JUDGMENT : PANDEY, J. 1. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioner calls in question (i) the proceedings initiated by the sales tax authorities for re-assessment of tax on sales made by it during the period April1, 1959 to October 31, 1959; (ii) the notice dated July 11, 1967 issued therefor and (iii) an order dated September 25, 1967 therein passed repelling the petitioner’s objection that the initiation of re-assessment proceedings was barred by time. 2. The petitioner has made two other like petitions claiming similar reliefs. Miscellaneous Petition No. 93 of 1966 relates to the turnover of sales during the period October 20, 1960 to November 9, 1961. Miscellaneous Petition No. 94 of 1968 relates to the turnover of sales during the period l November 1959 to October 19, 1960. This order shall dispose of all three petitions. 3. The material facts are, for the most part, not in dispute and may be shortly stated. In this Petition (92 of 1968), the turnover for sales made during the period April 1, 1959 to October 31, 1959 was assessed to tax on June 9, 1961. Subsequently, a notice under section 19 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, was issued to the petitioner and the turnover for the same period was re-assessed to tax on November 14, 1962. Even so, fresh proceedings for a second re-assessment of the turnover for the same period were re-started, a notice dated July 11, 1967 was served on the petitioner and its objection grounded on the statutory bar of limitation was overruled by the impugned order dated September 25, 1967. 4. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 93 of 1968, the turnover of sales made during the period October 20, 1960 to November 9, 1961 was assessed to tax on February 28, 1963. Thereafter, as in the other case, re-assessment proceedings were started, a notice dated July 11, 1967 was served on the petitioner and, by an order dated September 25, 1967, its objection relating to the bar of limitation was repelled. 5. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 94 of 1968, the turnover of sales made during the period November 1, 1959 to October 19, 1960 was assessed to tax on November 14, 1962. 5. In Miscellaneous Petition No. 94 of 1968, the turnover of sales made during the period November 1, 1959 to October 19, 1960 was assessed to tax on November 14, 1962. Thereafter, re-assessment proceedings were commenced as in the other two cases, a notice dated July 11, 1967 was served on the petitioner for that purpose and its objection relating to limitation was similarly rejected. 6. The question raised in these petitions relates to limitation and require examination of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958, which has been repeatedly amended. As originally enacted, it read as follows— “19(1). Where an assessment has been made under this Act and the Commissioner, in consequence of any information which has come into his possession, is satisfied that any sale or purchase of goods chargeable to tax under this Act during any year has been under-assessed or has escaped assessment or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been wrongly made therefrom, the Commissioner may, at any time within five calendar years from the expiry of such year, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary, proceed, in such manner as may be prescribed, to re-assess the tax payable on any such sale or purchase and the Commissioner may direct that the dealer shall pay, by way of penalty in addition to the amount of tax so assessed, a sum not exceeding that amount: Provided that in the case of an assessment made under any Act repealed by section 52, the period for re-assessment on the ground of under-assessment, escapement or wrong deduction shall be as provided in such Act notwithstanding the repeal thereof.” By the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act (20 of l96l), certain changes were introduced in this sub-section, but the only one material for these cases is substitution of the words “any period” and “such period” for the words “any year” and “such year”. By the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax (Second Amendment) Act, 1963 (23 of 1963), the words “or any Act repealed by section 52” were inserted after the words “this Act” occurring twice. By the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 (20 of 1964), the words “date of order of assessment” were substituted for the words “expiry of such period”. By the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 (20 of 1964), the words “date of order of assessment” were substituted for the words “expiry of such period”. This Amendment Act (20 of 1964) came into force on September 22, 1964. Thereafter the amended sub-section (1) read as follows: “19 (1). Where an assessment has been made under this Act and if for any reason any sale, or purchase of goods chargeable to tax under this Act, or any Act repealed by section 52, during any period has been under-assessed or has escaped assessment or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been wrongly made therefrom, the Commissioner may, at any time within five calendar years from the date of order of assessment after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary, proceed, in such manner as may be prescribed, to re-assess the tax payable by such dealer and the Commissioner may direct that the dealer shall pay, by way of penalty in addition to the amount of tax so assessed, a sum not exceeding that amount: Provided that in the case of an assessment made under any Act repealed by section 52, the period for re-assessment on the ground of under-assessment, escapement or wrong deduction shall be as provided in such Act notwithstanding the repeal thereof.” 7. On September 22, 1964, five calendar years computed from the end of any of the period covered by these cases had not expired because, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax (1964 MPH 782 (SC) = AIR 1964 SC 766 ), the unit of assessment is a quarter and a Full Bench of this Court laid down in Kanhayyalal v. Deputy Commissioner, Sales Tax ( 1958 MPLJ 313 (FB)) that a calendar year means the calendar year calculated from the 1st of January immediately succeeding the calendar year in which the assessment period expired. In other words, when the Amendment Act 20 of 1964 (which introduced the date of order of assessment to be the terminus a qua for computation of limitation for re-assessment) came into force on September 22, 1964, the right to re-assess the tax within five calendar years computed under the pre-amended law from the expiry of the relevant periods had not expired. The precise question is whether, if an amendment is made before expiry of the period of the time during which re-assessment could be made, that amendment which extends the time for such re-assessment would apply to cases that had already been assessed and subjected to tax under the unamended law. 8. In support of the view that, to such cases, the pro-amendment law would apply, the assessee has placed reliance on K. L. Chetty v. First Additional Income-tax Officer (AIR 1957 A P 159) and Government of Andhra v. K. Rajaiah (AIR 1951 AP 515). In the first case, a Hindu undivided family was assessed to income-tax on March 18, 1948. In doing so, a sum of Rs. 6,000 was taken into consideration as the undivided family’s share of income in a certain partnership. Under the unamended law, this assessment could be rectified under section 35 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, within four years from the date of the order of assessment. Subsequently, it was found that the undivided family got a much larger amount as its share of the partnership income. By a notice dated February 15, 1954, proceedings were initiated for rectifying the assessment and an endeavour was made to justify those proceedings on the strength of an amendment of section 35 ibid which was deemed to have come into force on April 1, 1952. Subba Rao C. J. (as he then was), who spoke for the Division Bench, held that there was no jurisdiction to re-open the assessment on the strength of the amendment that came into force on April 1, 1952 for the reason that the assessment had become final before that date. This view was followed in Government of Andhra v. K. Rajaiah because in that case also the assessment had become final before the amendment came into force. So, Subba Rao C. J. observed: “Applying those principles, the Division Bench held that, as the assessment had become final before the amendment, the amendment could not affect the rights conferred on the assesses. It is not disputed that the same principle will apply to the question now raised before us. As in that case, in this case the assessment had become final before the amendment was introduced. It is not disputed that the same principle will apply to the question now raised before us. As in that case, in this case the assessment had become final before the amendment was introduced. As the Amendment has not either expressly or by necessary implication given it retrospectivity, it cannot affect the final assessment already made.” (Page 516) It is implicit in the view taken in these cases that, if the amendment operates, or is deemed to operate from a date before the assessment becomes final, a different conclusion would be reached. 9. It is a general principle of law that a statute which takes away or affects a vested right or imposes a new liability or confers a new right must be presumed to be prospective, and not retrospective, in operation. But if the language employed in the statute, either expressly or by necessary intendment, gives a retrospectivity, this presumption may be displaced. This principle, however, applies to vested rights, whether substantive or remedial. It has no application to enactments dealing with procedure for the simple reason that no one can have any vested right in any procedure. Rules of limitation provided in a statute are prima facie rules of procedure and the general principle against retrospective operation will not apply to them unless they affect vested rights. So, in Shahid Gani v. S. G. P. Committee ( AIR 1940 PC 116 ), Sir George Rankin observed: “The rules of limitation which apply to a suit are the rules in force at the date of institution of the suit, limitation being a matter of procedure.” (Page 121) Referring to the Limitation Act, 1908, he further observed: “It provides a rule of procedure whereby British Indian Courts do not enforce rights after a certain time, with the result that certain rights come to an end.” (Page 121) 10. In I. T. Officer v. Calcutta Discount Co. ( AIR 1953 Cal. 721 = (1953) 23 ITR 471 ), Bose J., had dealt with the case earlier, accepted a contention like the one now advanced before us not-withstanding that the amended law had come into force before the expiry of the limitation provided by the unamended Act. In appeal, that decision was reversed. ( AIR 1953 Cal. 721 = (1953) 23 ITR 471 ), Bose J., had dealt with the case earlier, accepted a contention like the one now advanced before us not-withstanding that the amended law had come into force before the expiry of the limitation provided by the unamended Act. In appeal, that decision was reversed. Chakravarti C. J ., who spoke for the Division Bench, observed: “The first argument of the appellants was that by reasons of the provisions of section 1 (2) of the Amending Act, the new section 34 was to be deemed to have been on the statute book on 30-3-1948 and if it was there on that date, then by its own express language it applied, on and from that date, to all assessment years, in cases coming under clause (a) from the end of which eight years had not elapsed on the date of the issue of the notice. There was no question of any retrospective operation. The earliest of the three assessment years involved in the present case ended on 31-3-43. Eight years from that date would expire on 31-3-1951. The notice given on 28-3-1951 under the new section which was already in force and expressly authorised the issue of a notice within eight years was thus clearly within time and the proceedings based on the notice were perfectly valid. The notices issued in respect of the two subsequent years were even more clearly within time.” (Page 724) In S. C. Prashar v. Vasantsen ( AIR 1963 SC 1356 ), Hidayatullah J . (as he then was), who spoke for himself and Raghubar Dayal J ., reproduced with approval excerpts from the judgment of the Calcutta case and observed: “The law does not deal with concluded claims or their rival but with the enforcement of a liability to the State which though existing remained to be enforced.” (Paragraph 93) Referring to the same Calcutta case, Shah J . observed in S. S. Gadgil v. M/s. Lal and Co. observed in S. S. Gadgil v. M/s. Lal and Co. ( AIR 1965 SC 171 ) as follows: “But it may be recalled that the amending Act of 1948 with which the Court was concerned in Calcutta Discount Company’s case, came into force on September 8, 1948, but section 1 (2) prescribed that the amendment in section 34 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, shall be deemed to have come into force on March 30, 1948, and the period under the unamended section within which notice could be issued under section 34 (3) against the assessee-Company ended on March 31, 1951. Before that date the amending Act came into operation, and at no time had the right to re-assess become barred.” 11. Another case bearing on the point is State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Kamla Prasad ( (1957) 8 STC 440 ). There proceedings under section 13 (5) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, as amended by Act VI of 1949, were initiated for taxing the turnover of an unregistered dealer. As in this case, the question arose whether the extended period of limitation as introduced by the amendment applied to that case. Ramaswami C. J. (as he then was) observed: “In our opinion, the amended section applies to the present case. This view is supported by a decision of the Privy Council in Ramoyya v. Lakshmayya ( AIR 1942 PC 54 ), in which it was observed by Sir Madhavan Nair that ordinarily a suit would be governed by the law of limitation in force when the suit had been instituted; but if the defendants were able to show that the right of action had become barred under the old Act then the title that they had acquired could not be defeated by the subsequent Limitation Acts. A similar view has been expressed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sakkarai Ambalagaran v. Sundilapathi (16 IC 236), in which it was held that a mortgage executed when the Limitation Act of 1871 was in force and not barred when the Limitation Act of 1877 was passed, gets the benefit of the extension of the period of limitation under the latter Act. There is also a discussion of the principle in Manjoori Bibi v. Akol Mahumad (17 CWN 889), where it is pointed out by the Calcutta High Court that the presumption against a retrospective construction of a statute has no application to enactments which affect only the practice and procedure of Court even where the alteration which the statute makes has been disadvantageous to one of the parties. In the present case it appears that Bihar Act VI of 1949 came into effect from the 22nd March, 1949, on which date it was published in the Bihar Gazette. On this date proceedings under section 13 (6) could have been validly initiated against the assessee under the old law as it stood before the Amendment. In other words, the right of the authorities to take proceedings for assessment under the old law had not become barred when Bihar Act VI of 1949 was passed and came into effect. In our opinion, therefore, the proceeding initiated against the assessee on the 29th June, 1950, in the present case was governed by the provisions of section 13 (6) of Bihar Act XIX of 1947 as amended by Bihar Act VI of 1949. It follows that the proceedings initiated under section 13 (6) on the 29th June, 1950, against the assessee is legally valid and is not barred by limitation.” (Page 444) In view of all these authorities, it is plain enough that here there is no question of any concluded right or its revival. That being so, in our opinion, the Amendment Act 20 of 1964, which extended the limitation for initiating re-assessment proceedings before the one prescribed for that purpose by the unamended Act had expired, applies to these cases. 12. The only other question that requires consideration is whether, in these cases, the re-assessment proceedings were initiated within the period of five calendar years commencing from the date of order of assessment, as provided by the amended sub-section (1) of section 39 of the Act. It would appear from a bare reading of that section that it makes a distinction between “assessment” and “re-assessment”. In this context, the expression “order of assessment” could not be regarded as also including within its meaning an order of re-assessment. It would appear from a bare reading of that section that it makes a distinction between “assessment” and “re-assessment”. In this context, the expression “order of assessment” could not be regarded as also including within its meaning an order of re-assessment. It follows that, for initiation of re-assessment proceedings, time commences to run from the date of order of assessment, and not also from the date of order of re-assessment. That being so, in this case (92 of 1968), the re-assessment proceedings initiated on July 11, 1967, were commenced more than five calendar years after the order of assessment dated June 9, 1961. In the other two cases, however, the re-assessment proceedings were initiated well within the prescribed period. 13. The result is that this Petition (92 of 1968) succeeds and is allowed. The notice dated July 11, 1967, the proceedings for re-assessment and the order dated September 25, 1967 therein passed are all quashed. The respondents shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the petitioner to whom the security amount shall be refunded. Hearing fee Rs. 100. 14. The other to petitions are, however, dismissed. In each of those eases, the petitioner shall bear its own costs and pay out of the security amount those incurred by the respondents. The remaining amount of security shall be refunded. Hearing fee in each case Rs. 100.