ORDER : S.M.N. Raina, J. 1. This is a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner holds certain lands in village Chak Mahu in Tahsil Sironj and in villages Perwasa and Mahmuda of Tehsil Basoda in Vidisha District. On receipt of a notice under section 10 of the M. P. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act I960, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') the petitioner filed an application for permission to sell certain lands before the Collector, Vidisha. The permission was refused vide order dated 29-9-1966. The petitioner aggrieved by the said order filed an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal, which was also dismissed. The petitioner, thereupon, filed a revision petition before the Board of Revenue (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board') which was rejected on the ground that no revision lies vide Annexure 'A' to the petition. 3. The petitioner filed a return in pursuance of the notice of the Collector who was competent authority in this case. According to this return the petitioner held 154 Bighas, 10 Biswas of land in Chak Mahu, 77 Bighas, 7 Biswas in village Perwasa and no land in village Mahmuda. The competent authority, however, held that the petitioner holds 297 Bighas, 19 Biswas of land, that is 117.77 acres, and making an allowance for the petitioner and his dependents, 65.66 acres were declared surplus. Being aggrieved by this order the petitioner filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Bhopal Division, which was dismissed by the learned Additional Commissioner. The petitioner then went up in revision against the appellate order but his revision petition was rejected by the Board on the ground that it was not maintainable as no revision lies against an appellate order under the Act (vide Annexure 'A'). Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has filed this petition praying that the impugned order of the Board may be set aside and an appropriate writ be issued to the Board to hear the revision petitions on merits. 4. No returns have been filed on behalf of the non-petitioners No. 1 and 2 i.e. the Board and the Additional Commissioner, Bhopal. The non-petitioners Nos. 3 and 4, namely, the Collector Vidisha, and the State of M. P. have filed a return in which it has been contended that the revision petitions were rightly dismissed as no revision lies against the said orders. The non-petitioners Nos. 3 and 4, namely, the Collector Vidisha, and the State of M. P. have filed a return in which it has been contended that the revision petitions were rightly dismissed as no revision lies against the said orders. It was also urged that the petitioner ought to have filed two separate petitions as the impugned order (Annexure 'A') deals with two separate revisions against two distinct orders. 5. We are unable to accept the contention of the non-petitioners that the petitioner could not challenge the impugned order as a whole which disposed of two separate revision petitions particularly because both the petitions arise out of the proceedings under the Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act, 1960, against the petitioner and they were disposed of by a common order and the questions of law involved are almost identical. 6. As for the merits of the petition it is not necessary for us to go into the merits of the orders which the petitioner sought to challenge before the Board. The only point that arises for consideration in this case is whether the revision petitions filed by the petitioner before the Board were maintainable. The Board held that they were not maintainable in view of its decision in Satya Narayan v. State of M.P. 1908 RN 554 in which the earlier decision of the Board in Shiv Govind v. State of M. P. 1968 R N 400 was relied upon. In the aforesaid decision it has been laid down by the Board as under:- (i) An appeal or revision against an order of the Competent Authority under the Act lies to the Collector or the Commissioner as the persona designate and not the Court concerned; (ii) The intention of the Legislature to exclude the operation of section 50 of the M. P, Land Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'; from a case under the Ceiling Act, and from the language of sections 41 and 42 of the Act it is clear that the Legislature did not intend to provide revision against an order passed in appeal or revision in order to shorten the litigation. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the aforesaid decision of the Board on a number of grounds and he also cited certain decisions of this Court in support of his contention. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the aforesaid decision of the Board on a number of grounds and he also cited certain decisions of this Court in support of his contention. Before proceeding to consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel as well as the decisions cited by him, it is necessary to take note of the scheme of the Act as well as certain provisions of the Code. 8. Under section 11 of the Act the Competent Authority has been empowered to publish a final statement specifying therein the entire land held by the holder, the land to be retained by him and the land declared to be surplus after following the procedure laid down in the said section. The Competent Authority as defined in clause (e) of section 2 of the Act means:- (i) in respect of a holder where entire land is situate within a Sub-Division, the Sub-Divisional Officer; (ii) in respect of a holder whose entire land is situate in more than one Sub-Division of the same District, the Collector, and (iii) ID respect of a holder whose land is situate in more than one district, such authority as may be appointed by the State Government; Section 41 of the Act provides for appeal against every order of a revenue officer or competent authority in the following terms-: Except where the provisions of this Act provide otherwise, against every order of a Revenue Officer or Competent Authority under this Act or the rules made there under, an appeal shall lie- (i) if such order is passed by a Revenue Officer either as competent authority Or otherwise to the authority competent to hear appeals under sub-section (1) of section 44 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 (No. 20 of 1959) from an order passed by a Revenue Officer of the same rank under the said Code. (ii) if such order is passed by the competent authority where such authority is an officer other than a Revenue Officer appointed under sub-clause (Hi)'of clause (c) of section 2, to the Board of Revenue as if such officer were an Additional Settlement Com'-missioner appointed under section 65 of the said Code. Section 42 of the Act which provides for revision against the orders of the competent authority reads as follows :- 9. Section 42 of the Act which provides for revision against the orders of the competent authority reads as follows :- 9. Revision-The Board of Revenue or the Commissioner may on its/his motion or on the applicant; on by any party at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself/himself of the proceedings of any competent authority subordinate to it/him call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such competent authority, and may pass such orders in reference thereto as it/he thinks fit: 10. Provided that it/he shall not vary or reverse any order unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them for being heard: 11. Provided further that no application for revision shall be entertained against an order against which an appeal is provided under this Act. 12. If at this stage we examine the relevant provisions of the Code we would find that under section 44 a provision has been made for appeals from every original order under the Code or the rules made thereunder. There is no provision for an appeal against an order of a revenue officer under any other enactment. But under section 50 of the Code a revision is maintainable against an order of a Revenue Officer not only under the Code but also under any other enactment because section 56 clearly lays down that the expression "order" in Chapter V in which section 50 occurs shall include an order passed by a Revenue Officer under any other enactment for the time being in force4 It is thus clear that an order of a revenue officer under the Act would be subject to revision under section 50 of the Code unless this power is expressly taken away by the statute. 13. The only provisions in the Act which may be referred to in this connection is section 42. This section, however, only provides for revisions against the orders of the competent authority. It does not at all deal with the orders passed by a revenue officer who does not function as a 'Competent Authority' under the Act. 13. The only provisions in the Act which may be referred to in this connection is section 42. This section, however, only provides for revisions against the orders of the competent authority. It does not at all deal with the orders passed by a revenue officer who does not function as a 'Competent Authority' under the Act. In the absence of any express provision in the Act barring revisions against the orders of the Revenue Officers under the Act it is obvious that they would be maintainable under section 50 of the Code and the learned Additional Government Advocate, who appeared for the State, frankly conceded this position except in regard to the orders passed by a Revenue Officer as an appellate authority under section 41 of the Act. In respect of such orders he (sic) the view of the Board that they functioned as persona designate, and, therefore, their order could not be considered as the order of a Revenue Officer within the meaning of section 50 of the Code. 14. In Ram Milan v. Banshila 1978 MPLJ 466 : AIR 1958 M.P. 1958, 481 (F B), this Court had to consider the question whether under section 13 (3) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act the Deputy Commissioner functioned as a Revenue Officer or as a persona designata. It was pointed out in that case that: 15. A persona designata is a person pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character. 16. Applying this test it was held that the Deputy Commissioner functioned as a revenue officer and not as a persona designata. 17. In the Central Talkies Ltd. Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad (1964) 3 SCR 495 , the question for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was whether the District Magistrate mentioned in section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was a persona designata or not. Their Lordships held that a persona designata is a person selected as an individual in his private capacity, and not in his capacity as filling a particular character of office, and, therefore, the District Magistrate mentioned in section 3 was not a persona designata. 18. Their Lordships held that a persona designata is a person selected as an individual in his private capacity, and not in his capacity as filling a particular character of office, and, therefore, the District Magistrate mentioned in section 3 was not a persona designata. 18. If we apply the aforesaid test it would be clear that the revenue officers exercising appellate powers under section 41 of the Act are not persona designata inasmuch as it is clear from the language of section 41 that they function in their official capacity as revenue officers and not as an individual in private capacity, their official capacity being determined by section 44 of the Code. It would be also pertinent to mention in this connection that clause (ii) of section 41 provides that where the competent authority is an officer other than the revenue officer the appeal shall lie to the Board. The Board consists of a. President and a number of members and it would be preposterous to suggest that a Member who may exercise appellate powers under the aforesaid provisions on behalf of the Board would be functioning as persona designata and not as a Member of the Board. We therefore, hold that the view taken by the Board that revenue officers exercising appellate powers under section 41 of the Act function as persona designata is not correct. It, therefore, follows that the orders passed by them would be open to revision under section 50 of the Code. 19. It is necessary in this connection to deal here with the scope and implications of the provisions of section 42 of the Act from which certain inferences have been drawn by the Board for arriving at the decisions assailed before us. It appears to us that since the order of the competent authority is not open to revision under section 50 of the Code because it is an authority specially constituted for the purposes of the Act, the Legislature considered it necessary to provide for revision against its orders in cases where no appeal lies under the Act. It appears to us that since the order of the competent authority is not open to revision under section 50 of the Code because it is an authority specially constituted for the purposes of the Act, the Legislature considered it necessary to provide for revision against its orders in cases where no appeal lies under the Act. It is no doubt true that under section 41 of the Act an appeal lies against every order of the competent authority under the Act, but it appears that the expression "every order" was not intended to cover all orders passed during the course of the proceedings and that is why it was considered necessary to make a provision for revision against such orders under section 42 of the Act. It has been brought to our notice that in Rajesh Kumar v. The State of M. P. 1967 R N 566, the Board has held that the word 'order' in section 41 connotes a final determination of an issue or issues. The aforesaid decision was approved by the Board in Shiv Govind v. State of M. P. (supra). It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to make any pronouncement regarding the correctness of the view of the Board in this connection, but it is obvious that the Legislature did contemplate that some orders of the competent authority would fall outside the purview of section 41 of the Act, and, therefore) a provision for revision in respect of Such orders was made in section 42. 20. It is, however, clear that section 42 is meant to provide only for revisions against the orders of the competent authority against which the remedy of appeal was not available because recourse could not be had to the provisions of section 50 of the Code. We are unable to agree with the view expressed by the Board in paragraph 5 of the judgment in Shiv Govind v. State of M, P. (supra) that by making a specific provision for revision against the order of the competent authority the Legislature intended to restrict the scope of revision only to the said cases and did not want to provide for revision against the orders of the other revenue officers. Such an inference in our view is wholly unwarranted. Such an inference in our view is wholly unwarranted. In our view, the object of section 42 was to enlarge the rights of the litigants in the matter of revision by providing for revision against the orders of the competent authority which was not revisable under section 50 of the Code and not to restrict the rights already available to them under the Code. As pointed out above section 50 of the Code confers a general revisional power in respect of the orders of the revenue officers under any enactment and in the absence of any express provision in the Act taking away the right of a party to prefer a revision under the said section the said right must be deemed to remain unaffected. 21. We may here refer to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Anandrao v. The Board of Revenue 1965 MPLJ 238 (FB) : 1965 J L J 307 (FB). In that case it was held that even though section 28 of the M. B. Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951, laid down that the decision of the Collector shall be final, it only meant that there would be no further appeal and in the absence of any express bar to revision under any other provisions it did not exclude a general power of revision. The following observations in paragraph 14 in that case are pertinent :- 22. Having regard to these decisions it is fairly settled that in the absence of contrary intention specifically expressed or clearly implied when a matter is referred to an established Court it imports that the ordinary incidents of procedure of the Court are to attach to the determination by that Court and also any general right of appeal likewise attaches. This would be so where a legal right is involved in the dispute. 23. We way point out that the view taken in that case is applicable with much greater force to the present case particularly because section 41 of the Act does not lay down that the decision of the appellate authority shall be final. 24. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out an anomaly which arises if the view taken by the Board is accepted. 24. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out an anomaly which arises if the view taken by the Board is accepted. In view of the definition of 'competent authority1 as given in section 2 of the Act a Sub-Divisional Officer functions as competent authority in respect of a holder whose entire land is situate within his sub-division irrespective of its extent while the Collector functions as a competent authority in respect of a holder whose entire land is situate in more than one sub-division. It is, therefore, clear that whereas in a case of a holder holding extensive land within the same sub-division the Sub-Divisional Officer would function as the competent authority and the Collector as the appellate authority, whereas in the case of a holder holding the barest minimum land according to the Act in more than one sub-division in the same District, the Collector would be competent authority and the Commissioner the appellate authority. If it is held that no revision petition is maintainable against an order of the appellate authority a person holding extensive land within the same sub-division would be denied access to the Commissioner for the redress of his grievance although a holder having much less but in two sub-divisions would be entitled to approach the Commissioner as an appellate authority. This anomaly according to the learned counsel can be obviated if it is held that a revision petition is maintainable even in respect of the order of the appellate authority. We must say that such considerations are of limited value in construing the statute, but if two constructions are equally possible, the one which avoids the anomaly is preferable. However, as pointed out above there are other good reasons to hold that a revision petition against an order of a revenue officer as an appellate authority under section 41 of the Act is maintainable under section 50 of the Code. 25. We, therefore, hold that the Board was in error in holding that the revision petitions against the appellate orders of the revenue officers are not maintainable under section 50 of the Code. The impugned order is, therefore, erroneous and as the Board has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law resulting in miscarriage of justice the order must be set aside. 26. The impugned order is, therefore, erroneous and as the Board has failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law resulting in miscarriage of justice the order must be set aside. 26. The petition is, therefore, allowed with costs and the impugned order is hereby set aside. The Board is hereby directed to rehear the revision petitions filed by the petitioner and dispose them of according to law. Counsel's fee Rs. 50 if certified. 27. Before we conclude we may mention that the learned counsel for the petitioner pressed us for a very early decision in this case because he said the Board was hurriedly dismissing all such revision petitions although it was brought to their notice that the general question of their maintainability was under consideration of this Court in various petitions. We would not like to make any comment on the action of the Board because the full facts are not before us and there may be good reasons for disposing of a particular petition expeditiously. We may, however, observe in this connection that judicial propriety demands that when a general question of law affecting a large number of litigants is pending for consideration before a superior Court, the decision of the superior Court should be awaited and the cases of litigants the decision of which turns on such question should not be disposed of in a hurry leaving them to have recourse to the superior Court because consequences of such an action may be disastrous particularly to the poor litigants.