Judgment K.K.Dutta, J. 1. This petition in revision arises out of an order staying an execution case which was filed by the present petitioner for executing a decree, which he had obtained from the Bombay City Civil Court, as against the opposite party and which decree had been transferred for execution to the court of Munsif 3rd, Gaya. The opposite party has filed a title suit, namely, title suit No. 74 of 1967 in the court of Munsif 3rd, Gaya, challenging the validity of the decree on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud and for declaration that the decree as null and void. After institution of the suit he filed, an application in that very suit for staying the execution case. As alleged by the petitioner, without issuing of any notice of this application to, the petitioner defendant the court passed an order on 17-1-1968 as follows:- - "Stay execution proceeding as prayed. Inform." The petitioner subsequently entgred appearance in the title suit and thereafter filed a petition on 21-11-1968, for, recalling the aforesaid order which had been passed on 17-1-1968. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Court had no jurisdiction to stay the execution proceeding as such an order could only be passed by the Court which had passed the decree i. e. the Bombay City Civil Court. This contention was not accepted by the court below and it was held that the previous order passed on 17-1-1968 was not without jurisdiction and the petition filed by the petitioner for recalling that order was accordingly rejected as per order passed on 29-11-1968. The present petition is directed against this order. 2. It appears that the court below had come to the finding that it had jurisdiction to pass the order in question, on the ground that the court to which the decree had been transferred had powers under Order 21, Rule 29 of the Civil Procedure Code to pass an order staying the execution. 2. It appears that the court below had come to the finding that it had jurisdiction to pass the order in question, on the ground that the court to which the decree had been transferred had powers under Order 21, Rule 29 of the Civil Procedure Code to pass an order staying the execution. This rule provides as follows: "Where a suit is pending in any Court against the holder of a decree of such Court, on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided." The decree under execution in the present case was passed by the Bombay City Civil Court whereas the title suit in which the stay order was passed is pending in the court of Munsif 3rd, Gaya, that is, a court other than the court by which the decree was passed. Hence the question that arises for consideration is whether in view of the transfer of the decree to the court of the 3rd Munsif, Gaya, for execution, the transferee court can be deemed to be the court which has passed the decree, for the purpose of the application of the aforesaid Rule 29, as held by the court below. It appears that the point arose for consideration by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, in the case of Saradakripa Lala V/s. Comilla Union Bank, Ltd., AIR 1934 Cal 4. In this case the decree which had been passed by a Comilla Court was transferred for execution to a Chittagong Court and the prayer for stay of execution of the decree-was rejected by the Chittagong Court. In coming to its decision the High Court referred to the provisions of Sections 37 and 42 of the Civil Procedure Code. It was held that as the decree had been transferred by the original Court that Court had ceased to have jurisdiction and hence in view of the provisions of Sec.37 of the Civil Procedure Code as to the meaning of the expression. "Court which passed a decree", the expression would include the Court to which the decree had been transferred for execution. "Court which passed a decree", the expression would include the Court to which the decree had been transferred for execution. Sec. 42 of the Civil Procedure Code which lays down that the Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been, passed by itself was also relied upon for holding that the transferee court had the same power of staying the execution as the court which had passed the decree. It was accordingly held that the transferee court had the power under O. 21, R. 29 to pass an order staying the execution of decree which had been transferred from another court. No decision of the Patna High Court could be cited by learned counsel for either party on the point under consideration. It appears, however, that the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court has been dissented from by some other High Courts, namely, by the Rangoon High Court, in M.P.L. Chottyar V/s. Yanappa Chettyar, AIR 1936 Rang 184, the Mysore High Court in, Raghvender Rao V/s. Laxminarasayya, AIR 1962 Mys 89, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Khemchand Rajmal V/s. Rambabu Jabrimal, AIR 1958 Madh Pra 131 and Rajasthan High Court in Sohanlal V/s. Rajmal, AIR 1963 Raj 4 . As has been pointed out in these decisions, the interpretation of Sec.37 of the Civil Procedure Code as put by the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case to the effect that the court which passed the decree includes the court to which the decree has been transferred for execution does not appear to be correct. As has been pointed out in these decisions, the interpretation of Sec.37 of the Civil Procedure Code as put by the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case to the effect that the court which passed the decree includes the court to which the decree has been transferred for execution does not appear to be correct. The relevant portion of Sec.37 runs as follows : "The expression "Court which passed a decree" or words to that effect, shall, in relation to the execution of decrees, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, be deemed to include:- - (a) X X X (b) where the Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit." In expressing the view referred to above the Calcutta High Court proceeded on the assumption that after the transfer of the decree for execution, the transferor Court ceases to have any jurisdiction in the matter, but this is not the correct position and the consensus of judicial decisions is that even after such transfer, the transferor Court does not completely cease to have jurisdiction and that it retains jurisdiction in certain matters in connection with the execution of the decree. Even if it be held that the transferor Court to have any jurisdiction with respect to the execution of the decree after the transfer thereof to another Court for execution that would not bring the transferee Court within the purview of the expression "Court which passed the decree." As would appear from the relevant portion of Sec.37 of the Civil Procedure Code, already quoted above, where the Court of first instance which has passed the decree has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute it, the Court which, if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit, would also ba deemed to come within the expression "Court which passed the decree." It is hence manifest that even if the Bombay City Civil Court, which passed the decree which was transferred for execution to the Court below is deemed to have ceased to have any jurisdiction to execute the decree in view of the transfer order, if the suit wherein the decree was passed had to be refiled at the time when the application for execution of the decree was made, the aforesaid Bombay Court would have jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. That being the position, the transferee Court cannot in any sense come within the purview of the expression "the Court which passed the decree" and the view taken to that effect by the Calcutta High Court does not appear to be correct As regards Sec. 42 of the Civil Procedure Code, this section no doubt, provides that the court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself. The use of the expression "in executing such decree" is very significant and it is manifest therefrom that the powers vested in the transferee court under this section are meant for the purpose of executing the decree. The question, therefore, arises whether such power includes the power to stay the execution itself and if such a power of stay can be considered to be a power exercised in executing the decree. The question, therefore, arises whether such power includes the power to stay the execution itself and if such a power of stay can be considered to be a power exercised in executing the decree. In holding the view that the section enables the transferee court to enjoy all the powers that the transferor court itself had, the attention of the Calcutta High Court does not appear to have directed to the provisions of Sub-rule (1) of Order 21, Rule 26 which runs as follows: "The Court to which a decree has been sent for execution shall, upon sufficient cause being shown, stay the execution of such decree for a reasonable time, to enable the Judgment-debtor to apply to the Court by which the decree was passed, or to any Court having appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decree or the execution thereof, for an order to stay execution, or for any other order relating to the decree or execution which might have been made by such Court of first instance sr Appellate Court if execution had been issued thereby, or if application for execution had been made thereto." It is manifest from the provisions of this sub-rule that the transferee court has only a limited power of staying the execution of the decree transferred to it for execution and it can do so only for a reasonable time so that the judgment-debtor may move the court which passed the decree or any court having appellate jurisdiction in respect of decree for obtaining an order for stay of the execution. It follows that so far as the stay of the execution is concerned, the power of the transferee court is not co-equal to that of the court which passed the decree and on the contrary in view of the express provisions of Sub-rule (1) of Order 21, Rule 26, if the judgment-debtor wants the execution case to be stayed he has to move the original court which passed the decree for an order to that effect and the transferee court can grant him stay for a short period only in order to-enable him to make such application before the original court. On consideration of all the above aspects, I am quite unable to agree with the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case about the transferee court being entitled to exercise the powers of stay of execution embodied in Rule 29 of Order 21 and I further hold that the transferee court cannot be considered to be the court which passed the decree for the purpose of application of this rule. 3 It follows, therefore, that the view taken by the court below that it had the power to stay the execution is not correct and the order for stay of the execution case as passed by it cannot be upheld. 4. In the result, the present revision petition is allowed and the order of the court below staying the execution case is hereby set aside. As I find that the application filed by the present petitioner in the court below was not opposed in that court, it is directed that the parties will bear their own costs of this proceeding.