JUDGMENT S.D. Khare, J. - This is an appeal directed against an order dated 15th May, 1965, passed by the learned Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge, Deoria, acquitting the respondent of the charge of contravention of a bye-law framed by the District Board, Deoria, under Section 174 (2) (k) of the District Boards Act, 1922, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . 2. The facts leading to this appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent had worked a brick-kiln in village Baikunthpur, district Deoria, during the year 1963-64, without obtaining any licence from the district Board. The licence fee fixed by the Board during the relevant period was Rs. 100/- per year. This omission on the part of the respondent was noticed and a prosecution was launched against him for the contravention of the bye-law. The Additional S. D. M., Deoria, who tried the case held that there had been a contravention. It was not disputed before the Magistrate that the respondent had not taken out any licence for the year 1963-64 during which he had worked the brick-kiln. The contention before him was that the District Board had no jurisdiction to realise the fees because the same amounted to imposition of tax as it bore no reasonable relation to the expenditure incurred by the Board in regulating the trade or providing special amenities for the trade. The contention of the accused (respondent) was not accepted by the Magistrate and he was convicted for the breach of the bye-law framed under Section 174 (2) (k) of the Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. On an appeal being filed against the order of the Magistrate the learned Additional Sessions Judge arrived at the conclusion that the fee levied by the Board by means of the bye-law framed under the provisions of Section 174 (2) (k) of the Act was in the nature of a tax and the District Board had no power to impose tax. 3. The only point that arises for consideration in this appeal against acquittal is whether the prescribing of Rs. 100/- per annum as fees for a brick-kiln under a bye-law framed by the Board under Section 174 (2) (k) of the Act amounted to the imposition of a tax and was, therefore, ultra vices of the powers of the District Board. 4. 100/- per annum as fees for a brick-kiln under a bye-law framed by the Board under Section 174 (2) (k) of the Act amounted to the imposition of a tax and was, therefore, ultra vices of the powers of the District Board. 4. Section 174 (2) (k) of the Act reads as follows :- "174. Power of Board to make bye-laws. (1) ....... (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-sec. (1) a Board may in the exercise of the said power make any buy-laws described in the list below ............ (k) regulating slaughter house and offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, callings or practices and prescribing fee to defray the expenses incurred by the Board for this purpose." 5. In exercise of the powers conferred upon the Board under Section 174 (2) (k) of the Act the bye-law framed by the District Board was published in the U. P. Gazette dated - December 14, 1960, bearing No. 11101XXI-7 (49-52) dated December 14, 1950, Local Self Government Department. The fee prescribed for obtaining a licence for working a brick-kiln was under that notification Rs. 500/- per year, and a breach of the bye-law was to be punished with a fine of Rs. 100/- and also with a recurring fine of Rs. 5/- per day. 6. In the case of Shyam Lal v. Municipal Board, Firozabad, AIR 1956 Allahabad 185 a bye-law framed by the Municipality of Firozabad levying licence fee of Rs. 500/- per year on every brick-kiln was considered for its validity because prosecution had been started for its breach. 'It was held in that case by a learned single Judge of this Court that a fee can be justified if it was for some special services rendered or for some special work done for the benefit of those from whom the payments are demanded, that it could be levied in consideration of some services and that the amount realised had to be ear-marked to meet the expenses of rendering those services and must not go to the general revenue of the Municipal Board for that particular year. Applying these tests and considering the facts of the particular case it was held that the fee levied in that case amounted to the imposition of a tax. Applying these tests and considering the facts of the particular case it was held that the fee levied in that case amounted to the imposition of a tax. The writ petition was, therefore, allowed and a mandamus was issued to the Municipal Board, Firozabad, not to enforce the aforesaid bye-law. The criminal proceedings pending were also quashed. 7. It appears that after that ruling of this Court the fees prescribed for brick-kilns were revised by the District Boards also, and by Notification No. 4927/XXI-41 (5556) dated September 6, 1956, of the Local Self Government Department the fee for brick-kilns originally fixed at Rs. 500/- per year in the 1950 notification was reduced to Rs. 100/- per year only. 8. It is the levy of this fees which was challenged as amounting to imposition of a tax and the argument was accepted by the learned Temporary Civil and Sessions Judge. 9. In order to prove that the fees levied under the bye-law was not exorbitant two witnesses, namely, Kapildeo Singh, Accountant (P. W. 3) and Mohammad Akhtar Lari, clerk (P. W. 4) were examined. Kapildeo Singh (P. W. 3) stated that Mohammad Akhtar Lan (P. W. 4) getting salary of Rs. 145/- per mensem had been appointed to do the work of brick-kiln licences and was doing no other work. He further stated that a peon getting a salary of Rs. 71/- per mensem had also been appointed for that very purpose. The amount of annual salary of these two employees of the Board must have amounted to Rs. 2,592/, Kapildeo Singh further stated that two Inspectors each getting a salary of Rs. 141/- per mensem and one Mukhtar-e-am getting a salary of 87/- per mensem had also been appointed for licensing and checking work. He further stated that the District Board spent Rs. 1,000/-per year over litigation relating to licences. Mohammad Akhtar Lari (P. W. 4) deposed that the entire fee realised from those who worked brick-kilns during the year 1963-64 was Rs. 5,509/- only. The witness, however, stated that the licencee fee realised during the year 1962-63 amounted to Rs. 12,723/- only. Sri Ram Govind Singh (P. W. 1) Licensing Inspector, deposed that no special benefit was being conferred by the Board and no particular amenity provided by it to the persons working brick-kilns in the district. 10. 5,509/- only. The witness, however, stated that the licencee fee realised during the year 1962-63 amounted to Rs. 12,723/- only. Sri Ram Govind Singh (P. W. 1) Licensing Inspector, deposed that no special benefit was being conferred by the Board and no particular amenity provided by it to the persons working brick-kilns in the district. 10. It is, therefore, clear that the only expenditure which the District Board was incurring over the levying of licence fees was the appointment of certain staff to regulate the trade. It had also to spend a sum of Rs. 1,000/- per year over litigation concerning licences- The salary of the two employees exclusively employed for the brick-kilns amounted to Rs. 2,592/- per year, while the salaries of other employees who did other work also besides doing the work in respect of brick-kilns was over Rs. 4,000/- per year. 11. Thus a sum of Rs. 3,592/- per year (salary of two employees plus Rs. 1,000/-on litigation) was being defrayed by the Board exclusively over the regulation of brick-kilns and a good proportion of the total salaries of two Inspectors and one Mukhtar-e-am amounting to over Rs. 4,000/- per year was also being spent for regulating this trade. The two Inspectors appointed by the Board were not exclusively for the purpose of looking after the brick-kilns. They did some other work of the District Board also. It is difficult to work out the proportion of their salary which must be regarded to be in respect of the work for brick-kilns. However, roughly it may be regarded to be one-third of the total amount. 12. Thus it will be clear that more than Rs. 5,000/- per year was being spent by the Board for the regulation of this trade. 13. It was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that the money paid by the Board to its employees whose duty was to collect the dues could not be taken into consideration. In our opinion there is no force in this contention. This question was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar v. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 SC 966. In our opinion there is no force in this contention. This question was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar v. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore, A.I.R. 1963 SC 966. The point for consideration in that case was whether a particular levy under the Madras Hindu Religious Endownments Act (Madras Act 19 of 1951) was in the nature of fee or it amounted to a tax. It was observed that- "A levy in the nature of a fee does not cease to be of that character merely be-cause there is an element of compulsion or coerciveness present in it, nor is it a postulate of a fee that it must have direct relation to the actual services rendered by the authority to each individual who obtains the benefit of the service. If with a view to provide a specific service, levy is imposed by law and expenses for maintaining the service are met out of the amounts collected there being a reasonable relation bet-ween the levy and the expenses incurred for rendering the service the levy would be in the nature of a fee and not in the nature of tax." 14. It was held in the case of Nagar Mahapalika, Varanasi v. Durga Das Bhattacharya, A.I.R. 1968 SC 1119 that there is no generic difference between a tax and a fee; both are compulsory exaction of money by public authorities, but whereas a tax is imposed for public purposes and is not supported by any consideration of service rendered in return, a fee is levied essentially for services rendered, and as such there is an element of quid pro-quo between the person who pays the fee and the public authority which imposes it. 15. In that case the Board claimed that they had spent a sum of Rs. 1,43,000/- and odd for providing facilities and amenities to owners and drivers of rickshaws who were required to pay the fees. The sum of Rs. 1,43,000/- and odd was made up of the following items :- Rs. 68,000/- spent over paving of bye-lanes Rs. 20,000/- spent for lighting streets and lanes Rs. 47,000/- spent in making provision for parking grounds, and Rs. 8,000/- spent on payment of salary to the staff maintained for issuing licences and inspecting rickshaws. 16. The sum of Rs. 1,43,000/- and odd was made up of the following items :- Rs. 68,000/- spent over paving of bye-lanes Rs. 20,000/- spent for lighting streets and lanes Rs. 47,000/- spent in making provision for parking grounds, and Rs. 8,000/- spent on payment of salary to the staff maintained for issuing licences and inspecting rickshaws. 16. The Supreme Court did not consider the expenditure on the first two items to be for the purpose of providing facilities and amenities to owners and drivers of rickshaws. However, the last two items were taken into consideration and inasmuch as the amount spent on them was about 44 per cent of the total income of the Municipal Board from licences the imposition of licence fee at the rate of Rs. 30/- per year on each rickshaw owner and Rs. 5/- on each rickshaw driver was held to be ultra vires and illegal. 17. In our opinion the expenditure incurred on regulating the trade by the appointment of a clerk, a peon, a Mukhtar-e-am and Inspectors and also expenditure on litigation can be considered to be legiti mate expenditure for the purposes of regulating the trade, and where the amount of fees, imposed does not by itself appear to be excessive and the total collections from such fees bear reasonable proportion to the expenditure incurred in regulating the trade or providing for special amenities for the benefit of the licencees the fee imposed cannot be regarded to be a tax. 18. In the present case both these conditions are satisfied. From the year 1950 upto the year 1956 the fees imposed on each brick-kiln for issuing licence amounted to Rs. 500/- per year. However, after the case of Shyam Lal v. Municipal Board, Firozabad the matter appears to have been reconsidered by all the Municipal Boards and District Boards and the fee on brick-kilns was reduced to Rs. 100/- per year. It comes to about Rs. 8/- per month and cannot per se be regarded to be excessive. 19. Evidence has also been led to show that the District Board has to employ one clerk and one peon solely for the purposes of regulating this trade and the total expenditure on their salary comes to about Rs. 2,592/- per year. The expenditure on litigation comes to Rs. 1,000/- per year. 19. Evidence has also been led to show that the District Board has to employ one clerk and one peon solely for the purposes of regulating this trade and the total expenditure on their salary comes to about Rs. 2,592/- per year. The expenditure on litigation comes to Rs. 1,000/- per year. Besides, the District Board has also to employ one Mukhtar-e-am on a salary of Rs. 1,044/- per year and two Inspectors each on a salary of Rs. 141/- per month. The total expenditure on the licensing department, therefore, comes to about Rs. 6,000/- per year. It has come in evidence that these Inspectors and Mukhtar-e-am do some other work also and have not solely been employed for the purposes of inspecting the brick-kilns. Even if we take into consideration only one third of the sum spent on these Inspectors and the Mukhtar-e-am as the proportionate expenditure for regulating this trade the total expenditure for regulating the trade will come Rs. 5,092/-. The total income during the year 1963-64 from the licence fees of brick. kilns was Rs. 5,509/- only. 20. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the amount of fees realised by the District Board from this trade during the year in question bears no reasonable proportion to the expenditure incurred on regulating this trade and, therefore, the bye-law must be struck down as imposing a tax and not providing for fees. 21. It is not possible to fix the fees payable by a licencee in such manner that the total amount realised from the fees might be exactly equal to the amount spent in regulating the trade and providing for special amenities. The income from the fees is liable to increase or decreese from year to year. It may be that in certain years the amount of fees realised might be less than the expenditure actually incurred in regulating the trade. Again, it might also happen that in certain years the amount realised as fees might be more than the actual expenses incurred for regulating the trade. However, merely the fact that the position keeps on varying in that manner can be no ground for striking down the bye-law for the reason that in any particular year the receipts had far exceeded the expenditure. 22. In the present case also it has come in evidence that in one year, that is to say. However, merely the fact that the position keeps on varying in that manner can be no ground for striking down the bye-law for the reason that in any particular year the receipts had far exceeded the expenditure. 22. In the present case also it has come in evidence that in one year, that is to say. 1962-63 the receipts from licence fees had far exceeded the amount actually spent in regulating the trade. That circumstance in our opinion can be no ground for striking down the bye-law, particularly when we find that in the year in question the receipts from licence fee bore a reasonable proportion to the expenditure incurred in regulating the trade. 23. The fact that the brick-kiln had been worked by the respondent during the year 1963-64 within the limits of the district of Deoria has not been disputed. It is also not disputed that the respondent had not taken out any licence for working the brick-kiln. The bye-law as published in Notification No. 1110/XX1-7 (49-52) dated December 14, 1950, Local Self Government, as modified by Notification No. 4927/XXI-41 (55-56) dated September 6, 1956, Local Self Government Department was a valid bye-law framed under clause (k) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 174 of the District Boards Act. There has been a breach of the bye-law and such breach was punishable with a fine of Rs. 100/-. 24. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The order of acquittal passed by the appellate court is set aside and the respondent, P. K. Chaturvedi, is held to have committed the breach of the bye-law framed by the District Board under Section 174 (2) (k) of the Act, and is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month, as was ordered by the Additional S. D. M., Deoria.