JUDGMENT S.N. Dwivedi, J. - Swadeshi Iron and Steel. Company (Private) Ltd., Kanpur, is the decree-holder appellant in this appeal. It held a decree for Rs. 58,285.29 against the Kanpur Rolling Mills (Private) Ltd., the first respondent in the appeal. It applied for execution of the decree on November 5, 1965. The execution application made this specific prayer :- "The decretal amount be ordered to be realised by attachment ........of the money and interest thereon in deposit with M/s. Hindustan Steel Ltd.......... Rs. 30,000/- or such amount as may be found .......... by sending notice and prohibitory orders to the aforesaid company through its Chief Sales Manager and a copy of the orders be also sent to their Kanpur office at 24123 Karachi Khana, Kanpur, through its Sales Manager." 2. On November 10, 1965, the execution court issued a notice to the Sales Manager of the Hindustan Steel Ltd., Calcutta. A copy of the notice was also sent to the Sales Manager of the Hindustan Steel Ltd., Kanpur. The notice stated that a sum of Rs. 30,000/-was due by the Hindustan Steel Ltd. to the judgment-debtor. It asked the Hindustan Steel Ltd. to pay into court the said sum or such sum as may be found due to the judgment-debtor by December 11, 1965, or to show cause to the contrary. It pointed out that in default of either action an order for payment of the said sum would be passed. By the concluding sentence in the notice the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was expressly prohibited from making any delivery of goods to the judgment-debtor after service of notice so as to encumber the sum of Rs. 30,000/- or any amount with it to the credit of the judgment-debtor. On December 9, the Chief Sales Manager of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. sent a letter to the Execution court. The material portion of the letter reads :- "We have for acknowledgement your attachment order of 10th November, 1965 for Rs. 30,000/-. We have enquired of all our Plant Accounts Offices if there is anything outstanding against M/s. Kanpur Rolling Mills (Private) Ltd., Kanpur, in respect of supplies made to them by us. No demand certificate from them is still awaited. We shall therefore be grateful if the time for remittance of the amount is extended by a month .........." 3. 30,000/-. We have enquired of all our Plant Accounts Offices if there is anything outstanding against M/s. Kanpur Rolling Mills (Private) Ltd., Kanpur, in respect of supplies made to them by us. No demand certificate from them is still awaited. We shall therefore be grateful if the time for remittance of the amount is extended by a month .........." 3. By another letter of January 8/10, 1966, the said Chief Sales Manager informed the court that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was due to the judgment-debtor by it. The material portion of this letter reads :- "Ref. your attachment order of 10th November, 1965. In continuation of our letter ....... of December 9, 1965, we have pleasure in informing you that we are advising our accounts Department to remit an amount of Rs. 20,000/- held by us as security on account of M/s. Kanpur Rolling Mills (Private) Ltd., Kanpur, plus such interest as might accrue on the Fixed Deposit Receipt till the date of its encashment ........" 4. On January 15, 1966, the decree-holder applied for an order directing the Hindustan Steel Ltd. to pay the amount by a crossed cheque to it. This application was directed to be filed because the Hindustan Steel Ltd. had already written to remit the amount of Rs. 20,000/- to the court. As the amount of Rs. 20,000/- was not received by February 6, on the next day the court made an order that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. should remit the amount immediately. Thereupon on February 14, 1966, the Hindustan Steel Ltd. filed an objection. It is stated in the objection that on January 13, 1966, the Assistant Accounts Officer (Sales) of the objector at Calcutta advised the Assistant Sales Officer, Kanpur, that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was being remitted to it by a telegraphic transfer and that it was requested to deposit the said amount in court. It is said that unfortunately the Accounts Office of the objector at Calcutta, by sheer accident, wrongly advised the State Bank of India, Calcutta, to remit a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the judgment-debtor. So the remittance was made to the judgment-debtor who collected the amount. It is said that unfortunately the Accounts Office of the objector at Calcutta, by sheer accident, wrongly advised the State Bank of India, Calcutta, to remit a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the judgment-debtor. So the remittance was made to the judgment-debtor who collected the amount. It is further stated that this mistake was discovered only when the Kanpur office of the objector, after awaiting the remittance for pretty long time, wrote to the objectors Calcutta office informing of the non-receipt of money as per advice. Immediately the Calcutta office of the objector wrote to the State Bank of India, Calcutta, to stop payment to the judgment-debtor, but then it was too late. The money had already been paid to the judgment-debtor. It is also mentioned that the objector could not succeed in spite of sincere efforts to get the amount back from the judgment-debtor. 5. Besides these allegations the Hindustan Steel Ltd. also took certain legal objections. The first objection was that the amount was never attached in accordance with Rule 46 of Order 21, Code of Civil Procedure as the attachment was a condition precedent to the initiation of garnishee proceeding, the Courts order for payment is illegal. Another legal objection was that no order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from recovering the amount from the objector was made by the court. The third legal objection was that a similar prohibitory order was not made against the objector as well. It was asserted that in view of these legal defects the objector was not bound to pay the amount in court; and accordingly no liability can be fastened on it. 6. After hearing the parties on the merits of the objections the execution court upheld the objections, discharged the notice to the Hindustan Steel Ltd. for payment of debt in court and dismissed the execution application. 7. This Court has framed certain rules regulating garnishee proceedings; we are concerned with one of those rules. It is Rule 131 of Order 21. It provides materially. 7. This Court has framed certain rules regulating garnishee proceedings; we are concerned with one of those rules. It is Rule 131 of Order 21. It provides materially. "The Court may, in the case of any debt due to the judgment-debtor ....., which has been attached under Rule 46 of this order, issue a notice to any person (hereinafter called the garnishee) liable to pay such debt ......., calling upon him to appear before the court and show cause why he should not pay or deliver into court the debt due from ..........' or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree and the cost of execution." 8. The material portion of Rule 46 reads :- (1) In the case of- (a) a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument, ................. the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting .......... (i) in the case of the debt, the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor 'from making payment thereof until the further order of the court, .................. (2) A copy of such order shall be affixed on some conspicuous part of the court house and another copy shall be sent in the case of the debt, to the debtor,............ (3) A debtor prohibited under clause (1) of sub-rule (1) may pay the amount of his debt into court, and such payment shall discharge him as effectually as payment to the party entitled to receive the same." 9. It is evident from Rule 131 that the attachment of a debt under Rule 46 is the essential preliminary step for the issue of a notice under this rule to the garnishee. The manner of attaching a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument (the present case is one such) is provided for in Rule 46. It is clearly stated in Rule 46 that the debt shall be attached by means of a written order prohibiting the creditor, that is, the judgment-debtor, from recovering the debt and another similar order prohibiting the debtor, that is, the garnishee, from making payment thereof until further order of the court. So the making of a prohibitory order against the judgment-debtor and the prospective garnishee is the first essential step. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 46 further provides that a copy of the prohibitory order shall be affixed on some conspicuous part of the court house. So the making of a prohibitory order against the judgment-debtor and the prospective garnishee is the first essential step. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 46 further provides that a copy of the prohibitory order shall be affixed on some conspicuous part of the court house. This is the second step for attachment of a debt. Sub-r. (2) also provides that a copy of the prohibitory order shall be sent to the debtor, that is, the prospective garnishee. This is the third step for the attachment of a debt. It is not disputed on behalf of the appellant that none of these three steps was taken in the present case. No prohibitory order restraining the judgment-debtor from re. covering the debt from the Hindustan "'Steel Ltd. was made. No similar express order was made against the Hindustan Steel Ltd. prohibiting it from paying the debt to the judgment-debtor. The making of a prohibitory order is the foundation of an order of attachment. The very foundation is lacking in the case. Indeed it is curious that in its application the decree-holder did not make any prayer that the attachment of the amount should be made in the mode provided for in Rule 46. The only prayer was that the amount should be attached by sending notice and prohibitory orders to the Hindustan Steel Ltd. perhaps this mistake on the part of the appellant misled the court is not observing the procedure indicated in Rule 46. The court straightway issued a notice to the Hindustan Steel Ltd. directing it to pay the amount in court. On account of the total absence of attachment in accordance with Rule 46, we think that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was not bound to deposit the amount in court. 10. In Imperial Bank of India v. Mst. Bibi Sayeedan, A.I.R. 1960 Pat. 132, it was held that garnishee proceedings can be started only after the debt has been attached under Rule 46. In K. Hydro Electric Supply Co. v. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1941 Calcutta 364, Mr. Justice R. C. Mitter said :- "According to the Code of Civil Procedure, garnishee proceedings in respect of a debt can be started only after the debt has been attached under Order 21, Rule 46. In K. Hydro Electric Supply Co. v. Lakshmi Narain, AIR 1941 Calcutta 364, Mr. Justice R. C. Mitter said :- "According to the Code of Civil Procedure, garnishee proceedings in respect of a debt can be started only after the debt has been attached under Order 21, Rule 46. If a debt attachable under Order 21, Rule 46, had not in fact been attached or if the debt is one which cannot be attached under the process laid down in Order 21, Rule 46, garnishee proceedings cannot be taken." 11. As there was no attachment order in accordance with Rule 46, garnishee proceedings cannot be taken against the Hindustan Steel Ltd. in this case. Counsel for the appellant felt the difficulty created by the omission of an attachment order under Rule 46. He has made a brave effort to get over this difficulty in two ways. Firstly, it is said that there was a sort of substantial compliance with Rule 46. The notice issued by the court on November 10, 1965, directed the Hindustan Steel Ltd. to deposit the amount in court. It is urged that by implication this notice prohibited the Hindustan Steel Ltd. from paying the amount to the judgment-debtor. It is noteworthy that although this notice ex-pressly prohibits the Hindustan Steel Ltd. from making any delivery of goods to the judgment-debtor, it refrains from expressly prohibiting the said company from paying the amount to the judgment-debtor. Assuming, however, that the prohibitory order is necessarily implied in this notice inasmuch as it directs the Hindustan Steel Ltd. to pay the amount in court, the making of a prohibitory order against the debtor alone does not amount to attachment of a debt under Rule 46. Rule 46 expressly requires the court to make a prohibitory order against the judgment-debtor also restraining him from realising the amount from the debtor. As debt is a bilateral obligation, it is eminently- just and proper that a prohibitory order should be made not only against the debtor but also against the creditor in order to bring about an effective attachment of debt. As debt is a bilateral obligation, it is eminently- just and proper that a prohibitory order should be made not only against the debtor but also against the creditor in order to bring about an effective attachment of debt. We have already pointed out that there was no order of the court prohibiting the judgment-debtor in this case from realising the amount from the Hindustan Steel Ltd. Accordingly we are unable to hold that there was substantial compliance with the procedure specified in Rule 46 for attachment of the amount in question. In support of our view we rely on the following passage in Sri Krishna Gupta v. Sri Ram Babu, A.I.R. 1967 Alld. 136 :- "From this case, two things are quite clear, (i) that no attachment comes into existence unless the whole procedure prescribed by law for making an attachment in the particular case has been gone through and (ii) that if no attachment comes into existence according to the procedure pres-, cribed, any step taken towards the achievement of that object is a mere nullity which has no effect on the property." 12. It will follow from this passage that the mere issuing of an implied prohibitory c,rder to the Hindustan, Steel Ltd. alone will not effect the attachment of the debt in this case, and that as there was no attachment at all, the garnishee proceedings are void. Of necessity, the Hindustan Steel Ltd. cannot be made liable to pay the amount which it has already paid to the judgment-debtor. 13. The next submission is that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. is estopped from raising any objection to the legality of the proceedings against it inasmuch as in reply to the notice of the court dated November 10, 1965, it has consented to pay the amount in court. This consent was reiterated by it in its second letter of January 8/10, 1966. By , this letter it has clearly agreed to pay the amount of Rs. 20,000/- in court. In support of this argument reliance was placed on Jagunnessa Bibi v. Satish Chandra Bhattacharya, AIR 1924 Calcutta 633. The facts of that case, are however, entirely distinguishable from the facts of this case. That was a case regarding substitution of a legal representative in place of a deceased party. Some of the elements of the rule of estoppel are not present in this case. The facts of that case, are however, entirely distinguishable from the facts of this case. That was a case regarding substitution of a legal representative in place of a deceased party. Some of the elements of the rule of estoppel are not present in this case. It is not explained as to how the consent of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. to deposit the amount led the appellant to act to his detriment. Counsel says that if the Hindustan Steel Ltd. had appeared in response to the notice and had objected on the ground of non-attachment of the debt, the appellant would have taken steps for attachment of the debt. It appears to us that this consideration is not material to the application of the rule of estoppel. Further, it is evident from the two letters of the Hindustan Steel Ltd. that it was labouring under the misapprehension that there did exist an attachment. Both of its letters refer to the supposed existence of an attachment order. It is accordingly difficult to expect that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. could have taken an objection to the courts notice for want of actual attachment. Indeed this is a case where both the decree-holder as well as the Hindustan Steel Ltd. were under misapprehension about an attachment order. So the Rule of estoppel cannot apply. 14. It is then submitted that, at all events, it should be deemed that by its consent to deposit. the amount in court the Hindustan Steel Ltd. waived its objection to the absence of an attachment order. We are unable to accept this argument as well. In Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand, A.I.R. 1967 SC 425, Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar observed :- "Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question. As Sir John Romilly, M. R., has observed in Vyvyan v. Vyvyan, (1861) 30 Beav. 65 at p. 74 : 54 ER 813 at p. 817, Waiver or acquiescence, like election, presupposes that the person to be bound is fully cognizant of his rights. and, that being so, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another, either, but not both, of which he might claim." 15. 65 at p. 74 : 54 ER 813 at p. 817, Waiver or acquiescence, like election, presupposes that the person to be bound is fully cognizant of his rights. and, that being so, he neglects to enforce them, or chooses one benefit instead of another, either, but not both, of which he might claim." 15. So there can be no waiver if the party did not know the relevant facts and was accordingly unaware of his right to take an objection. We have already pointed out that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was labouring under misapprehension that there was an attachment order, although there was none such. It was unaware of the absence of an attachment order and consequently of its right to take an objection. There can, therefore, be no waiver. Again, a prospective garnishee, as the Hindustan Steel Ltd. is, stands in a peculiar position. Firstly, he represents himself. Secondly, any voluntary action on its part or any order of the court in respect of the debt owned by it affects the right of its creditor. It can waive its own rights or benefits. But the rule of waiver cannot be applied against it in such a manner as to affect the rights of its creditor. 16. In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 38 page 343, paragraph 132, it is said :- "The garnishee ordinarily cannot waive any of the rights of defendant. Thus, the garnishee cannot waive as by acceptance of service or by voluntary appearance, essential elements giving control over the property or res, and a voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court by the garnishee will not confer jurisdiction to render judgment against the garnishee where there is no valid judgment against defendant. .................... While the primary duty of the garnishee is to raise questions pertaining to whether he has funds belonging to defendant, the garnishee may question the validity of the proceeding, particularly where it is sought to make him personally liable by reason of the payment of the fund sought to be subjected, and where the principal defendant is not personally before the court, the garnishee must, for his own protection enquire whether the court has jurisdiction over defendant or himself." 17. At page 379 in paragraph 157 there is this passage. At page 379 in paragraph 157 there is this passage. "The more generally accepted rule is that as against defendant, and as far as the debt or property which it is sought to reach is involved, a consent or waiver by the garnishee cannot supply the place of service of the writ or summons of garnishment in the manner required by statute. Hence a valuntary acceptance of service by the garnishee, or his express waiver of service, or voluntary appearance or answer, even though the answer may admit the indebtedness, or a voluntary surrender of the property or debt by the garnishee, does not under the general rule deprive defendant of his rights." 18. As the Hindustan Steel Ltd. could not waive fundamental defects in procedure so as to effect the rights of the judgment-debtor, its mere consent to pay the amount in court would not be sufficient to make it liable in garnishee proceedings on account of the fact that it has by oversight paid the amount to the judgment-debtor. 19. In the end, counsel for the appellant faintly suggested that the Hindustan Steel Ltd. was at fault, and accordingly it should be made liable to pay the amount in court. There was no doubt a mistake on its part, but the mistake was unintentional and accidental. This type of mistake is hardly sufficient to countervail the appellants own mistake in making a proper prayer and in observing the strict formalities of Rule 46. 20. For all these considerations we are of opinion that this appeal should fail and is hereby dismissed. We make no order as to costs