ORDER V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. 1. More than 8 years ago, a landlord, claiming to be need of his own building for occupation, moved the Rent Control Court for eviction, hardly suspecting that the protracted course of legal proceedings would go on for so long and probably beguiled into believing that Rent Control proceedings would be disposed of quickly, as they should be, and that the tribunals in charge would obey the mandate of section 24 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act hereinafter referred to as the Act. This provision, a mere dead letter now, obliges the Rent Control Court to pass final orders in any proceeding before it within 4 months from the date of appearance of the parties thereto as far as may be practicable. In the present case, the Court took 4 years instead of the statutory period of 4 months. If law courts acquire the chronic habit of slow motion and violate, with unconcern, specific legislative prescriptions limiting protraction, people generally will lose faith in the rule of law and become cynical about judicial institutions. 2. There were three separate engagements by which the petitioners (landlords) entrusted two buildings to the respondent (tenant). Ext. A-5 is one such lease relating to one building (as ordinarily understood) and Ext. A-7 is another such lease which relates to the ground floor of the second building, the upstair part of which has been let out to the same tenant on an oral lease. The landlord brought one petition in regard to all the three engagements and sought eviction of both the buildings alleging bona fide need for own occupation, subletting and arrears of rent. We are concerned only with the first ground. The Rent Control Court refused eviction, except on the ground of arrears of rent which have since been deposited, negativing the plea of bona fide need and subletting. The appellate authority upheld the plea of bona fide need and negatived the tenant's contention under the second proviso to section 11 (3) of the Act. The revisional authority upheld the plea of bona fide need of the landlord, but also upheld the claim of the tenant under the second proviso to section 11 (3), ultimately rejecting the eviction petition. The appellate authority upheld the plea of bona fide need and negatived the tenant's contention under the second proviso to section 11 (3) of the Act. The revisional authority upheld the plea of bona fide need of the landlord, but also upheld the claim of the tenant under the second proviso to section 11 (3), ultimately rejecting the eviction petition. In this revision by the landlord, it has been urged before me that the order of the revisional Court (under section 20 of the Act) is bad because there was no ground for reversing the finding of fact entered by the appellate authority against the tenant on the question of his dependence for his livelihood on the income derived from the business carried on by him in such building. The facts, so far as are relevant for this contention, may be briefly stated. The tenant manufactures eye-lees, medicated soaps, etc., and he has been trading so successfully with such stuff that he has expanded his business considerably and depends for his livelihood on this operation. In one of the two buildings (No. 1/164 covered by Ext. A-5), he resides with his family. In the other, he carries on his business. His case, however, is that he has put up some additional sheds and is using part of his dwelling to accommodate his expanding business. His contention is that he solely depends on the takings from this trade for his livelihood and therefore is protected from eviction by the second proviso to section 11 (3) of the Act. He has also raised the ground that since there are three separate leases a single eviction petition for all the three together will not lie. He has improved upon this plea before me, in view of certain later developments, that the landlord's case being that all these three engagements have subsequently merged into one transaction, there cannot be partial eviction and one building out of the two cannot be ordered to be evicted, as was done by the Subordinate Judge. He has also a contention that there has been no valid termination of the tenancy or tenancies and therefore eviction under the rent control law is not permissible, the provision for notice to quit under the Transfer of Property Act not having been complied with. 3. He has also a contention that there has been no valid termination of the tenancy or tenancies and therefore eviction under the rent control law is not permissible, the provision for notice to quit under the Transfer of Property Act not having been complied with. 3. The landlord's case is (two brothers are the landlords who claimed the building in the beginning to belong to them jointly but, on partition subsequent to the institution of the petition, both the buildings have been set apart to the 2nd petitioner who, for all practical purposes, is the petitioner-landlord) that he is a school master in a Government school in Pathiripala; the buildings are in Ottappalam, 7 miles away; he is sickly and does not have a convenient house in Pathiripala, the one that he is occupying being unsuitable for his residential needs. Moreover, two or three other teachers are staying with him in that building. He adds that he has received permission from the Education Department to stay at Ottappalam and attend to his duties as teacher in Pathiripala. His case is one of bona fide need for occupation for himself. He has also taken other grounds which are unnecessary to consider. At the time the petition was filed, it must be noted, he was a teacher in Perinthalmanna, which is far away from Ottappalam and Pathiripala. The ground of bona fide need was based on the allegation that he was expecting a transfer to Pathiripala from Perinthalmanna and that, in that event, he would be in real difficulty for a suitable accommodation unless he got back his own house. 4. It is proper to notice that at the time the petition for eviction was filed, the second proviso to section 11 (3) was not in the statute. This was brought in by way of amendment by Act 29 of 1961 which was given retrospective effect and therefore would govern the present case. One consequence of this circumstance is that the landlord did not make suitable allegations to negative a possible plea under the second proviso to section 11 (3). Indeed; the tenant also could not make proper averments to found a case coming within that proviso. He made certain vague statements in that direction coming to know of an amendment like that but not being actually aware of the recise provision. Indeed; the tenant also could not make proper averments to found a case coming within that proviso. He made certain vague statements in that direction coming to know of an amendment like that but not being actually aware of the recise provision. However, when parties went to trial and evidence was recorded, the tenant gave evidence in conformity with the second proviso to section 11 (3) and there was some cross-examination also on that basis. It must be observed, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned District Judge, that there was no concentrated attempt by either party to separate one of the buildings from the other and establish that that building (No. 1/164 covered by Ext. A-5) was being used exclusively for the residence of the respondent and so was not necessary for his business and could be ordered to be vacated. 5. As I stated earlier, the appellate authority upheld the bone fide need of the petitioner, but when confronted by the second proviso to section 11 (3), he held that, at any rate, one of the two buildings, i.e., the one covered by Ext. A-5 was not used for the business and therefore could not attract the second proviso aforesaid. He therefore ordered eviction of that one. The revisional Court while upholding the bona fide need of the landlord held that the tenant had been handicapped in a way, because the separate consideration of one out of the two buildings on the score that it was being used only for residence and not for residence-cum-business-was not clearly before the minds of the parties or the Court. In a way, this aspect is further emphasised by the absence of a discussion on these lines in the trial Court's judgment. The learned District Judge was perfectly right in thinking that the tenant could not have met this case which was clearly articulated for the first time before the appellate Judge only. Nevertheless, it was open to the landlord, when he found that he could not get both the buildings, at least to claim one of the two so that he could live in that building. Nevertheless, it was open to the landlord, when he found that he could not get both the buildings, at least to claim one of the two so that he could live in that building. What the learned District Judge should have done under those circumstances was to call for findings as to (a) whether there were three separate engagements or only one and (b) assuming that there were three separate engagements to begin with, whether they had been converted into a single engagement at a later stage; on a finding being obtained regarding this matter, he would be in a position to decide whether one eviction petition was possible covering what, to start with, was three separate engagements. He would also be able to consider whether, even if there had been a transformation of three leases into one by subsequent conduct or understanding, it was permissible, under the rent control law, to grant eviction of one part of the holding, that is to say, one out of the two buildings covered by the engagement. If he finds that there is only one engagement and if he further finds that partial eviction is not permissible, the petition has to fail for that reason. If he finds that there are three engagements, and further, that it is possible to club, in one eviction petition, all these three leases, the question can be considered by him properly as to whether eviction of one of the two buildings could be granted on the ground that that building was not essential for carrying on the business of manufacture of eye-lees, soaps etc., wherewith the tenant was making his livelihood. For these reasons, I think it proper to set aside the order of the District Judge and send the case back to him. 6. The plea of the tenant that the tenancy has not been terminated was not considered by the revisional Court. It is true that this plea was taken even before the Rent Control Court. It is also true that the appellate authority considered it but overruled it. It is now well settled that the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is not such a self-contained Code as to exclude the operation of the Transfer of the Property Act. Whether notice is necessary at all in the particular class of leases with which we are concerned has not been investigated. It is now well settled that the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is not such a self-contained Code as to exclude the operation of the Transfer of the Property Act. Whether notice is necessary at all in the particular class of leases with which we are concerned has not been investigated. The landlord has an additional answer to this case that the leases were at will and therefore a mere demand was sufficient, without any antecedent termination of tenancy or notice to quit. This has not been considered by any of the Courts below Assuming that notice is necessary, the further question, which is one of mixed fact and law, arises as to whether the notice sent in this case is a valid notice to quit. Also, the fact has to be gone into whether the tenant has abandoned his plea of want of notice to quit as is urged before me. Therefore, the revisional authority will have to consider, from those various aspects, the question of notice to quit. If any finding has to be called for in this connection (i.e. if any evidence has to lie led by either party, satisfactorily to dispose of those questions) that can also be directed by the revisional court. The revisional authority has proceeded on the footing that there is bona fide need for the landlord and in so doing he has affirmed the finding of the appellate authority. However, respondent's counsel has argued that, since on the date of the institution of the petition the landlord was a teacher in Perinthalmanna and not at Pathirippala, he had set up only a future and not a present need in his eviction petition and this was fatal. I must point out that the concept of need cannot be narrowly understood or pedantically interpreted but applied in a pragmatic way. The petitioner has really been transferred to Pathirippala, even as he had alleged in his petition. He must have reasonably expected a transfer and it might well be said that a need had arisen then. It is not necessary that there should be a current, urgent need. It is enough if it is reasonably likely to arise in the near future. He must have reasonably expected a transfer and it might well be said that a need had arisen then. It is not necessary that there should be a current, urgent need. It is enough if it is reasonably likely to arise in the near future. Knowing that between the institution of the petition and the ultimate order from the apex court years pass, it will be as good as repealing the provision for eviction on the ground of bona fide need, if courts insist on landlords proving a present need as against a prospective but certain need. Else, when the need confronts him, the building will be years away from him. Proceedings in court should not become tantalising tricks. There is another difficulty in the way of the respondent in putting forward this contention. As a fact, subsequent to the institution of the petition the teacher has been transferred to Pathirippala. Cannot the rent control Court take note of this subsequent event and give relief? A recent decision of His Lordship Mr. Justice Balakrishna Eradi, reported in 1969 K.L.T. 334 takes the, view that there is a discretion vested in the Court to depart from the general rule that the rights of parties must be determined as on the date of the institution of the action in justifiable circumstances, provided such departure will not cause injustice. 7. I do not, however, think it necessary to interfere with the finding of bona fide need concurrently upheld by the appellate and revisional authorities. I set aside the decision of the revisional court and send back the case to the District Court of Palghat for disposal according to law and subject to the directions given above There will be no order as to costs.