JUDGMENT : B.K. Patra, J. - This is an appeal against an appellate order of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Berhampur setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif, Berhampur in favour of the Plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the disputed properties. These properties admittedly belonged to Bharat Sahu who got them on partition between himself and his brother who is the father of the present Appellant. Bharat had two daughters Malati and Parbati but had no son. Both the daughters were married and Prahallad Sahu, the second Respondent is Parbati's husband. Respondents 3 and 4 are the daughters and Respondents 5 and 6 are the sons of Parbati. On 29-2-1932 Bharat executed a sale deed (Ex. 3) in respect of an his properties including his residential house (disputed properties) in favour of his daughter Parbati for the alleged consideration of Re. 300/. It was stated in the sale deed that out of this amount of Rs. 300/-, Rs. 107/- was required to discharge the dues of a mortgage bond which Bharat had executed in favour of one Chandra and that the balance of Rs. 193. had been taken previously by Bharat from Parbati for his household expenses. It is the admitted case of the parties that in spite of the execution of the sale deed, Bharat continued to live in his residential house with his daughter and son-in-law and their children and that he and his son-in-law (Respondent No. 2) were jointly cultivating the disputed lands. Parbati died in the year 1951 and on 1-11-1957 her husband Respondent No. 2 on behalf of himself and his two minor sons sold the disputed properties to the Plaintiff under registered sale deed (Ext. 1) for a consideration of Rs. 2000/-. Shortly afterwards there was dispute regarding the possession of the properties between the Appellant (Plaintiff) and Respondent No. 1 (Defendant No. 1) which ultimately terminated in favour of the latter. The Plaintiff-Appellant thereafter brought the suit for declaration of title to the properties and for recovery of possession of the same. Respondent No. 2 and his sons who were impleaded as Defendants supported the case of the Plaintiff'. The suit was contested by Respondent No. 1 whose main defence was that the sale deed (Ext. The Plaintiff-Appellant thereafter brought the suit for declaration of title to the properties and for recovery of possession of the same. Respondent No. 2 and his sons who were impleaded as Defendants supported the case of the Plaintiff'. The suit was contested by Respondent No. 1 whose main defence was that the sale deed (Ext. 3) which he had executed in favour of his daughter Parbati was Benami; that Bharat did so to save the properties from the clutches of his creditors; and that the sale deed was never Acted upon and despite the execution thereof he continued to remain in possession of the properties. Both parties let in evidence in support of their respective cases and on a consideration thereof, the learned Munsif held that the sale deed (Ext. 3) is not Benami and was in fact Acted upon, that after the execution of the sale deed, Parbati acquired valid title to the properties which on her death devolved on Respondent No. 2 and his sons, and that consequently the sale deed (Ext. 1) which the latter executed on 1-11-19157 in favour of the Plaintiff passed valid title to the latter. He, therefore, passed a decree in favour of the Plaintiff-Appellant. 2. The learned Subordinate Judge on a review of the evidence came to the opposite conclusion regarding the Benami character of the sale deed (Ext. 3). In doing so, he placed considerable reliance on the circumstance that despite the fact that the sale deed (Ext. 3) was of the year 1932, no steps had ever been taken either by Parbati or after her death by her husband to get the properties mutated in Parbati's name. It is significant that this was not done in spite of the fact that a fresh settlement took place in the year 1950 as evidenced by the Khatian (Ext. 5). He took due note of the fact that although the Plaintiff had filed the second sheet of the original sale deed of the year 1932 on the plea that the first sheet got burnt when his vendor's house caught fire, the first sheet of the sale deed was in fact filed in Court by Respondent No. 1 thereby disproving the story about the alleged burning of the house and the consequent destruction of the first page of the sale deed. The learned Subordinate Judge also placed considerable reliance on the recitals of a document marked exhibit C dated 20-11-1956. This document, the genuineness of which is not disputed, is described as an award and is drafted on a plain paper which is unregistered. It is admittedly signed by Bharat Sahu Respondent No. 1; Tarini Sahu (Appellant); Prahallad Sahu Respondent No. 2, on behalf of his minor SOD Gopal Sahu Respondent No. 5; and Madhab Choudhury the eldest son-in-law of Respondent No. 1 as the executants thereof. Certain other Bhadralogs have signed the document as witnesses. It is recited in this document that about 21 years previously Bharat had executed a sale deed nominally in favour of his daughter Parbati, but despite such execution Bharat alone was continuing to be the owner in possession of the properties covered by the sale deed. It then narrates that he bad decided to take on adoption the son of the Appellant. Then follows certain dispositions of a portion of his properties in favour of the minor Respondent No. 5 and certain other relations. The Plaintiff Appellant who was admittedly an executants of this document took the plea that by some mis-representation, Respondent No. 1 obtained his signature on a blank piece of paper. But in the plaint itself he took a different plea, namely, that he signed on Ext. C as it was represented to him that it was a draft adoption deed. Similarly, Defendant No. 2 in his written statement had taken the plea that his signature on the document was obtained by misrepresentation without explaining to him the contents thereof. The learned Subordinate Judge considered these pleas and rightly held that it is highly unlikely that Respondent No.), who was an old man more than 80 years old, could have managed to misrepresent and deceive the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 in the manner alleged. He, therefore, rightly held that Ext. C is a genuine document. There is no dispute that Ext. C being an unregistered document cannot affect any immovable property comprised therein. But this document is relied upon solely for the purpose of explaining the nature of the sale deed Ext. 3. This document contains the previous statement of Appellant and Respondent No. 2 regarding the nature of Ext. C and reliance can certainly be placed on such statements. The circumstances under which Ext. But this document is relied upon solely for the purpose of explaining the nature of the sale deed Ext. 3. This document contains the previous statement of Appellant and Respondent No. 2 regarding the nature of Ext. C and reliance can certainly be placed on such statements. The circumstances under which Ext. C came into existence can well be visualised. In 1956 Defendant No. 1 who had no male issue of his own decided to adopt the son of the Plaintiff. He was conscious of the fact that previously he had executed a nominal sale deed in respect of all his properties in favour of his daughter Parbati. Rightly apprehending that if that document was allowed to stand litigations might arise in future, he convened a panchayat and got a document executed which contained the recitals regarding the true mature of Exhibit 3. That is apparently the reasons why he wanted it to be signed by Parbati's husband on behalf of his minor son. As, before adoption actually took place, he wanted to settle some of his properties on his near relations, be got the document signed by the Plaintiff whose minor son he was going to take in adoption. Ext. C is a document which came into existence at a time when there was no dispute between the parties and as such it is a document of considerable importance to decide the true nature of Ext. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge rightly relied on this document in support of his conclusion that Ext. 3 is a Benami Kabala. 3. The main point for decision in this litigation is whether or not Ext. 3 is Benami. If it is Benami, it would naturally follow that Plaintiff-Appellant could not have acquired any title to the properties under the sale deed Ext. 1. If, on the other band, Ext. 3 is not Benami and was meant to be and was actually acted upon Plaintiff's title to the disputed properties would be unassailable. The learned Subordinate Judge on a consideration of some of the important aspects of this case gave a finding that the document is Benami, and this is a finding of fact which is binding on me in second appeal. Despite this position of law, I have at some length referred to the facts and circumstances of the case, because it was contended by Mr. Despite this position of law, I have at some length referred to the facts and circumstances of the case, because it was contended by Mr. R.C. Misra appearing for the Appellant that a finding of fact would be binding in second appeal only if there is evidence to support it and that in this case, the learned Subordinate Judge instead of independently discussing all the evidence on record merely recited the argument advanced before him on behalf of Respondent No. 1 and concluded by saying that he was in fun agreement with those contentions. The charge that the first appellate Judge has not appealed his mind to the materials on record does not appear to me to be justified, although it may be, that he has not adverted to every bit of evidence adduced in this case, but was content merely to refer to the important aspects thereof. But it is well settled that the High Court is not justified in interfering with a finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court merely because the judgment of the lower appellate Court is not as elaborate as that of the trial Judge, or because some of the reasons given by the trial Judge had not been expressly reversed by the lower appellate Court. If a finding of fact has been recorded by the lower appellate Court without any evidence that finding can be successfully challenged in second appeal. This, however, does not mean that wherever the High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate Courts could not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate Court, See R. Ramachandran Ayyar Vs. Ramalingam Chettiar. In this case, far from there being no evidence to support the finding given by the learned Subordinate Judge, I find that the ground on which the finding is based is proper and reasonable and that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the finding. 4. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Final Result : Dismissed