( 1 ) THIS petition by the defendant in OS. 14 of 1966 on the file of the Civil judge, Udipl, is directed against an Order made on 11-9-1968 on IA. No. I, preferred by him under S. 11 (2) of the Mysore Court-fees and Suits Valuation act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). By the impugned Order the prayer of the defendant for treating the issue relating to valuation of subject matter of the suit for the purposes o'f Court-fee as a preliminary issue, had been rejected. ( 2 ) THE original suit being one for partition and separate possession of joint family properties, Court-fee had been paid under S. 35 (2) of the Act. The defendant's contention was that such valuation was incorrect as according to him there was a prior partition. He also filed, though belatedly, an application under S. 11 (2) of the Act for a trial of the issue relating to valuation before evidence was recorded on other issues bearing on the merits o the case. The learned Civil Judge rejected the application on the ground, inter aha, that the issue involved a mixed question of fact and law. This revision is directed against that Order. ( 3 ) SRI Santhosh Hegde, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, relying strongly on the provisions ot S. 11 (2) of the Act, submitted that the rule of procedure enacted therein was mandatory and that there was no option left to the Court to depart from it and postpone the consideration of such an issue to a later stage in the trial of the suit Sri P. Viswanatha Shetty, the learned Counsel appealing on behalf of the respondent, submitted that a defendant could not invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under S. 115, cpc. in matters pertaining to Court-fee payable on a plaint. He further submitted that the defendant in tne present case was not at all prejudiced in any manner on account of the procedure followed by the Court. He also contended that having regard to the circumstances with which the Court was faced, it was an eminently reasonable order and therefore, not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC. , even if there was an element of illegality or irregularity involved in the making of it. He also contended that having regard to the circumstances with which the Court was faced, it was an eminently reasonable order and therefore, not liable to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC. , even if there was an element of illegality or irregularity involved in the making of it. In support of these propositions he relied on two decisions : ratnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla, AIR 1961 SC. 1299 and H. S. Siddappa v. Lakshmamma , (1965) 1 Mys. L. J. 232. ( 4 ) IN my opinion, the petition does not deserve to succeed. It is no doubt true that the procedure enjoined by S. 11 (2) is mandatory as contended for by Sri Hegde. But the purpose of this provision is only to enable a defendant to raise a contention as to the proper Court-fee payable oh the plaint and to assist the Court in arriving at a just decision. It is not intended to serve the purpose of a weapon ot defence in the hands of a contesting party to obstruct or delay the progress of the suit. The Act is primarily intended to safeguard the interests of the State in the matter of collection of court-fee. That such is the underlying purpose of these provisions is clearly affirmed in the decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by Sri viswanatha Shetty. In Ratnavarma v. Vimla , AIR 1961 SC. 1299 it is observed by the supreme Court thus :"the Court-fees Act was enacted to collect revenue for the benefit of the State and not to arm a contesting party with a weapon of defence to obstruct the trial of an action. By recognising that the defendant was entitled to contest the valuation of the properties in dispute as if it were a matter in issue between him and the plaintiff and by entertaining petitions preferred by the defendant to the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction against the Order adjudging court-fee payable on the plaint, all progress in the suit far the trial of the dispute on the merits has been effectively frustrated for nearly five years. We fail to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate Court-fee On his plaint. We fail to appreciate what grievance the defendant can make by seeking to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court on the question whether the plaintiff has paid adequate Court-fee On his plaint. Whether proper Court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. How by an order relating to the adequacy of the Court-fee paid by the plaintiff, the defendant may feel aggrieved, it is difficult to appreciate. " ( 5 ) AGAIN, in the same judgment, in considering the scope and purpose of s. 12 (2) of the Madras Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, which is in pari materia with the present S. 11 (2), their Lordships have observed thus:"the anxiety of the Legislature to collect Court-fee due from the litigant is manifest from the detailed provisions made in Chap. III of the Act, but those provisions do not arm the defendant with a weapon of technicality to obstruct the progress of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision against an order determining the Court-fee payable. In our view, the High Court grievously erred in entertaining the revision application on questions of Court-fee at the instance of the defendant, when no question of jurisdiction was involved. " ( 6 ) THE learned Counsel for the repondent also placed strong reliance on the above observations of the Supreme Court and contended that the petition under S. 115 CPC. would not be maintainable. In that decision there was an adjudication as regards the proper Court-fee payable on the plaint. It is, therefore, plain that the Court concerned therein had not refused to decide the question, as in the present case Hence there was no question of failure to exercise jurisdiction in the said Case S. 11 (2), it seems to me, does require a Court to decide all questions relating to valuation of the subject matter of the suit and the sufficiency or otherwise of the Court-fee paid on the plaint on an objection taken by a defendant in that regard. It further enjoins that such questions ought to be so decided first before evidence is recorded affecting such defendant on the merits of the claim. Put on the facts of this case, it cannot be posited that the Court had exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of S 11 (2) of the act. It further enjoins that such questions ought to be so decided first before evidence is recorded affecting such defendant on the merits of the claim. Put on the facts of this case, it cannot be posited that the Court had exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of S 11 (2) of the act. But it is the contention of Sri Viswanatha Shetty that even in such a case it would not be open to a defendant to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under S. 115 CPC. I consider it unnecessary to decide this question as the case can be disposed of on the other ground advanced on behalf of the respondent. ( 7 ) ON a consideration of all the facts and- circumstances of this case, I find it difficult to appreciate how the defendant could be said to be prejudiced by the impugned Order. It is no doubt true that in conceivable cases, a proper valuation of the subject matter of the suit may result in taking the suit out of the jurisdiction of a Court in which it was first instituted. The present case is not one such. On the other hand, the Court below, in my opinion, appears to have been faced with a genuine difficulty in complying with the requirements of S. 11 (2 ). Any compliance with those provisions at a preliminary stage, in a sense, would be tant-amount to a pre-trial of certain issues of fact which in a large way had a bearing on the merits of the main controversy. Moreover, adoption of such course would perhaps be open to criticism that it was not in conformity with the provisions of Rule 2 of Order 14 CPC. , whereunder it is enjoined that only such issues o'f law as may result in a disposal of the whole or part of a case ought to be tried first before proceeding with the trial of issues of fact. In these circumstances, it seems to me, the order impugned cannot be said to be unreasonable or unjust. In saying this, i do not wish to be understood as laying down that the requirements of s. 11 (2) were in any manner discretionary. It is for these reasons that sri Shetty contended that it was not a case where this Court could interfere under S. 115 CPC. In saying this, i do not wish to be understood as laying down that the requirements of s. 11 (2) were in any manner discretionary. It is for these reasons that sri Shetty contended that it was not a case where this Court could interfere under S. 115 CPC. ( 8 ) THE challenge made by the defendant against the impugned order is based purely on a technical ground that there has been non-compliance with the requirements of S. 11 (2 ). This statutory provision, as observed by the Supreme Court in the above referred case, has been enacted for the benefit of the State and, although it enables a defendant to an action to raise a contention as to the proper Court-fee payable, it is only intended for the purpose of assisting the Court in order to arrive at a just decision on the question. As observed earlier, no prejudice has been shown to have been caused to' the defendant as a result of such an order. For these reasons I decline to interfere with the impugned order. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed, but without costs. --- *** --- .