Judgment :- 1. By Ex. R2 dated 6-2-1969, the 2nd respondent Regional Transport Authority (the RTA. for short) directed the issue of a temporary permit for a period of four months to the appellant, who was not an operator on the particular route, under S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act overruling the objections of five operators on the route. A permit was issued on 11-2-1969, and the appellant commenced operation the very next day. 2. A person who has opposed the grant of a permit has a right of appeal under clause (f) of S.64 of the Act, and, ordinarily, that would be an impediment to his coming direct to this Court with an application under Art.226 of the Constitution. The Ist respondent, an operator on the route, was under no such disability, for, he had not appeared before the R.T.A. or otherwise opposed the grant to the appellant, although his father was one of the five operators who had. He came to this Court with an application under Art.226 of the Constitution for quashing the grant. That has been allowed by the learned single judge who heard the case. Hence this appeal. 3. The grounds urged by the 1st respondent for quashing the grant (omitting those which have not been urged before us) were: (1) that the RTA. issued no manner of notice before granting the permit so "as to enable persons like the 1st respondent to make representations as they are entitled to do under sub-S. (1) of S.47 of the Act; (2) that there was breach of R.177 (2) of the Kerala Motor Vehicles' Rules made under the Act; (3) That the proceedings of the RTA. were vitiated by mala fides; and (4) that there was no temporary need within the meaning of clause (c) of S.62 of the Act under which the grant was made and no material whatsoever on which a finding of such a need could be based. The learned single judge has found in favour of the 1st respondent on all these points; but, it seems to us that he has primarily based his decision on the ground of mala fides, his findings on points (1) and (2) being used as circumstances in support thereof, not as by themselves vitiating the grant, and his conclusion on point (4) resting largely on his finding of mala fides. 4. 4. If mala fides are out of the way we do not think that there is any ground for interference in this case. The impugned order, Ex. R2, though brief, clearly shows that the RTA. did apply its mind to the requirements of S.62 of the Act, and it seems to us that it had ample material before it to reach the conclusion it did. On 2111969, the R. T. A. considered written representation received frown certain quarters, including local bodies and educational institutions of the area concerned, asking for an additional service on the route and it decided to take up the question whether there was a permanent need for such a service. It issued and published a notification purporting to be under S.47 of the Act that section, in fact, contemplates no such notification to the effect that there was a proposal to introduce an additional "pucca" service on the route and stating that any person wishing to make any representation in the matter should do so within 15 days. It also ordered the Motor Vehicles Inspector to make enquiries and report urgently as to the necessity of the proposed additional service. On 27 11969, the Motor Vehicles Inspector reported that there was permanent need for such a service meanwhile on 2411969 the 1st respondent had applied for a temporary permit on the route. This application came up for consideration before the R. T. A. at its meeting held on 6 21969, and, after hearing the representations made by the five objectors already referred to, it made the impugned order Ex. R2 in the following terms: "Heard the applicant & objectors. Temporary necessity felt till pucca service is introduced for which action has been taken. T. P. sanctioned". The action referred to as taken is respect of a pucca service was apparently the publication purported to be made under S.47; however, it is apparent from Ex. R2 that, before granting the temporary permit, the R. T. A. had come to the conclusion that there was a permanent need and that what it called a pucca service was therefore necessary. R2 that, before granting the temporary permit, the R. T. A. had come to the conclusion that there was a permanent need and that what it called a pucca service was therefore necessary. To reach that conclusion it had the representations it had already received we are leaving out of account a monster petition purporting to have been signed by over six hundred persons, the authenticity of which seems doubtful but which must have been received atleast by 211 1959, and not as the learned single judge seems to have suspected after the issue of the permit, since it is referred to in the communication sent to the Motor Vehicles Inspector on 2111969 and, what is more important, the report of the Motor Vehicles Inspector. It is now beyond doubt see M. P. S.R.T. Corporation v. R. T. Authority AIR. 1966 S. C.156 that the unsatisfied demand pending the issue of pucca permit to meet a permanent need is a temporary, need within the meaning of clause, (c) of S.62 of the Act. and, so long as the prohibition in the proviso to the section is not attracted, would justify the issue of a, temporary permit. As we have already observed unless mala fides are established the requirements of S.62 of the Act seem amply satisfied. 5. The chalan attached to the application made by the appellant on 2411969 for a temporary permit shows that the requisite fee for the application was paid much earlier, on 30-12-1968. Thus, the expedition with which the matter was dealt with, the failure to invite objection regarding the grant of a temporary permit and the issue of the permit in (as he found) breach of R.177, are the circumstances that led the learned single judge to the inference of mala fides "unholy haste and hush-hush" are the words he has used. He also seems to have thought that the R T.A. had not found that there was a permanent need before it found that there was temporary need until a pucca service was introduced. But, as we have shown, such a finding is implicit in the order, Ext. R3, it made. 6. It would also appear that the learned single judge drew an inference of connivance between the appellant and the road transport authorities. But, as we have shown, such a finding is implicit in the order, Ext. R3, it made. 6. It would also appear that the learned single judge drew an inference of connivance between the appellant and the road transport authorities. This he did in the view that the communication sent to the appellant regarding the grant of bis application constituted the permit for operating the service. This communication was on 18-12-1969, and the learned judge thought that the appellant's conduct in putting the vehicle on the route on the 12th February, before he had received the communication, was illegal. Actually, the permit is an entirely different document in a particular form as prescribed by R.177 of the rules. This, as we have already said, was issued to the appellant on 11-21969 so that there was nothing illegal in the appellant putting his vehicle on the route the following day and no question of the road transport authorities having shut their eyes of any illegal act of his. 7. We do not deny that the circumstances referred to by the learned judge do raise some measure of suspicion. And if you begin with the thesis that the entire proceedings from beginning to end, from the written representations received regarding the need for an additional service on the route and the notification purportedly made under S.47 of the Act right down to the order Ex. R2 granting the permit were the result of a conspiracy between the appellant and the RTA., all these circumstances would fall nicely into place. But if you make no initial assumption, bearing in mind that it is for the person asserting mala fides to prove it, we do not think that the circumstances are sufficient to establish any such thesis. At the worst, they serve only to excite suspicion. 8. We might mention that the fact that the appellant had paid, the fee necessary for an application for a temporary permit as early as 30-12-1968 does not necessarily mean that he had made up his mind to make this particular application even on that day, waiting for three weeks thereafter to engineer the proceedings that culminated in the grant of the permit to him. We are told that operators have often to make emergent applications and therefore always have in their possession paid chalans for the necessary fees. This seems a plausible explanation. 9. We are told that operators have often to make emergent applications and therefore always have in their possession paid chalans for the necessary fees. This seems a plausible explanation. 9. That the appellant made his application on 24-1-1969, soon after the RTA. notified the proposal for an additional service on the route, and even before it had decided that an additional service was necessary, is no ground for suspicion. For, that is what one would expect a person who has an eye on the route (and who not being already an operator thereon can have no reason to oppose an additional service) to do against the possibility of a permanent need being found. Once a permanent need is found, a temporary need pending the grant of pucca permit would necessarily follow, and operation on the route on a temporary permit would be a qualification for a pucca permit. 10. That at least five of the operators on the route came to know of the appellant's application in time to appear at the meeting of the RTA. at which the application was considered and oppose the grant would indicate that there was no hush-hush or secrecy regarding the proceedings. But, as we have already said, the learned single judge took the view that the obligation cast by S.47 on the RTA. to "take into consideration any representation made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies" in considering an application for a permit necessarily implied some sort of previous notice, at least a general notice by publication or otherwise, so that the persons entitled to make representation might have an opportunity of doing so. We do not think that this is obligatory in the case of an application for a temporary permit although we must emphasise that it is highly desirable to give some such notice, wherever possible. We are told that, in practice, all persons interested do get due notice of the consideration of an application for a temporary permit, either from the agenda of the meeting of the RTA. We are told that, in practice, all persons interested do get due notice of the consideration of an application for a temporary permit, either from the agenda of the meeting of the RTA. which is posted in advance on the notice board of its office or by other means. In this particular case it is clear that there must have been some sort of notice, at least information supplied in advance for five persons to appear and oppose the grant. 11. The word, "permit" as defined in S.2 (20) of the Act would include a temporary permit and it has not been contended before us that S.48 of the Act does not apply to the grant of a temporary permit, the context excluding a temporary permit, because S.62 mikes comprehensive provision for such permit'. However, despite the use of the word, "procedure" in its heading what S.47 actually sets out are the matters to which the RTA. must have regard in considering an application for a permit. The procedure to be followed in granting a permit is really prescribed by S.57, and S.47 and 57 have to be read together the latter forms part and parcel of the former. S.47 no doubt implies a procedure by which the persons interested can come to know of an application for a permit so that they can make representations regarding that as they are entitled to do. But the statute does not leave the procedure to be implied by S.47. It lays it down in express terms by S.57 which provides for at least thirty days' notice by publication. And when by S.62 the statute says in as many words that a temporary permit may be granted without following the procedure laid down in S.57, it as good as dispenses with notice. The reason is not far to seek. For, a temporary permit is ordinarily required to meet an emergency and if a procedure of giving at least thirty days' notice inviting representations were to be followed, the delay necessarily involved would often defeat the very purpose of such a permit. Nevertheless, if any representations are actually received, the RTA. is bound to consider them under S.47; and that, it is not denied, has been done in this case. 12. Nevertheless, if any representations are actually received, the RTA. is bound to consider them under S.47; and that, it is not denied, has been done in this case. 12. The view we are taking is in accord with that taken by a single judge of this Court in Simon v. RTA, Allepey 1959 KLJ. 659 and with great respect, we are unable to agree with the contrary view taken in Kotath Transport Ltd. v. R. T. Authority AIR. 1954 Rajasthan 33 and in Ambala Ex. S. T. Co operative Society v. Punjab State AIR. 1959 Punjab (FB.) and reiterated, in Prem Bus Service v. RTA. Patiala AIR. 1968 Punjab 344. 13. Sub-rule (2) of R.177 of the rules lays down that a permit shall be issued only after the expiry of thirty days of the date of despatch of the communication of the decision of the Transport Authority granting the permit unless the grant was not objected to under the provisions of the Act or the rules. Although a temporary permit is one of the several classes of permits specified in sub-rule (1) of this rule, we do not think that the restriction in sub-rule (2) applies to the issue of a temporary permit. If it. did, the delay of at least thirty days involved would often defeat the very purpose of the temporary permit. As we have seen, the procedure prescribed by S.57 of the Act which requires public notice, with thirty days' time given for making representations, and a public hearing thereafter, does not apply to temporary permits, and we should think that any representation which may be made in the case of the grant of a temporary permit is not an objection under the provisions of the Act or the rules within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of R.177. 14. In the result we allow this appeal and dismiss the 1st respondent's writ petition. There will be no order as to costs either here or before the single judge.