JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - The question, which arises for consideration in these two revisions, is whether a suit for cancellation of a sale deed filed in a civil court abates under Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. 2. Suit No. 219 of 1967 was filed in the court of the 1st Additional Munsif, Varanasi, for cancellation of a sale deed on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. The defendants filed an application for staying (abating) the suit on the ground that consolidation operations had started in the village where the land transferred under the sale deed was situate. By order dated December 14, 1967, the Munsif rejected the application, holding that the suit was not for declaration of right, title or interest over agricultural land. In doing so, he followed the decision of Dhawan, J. in Sri Niwas v. Sarwan, 1965 ALJ 1147. Against this order, Civil Revision No. 349 of 1968, has been filed by the defendant. Suit No. 181 of 1965 was filed in court of Munsif, Jaunpur, for cancellation of a sale deed in respect of agricultural plots on the ground that plaintiff No. 2 Shrimati Banshi was the tenureholder of the plots but defendant No. 2, who bears the same name, impersonated the plaintiff and executed the sale deed. In this case also, the defendants moved an application under Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act for abating the suit. The Munsif dismissed the application on August 11, 1967, holding that the only question, which arose for determination in the suit, was as to the identity of the real Shrimati Banshi and, therefore the case was not covered by Section 5. Against this order, Civil Revision No. 1183 of 1967 has been filed in this Court. Both the revisions came up for hearing before Verma, J., who has referred them for decision to a Division Bench. 3. The revision portion of Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, as it stood before its amendment in 1966, was in these terms :- "Effect of declarations-Upon the publication of the notification under Section 4 in the Official Gazette, the consequences, as hereinafter set forth, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act from the date specified thereunder till the publication of notification under Section 52 or sub-sec. (1) of Section 6, as the case may be, ensue in the area to which the declaration relates namely : (a) ................. (b) (i) all proceedings for correction of the records and all suits for declaration of rights and interests over land, or for possession of land, or for partition, pending before any authority or court, whether or first instance, appeal, or reference or revision, shall stand-stayed, but without prejudice to the right of the person affected to agitate the right or interests in dispute in the said proceedings or suits before the Consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (ii) the findings of consolidation authorities in proceedings under this Act in respect of such right or interest in the land, shall be acceptable to the authority or Court before whom the proceeding or suit was pending which may, on communication thereof by the parties concerned, proceed with the proceedings or suit, as the case may be. (c) .................." 4. Section 5 was amended by U. P. Act XXI of 1966 and the relevant portions of the Amending Act reads as follows :- "Amendment of Section 5 of the U. P. Act No. V of 1964. The existing Section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter called the principal Act) shall be re-numbered as sub-sec. (1) thereof, and. (i) Clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) as so renumbered, shall be omitted; and (ii) after sub-sec. (1) as so numbered the following new sub-sec. shall be added. Viz. (2) Upon the said publication of the notification under sub-sec. (2) of Section 4, the following further consequences shall ensue in the area to which the notification relates, namely :- (a) every proceeding for the correction of records and every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before any court or authority whether of the right instance or of appeal, reference or revision shall, on an order being passed in that behalf by the court of authority before whom such suit or proceeding is pending, stand abated. Provided that no such order shall be passed without giving to the parties notice by post or in any other manner and after giving them an opportunity of being heard: Provided further that on the issue of a notification under sub-sec. (1) of Section 6 in respect of the said area or part thereof, every such order in relation to the land lying in such area or part as the case may be, shall stand vacated, (b) Such abatement shall be without prejudice to the rights of the persons affected to agitate the right or interest in dispute in the said suits or proceedings before the appropriate consolidation authorities under and in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder." 5. The contention of the opposite-parties in these cases is that a suit for cancellation of a sale deed is not a suit for declaration or adjudication of rights or interest in any land. In such cases, the court has to determine only the question whether the sale has been obtained by fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation or is avoidable for some other reason. The court is not called upon to determine the rights in the land. Considerable reliance is placed on the decision of Dhawan, J. In Sri Niwas v. Sarwan, 1965 ALJ 1147. This was a case under the unamended Section 5. In this case, a suit had been filed for a declaration that the sale deed, which was executed by the Karta of the Hindu family, was not binding as the sale was without legal necessity and for no consideration. When the matter was pending in second appeal before this Court, and application was made under Section 5 for staying the hearing of the second appeal as consolidation proceedings had started in the village where the land was situated. The decision and reasoning of Dhawan, J. are contained in the following passage :- "But a suit for cancellation of a sale on the ground that it was not for legal necessity or consideration is not a suit for a declaration of right or interests over land nor for possession of land or for partition. Therefore, even after the initiation of consolidation proceedings, this part of the suit cannot be stayed. Therefore, even after the initiation of consolidation proceedings, this part of the suit cannot be stayed. The proper procedure would be to decide the suit for a declaration that the sale deed is invalid and remit this decision to the consolidation proceedings for decision of other questions-namely, which party is entitled to this land, and so on. If this appeal is allowed and the sale deed declared void any decision of the consolidation authorities based on that sale deed will become ineffective and must be reconsidered. This need not affect the consolidation proceedings in the village as a whole as the only effect will be to substitute the plaintiff for the defendants as are entitled to the consolidated plots." 6. It must be kept in mind that, though the words in the original Section 5 were "all suits for declaration of rights and interests over land, or for possession of land, or partition", the words used in the amended section are "every suit and proceeding in respect of declaration or rights or interest in any land lying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceedings can or ought. to be taken under this Act." The contention of learned counsel for the applicants in these two revisions is that the words of the amended Section 5 are wide enough to include suits for cancellation of sale deeds, as these suits are also in respect of the declaration or adjudication of the rights of parties in the agricultural plots. He contends that these suits are filed because there is a cloud upon the right, title or interest of the plaintiff in the plots and the relief is sought to establish the plaintiff's rights in the plots. He has contended that suits for cancellation of sale deeds stand on the same footing as suits for cancellation of a decree or other transfers like gift and exchange or for cancelling or declaring invalid a will. In support of his contention, he has relied on several decisions of this Court. He has contended that suits for cancellation of sale deeds stand on the same footing as suits for cancellation of a decree or other transfers like gift and exchange or for cancelling or declaring invalid a will. In support of his contention, he has relied on several decisions of this Court. In Shrimati Lail v. Shrimati Ramjhari, 1968 ALJ 693 decided by one of us, it was held, distinguishing the case of Sri Niwas v. Sarwan, that a suit for cancellation of a sale deed on the ground that the executor had no right or title in the property and could pass no valid title by the sale deed could be abated under Section 5. It was held that the moment the plain tiff established that she was the real tenure-holder and that the executor of the sale deed was not the tenure holder, the sale deed automatically fell and, therefore, the real question for consideration in the case was whether the plaintiff or the executor of the sale deed was the tenure holder. In Shrimati Manjhari v. Ram Sewak, Civil Revision No. 1629 of 1967 decided on February 14, 1969, S. N. Singh, J. has held that a suit for cancellation of a decree in respect of agricultural plots, which had come under consolidation, could be abated under Section 5. He observed :- "The question whether the plaintiffs are tenure holders or the defendant was involved in the case and, while determining that question whether the plaintiffs were tenure holders or the defendant in my opinion, the consolidation authorities can go into the question as to whether the decrees passed were binding on the plaintiffs or not. Powers given to consolidation authorities, in my opinion, are sufficiently large and there is nothing which can suggest that the consolidation authorities are not competent to go into this matter while deciding the title of one party or the other." 7. In Lal Chand v. The Assistant Director, Consolidation, C.M. Writ No. 3746 of 1966 decided on July 13, 1967, a question was raised that the consolidation authorities cannot go into the question whether a decree is a nullity or not. Rejecting this contention, Satish Chandra, J. observed :- "The fact that a suit for cancellation of the decree was not filed will not bar the consolidation authorities from going into this limited question. Rejecting this contention, Satish Chandra, J. observed :- "The fact that a suit for cancellation of the decree was not filed will not bar the consolidation authorities from going into this limited question. They found that the decree was obtained by collusion. That will make the decree both void and a nullity. On this finding the decree could be legitimately ignored." 8. In Mathura Prasad v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, C.M. Writ No. 4221 of 1967 decided on May 13, 1968, a point was raised that the question of the validity of a will could not be gone into by the consolidation authorities. A Bench of this Court consisting of Rajeshwari Prasad and Parekh, JJ. rejected this contention and observed :- "Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that for the purpose of deciding the claim of the petitioner, which was grounded upon a certain will, the consolidation authorities should not have entered into an enquiry whether the will was really a valid will or whether the property did pass to the petitioner under that will or not. We do not find it possible to agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner for the simple reason that the petitioner had chosen to base his title on that will and, for the purpose of deciding the title of the petitioner, it was necessary to consider the merits of the will." 9. From the language of the amended Section 5 it is clear that, if a suit can be abated, then the consolidation authorities must have jurisdiction to go into the question involved. Conversely, if a matter can be gone into in consolidation proceedings, then a suit in respect of that matter must be abated under Section 5. 10. The object of Section 5 (2) as amended, is clearly to abate suits pending in civil and revenue courts in respect of matters which can be decided by the consolidation authorities, so that consolidation proceedings may not be delayed and may be disposed of expeditiously. If question regarding validity of sale deeds, gift deeds, deeds of exchange, wills and decrees arise in cases before the consolidation authorities, it would certainly be in the interest of expeditious disposal of cases that those authorities should have power to decide these questions. If question regarding validity of sale deeds, gift deeds, deeds of exchange, wills and decrees arise in cases before the consolidation authorities, it would certainly be in the interest of expeditious disposal of cases that those authorities should have power to decide these questions. If it is held that the consolidation authorities have no power to decide such questions and they must either await the results of suits already filed, challenging these transactions, or should accept these transactions at their face value, ignoring the pendency of the suits where they have been challenged, then it would either lead to delay in the disposal of consolidation proceedings or to great difficulty and hardship. In a large number of consolidation cases, the validity of sales, gifts, exchages, wills and decrees is challenged. If, as suggested by Dhawan, J. in Sri Niwas v. Sarwan, the civil court should decide the matter and the consolidation authorities should wait for the decision, then that would virtually hold up consolidation proceedings. Such question are not raised in isolated cases but in a large number of them. If, on the other hand, the suit.: where these transactions are challenged, are allowed to proceed and the consolidation proceedings also proceed, then it will lead to this difficulty that the final decision of the civil court will become unenforcible. A simple example will illustrate the point. A, who owns five plots, transfers one plot to B who holds three plots. He then files a suit for cancellation of the sale deed but, during the pendency of the suit, consolidation proceedings start. If it is to be held that the matter must be decided by the civil court and that the consolidation authorities have no power to go into this question, then the consolidation authorities will accept the sale deed as valid and ultimately allot chaks to the parties on that basis. Suppose they allot two chaks to A in lieu of his four remaining plots and allot two chaks to B in lieu of his three plots and the fourth plot which he has purchased. The consolidation proceedings will certainly be over long before the civil suit is finally decided. Suppose they allot two chaks to A in lieu of his four remaining plots and allot two chaks to B in lieu of his three plots and the fourth plot which he has purchased. The consolidation proceedings will certainly be over long before the civil suit is finally decided. If, ultimately, the civil suit is decided in favour of the plaintiff and the sale deed is cancelled, then there appears to be no machinery by which the decree of the civil court can be enforced or given effect to. The finding of the consolidation authorities that B is the tenure-holder of the four plots and is entitled to the two chaks allotted to him cannot be reopened after the close of the consolidation proceedings. Learned counsel has not been able to point out any forum where effect could be given to the decree of the civil court. Another practical difficulty would be that it would not be possible to trace the original plot which was transferred by sale or to find out which plot, after consolidation represents that plot. No such delay or difficulty arises if it is held that the suit should be abated and the matter should be decided by the consolidation authorities. The only thing that can be said against this is that the decision of the consolidation authorities cannot be as satisfactory as that of the civil court. But then the Legislature has entrusted many questions and matters for decision to the consolidation authorities which were previously being decided by the civil and revenue courts. We can see no reason why the Legislature should exclude decisions of such questions as to whether a sale deed has been obtained by fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation from the jurisdiction of consolidation authorities. 11. The language of the amended Section 5 (2) is very wide. It provides for the abatement of suits not only "for declaration of rights or interests in any land" but also for suits in respect of declaration of rights or interests in any land. In consolidation proceedings, the question whether a sale deed is briding or not arises during the course of adjudication upon the rights of parties in the land. The decision of this question is, in effect and substance, in respect of the declaration of the rights or interests of parties in the land. In consolidation proceedings, the question whether a sale deed is briding or not arises during the course of adjudication upon the rights of parties in the land. The decision of this question is, in effect and substance, in respect of the declaration of the rights or interests of parties in the land. A suit for cancellation of a sale deed is filed to dispel the cloud on the right and title of the plaintiff in the land; cancellation by itself is no relief-the real relief is that, in spite of the execution of the sale deed, the plaintiff continues to be the tenureholder. What the plaintiff really wants is that he should be declared to be the tenureholder-whether that is done by actually cancelling the sale deed or by declaring that the sale deed is not binding and is inoperative. In substance, the suit is in respect of declaration of rights or interests in the land. It thus appears to us that a suit for cancellation of a sale deed in respect of agricultural land is covered by Section 5 (2) of the Act. 12. It was urged by learned counsel for the opposite-parties that the specific relief of cancellation cannot be granted by consolidation authorities. It is true that the consolidation authorities cannot ask the parties to deliver up the sale deed and cancel it or sent a copy of its order to the Registrar to make entries in thee original sale deed and in his registers. The form of the relief however is, to our mind, immaterial. If the consolidation authorities hold that the sale deed has been obtained by fraud etc., and is inoperative, the party will get substantially all the relief which he wants. He will be declared to be still the tenureholder of the plots and will be entitled to a chak in lieu of them. Therefore, the mere fact that the consolidation authorities cannot grant a relief in the form in which the civil court can does not affect the question. The suit remains a suit in respect of the declaration or adjudication of the rights of parties in the land. Learned counsel for the respondents referred as to certain cases which lay down that until a sale deed is cancelled by a competent court, it must be given effect to. We have no quarrel with this proposition. The suit remains a suit in respect of the declaration or adjudication of the rights of parties in the land. Learned counsel for the respondents referred as to certain cases which lay down that until a sale deed is cancelled by a competent court, it must be given effect to. We have no quarrel with this proposition. What we have to decide is whether the consolidation authorities can go into the question whether the sale deed is binding or not and grant substantially the same relief which the civil court can. Since we have come to the conclusion that the consolidation authorities have been empowered to grant substantially the same relief in respect of a sale deed which the civil court can, they must be held to be competent authorities to declare the sale deed not binding and inoperative. 13. We may also mention that we have come across a large number of consolidation cases where the consolidation authorities have gone into the question of validity of sales, gifts, exchanges, wills and decrees. We have been referred to only two cases, already noticed above, where it was challenged that the consolidation authorities had no jurisdiction to do so; but we have not been referred to any decision where such objection has been upheld. In the two cases referred to above, the objection was rejected. It, therefore, appears to be the consistent view of this Court, at least after the amendment of Section 5, that the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to go into these question and that suits, in which these very questions arise and which are pending on the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, should be abated. 14. For these reasons, we are of opinion that suits for cancellation of sale deeds in respect of agricultural plots, which are pending on the date of the notification - under Section 4 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, should be abated under Section 5 (2) . These two revisions are accordingly allowed. The order of the Additional Munsif, Varanasi, rejecting the application under Section 5 is set aside and Suit No. 219 of 1967 is abated under Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The order of Munsif. These two revisions are accordingly allowed. The order of the Additional Munsif, Varanasi, rejecting the application under Section 5 is set aside and Suit No. 219 of 1967 is abated under Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The order of Munsif. Jaunpur dated August 11, 1967, is also set aside and Suit No. 181 of 1965 is also abated under Section 5 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Parties will bear their own costs of these two revisions.