D. A. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a member of respondent No. 1 society and has built a bungalow as a member of the said society. It appears that for the purpose of constructing the bungalow the petitioner had taken a loan from respondent No. 1 society in the year 1949 and he was repaying the loan by monthly installment of Rs. 150. 00. The petitioner was indebted to the society to the tune of Rs. 5409-92. As the petitioner failed to repay the loan by installments respondent No. 1 society approached the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies with a request to refer the dispute to the Nominee for adjudication. Accordingly the Assistant Registrar Co-operative Societies referred the dispute to the Nominee for adjudication. Various contentions were taken by the petitioner before the Nominee. At the time of the arguments a further contention was raised that the Nominee had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute as the reference may by the Assistant Registrar was illegal and invalid. The Nominee repelled all the contentions and made an award in favour of the respondent No 1 society. The petitioner carried the matter in appeal to the Gujarat State Co-operative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal ). The Tribunal dismissed the appeal and confirmed the award of the Nominee. The petitioner has challenged the decision of the Tribunal and award of the Nominee in this petition. ( 2 ) MR. H. B. Desai learned advocate who appeared for the petitioner submitted the following propositions for consideration in this petition :- (1) The reference of the dispute to the Registrars Nominee is bad and illegal as the Assistant Registrar had not applied his mind to the existence or otherwise of the dispute and therefore the Registrars Nominee had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the dispute. (2) The Assistant Registrar had no jurisdiction to refer the dispute to the Registrars Nominee for adjudication as respondent Co-operative Society had not resolved in a general meeting to refer the dispute between itself and the petitioner to the Registrar. (3) The claim of the respondent No. 1 society is barred by limitation. The aforementioned propositions will be disposed of in the order in which they are set out. ( 3 ) RE. Ground No. 1. The first contention of Mr. (3) The claim of the respondent No. 1 society is barred by limitation. The aforementioned propositions will be disposed of in the order in which they are set out. ( 3 ) RE. Ground No. 1. The first contention of Mr. Desai was that while making a reference of a dispute under sec. 98 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the Assistant Registrar is a quasi judicial authority and has a duty to act judicially and as a necessary corollary the Assistant Registrar must hear the parties before making a reference of a dispute to the Registrars Nominee and if reference is made at the back of the. party without giving any opportunity to the party affected by the dispute to challenge the existence of the dispute the reference would be bad in law and consequently the Registrars Nominee to whom the reference is made would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute. In order to appreciate this contention the scheme of Chapter IX of the Act which provides for procedure for deciding dispute will have to be examined. Sec. 96 provides as to which type of dispute and between what particular parties shall be referred to the Registrar. Sec. 96 provides as under :-96 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force any dispute touching the constitution management or business of a society shall be referred in the prescribed form either by any of the parties to the dispute or by a federal society to which the society is affiliated or by a creditor of the society to the Registrar if the parties thereto are from amongst the following :- (A) a society its committee any past committee any past or present officer any past or present agent any past or present servant or nominee heir or legal representative of any deceased officer deceased agent or deceased servant of the society or the Liquidator of the society; (B) a member past member or a person claiming through a member past member or a deceased member of a society or a society which is a member of the society;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) When any question arises whether for the purposes of sub-sec. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) When any question arises whether for the purposes of sub-sec. (1) a matter referred to for decision is a dispute or not the question shall be considered by the Registrar whose decision shall be final. Explanation I. :- For the purposes of this sub-section a dispute shall include (I) a claim by a society for any debt or demand due to it from a member past member or the nominee heir or legal representative of a deceased member whether such a debt or demand be admitted or not;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IF there is a dispute touching the constitution management or business of a society and if the dispute is between the member and the society it is obligatory that such a dispute shall be referred to the Registrar. The word dispute in sec. 96 (1) will include a claim by a society for any debt or demand due to it from a member. Thus if a member of the society is indebted to the society and refuses to pay or demurs his liability to pay the debt a dispute would come into existence which can only be settled by adjudication either by the Registrar or by his Nominee upon a reference made by the Registrar under sec. 96. Whenever either a society or a member approaches the Registrar with a dispute it would be the duty of the Registrar to decide whether the dispute exists or not. It is only when the Registrar is satisfied that a dispute exists that the same can be either adjudicated upon by him or he can refer the same to his Nominee. Sec. 98 provides for settlement of dispute either by the Registrar or by the Nominee. Relevant portion of sec. 98 reads as under :-98 (1) If the Registrar is satisfied that any matter referred to him is a dispute within the meaning of sec. Sec. 98 provides for settlement of dispute either by the Registrar or by the Nominee. Relevant portion of sec. 98 reads as under :-98 (1) If the Registrar is satisfied that any matter referred to him is a dispute within the meaning of sec. 96 the Registrar shall subject to the rules decide the dispute himself or refer it for disposal to a nominee or a board of nominees appointed by the Registrar :-PROVIDED that no person who is connected with a dispute or with the society at any stage or has previously inspected the society or audited its accounts shall be appointed as a nominee or as member of the board of nominees to settle the dispute. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . READING secs. 96 and 98 together it would appear that whenever there is a dispute of the nature envisaged by sec. 96 (1) between the parties as set out in sec. 96 the only way this dispute can be settled is by way of a reference to the Registrar and the Registrar on being satisfied that a dispute exists he may adjudicate upon it himself or refer the same to his Nominee. Any other mode of settlement of such a dispute between the said parties is barred by the provisions contained in Chapter IX of the Act. ( 4 ) NOW when one party to a dispute approaches the Registrar with a dispute and claims adjudication upon it before the Registrar either himself proceeds to adjudicate upon the dispute or refers it for adjudication to his Nominee he must be satisfied that a dispute exists. Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 96 provides that when any question arises whether for the purposes of sub-sec. (1) a matter referred for decision is a dispute or not the question shall be considered by the Registrar whose decision shall be final. Therefore whenever one of the parties to the dispute approaches the Registrar for adjudication upon it and if the question is raised before the Registrar whether the dispute as alleged exists or not that question has to be considered by the Registrar. The Registrar must be satisfied that a dispute as alleged exists. It is only after the Registrar is satisfied that the dispute as alleged exists that he may proceed to act under sec. 98. The Registrar must be satisfied that a dispute as alleged exists. It is only after the Registrar is satisfied that the dispute as alleged exists that he may proceed to act under sec. 98. The question then is whether the satisfaction of the Registrar should be objective satisfaction or subjective satisfaction and whether at all it can be called in question in any manner in any subsequent proceeding. The language of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 98 shows that whenever a party approaches the Registrar with a dispute the Registrar has to refer that dispute if he is satisfied that the dispute is one within the meaning of sec. 96. If a question is raised before the Registrar that the dispute does not exist the Registrar has to consider that question. Now while considering that question is it obligatory upon the Registrar to call upon the parties affected by the dispute to appear before him and When hold a sort of a quasi judicial inquiry and record his decision one way or the other ? Mr. Desai for the petitioner urged that the Registrar entertaining a dispute under sec. 96 and before proceeding to adjudicate upon it must first satisfy himself that the dispute as envisaged by sec. 96 exists and in so doing he must act as a quasi judicial authority and hear the parties affected by the dispute. The scheme of sec. 98 shows that the Registrar can either adjudicate upon the dispute himself or refer the dispute to his Nominee. Assuming that in a given case the Registrar proceeds to adjudicate upon the dispute himself is it obligatory upon him first to hear the parties as to the existence of the dispute and then after having done so he must record first the finding that he is satisfied that the dispute exists and then again proceed to call upon the parties to appear before him and adjudicate upon the dispute on its merits. Sec. 96 read with sec. 98 does not admit of such a construction. If the Registrar on receipt of a reference which is to be made in the prescribed form in respect of a dispute by a party contemplated by sec. 96 is satisfied on the matters placed before him that a dispute as envisaged by sec. 96 exists it is not further necessary for him to inquire into the existence of this dispute. 96 is satisfied on the matters placed before him that a dispute as envisaged by sec. 96 exists it is not further necessary for him to inquire into the existence of this dispute. Of course if at any stage before he makes a reference or he takes it upon himself to adjudicate upon the dispute a question is raised before him that the dispute as alleged does not exist it would be necessary for him to consider that question. That does not mean that in every case where the dispute is brought before the Registrar he must proceed to decide the question of the existence of the dispute himself. If such was the intention of the Legislature sub-sec. (2) of sec. 96 would not have been worded in the manner in which it has been done. Sub sec. (2) could have been worded to the effect that on receipt of a reference of a dispute to it under sec. 96 (1) the Registrar shall proceed to consider whether the dispute exists and after he is so satisfied that the dispute exists he should either proceed to adjudicate upon the dispute himself or refer the same for adjudication to his Nominee. That is not the language of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 96. On the contrary the language of sub-sec. (2) excludes a formal inquiry into the existence of a dispute. What it enables the Registrar to do is that if in a given case the question is raised before him as to the existence of the dispute it would be necessary for him to consider the same. But if on considering the same he reaches a conclusion one way or the other his decision would be final. The language of sub-sec. (2) does not admit of a construction that in every case whenever a reference is received by the Registrar under sec. 96 (1) he must proceed to examine the question of the existence of the dispute by calling upon the parties to be before him and after hearing the parties he must be satisfied that the dispute exists. Under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 96 whenever a question is raised before the Registrar on the point whether the matter referred for his decision is dispute or not he must consider that question. It would only mean that if any contention is raised that the matter brought before him under sec. Under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 96 whenever a question is raised before the Registrar on the point whether the matter referred for his decision is dispute or not he must consider that question. It would only mean that if any contention is raised that the matter brought before him under sec. 96 (1) does not fall within the scope and ambit of sec. 96 or parties between whom the matter is raised are not those envisaged by sec. 96 that aspect may be considered by the Registrar. He is only required to consider that aspect. No formal or elaborate inquiry is envisaged by sec. 96 (2 ). Notice to parties for hearing the parties is not envisaged or contemplated by sec. 96. If some one appears and brings facts to his notice it would be open to him to consider those facts. But it does not necessarily imply any regular or formal inquiry by a quasi judicial authority who has a duty to act judicially. Reference in this connection was made to I. R. Hingorani v. Pravinchandra 67 Bom. L. R. 306. In that case the petitioner had challenged the order of reference and it was contended that unless the Registrar applies his mind to the facts placed before him when a dispute is alleged he could not decide the question raised before him and therefore reference made by him without following the procedure would be bad in law. It was conceded before the Division Bench of the Maharashtra High Court that the question about the existence of a dispute has to be decided by the Registrar judicially and that the proceeding before him is a quasi judicial proceedings. It is from this concession that an inference was drawn that the Registrar must hear the parties before he decides or satisfies himself about the existence of the dispute. It was suggested that as soon as the matter is brought before the Registrar under sec. 96 (1) the Registrar should issue notice to both the parties and give them an opportunity of being heard so that he can decide or satisfy himself whether a dispute within the meaning of sec. 96 (1) exists. It is further observed that it is such a decision of the Registrar arrived at in the manner aforesaid which will be final under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 91. With great respect the language of sub-sec. 96 (1) exists. It is further observed that it is such a decision of the Registrar arrived at in the manner aforesaid which will be final under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 91. With great respect the language of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 96 which appears to be pari materia with sec. 91 (2) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act 1961 does not admit of the construction that the Registrar while considering the only question whether a dispute exists or not is a quasi judicial authority which must act judicially thereby implying that the parties should be heard before deciding the existence of dispute. If any matter is brought to the Registrar by a party contemplated by sec. 96 and on the materials placed before the Registrar he is satisfied that a dispute as envisaged by sec. 96 exists between the parties as contemplated by sec. 96 there is nothing in sec. 96 which requires that the Registrar should enter into an inquiry about the existence of the dispute. It may be that in a given case the Registrar on the materials placed before him may not be satisfied about the existence of a dispute and he may in order to arrive at his satisfaction which as would be presently pointed out would be a subjective satisfaction of the Registrar call upon one or the other party to produce materials before him and then reach a conclusion about the existence of the dispute one way or the other. The finality attaches to the decision not because the Registrar is a quasi judicial authority who has a duty to act judicially and must therefore hear the parties but because he has to apply his mind to the facts brought before him and reach a subjective satisfaction as to the existence of the dispute one way or the other and on his being so satisfied if he makes a reference of the dispute that decision of referring dispute which postulates the existence of a dispute would be final. ( 5 ) THE Registrar has to be satisfied about the existence of the dispute which would mean that there is a dispute as envisaged by sec. 96. He must be further satisfied about the existence of a dispute between the parties as contemplated in sec. 96. ( 5 ) THE Registrar has to be satisfied about the existence of the dispute which would mean that there is a dispute as envisaged by sec. 96. He must be further satisfied about the existence of a dispute between the parties as contemplated in sec. 96. If he is satisfied about these two things it is within his powers either to take upon himself the adjudication of the dispute or refer the dispute to his Nominee. The satisfaction of the Registrar looking to the language of sec. 96 must be his subjective satisfaction and it is not open to a challenge before the Court of law. If the construction as suggested by Mr. Desai were to be accepted the satisfaction of the Registrar would have to be an objective satisfaction which must appear on the face of the record and must be open to correction by a superior Court. But if the order of the Registrar is to be final it cannot be gainsaid that the satisfaction about the existence of dispute must be his subjective satisfaction. If that is the correct approach while being satisfied about the existence of dispute he would not be a quasi judicial authority who has a duty to act judicially and of necessity must hear the parties before referring the dispute to his Nominee. In my opinion the Registrar is discharging an administrative function while referring the dispute to his Nominee. It may be that while discharging this administrative function he may in order to satisfy himself make inquiry including one of hearing the parties affected by the dispute. But that does not mean that he is a quasi judicial authority who must hear the parties before referring the dispute for adjudication either to himself or his Nominee. In my opinion the language of sec. 98 (1) does not admit of such a construction. Chapter IX of the Act provides for a special machinery for settlement of dispute. It also provides a special Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute. It is only with a view to avoid any frivolous dispute being litigated involving the Co-operative Society in avoidable expense that the intervention of the Registrar is retained before any dispute can be referred for adjudication. It also provides a special Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute. It is only with a view to avoid any frivolous dispute being litigated involving the Co-operative Society in avoidable expense that the intervention of the Registrar is retained before any dispute can be referred for adjudication. Where a member has a claim against the society or the society has a claim against the member a Tribunal set up under the Act may adjudicate upon the dispute but such a direct reference is prohibited and the power is vested in the Registrar to refer the dispute to the Tribunal only with a view to save the society from being dragged into litigation of frivolous disputes. If that was the purpose for which power was vested in the Registrar to refer dispute to the Nominee it would only mean that the Registrar would be acting in an administrative capacity. In that capacity he will nominate his Nominee to adjudicate upon the dispute which would mean that he has thereby created a Tribunal for the adjudication of the dispute. The creation of a Tribunal and asking the Tribunal to adjudicate upon a dispute would not be the function of a quasi judicial authority. In this connection it would be advantageous to refer to the provision contained in sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act which provide for setting up of an Industrial Tribunal for adjudicating upon industrial disputes. If the appropriate Government is of the opinion that an industrial dispute exists it can refer the same for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The existence of the dispute and setting up of Tribunal are left to the subjective satisfaction of the Government and they are the administrative acts of the Government. It is not necessary for the appropriate Government to take upon itself the inquiry about the existence of a dispute by hearing both the parties. Such a provision in a given case might be self defeating. It is not necessary for the appropriate Government to take upon itself the inquiry about the existence of a dispute by hearing both the parties. Such a provision in a given case might be self defeating. To illustrate a dispute arising out of an election held by a Co-operative Society may have to be expeditiously disposed of and if with regard to the existence of the dispute the Registrar is required to make an inquiry after notice to the parties that itself might drag on and after it is decided that the dispute exists a further elaborate inquiry will have to be made for settlement of the dispute. Viewed from either angle it is not possible to accept the submission of Mr. Desai that the Registrar acting under secs. 96 and 98 of the Act is a quasi judicial authority who has a duty to act judicially and therefore before he can take upon himself the adjudication of a dispute or refer it to his Nominee for adjudication he must hold an inquiry after notice to the parties about the existence of the dispute. ( 6 ) THERE is intrinsic evidence in the language of sub-sec. (2) to come to the conclusion that no judicial inquiry is contemplated before the Registrar in respect of the existence or otherwise of a dispute. The decision of the Registrar as to the existence of the dispute is final. When a particular decision of an authority under an Act is final it would be final for the purpose of that Act and that decision would not be open to challenge before any of the authorities set up under the Act. It was once contended that when any decision is said to be final for the purpose of the Act it would only mean that no appeal would lie against it but thereby the revisional jurisdiction of the superior authority is not excluded. The controversy on this point is set at rest by the Full Bench decision of this Court in Madhaji Lakhiram v. Mashrubhai III G. L. R. 438. In that case sub-sec. (5) of sec. 88c of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 came up for construction before the Full Bench. Subsec. (5) provides that decision of the Mamlatdar under sub sec (3) subject to appeal to the Collector shall be final. In that case sub-sec. (5) of sec. 88c of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 came up for construction before the Full Bench. Subsec. (5) provides that decision of the Mamlatdar under sub sec (3) subject to appeal to the Collector shall be final. In the facts of that case a revision application was preferred against the order of the Collector and a question arose whether an order of the Collector which would be final was open to the revision by the Revenue Tribunal. After reviewing case law on the subject Miabhoy J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court observed that though ordinarily and in the absence of any other indication it may be proper to construe the word final in its technical or limited sense this is not so in all cases. Whether the word is used in its ordinary or limited sense must primarily depend upon the context in which the Legislature has used it. At other stage it has been observed that the word final does not always mean not subject to appeal. After considering some of the provisions of the Tenancy Act it has been observed that the expression final in sub-sec. (5) of sec. 88c is not used by the Legislature in the limited or technical sense of not subject to appeal but that it is used also in the wider sense of not being subject to revision. The limited purpose for which sub-sec. (2) is introduced in sec. 96 would also show that the word final is not used in any technical or limited sense but in a wider sense which would include not open to revision. However without going so far it must be stated that under any statute any decision is made final it would certainly mean that it is final so far as the authorities set up under the statute are concern ed. If that meaning is not attached to word final in sub-sec. (2) the word final would lose all sense. If therefore the word final in sub-sec. (2) is construed to mean that so far as the authorities set up under the Act are concerned the decision of the Registrar referring the dispute to his Nominee is not open to reconsideration it would make sense otherwise it would lose all significance. (2) the word final would lose all sense. If therefore the word final in sub-sec. (2) is construed to mean that so far as the authorities set up under the Act are concerned the decision of the Registrar referring the dispute to his Nominee is not open to reconsideration it would make sense otherwise it would lose all significance. When the Legislature thus intended that the Registrars decision on this point to be final it would also provide a clue to the legislative intendment that whatever inquiry is contemplated by sub-sec. (2) is not a judicial inquiry. ( 7 ) WHEN the Registrar decides to refer the dispute for adjudication to his Nominee or proceeds to adjudicate upon the dispute himself the parties rights are in no way affected. It is only the starting point of the inquiry into the merits of the dispute. If the Registrar refers the dispute to the Nominee he thereby does not decide or pass upon the rights of the parties. The rights of the parties will be adjudicated upon by the Nominee to whom the dispute is referred or if the Registrar takes upon himself to adjudicate upon the dispute he must then decide the dispute. It can never be gainsaid that the inquiry before the Nominee into the merits of the dispute or before the Registrar into the merits of the dispute would be judicial inquiry. At this stage the parties are bound to remain present and it is even so provided by the procedure prescribed in the Rules. Therefore before adjudication of the dispute is undertaken the Registrar merely proceeds to refer a dispute for adjudication or proceeds to undertake the adjudication upon himself assuming existence of the dispute he is not deciding or adjudicating upon the rights of the parties. If such an inquiry does not in any way decide the rights of the parties it would not be a judicial inquiry. The decision that a dispute exists would in no way affect the merits of the dispute. But urged Mr. Desai that once existence of a dispute is accepted one way or the other one or the other party would be dragged into litigation. If a party is taken to litigation that itself would not in any way prejudicially affect whatever rights he has. But urged Mr. Desai that once existence of a dispute is accepted one way or the other one or the other party would be dragged into litigation. If a party is taken to litigation that itself would not in any way prejudicially affect whatever rights he has. If in any inquiry the rights of the parties are not adjudicated upon or the decision would not affect the merits of the dispute or rights of the parties it is impossible to accept the contention of Mr. Desai that the inquiry is a quasi judicial inquiry. Therefore with respect to the decision of the Maharashtra High Court it is difficult to accept that the Registrar acting under sec. 96 while making a reference of the dispute to the Nominee is a quasi judicial authority who has a duty to act judicially and any order of reference made by him without hearing parties would be violative of the principles of natural justice. The contention of Mr. Desai must therefore fail. ( 8 ) RE. Ground No. 2. The second contention of Mr. Desai is that in the absence of a resolution in the General Meeting of the respondent society resolving to refer the dispute between the society and the petitioner to the Assistant Registrar the application for reference made by the society would be illegal. This contention may be disposed of by observing that two Tribunals namely Registrars Nominee and the Co-operative Tribunal in appeal have recorded a concurrent finding that at the adjourned general meeting of the society held on 7-10-1962 a resolution was adopted for referring the dispute between the society and the petitioner to the Assistant Registrar. Mr. Desai did not dispute the fact that there is a concurrent finding to that effect both of Registrars Nominee and the Tribunal. But urged Mr. Desai that without disputing the existence of the resolution as alleged by the other side his contention is that the resolution itself is illegal or invalid because it is not signed either by the president or secretary of the society and such a resolution would not be valid. It appears that a special general meeting of the Society was called on 30-9-62. One of the items on the circulated agenda shows the reference of the dispute between the society and the petitioner to the Registrar. It appears that a special general meeting of the Society was called on 30-9-62. One of the items on the circulated agenda shows the reference of the dispute between the society and the petitioner to the Registrar. This meeting could not be held for want of quorum and it was adjourned to 7-10-62 and on that day a resolution was adopted sanctioning the Managing Committees decision to institute arbitration proceedings against the petitioner. The contention of Mr. Desai is that this resolution is not signed by anyone. No bye law was pointed out which provides that every resolution must be signed-either by the president or secretary. If the resolution is adopted the resolution derives its sanction from the adoption by a competent body and not by signature of an authority. The Tribunal has found as a fact that the resolution was adopted at the adjourned meeting. If the resolution was adopted it is good and valid and it is immaterial that it is not signed by anyone. If there was such a resolution reference would be quite valid and there is no merit in the contention that the reference is invalid as there was no resolution adopted in the general meeting of the society for referring the dispute to the Registrar. The contention of Mr. Desai must therefore be rejected. ( 9 ) RE. Ground No. 3. That takes me to the last contention of Mr. Desai. It was contended that the claim of the society against the petitioner is barred by limitation. In order to appreciate this contention some undisputed facts may be stated. The petitioner appears to be the founder member of the society which was incorporated as far back as 1929. In that very year a loan was advanced to the petitioner. The petitioner had to pay the loan by monthly installments of Rs. 150. 00. It appears that the petitioner went on repaying the loan. On 30-6-1955 the petitioner was indebted to the tune of Rs. 4597-30. The society on the application of the petitioner posted a Hawala entry crediting Rs. 4000/in the loan account of the petitioner and debited that very amount to the what is described as Hapta Tax Khata meaning thereby a fresh loan to the petitioner. Thereafter interest has been added form year to year and at the relevant time the petitioner was indebted to the society to the tune of Rs. 4000/in the loan account of the petitioner and debited that very amount to the what is described as Hapta Tax Khata meaning thereby a fresh loan to the petitioner. Thereafter interest has been added form year to year and at the relevant time the petitioner was indebted to the society to the tune of Rs. 5409-92. Mr. Desai urged that since 1955 the petitioner has not paid anything to the society. Mr. Desai urged that the petitioner had undertaken a liability to repay the loan by monthly installments of Rs. 150/and the limitation would begin from the first day when the default was committed in paying the installment. It was therefore urged that since 30-6-1955 the petitioner has not paid anything and the limitation would begin to run from that date and therefore in 1962 when the dispute was referred for adjudication the claim of the society had become barred by limitation. The Nominee has after taking into consideration certain facts and especially after taking into consideration the application for loan made by the petitioner has recorded a finding that the claim is not barred by limitation. Even apart from this finding on the interpretation of sec. 97 it does not appear that the claim of the society is barred by limitation. It may be mentioned that the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act 1961 came into force from 1 By the Gujarat Act the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act 1925 was repealed. Respondent No. 1 society was governed by the repealed Act till 1-5-1962. It is clear from the provisions of the repealed Act that no limitation was prescribed for recovering the amount due to the society from its member. Therefore till 1-5-1962 the contention as to the limitation could not have been entertained because no limitation was prescribed and the law was well settled that the Indian Limitation Act did not apply to the transaction between the Co-operative Society and its members. Since the introduction of the Gujarat Act sec. 97 provides for limitation. Mr. Desai stated that the present dispute was referred to the Nominee after 1-5-1962 and it would be governed by the Gujarat Act. Sec. 97 of the Gujarat Act provides for limitation. Since the introduction of the Gujarat Act sec. 97 provides for limitation. Mr. Desai stated that the present dispute was referred to the Nominee after 1-5-1962 and it would be governed by the Gujarat Act. Sec. 97 of the Gujarat Act provides for limitation. It reads as under :-97 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Limitation Act 1908 but subject to the specific provisions made in this Act the period of limitation in the case of a dispute referred to the Registrar under sec. 96 shall (A) when the dispute relates to the recovery of any sum including interest thereon be computed from the date on which such member dies or ceases to be a member of the society;. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) The period of limitation in the case of any dispute other than those mentioned in sub-sec. (1) which are required to be referred to the Registrar under sec. 96 shall be regulated by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 as if the dispute were a suit and the Registrar a Civil Court. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-secs. (1) and (2) the Registrar may admit a dispute after the expiry of the period of limitation if the applicant satisfied him that he had sufficient cause for not referring the dispute within such period and the dispute so admitted shall be a dispute which shall not be barred on the ground that the period of limitation had expired. MR. Desai urged that the present dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 society would be governed by sub-sec. (2 ). If sub-sec. (2) is attracted the period of limitation would be as provided by Indian Limitation Act 1963 Sub-sec. (2) would apply in the case of any dispute other than those mentioned in sub-sec. (1 ). If therefore the present dispute is one which would be covered by any one of the clauses of sub-sec. (1) sub-sec. (2) would not apply to the same. Sub-sec. (1) (a) shows that when the dispute relates to recovery of any sum including interest thereon due to a society by a member thereof the limitation would be computed from the date on which such member dies or ceases to be a member of the society. (1) sub-sec. (2) would not apply to the same. Sub-sec. (1) (a) shows that when the dispute relates to recovery of any sum including interest thereon due to a society by a member thereof the limitation would be computed from the date on which such member dies or ceases to be a member of the society. There is no dispute that the present dispute is one for recovery of loan including interest due to the society from its member. It is not in dispute that the dispute would fall under sub-clause (a ). Sub-clause (a) does not provide for any period of limitation but it provides for starting point of limitation in respect of such a dispute as contemplated therein. The present dispute in terms falls within the ambit of sub-clause (a ). As sub-clause (a) does not provide for limitation it would only mean that the provisions of the Indian Limitations Act 1963 would apply subject to the qualifications therein provided for. If secs. 97 (1) (a) is read with sec. 97 (3) that when the dispute relates to the recovery of any sum due to the society from its member the period of limitation would be regulated by the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act subject to the fact that the limitation would begin to run from the time or event provided for in sub-clause (a) of sec. 97 (1 ). The limitation would therefore begin to run in such a case from the date of the death of the member or his ceasing to be a member. It would appear that the Legislature never wanted to provide for any period of limitation in respect of the money claim of a society during the life time of a member or during his continuance as a member. The period of limitation would begin to run from the date the member ceases to be a member or from the date of his death. The only construction that can be placed on sec. 97 (1) (a) is that during the life time of a member or continuance of membership of a member of the Co-operative Society there would be no bar of limitation in respect of a money claim which the society has against its member. That was the situation under the repealed Act. That situation is sought to be retained under sub-clause (a ). That was the situation under the repealed Act. That situation is sought to be retained under sub-clause (a ). In fact the Legislature never wanted to permit any member of the society during his continuance to avoid his liability to repay the money claim of the society by any bar of limitation. The effect of the provisions contained in sec. 97 (1) (a) is that during the period the member continues to be a member or during his life time whichever event occurs earlier the money claim of the society against such a member including interest thereon would not be barred by limitation. In other words the society can recover its dues from its member during the time of his continuance of his membership or during his life time whichever event occurs earlier without any bar of limitation. In the instant case the petitioner is a member of the society and continues to be so till today. The claim is a money claim of the society due from its member including the interest thereon the case falls within the four corners of sec. 97 (1) (a) of the Act and therefore this claim would not be barred by limitation as there is no bar of limitation provided therein. The contention of Mr. Desai must therefore be rejected. [the rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] .