure that if the Act is worked in the true spirit in which it is meant to be worked it is bound to be a greater success than it seems to be at the moment. ( 14 ) PRAKASH Narain, J. Sitting with Andley, J. when we decided Criminal Appeal No. 16-D of 1965, Municipul Corporation of Delhi v. Prahalad Singh the point regarding a sale by itself being an offence under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not argued before us. ( 14 ) PRAKASH Narain, J. Sitting with Andley, J. when we decided Criminal Appeal No. 16-D of 1965, Municipul Corporation of Delhi v. Prahalad Singh the point regarding a sale by itself being an offence under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was not argued before us. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mangaldas Raghavij v. Stale of Maharashtra and another was also not brought to our notice. In view of the fact that the Supreme Court in this case has in terms laid down that a sale by itself is an offence governed by Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act it would appear that the earlier decision in Criminal Appeal No. 16-D of 1965 to which I was a party would not be applicable in cases where the prosecution is for sale of an adulterated article of food. Section 2 (V) defines "food" as, inter alia, including any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition or preparation of human food. Section 2 (XIII) defines "sale". So, if there is any article sold which may be an ingredient of any article to be prepared for human consumption as food it would be covered by the mischief of Section 7 of the said Act. I am, therefore. in the entire agreement with our judgment rendered, in this case.