RAMBHEJA v. NETWON CHIKHLI COLLIERIES PR LTD — 1969 DIGILAW 131 (MP)

JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THE respondent Company filed an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Chhindwara, under section 247 (4) of the Madhya Pradesh land Revenue Code, 1959, (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for determining compensation for the acquisition of surface rights over a piece of land measuring 0. 07 acre out of Khasra No. 282 j7 situate in mouza Newton-Chikhli, tahsil and district Chhindwara, owned and possessed by the appellant. The proceedings were registered as Revenue Case No. 8/a-67 of 1965-66. ( 2. ) THE Sub-Divisional Officer determined the amount of compensation payable to the appellant at Rs. 220. 75. As the appellant was not satisfied with the award of the Sub-Divisional Officer, he filed a civil suit (civil suit No. 1-B of 1969) in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Chhindwara. ( 3. ) DURING the pendency of the suit aforesaid, the respondent Company obtained from the Collector, Chhindwara, permission to enter upon the land in question. It is alleged that the Naib-Tahsildar, Chhindwara, has started proceedings for taking possession of the surface of the land. It is also alleged that there are certain blocks of buildings standing on the land and the respondent; company, after obtaining possession of the land, intends to demolish them for the purpose of constructing labour blocks and other buildings subservient to its mining activities. ( 4. ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid proceedings of the respondent Company, the appellant moved an application under rules 1,2 and 7 of Order xxxix read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for a temporary injunction restraining the respondeat from entering upon the land and from taking possession of the blocks standing thereon till the final disposal of the suit. ( 5. ) THE application has been dismissed by the learned Additional District judge. In his opinion, there was no case for the issuance of a temporary injunction as all that the appellant was entitled to was compensation which was to be determined in the suit There was also no balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, nor would the non-issuance of an injunction cause him any irreparable loss. ( 6. In his opinion, there was no case for the issuance of a temporary injunction as all that the appellant was entitled to was compensation which was to be determined in the suit There was also no balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff-respondent, nor would the non-issuance of an injunction cause him any irreparable loss. ( 6. ) IN this appeal, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant contends that the respondent Company is not entitled to possession of the land till the compensation in respect of it has been determined by the Civil Court and tendered to the appellant. Reliance is placed on the provisions of sub-section (5)of section 247 of the Code. ( 7. ) UNDER sub-section (1) of section 247 of the Code, unless it is otherwise expressly provided by the terms of a grant made by the Government, the right to all minerals, mines and quarries shall vest in the State Government. Under sub-section (2) of the section, the right to all mines and quarries includes the right to occupy such other land as may be necessary for purposes subsidiary thereto. Sub-section (3) of the section then provides that if for the proper enjoyment of the right over any minerals, mines or quarries granted to any person by the Government, it is necessary for him to occupy such other land as may be necessary for the purpose, the Collector may, by an order in writing, subject to such conditions and reservations, as he may specify, delegate the powers to occupy the land to the person to whom the right has been assigned. It is further provided that no such delegation shall be made until notice has been duly served on all persons having rights in the land affected, and their objections have been heard and considered. It appears that as the respondent Company needed certain lands for purposes subsidiary to its mining lease, it has obtained from the Collector the right to occupy the suit land under the aforesaid sub-section. Sub-section (4) of section 247 then says that, if, in the exercise of the right aforesaid over any land, the rights of any person are infringed by the occupation or disturbance of the surface of such land, the Government or its assignee of the surface of such land shall pay to such person compensation for such infringement. Sub-section (4) of section 247 then says that, if, in the exercise of the right aforesaid over any land, the rights of any person are infringed by the occupation or disturbance of the surface of such land, the Government or its assignee of the surface of such land shall pay to such person compensation for such infringement. It is further provided that the amount of such compensation shall be calculated by the Sub-Divisional Officer; but, if his award is not accepted, by the Civil Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 189k In the instant case, as the rights of the plaintiff-appellant were being infringed by the occupation of the suit land by the respondent Company, the respondent Company was liable to pay such compensation to him as may be determined by the Sub-Divisional Officer or by the civil Court The Sub-Divisional Officer had given his award ; but that award was not acceptable to the plaintiff-appellant. He had, therefore, gone to the civil Court for the de ermination of the compensation, in respect of the suit land. ( 8. ) WE then come to the crucial sub-section (5) of section 247 of the Code on which great reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant for his prayer for injunction. That sub-section is in these terms : "no assignee of the Government shall enter on or occupy the surface of any land without the previous sanction of the Collector, and unless the compensation has been determined and tendered to the persons whose rights are infringed " As the sub-section reads, it provides for two conditions precedent b fore the respondent Company as an assignee of the Government could claim to occupy the suit land (a) The previous sanction of the Collector ; and (b) unless the compensation has been determined and tendered to the persons whose rights are infringed. It is not disputed that the previous sanction of the Collector has been obtained and the only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the the second condition has also to be satisfied before the respondent Company occupies the suit land under the Code. It is not disputed that the previous sanction of the Collector has been obtained and the only question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the the second condition has also to be satisfied before the respondent Company occupies the suit land under the Code. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant, in short, is that unless the compensation is determined by the Civil Court and tendered to the plaintiff-appellant by the respondent Company, the respondent Company as an assignee of the Government cannot enter upon or occupy the surface of the suit land ( 9. ) HAVING considered the matter, I am of opinion that the second condition aforesaid need not be complied with, if the first condition has been complied with by the respondent Company and that consequently, the respondent company was entitled to enter upon and occupy the suit land even before the compensation in respect of it had been determined by the Civil Court and tendered to the plaintiff-appellant. My reasons for so holding are, in short as follows: (1) The word and in sub-section (5) has to be read disjunctively, or distributively, in other words, the word or can be substituted for it. No doubt, ordinarily and means and, and or means or the one is conjunctive and the other disjunctive or distributive. But, if the general scheme of an act of Parliament obviously calls for and to be read as or or or as and, the Court is, free to take the very important step of altering the verbiage of that Act. [see Brahmah v. Bannigan ( (1913) S. A. L. R. 132 at page 135. P) Per Gorden J. , You do sometimes read or as and in a Statute. But, you do not do it unless you are obliged because or generally does not mean and and and does not generally mean or. Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate To. [see Brahmah v. Bannigan ( (1913) S. A. L. R. 132 at page 135. P) Per Gorden J. , You do sometimes read or as and in a Statute. But, you do not do it unless you are obliged because or generally does not mean and and and does not generally mean or. Green v. Premier Glynrhonwy Slate To. ( (1928) 1 K. B 561, C. A.) per Scrutton L J. ,] even while construing the Constitution, the Supreme Court read and in a distinguishing sense as or in Article 22 (7); Gopalan v. State of Madras (AIR (37) 1950 S. C. 27.); s. Krishnan v. State of Madras (A I R (38) 1951 S. C. 301 at p. 304.) To carry out the intern ion of the Legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions or and and one for the other, (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th edition, page 229 ). (2) If the word and is not read disjunctively, sub-section (6) of section 247 becomes redundant. Sub-section (6) provides that, if the assignee of the Government fails to pay compensation as provided in sub-section (4), the Collector may recover such compensation from him on behalf of the persons entitled to it, as if it were an arrear of land revenue. Now, if the assignee is precluded from entering on or occupying the land unless he tenders the compensation to the person whose rights are infringed, there would hardly be an occasion to resort to the provisions of sub-section (6)for the recovery of compensation under it. (3) It also does not appear reasonable to provide two conditions precedent for the entry of the assignee on the land Under the first condition he has to obtain the sanction of the Collector. Ordinarily, the right to occupy any land, as may be necessary for purposes subsidiary to mining or quarrying is of the Government as provided for under sub-section (2 ). This right, it has power to assign or delegate provided notices are served on the persons whose rights are affected and their objections are heard and considered. Once this is done, the right of occupation is only subject to the right of the person whose rights are infringed to claim compensation for the determination and recovery of which provision is made in sub-section (4) and (6 ). Once this is done, the right of occupation is only subject to the right of the person whose rights are infringed to claim compensation for the determination and recovery of which provision is made in sub-section (4) and (6 ). Ordinarily, the assignee could enter on the land and occupy it on paying compensation. Why then is there provision made for the sanction of the collector before he can exercise the right of occupation? It is because in suitable case, the Collector in his discretion may permit the assignee to enter on and occupy the land even before compensation has been determined and tendered. (4) If the provisions of the second condition are to be satisfied in every case, there is no need for the first condition because, if the occupation of the land is to be after the compensation amount is determined and tendered to the person whose rights are infringed, it presupposes that delegation has been made under sub-section (3) and compensation determined under sub-section (4), where then is the need for the permission of the Collector for entering on and occupation of the land? (5) The first condition is obviously made because the determination of compensation in a Civil Court is a lengthy process which is bound to take time which may detrimental affect the lease of the assignee. The delay may thus be more injurious to the assignee than to the person whose rights are infringed and for the protection of whose interests, adequate provisions have been made in the Code, because all that he is entitled to is adequate compensation for his surface rights. ( 10. ) THE provisions of sub-section (5) of section 247 of the Code do not, therefore, bar the right of the respondent Company from entering upon and occupying the suit land as it has already obtained the previous sanction of the Collector for the purpose, and it need not be prevented from entering upon or occupying the suit land till compensation in respect of its surface rights is determined by the civil Court and tendered to the appellant. ( 11. ) THE application for a temporary injunction was, therefore, rightly refused. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.