JUDGMENT : 1. This application in revision by the Office Secretary, Bhudan Yajna Samiti, Chapra, is directed against the ORDER :granting temporary injunction passed by the learned Subordinate Judge reversing the ORDER :of the Munsif vacating the ad-interim injunction which was issued against the petitioners and opposite party no. 5 in Title Suit No. 62 of 1966 filed on 26.7.66 by opposite party nos. 1 to 4 for a declaration that the ORDER :passed under Section 11(4) of the Bihar Bhoodan Yajna Act, 1954 (Bihar Act XXII of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the Act') is void and inoperative. 2. According to the plaintiffs (opposite party nos. 1 to 4), plot no. 981 measuring 16 kathas 3 dhurs was recorded as gairmazrua malik under khata no. 154 in village Bareja Farusahi within the district of Saran. In the said khata ex-landlord Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary had eight annas interest whereas the remaining eight annas interest belonged to other ex landlords and landladies, namely, Bishambhar, Birendra, Chand Kuer and Janki Kuer. The latter set of maliks, about 40 to 41 years back, settled their share, i.e., eight annas share of the said plot, with the plaintiffs by a sada - hukumnama and since that time the plaintiffs are in possession over 8 kathas 1½ dhurs of land in the said plot as tenants. The other co-sharer, namely, Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary started claiming the said land which was in possession of the plaintiffs, in March, 1965 and a proceeding under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated against the plaintiffs on one hand and Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary on the other. In the said proceeding Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary disclosed for the first time that he had donated 4 kathas of land out of the said plot to Shri Vinoba Bhave, and the former was in possession over the remaining land in the said plot. It appears that the plaintiffs case further was that on enquiry they learnt that a Dan Patra was presented by Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary to Shri Vinoba Bhave and in Case No. 1 of 1965/66 under Section 11 of the Act, the Revenue Officer confirmed the said Dan Patra on 27.6.65. Aggrieved by the said ORDER :the plaintiffs filed appeal under Section 17(1) of the Act which was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said ORDER :the plaintiffs filed appeal under Section 17(1) of the Act which was dismissed. The petitioner thereafter filed a petition on 5.4.66 under Section 22 of the Act for removal of encroachment made by the plaintiffs. On 31.5.66 the Revenue Officer passed ORDER :for removal of the encroachment and for ejectment of the plaintiffs, which led to the filing of the suit by the plaintiffs for the relief mentioned earlier. After the suit was filed the plaintiffs filed an application under ORDER :39 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code') for restraining the petitioner from taking possession of the land from the plaintiffs, as ORDER :ed by the Revenue Authority. An ORDER :of ad interim injunction was passed initially by the trial court. On notice the petitioner appeared and filed a rejoinder by way of show cause and prayed that ad interim injunction may be vacated. According to the petitioner, by a Collectorate partition in the year 1936 between Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary and the other co-sharers the entire plot fell to the share of Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary. Both parties filed documents. Learned Munsif after hearing both the parties held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case and to make out a case of irreparable injury. He further found that there was no balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs, and vacated the ORDER :of ad interim injunction passed against the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said ORDER :the plaintiffs-opposite party preferred an appeal. The appellate court after hearing the parties set aside the ORDER :of the learned Munsif and directed issue of temporary injunction. Hence, this revision application by the petitioner. 3. Mr. Prabha Shanker Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that the lower appellate court erred in setting aside the ORDER :of the learned Munsif and directing the issue of temporary injunction against the petitioner. According to him, the appellate court acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction beyond the scope prescribed under ORDER :39 Rule 1 of the Code. His contentions may be summarised as follows : (1) The learned Subordinate Judge erred in holding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case. According to him, the appellate court acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction beyond the scope prescribed under ORDER :39 Rule 1 of the Code. His contentions may be summarised as follows : (1) The learned Subordinate Judge erred in holding that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case. (ii) He erred in directing issue of ad interim injunction without deciding as to what irreparable injury will be caused to the plaintiffs if injunction was not granted. (iii) He erred in granting injunction although the balance of convenience was in favour of the petitioner. (iv) He failed to consider that the grant of injunction will stultify the provision contained under Section 22 of the Act. 4. I will take up for consideration the point raised under contention nos. (i) & (iv) first. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the sada hukumnama which is the basis of title of the plaintiffs is inadmissible in evidence. Besides, the co-sharers from whom the plaintiffs alleged to have taken the settlement had themselves no title as in Collectorate partition in 1936 between Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary and the other set of co-sharers, the entire land under the said plot fell to the share of Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary. The plaintiffs have not filed rent receipts nor they produced the zamindari returns submitted by the outgoing landlords under the Land Reforms Act in ORDER :to show that the plaintiffs were tenants of any portion of the suit land. He further submitted that according to the provisions contained under Section 17 (4) of the Act; the suit instituted by the plaintiffs is manifestly time barred as the Section provides that any party aggrieved by the ORDER :of the Revenue Authority confirming the Dan Patra must institute a suit within a period of six months. In the instant case, the said ORDER :of confirmation was passed on 27.5.65 whereas the plaintiffs instituted the suit on 26.7.66. In that view of the matter the plaintiffs have failed to establish their prima facie case in ORDER :to attract the provisions contained under ORDER :39 Rule 1 of the Code. He has drawn my attention to Paragraph 5 of the trial court ORDER :wherein the learned Munsif dealt elaborately with this aspect of the case and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to establish prima facie case. 5. On the other hand, Mr. He has drawn my attention to Paragraph 5 of the trial court ORDER :wherein the learned Munsif dealt elaborately with this aspect of the case and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to establish prima facie case. 5. On the other hand, Mr. Jagdish Pandey, appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-opposite party has drawn my attention to Paragraph 11 of the appellate court JUDGMENT : wherein according to him the appellate court dealing with the salient features came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing prima facie case of settlement. He further submitted that it was not necessary for the appellate court to give elaborate reasons as to why it was reversing the ORDER :of the trial court. In ORDER :to support his submission he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in (2) Ramachandra Ayyar and another V. Ramalingam Chettiar and another (A.I.R. 1963 Supreme Court 302) wherein their Lordships were considering the scope of Section 100 of the Code, and they observed that the High Court was not entitled to interfere merely because the JUDGMENT : of the lower appellate court was not as elaborate as that of the trial court or that some of the reasons given by the trial court were not expressly reversed. But, in my opinion, the contention of Mr. Pandey cannot be accepted as their Lordships had not laid down general proposition of law. In that very case their Lordships further observed that in hearing a second appeal if the High Court was satisfied that the decision was contrary to law or some usage having the force of law or that the decision had failed to determine some material issue of law or if there was substantial error or defect in the procedure provided by the court, which might have produced error or defect in the decision of the case upon the merits, it could interfere with the conclusion of the lower appellate court. In the instant case in Paragraph 11 while dealing with the important issue of prima facie case, the lower appellate court dealt with this matter in most unsatisfactory manner, which may be usefully quoted here : "11. Point no. In the instant case in Paragraph 11 while dealing with the important issue of prima facie case, the lower appellate court dealt with this matter in most unsatisfactory manner, which may be usefully quoted here : "11. Point no. 2 : The case of the plaintiffs-appellants is that the aforesaid land of 8 kathas 12 dhurs was settled with them 40 or 41 years ago by the delivery of possession and admittedly they are in possession of the same at least since 10.3.1965 even according to the defendants case. So their possession on the said land is a prima facie case of the settlement by delivery of possession. So this point no. 2 is decided in the affirmative." It is well established that in ORDER :to secure an ORDER :of injunction there is onus on the plaintiffs to establish prima facie case and the court has to be satisfied whether there is a serious question to be tried in the suit, and that on the facts before the court there is the probability of the plaintiffs being entitled to the relief asked for by them. Learned counsel for the petitioner further urged that the learned Judge failed to consider that the grant of injunction will stultify the provisions contained under Section 22 of the Act and the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy that there are substantial grounds for doubting the Existing of legal right in the defendants. Mr. Pandey, however, contended that the plaintiff' claim is bonafide and their suit raises a fair and substantial question to go to the trial. He urged that Even the sada hukumnama is admissible for collateral purpose and he referred to the Full Bench decision of the Court in (2) Mostt. Ugni and another V. Chowa Mahton and others ( 1968 PLJR 3 ) on which reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner also to show that the sada hukumnama is inadmissible in evidence. Mr. Pandey referred to Paragraph 16 of the JUDGMENT : at page 19 where their Lordships observed that the unregistered hukumnama, though inadmissible, could be locked into to show the nature and character of possession. Besides, he submitted that the plaintiff were the settled raiyats of the village and were in possession of the land since more than 12 years and had acquired occupancy right which can independently be proved by oral evidence. Besides, he submitted that the plaintiff were the settled raiyats of the village and were in possession of the land since more than 12 years and had acquired occupancy right which can independently be proved by oral evidence. As regards the allegation that the suit was time barred, he submitted that Section 17 (4) of the Act is not applicable in the instant case as the plaintiffs in their suit have challenged the very jurisdiction of the Revenue authority to confirm the alleged Dan Patra, and in ORDER :to support his contention he relied on a Full Bench decision of this Court in (3) Patna Municipal Corporation V. Ram Bachan Lal (A.I.R. 1961 Patna 142) wherein their Lordships held that the civil court is a court of plenary jurisdiction, and is competent to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A local authority, an administrative authority or any tribunal of limited jurisdiction cannot assume jurisdiction to do anything or to pass any ORDER :by arriving at a wrong decision on facts. Such facts have been referred to as preliminary collateral facts or as jurisdictional facts. But, in my opinion these controversies between the parties cannot be decided at this stage under revisional jurisdiction of this Court in the absence of materials on record. This exclusively falls for determination by the trial court in the suit itself. Expression of any opinion by this Court on these matters may also cause prejudice to the parties. I am at present concerned only to find out whether a prima facie case has been made out by the plaintiffs for the grant of the injunction. In my JUDGMENT :, the plaintiffs have failed to establish prima facie title as held by the trial court. The learned Subordinate Judge has not given reasons to show that the trial court was wrong in so deciding. The appellate court has not even taken into consideration the Collectorate partition of 1936 according to which the entire land fell into the share of Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary who executed the Dan Patra in favour of the petitioner. The first principle governing applications for temporary injunction is that the applicant must show that he has a prima facie case. The appellate court has not even taken into consideration the Collectorate partition of 1936 according to which the entire land fell into the share of Ram Rajeshwar Prasad Tiwary who executed the Dan Patra in favour of the petitioner. The first principle governing applications for temporary injunction is that the applicant must show that he has a prima facie case. Where the court passing an ORDER :granting temporary injunction loses sight of this principle and grants injunction merely because the plaintiff has filed a suit and has asked the court to preserve the status quo, its ORDER :is vitiated by material irregularity. Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioner is justified in contending that the ORDER :of the learned Subordinate Judge is vitiated by material irregularity. Further, in Paragraph 14 of its JUDGMENT : the appellate court mentioned that the description in the show cause petition showed that 4 kathas of land claimed by the defendant situated within the eastern half of plot no. 981, and therefore, it did not form part of the western 8 kathas 1½ dhurs of land claimed by the plaintiffs. So, it held that there appeared to be no conflict between the parties. I fail to understand that if there was no conflict between the parties why the learned Subordinate Judge directed issue of temporary injunction against the defendant. So, this part of the JUDGMENT : is also cryptic and equally vague. 6. Now I turn to consider the second contention of learned counsel for the petitioner who urged that the plaintiffs have also failed to establish as to what irreparable loss would be caused to them if the injunction was not granted. It is admitted case of the parties that on the disputed land the plaintiffs have only palani (cattle-shed), nad, khunta and manure pits and the plaintiffs have their residential house at some distance. The trial court in Paragraph 5 of its ORDER :held that the residential house of the plaintiffs is near the suit land intervened by a road and it observed that the palani might have been temporarily constructed after the confirmation of the Dan Patra as advocated by the counsel of Bhudan Samiti. The trial court in Paragraph 5 of its ORDER :held that the residential house of the plaintiffs is near the suit land intervened by a road and it observed that the palani might have been temporarily constructed after the confirmation of the Dan Patra as advocated by the counsel of Bhudan Samiti. It is clear that even if the petitioner takes delivery of land as ORDER :ed by the Revenue Authority under the Act, the plaintiffs on succeeding in the suit, can get back the land with mesne profits and damages in terms of money for any loss caused to them. Therefore, it cannot be said that any irreparable loss will be caused to the plaintiffs if no injunction is granted to them. ORDER :39 Rule 1 of the Code clearly provides that the applicant has further to satisfy by showing that irreparable injury shall accrue to him if the injunction is not granted. Had there been the residential house of the plaintiffs on the disputed land, then of course the removal would have caused irreparable injury to them as held in (4) Subodh Gopal Bose V. Province of Bihar and others (A.I.R. 1953 Patna 222). But in the instant case I am of the view that any loss which may be caused to the plaintiffs can easily be compensated in terms of money, Mr. Pandey, however, insisted that the loss will be irreparable one and the plaintiffs have no other alternative place to keep the cattle even for the time being as their residential house is not adequate to accommodate the cattle, and etc. According to him, cattle-shed and manure pits cannot be compensated in terms of money. In ORDER :to support his contention he relied on a decision of this Court in (5) Brajendra V. Kashibai (I.L.R. 24 Patna 656). In my opinion, the JUDGMENT : in that case does not lend support to his contention, because their Lordships have observed that temporary injunction can only be granted where award of compensation and damages will not be a full and complete remedy to a person applying for the same. In my opinion, the JUDGMENT : in that case does not lend support to his contention, because their Lordships have observed that temporary injunction can only be granted where award of compensation and damages will not be a full and complete remedy to a person applying for the same. They further held at page 662 : "Irreparable injury does not mean injury that is not physically capable of being remedied but it is such an injury which could not be adequately remedied by damages......" In that case the property in dispute was a coal mine, where their Lordships at page 663 observed that in the event of the plaintiff's establishing their legal right they may be sufficiently compensated for being kept out of possession of the mines in recovering the price of coal with interest from the defendant in the shape of damages. They further held that in that case the plaintiffs could not show as to how award of damages will not be full and complete remedy of the plaintiffs grievance. Therefore, in my opinion, that decision rather helps the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. In (6) Hemraj Kapoor V. Seventeen Textile Traders (India) and others (A.I.R. 1961 Patna 318) Ramaswami, C.J. and Kanhaiya Singh, J. (as they then were) after surveying various authoritative decisions of this Court, at page 319 in Paragraph 6 of their JUDGMENT : observed that the court must also consider the question of irreparable or serious injury which will be caused to the plaintiffs if injunction is not granted. It will be useful to quote a portion of the JUDGMENT : which reads :- “But the circumstances that the plaintiff has a prima facie case does not necessarily mean that an ORDER :of injunction must follow. The Court must also consider on which side lies the balance of convenience. In the case of (5) Brajendra Nath V. Kashibai, A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 177, their Lordships have laid down that in ORDER :to obtain an interlocutory injunction it is not enough for the plaintiff to show that he has a prima facie case. The Court must also consider on which side lies the balance of convenience. In the case of (5) Brajendra Nath V. Kashibai, A.I.R. 1947 Pat. 177, their Lordships have laid down that in ORDER :to obtain an interlocutory injunction it is not enough for the plaintiff to show that he has a prima facie case. He must further show that (1) he will suffer an irreparable injury if the relief of temporary injunction is not granted; (2) in the event of his success he will not have the proper remedy in being awarded adequate damages; (3) the balance of convenience is in his favour, or, in other words, his inconvenience will in all events exceed that of the defendant in case he is restrained; and (4) lastly, he must show a clear necessity for affording immediate protection to his alleged right or interest which would otherwise be seriously injured or impaired. Their Lordships have further laid down that temporary injunction can only be granted where award of compensation and damages will not be a full and complete remedy to the person applying for the same." 7. In my opinion, in the instant case it was equally necessary for the plaintiffs to establish that they would suffer irreparable loss if ad interim injunction was not made absolute. The appellate court has dealt with this matter in Paragraph 10 of its JUDGMENT : where it simply mentioned that the plaintiffs have no alternative suitable place and, therefore, they would suffer irreparable loss. In my opinion, that is not enough for granting injunction. It ought to have examined whether the loss, if any, could be compensated in terms of money. For this reason also, the JUDGMENT : of the appellate court is vitiated. 8. Now I advert to the third and the last contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. He submitted that the appellate court also failed to consider the balance of convenience which was in favour of the petitioner. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite party submitted that if the injunction is not granted the plaintiffs will be put to great inconvenience. They will have to remove the palani, nad, manure pits etc. whereas no inconvenience shall be caused to the defendant-petitioner. On the other hand, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-opposite party submitted that if the injunction is not granted the plaintiffs will be put to great inconvenience. They will have to remove the palani, nad, manure pits etc. whereas no inconvenience shall be caused to the defendant-petitioner. He further supported the finding of the appellate court on this issue, where in Paragraph 9 of its JUDGMENT :, it has held that the plaintiffs have got their palani, nad, khunta and other implements of agriculture on 8 kathas 1½ dhurs of land since 19-3-65, while the defendants have not taken possession of even 4 kathas of land on the basis of the Dan Patra dated 8-10-1952, even after the aforesaid act came into operation from 21-7-1954. Therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the balance of convenience was in favour of the plaintiffs. In my opinion, the theory of comparative inconvenience and mischief works differently in different cases according to the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The plaintiffs have to show that their inconvenience in the event of withholding the relief of temporary injunction will in all events exceed that of the defendant and they have further to show that their such inconvenience will outweigh what they have to suffer, if the injunction is granted. In the instant case, I have been told that the defendants have filed written statement and the issues have already been framed. In the event of plaintiff's success they will get damages or mesne profits and there will be no difficulty in ascertaining the amount of mesne profit and damage nor there will be any difficulty in recovering the damage ascertained from the defendant-petitioner. If the petitioner is kept out of possession by granting injunction by an ORDER :of the court, he will not get any mesne profit or damage even if he succeeds in the suit, whereas the plaintiffs shall get such damages as mentioned above. In that view of the matter also, in my view, the balance of convenience is in favour of withholding relief of temporary injunction, i.e., it is in favour of the petitioner. 9. Therefore, after examining from different aspects, I am convinced that the JUDGMENT : of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Mr. Belwariar appearing on behalf of opposite party no. 5 has adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. 9. Therefore, after examining from different aspects, I am convinced that the JUDGMENT : of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Mr. Belwariar appearing on behalf of opposite party no. 5 has adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Prabha Shanker Mishra appearing for the petitioner, and has net raised any other point for consideration. 10. In the result, the application is allowed, the JUDGMENT : of the appellate court is set aside, and the ORDER :of the Munsif is restored; but in the circumstances of the case there will be no ORDER :as to costs of this Court. I further direct that the suit should be expeditiously disposed of by the trial court. Application allowed