ORDER : Venkataraman, J.—This appeal arises out of Claim Petition No. 11 of 1963 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (District Judge, Tirunelveli u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The Petitioner Manicka Thai was a girl aged about 14 years. On 15-1-1963, at about 3-30 p.m., she was walking on the western side of the Tirunelveli-Nagercoil main road at Nanguneri. She was going from south to north. Her case is that a motor cycle MDT 4947 driven by minor Vellapandi Thevar came opposite from north to south and hit her. She fell down unconscious. As a result of the impact, there was fracture of bones on her left leg and she became lame. Therefore, she filed the petition through her father and next friend for compensation of a sum of Rs. 5,000/-. She claimed that she had been earning about Rs. 60/- per month as labourer, that she could not do any manual work because she became lame, and that her prospects of marriage had become impaired. 2. Minor Vellapandi Thevar through his father and guardian Vanamamalal Thevar was impleaded as 1st Respondent, the owner of the vehicle D. Subramanian as the 2nd Respondent, and the insurance company with whom the vehicle had been insured over claims of third parties as the 2nd Respondent. 3. The version of the 1st Respondent, aged about 17-years in his counter was that he was not riding the motor vehicle but was only leading it, that there was a downward gradient on the road from north to south at that place, that the vehicle consequently came a little fast, that out of fright the Petitioner ran across the road and dashed against the vehicle. The circumstances under which the vehicle came to be entrusted at that moment to minor Vellapandi Thevar were brought out in the evidence of R. Ws. 1 and 2.. The owner of the vehicle 2nd Respondent had entrusted the vehicle for repairs to-R.W. 1 Thangavel Asari. R.W. 1 states that there was starting trouble. However, he took out the vehicle for test. At a place, about a mile away from his smithy, R.W. 1 wanted to take bath in a river and so he asked minor Vellapandi Thevar to take the motor cycle to R.W. 1's smithy by leading it. R.W. 1 states that there was starting trouble. However, he took out the vehicle for test. At a place, about a mile away from his smithy, R.W. 1 wanted to take bath in a river and so he asked minor Vellapandi Thevar to take the motor cycle to R.W. 1's smithy by leading it. R.W. 1 did not know whether after the handing over of the motor cycle, the minor actually drove it. 4. One of the contentions taken by the father was that under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act no relief could be had against the father of the driver of the vehicle, but could be had only against the driver of the vehicle, its owner and the Insurance Company. 5. Apart from the medical evidence which is not very material now, on the actual occurrence the Petitioner gave evidence as P W. 1 and examined P.W. 4 who had been sitting on a culvert near the place of occurrence. He supports the version of the Petitioner. 6. About the injuries the lady Doctor P.W. 3 was examined. P.W. 3 deposed that on 15-1-1963 she examined the Petitioner and found fracture of both bones on the left leg. 7. On behalf of the Respondents two witnesses were examined. R.W.l's evidence has been summarised above R.W.2 is put forward as an eye-witness to the occurrence. His evidence is that the minor was leading the motor cycle, from south to north, that there was a gradient from north to south, that the motor cycle was coming fast, that on seeing it the Petitioner and another girl got alarmed, that the girl ran towards west and the Petitioner towards east, and that the Petitioner collided with the vehicle and fell down. 8. The Tribunal had no hesitation in accepting the Petitioner's case that the vehicle was driven by minor Vellapandi Thevar who had no driving licence and dashed against the Petitioner who was coming on the proper side of the road (western side). He fixed the amount of damages at Rs. 3,000/- and held that the minor's father would be liable to pay the amount. The Tribunal observed: The 1st Respondent's father is certainly vicariously liable to pay damages. No authority is shown to me that the father is not liable. He fixed the amount of damages at Rs. 3,000/- and held that the minor's father would be liable to pay the amount. The Tribunal observed: The 1st Respondent's father is certainly vicariously liable to pay damages. No authority is shown to me that the father is not liable. But the Tribunal held that the 2nd Respondent, owner of the vehicle, could not be made liable because he had no knowledge that the vehicle would be used in the particular manner. ' Similarly the 3rd Respondent, the Insurance-Company, could not be made liable, for the vehicle was driven by a person who did not possess a driving licence. This appeal has been filed by minor Vellapandi Thevar through his father and guardian. 9. The Appellant's learned Counsel Mr. R. Kallappan could not really canvass the finding of the Tribunal that the vehicle was driven by minor Vellapandi Thevar and dashed against the Petitioner. That is the only conclusion possible in this case. There is no reason to reject the evidence of the Petitioner and P.W. 4. It is significant that minor Vellapandi Thevar did not enter the witness-box. The evidence of R.W.2 is interested and worthless. He is an agnate of the minor. Further, it is curious that he says that the minor was leading the motor cycle from south to north which is nobody's case. 10. No exception can be taken to the quantum of damages fixed by the Tribunal, considering that the accident has resulted in the permanent lameness of the Petitioner and has affected her capacity to do manual labour and her prospects of marriage. There cannot be any doubt that the amount of compensation could be recovered from any assets which may happen to belong to minor Vellapandi Thevar, though of course he cannot be made personally liable in view of his minority. The order of the Tribunal does not make it clear that the compensation could be recovered from the assets of minor Vellapandi Thevar and that is now made clear. 11 The only question which remains for consideration is whether the father of the minor and consequently his assets could be made liable for the tort of minor vellapandi. Thevar causing injuries to the Petitioner by driving the motor cycle without a licence and dashing against her. 11 The only question which remains for consideration is whether the father of the minor and consequently his assets could be made liable for the tort of minor vellapandi. Thevar causing injuries to the Petitioner by driving the motor cycle without a licence and dashing against her. When the matter came up for hearing on a previous occasion, I found, on a prima facie examination of the authorities and text books, that in a case like this the father could, not be made liable for a tort committed by his son. Since the Respondent was absent, I directed notice to be taken once again to the Respondent so as to give her an opportunity to sustain order of the court below. She is still absent. I have, therefore, considered the case with particular care. I find that under the circumstances of the case, the father could not be made liable, the simple reason being that he could not have anticipated that his son who had no driving licence would drive the motor vehicle and much less could he anticipate that his son would dash the vehicle against a passer-by on the road. In Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 12th Edition, at page 87, in paragraph 161, it is stated: A parent is not, as such, liable for the torts of. his child North v. Wood 1914 1 K.B. 629 Donaldson v. McNiven (1952) 2 A11 E.R. 691. If, however, the circumstances are such as to bring into existence the relationship of master and servant between parent and child, and a tort is committed by the child in the course of his employment, or if the parent has himself been guilty of negligence, then he will be liable Sullivan v. Creed (1904) 2 Ir. Rep. 317; Bebee v. Sales 32 T.L.R.413 ; Newton v. Edgerley (1959) 1 W.L.R. 1031. In Winfield on Tort, 7th Edition, at pages 74 and 75, it is stated: A parent or guardian is not in general liable for the torts of a child ; but to this there are two exceptions. First, where the child is employed by his parent and commits a tort in the course of his employment, the parent is vicariously responsible just as he would be for the tort of any other servant of his. First, where the child is employed by his parent and commits a tort in the course of his employment, the parent is vicariously responsible just as he would be for the tort of any other servant of his. In Moon v. Towers (1860)8 C.B. N.S. 611, the Defendant employed his son, aged seventeen or eighteen years, as treasurer at his theatre. The son wrongfully gave into custody the Plaintiff, another servant, on a criminal charge. It was held that the Defendant was not liable to an action for false imprisonment for he had neither authorised nor ratified his son's act and apparently it was not done in the course of employment. Secondly, the parent will be liable if the child's tort were due to the parent's negligent control of the child in respect of the act that caused the injury, or if the parent expressly authorised the commission of the tort, or possibly if he ratified the child's act. Thus, where a father gave his boy, about fifteen years old, an airgun and allowed him to retain it after he had smashed a neighbour's window with it, he was held liable for the boy's tort in injuring the eve of another boy with the gun. Bebee y. Sales' 32 T.L.R. 413, where, however, a boy aged thirteen had promised his father never to use his air-rifle outside the house where there was a cellar to which the rifle could be fired and subsequently broke the promise, the Court of Appeal refused to disturb the trial Judge's finding that the father had not been negligent. (1951) All E.R. 691. Nor will he be liable to one who is bitten by a dog which belongs to his daughter who is old enough e.g. seventeen years to be liable to exercise control over it, and this is so even if the father knows of the dog's ferocious temper. (1914)1 K.B. 629. 12. I shall now discuss chronologically some of the important cases noted in the above passages. In Sullivan v. Creed (1904) 2 Ir. Rep. 317 the headnote sums up correctly the facts and decisions: Defendant left a gun loaded and at full1 cock standing inside a fence on his lands, beside a gap from which a private path led over Defendant's lands from the public road to his house. In Sullivan v. Creed (1904) 2 Ir. Rep. 317 the headnote sums up correctly the facts and decisions: Defendant left a gun loaded and at full1 cock standing inside a fence on his lands, beside a gap from which a private path led over Defendant's lands from the public road to his house. The Defendant's son, aged between fifteen and sixteen, coming from the road through the gap on his way home, found the gun. He went back with it to the public road, and not knowing that it was loaded pointed it, in play, at the Plaintiff, who was on the road. The gun went off, and the Plaintiff was injured: Held, by the King's Bench division (Palles, C.B., and Gibson, J.: Boyd, J. diss. ) and by the Court of Appeal, that the Defendant was liable in respect of the injury. The point of the decision was that the Defendant was negligent in leaving his loaded gun at the place and he must have anticipated someone, particularly any member of his family taking and using it without knowing that it was loaded. 13. In North v. Wood (1914) 1 K.B. 629 the head-note again sums up the facts and the ratio of the decision correctly: A father allowed his daughter aged seventeen, who resided with him, to keep in his house a dog which he knew to be savage. The dog was her property,-and. she paid for its food and licence out of her earnings. While so kept there it attacked and killed a valuable dog belonging to a third person: Held that, as the daughter was of a sufficient age to allow of her exercising control over her dog, her father was not responsible for the damage done. 14. In Bebee v. Sales 32 T.L.R. 413 the head-note sums up the facts and ratio of the decision correctly: The Defendant gave a present of an airgun to his son, who was about 15 years old, and his son, when shooting at a mill broke a window. The Defendant in consequence of a complaint from the miller promised to smash the airgun, but did not do so. Afterwards the Defendant's son, when playing with the Plaintiff, another boy shot him in the eye. The Defendant in consequence of a complaint from the miller promised to smash the airgun, but did not do so. Afterwards the Defendant's son, when playing with the Plaintiff, another boy shot him in the eye. In an action by the Plaintiff against the Defendant for negligence in allowing the boy to have the gun, the Judge held that after the warning received by the Defendant it was negligence to allow the boy to use the gun, and he awarded the Plaintiff damages. Held, that there was evidence to justify the Judge's conclusion. 15. In Donaldson v. McNiven (1952) 2 All E.R. 691 the head-note runs: The Defendant, who lived in a populous district of Liverpool, allowed his son, aged thirteen years, to have an air rifle on condition that it was never used outside the house. There was a large cellar to the Defendant's house where the son was allowed to use the air rifle Behind the house and providing access to it and other houses was an alley-way where children came to play. Without the Defendant's knowledge, the son fired the air rifle in the alley-way and injured the Plaintiff, a child aged five, who was-standing at the entrance to the alley-way. Held: there was no ground for disturbing the finding of fact in the Court below that there was no such lack of super vision by the Defendant of his son's activities as would constitute negligence on his part, and, therefore, the tort was that of the Defendant's son alone and the Defendant was not liable in damages. In the course of his judgment Lord Goddard C.J., observed that no point was taken at the trial that the father was negligent in letting, his son to have the airgun at all. The learned Judge pointed out: The case was put entirely on lack of supervision, but how are you going to supervise a small boy for every hour of the day ? If there was nothing wrong in the Defendant allowing his son to have an air-gun and I am far from saying there-was nothing wrong, I cannot see that he could do more than extract a promise from his son never to use the air-gun in the street. He cannot be watching his son all day and every day, nor is. there any obligation on him as a parent to do so. He cannot be watching his son all day and every day, nor is. there any obligation on him as a parent to do so. Some people have thought that parents ought to be responsible for the torts of their children, but they are not. The negligence in this case was merely the negligence of the boy. On the findings-of the learned Judge the parents had done all that parents could reasonably do and I can see no ground for imputing negligence to the father. The other learned two Judges agreed with this conclusion. 16. The above case was distinguished in Newton v. Edgerley (1959) 1 W.L.R. 1031. The head-note sums up the facts and the ratio of the decision correctly: The infant Plaintiff received an injury to the right leg when a shotgun which the Defendant's son, aged 12 years, was carrying under his arm was discharged by the act of a third boy whilst all three were walking in file through a wood. The Defendant's son had bought the gun out of his savings, with his father's approval. The Defendant had instructed his son in the use of the gun, but not as to the way to handle the weapon when others were present in particular if he was walking with others in single file--since he had forbidden him to take the gun off the farm, and had told him not to use it, even on the farm, when other children were present. The son had taken the gun off the farm in disobedience to the Defendant's instructions on the occasion of the accident. Held, that the Defendant was negligent in that he should either have forbidden the use of the gun at all, or else have ensured, by giving him very careful instructions as to the use of the weapon if others were present, that if the boy succumbed to temptation and went out he would not be danger to others. 17. The principles which could be deduced from the above cases support what I have said at the beginning, namely, that the father in this case could not have anticipated that his son would drive the motor cycle, for the son did not possess a driving licence, and by driving the vehicle he would dash against a passer-by and cause her injuries. It could not be said that the father was negligent in not taking precautions to avert such a catastrophe. I therefore, set aside the portion of the order of the Tribunal making the father and his assets liable. But in view of the misfortune caused to the unfortunate Petitioner, I suggest that the father of the minor pay a sum between Rs. 1,200/- to Rs. 1,500/- to the Petitioner irrespective of his legal liability and the Petitioner would have to give credit for such payment towards the sum of Rs. 3,000/- recoverable from vellapandi. 18. I must add that the learned Counsel for the Petitioner did not urge before me the point taken in the counter that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed against the father. Actually I find no such limitation against the power of the Tribunal. Section 110F states that where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted far any area, no civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any matter relating to any claim for compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area. Since there is no limitation on the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal, it would follow that the Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction and not the civil Court. Further it is desirable that there should be only one Tribunal to go into the whole question and, when the Tribunal has got jurisdiction over the other parties, it should obviously have jurisdiction over the father in this case as well. It so happened that the claim against the father has failed on its merits. But that is a different matter. 19. The appeal is allowed. No order as to costs.