JUDGMENT : A. P. Sen j. ( 1. ) This matter comes on a reference by Naik and Shiv Dayal jj. of the following questions : (1) Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was invalid, for the reason that the locality where the land was situate was not specified therein ? (2) Whether, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the afore- said objection was open to the petitioner ? (3) Whether, in the event of the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act being invalid for the aforesaid reason, the land acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed ? Their difference lies on the construction of the expression "land in any locality" appearing in section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). That section provides as follows : "4. (1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose, a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality." ( 2. ) At the time when the reference was made, there was a conflict of opinion prevalent in this Court, regarding the actual requirements of that section. One was the view taken by Shrivastava and Tare jj. in Iftikhar Ahmed v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1959 M P L J Note 96- AI R 1961 MP 140) laying down that the failure of the Government to specify the locality where the land is situate or an omission on their part to give particulars of the land sought to be acquired, in a notification under section 4 (1), renders the notification invalid and has the effect of vitiating the land acquisition proceedings. The other was that taken by Dixit, C. J. and Pandey, J. in Hiralal Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh (M. P. No. 155 of 1960, decided on 17-2-1961) Bhaiyalal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1961 M P L J Note 138) (M. P. 277 of 1960 decided on 6-7-1961). The other was that taken by Dixit, C. J. and Pandey, J. in Hiralal Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh (M. P. No. 155 of 1960, decided on 17-2-1961) Bhaiyalal Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1961 M P L J Note 138) (M. P. 277 of 1960 decided on 6-7-1961). and Anand Kumar Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1963 M P L J Note 132 = M. P. No. 205 of 1961 decided on 10-10-1961). holding that the notification under section 4 (1) being of an exploratory nature, the particulars of the land necessary for defining and identifying it need not be stated and, therefore, failure to furnish such particulars would not render the notification a nullity. The learned Judges, however, stated that the Government in a declaration under section 6(1) of the Act, by virtue of sub-section (2) thereof, must give sufficient particulars of the land as also the district or other territorial division in which it is situate. ( 3. ) The difference between sections 4 (1) and 6 (1) of the Act, is that whereas the former section refers to "land in a particular locality", the latter contemplates "a particular land" i. e. a specific piece of land. So far the construction of these sections is concerned, there can now be no controversy as regards this, in view of the clear pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1960 SC 1203 ) and State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma and others (1966 M P L J 995= AIR 1966 SC 1593 .) In Barkya Thakurs case, the Supreme Court has observed : "The purpose of the notification under section 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is only under section 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that the land with proper description and area so as to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for a company." These observations were, no doubt, made by their Lordships while dealing with the question whether the Government are required to specify the nature of public purpose for which the lands are needed. In State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma and others (supra), their Lordships have, however, dealt with the other aspect whether the Government in a notification under section 4 (1), should also give a description of the land. In dealing with that question, their Lordships stated : "The process of acquisition always begins with a notification under section 4 (1). That provision authorises the appropriate Government to notify that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. It will be noticed that in this notification, the land needed is not particularised but only the locality where the land is situate is mentioned. * It has to be satisfied under section 6 after considering the report made under section 5-A that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company and it then makes a declaration to that effect under section 6. Reading sections 4, 5-A and 6 together it seems to us clear that the notification under section 4 (1) specifies merely the locality in which the land is to be acquired and then under section 4 (2) survey is made and it is considered whether the land or part of it is adapted to the purpose for which it is required and maps are prepared of the land proposed to be taken. Then after objections under section 5-A have been disposed of the Government has to decide what particular land out of the locality specified in the notification under section 4 (1) it will acquire. It then makes a declaration under section 6 specifying the particular land that is needed. (Italics mine). It, accordingly, follows that a notification under section 4 (1) is merely exploratory or preliminary in nature and the exact area to be acquired need not be particularised at that stage. It then makes a declaration under section 6 specifying the particular land that is needed. (Italics mine). It, accordingly, follows that a notification under section 4 (1) is merely exploratory or preliminary in nature and the exact area to be acquired need not be particularised at that stage. But it is otherwise with a declaration under section 6, which is issued after the Government have applied their mind to the exact area and location of the land which is needed for a public purpose and are, therefore, to be acquired. The acquired lands, accordingly, need to be particularised only in the declaration under section 6 of the Act. In view of this, there is no necessity for me to deal with the decisions of the other High Courts which have taken the same view. The view taken in Iftikhar Ahmeds case (supra) in so far as it lays down that an omission to give particulars of land in a notification under section 4 (1) renders the notification invalid and, therefore, vitiates the entire land acquisition proceedings, can no longer be accepted as laying down good law. ( 4. ) Nevertheless, question still remains whether it is the duty of the Government to specify the locality where the land is situate as stated in Iftikhar Ahmeds case. That it is so, is apparent from the plain meaning of the section as also the underlined portions (Italics here) from the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Vishnu Prasads case. That brings me to a consideration of the questions referred. The first and third questions are simply two different ways of expressing the same problem viz., the meaning of the word "locality" occurring in section 4(1) of the Act. In framing the questions referred, the learned Judges have assumed that a village is not a "locality" within the meaning of the section. But I beg to differ with them. The word locality" has not been defined in the Act. The general rule of construction is that, where the words in a statute are plain, their literal and simple meaning is to be adopted unless the context requires otherwise. Now, the word "locality" has an indefinite meaning, but its indefiniteness has certain well recognised limits. The word locality" has not been defined in the Act. The general rule of construction is that, where the words in a statute are plain, their literal and simple meaning is to be adopted unless the context requires otherwise. Now, the word "locality" has an indefinite meaning, but its indefiniteness has certain well recognised limits. In human laws, neither the world nor the greater portion of it is spoken of as a locality [See, Words and Phrases, West Publishing Co., Permanent Edition, Vol. 25A, pp. 176 to 179]. The legal meaning of the word as given in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edition, Vol. 1, p. 1158 is "Limitation to a country, district or place-Blackstone". So also, in Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, p. 1088, that meaning is given as "In a definite region, in any part of space ; geographical position". In common parlance, the word "locality" means "neighbourhood, vicinity and environment". In its ordinary dictionary meaning, the word "locality" denotes "place, position, district". ( 5. ) Of its different shades of meaning, the word "locality" in section 4 (1) of the Act must be interpreted in its narrower sense, having regard to the context in which it appears. It relates to a definite area, the whereabouts of which are capable of being ascertained and known. ( 6. ) That the mention of a village as "locality" in a notification under section 4 (1) is a sufficient compliance of the requirements of the section, has consistently been the view of the authorities charged with the duty of administering it. The statutory form of a notification under that section, as prescribed in Form I, bears this out. So also, in F.G.H. Andersons Manual of Land Acquisition, which is a work of some importance, the learned compiler states- "The notification under section 4 may describe the locality in which land is likely to be needed in the moat general terms, but if it is described by enumeration of villages (Settlement numbers), the list o( villages (Settlement Nos.) should be complete, in order that difficulty may not arise." x x x x "Under section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, the Collector has to give public notice of the substance of the notification published in the Gazette, at convenient places in the locality in which the land is situate. Attention is also invited to para 3 (ii) of the C. R. No. LAQ 2555 G, dated 10th January 1956. Individual notices are not specifically prescribed in the Act but they are issued as a matter of practice and in order to ensure that all (concerned) individuals are informed." While a departmental instruction cannot override the true meaning or construction underlying a statutory provision, but an executive instruction can be accepted as an admissible aid to its proper interpretation, if it has prevailed from a long time without any challenge and without being; modified by Courts of law [See, Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass (ILR 35 Cal 701) Kanhaiyalal v. Municipal Committee, Mungely(1960 MPLJ 139) and The State of Mysore v. M. H. Bellary ( AIR 1965 SC 868 ). In Bellarys Case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court used a Government circular for construing a Service Rule framed under the Constitution ( 7. ) This construction of mine is in no way affected by Instruction No. 9 issued by the State Government, laying down the manner in which the Government has to be moved for issuing a notification under section 4 (1). It reads :- "Instruction No. 9:- On receipt of an application made under paragraph 2 the Deputy Commissioner shall (if the land is to be taken up permanently) forward it, together with the sketch and estimate referred to in paragraph 4 and with a draft notification in Form I for applications under section 4 to the Secretary to Government (Revenue Department). In forwarding the draft notification, the Deputy Commissioner shall add to the details supplied by the application any further particulars which he may deem necessary for the better identification of the land. In all cases, except when land is required for a railway company it must be stated whether budget provision exists and, if not, how the cost of acquisition can be met." The portion underlined (Italics here) requiring the Deputy Commissioner to forward such further particulars as he may deem necessary for the better identification of the land, is only for the purpose of enabling the Government to be satisfied as regards the existence of a public purpose. The requirements of Instruction No. 9 do not envisage that the Government in issuing the notification under section 4 (1), ought to change the statutory form of a notification as prescribed under the Act ( 8. The requirements of Instruction No. 9 do not envisage that the Government in issuing the notification under section 4 (1), ought to change the statutory form of a notification as prescribed under the Act ( 8. ) I think, the decision in Iftikhar Ahmeds case (supra), insofar as ii deals with this aspect, is still good law. In that case, Shrivastava, J., speaking for the Court, had observed- "It is true that at the stage when a notification under section 4 of the Act is issued, the Government is not in a position to say definitely which particular piece of land is proposed to be taken, A survey to determine the land most suitable for the purpose and to fix its boundaries has to be undertaken. All the same, the locality, in which the land to be acquired is, has to be given. The locality should be reasonably a small one to show the whereabouts of the land." If the locality is a reasonably small one, like that of a village, the naming of such village as a locality is a sufficient compliance of section 4 (1). But this does not necessarily imply that the naming of a city like Bhopal, would amount to a specification of a locality within the meaning of the section. It all, therefore, depends on the nature of the locality where the land is situate in each particular case. The answer to the first question, therefore, must be that village is a "locality" within the meaning of section 4(1) of the Act, having regard to the smallness of the area involved. The naming of a village as a locality in a notification issued under that section, therefore, does not render it invalid in any manner. ( 9. ) It would be convenient to take up the third question which is interlinked with the first question that I have dealt with. Even assuming that the naming of a village does not have the effect of specifying "the locality where the land is situate", within the meaning of section 4 (1) of the Act, that defect would not, by itself, render the notification invalid. Under the existing law, before a reference is made to the Court, three stages have to be gone through. The first stage is the notification under section 4 (1) followed by a preliminary investigation and the hearing of objections to the proposed acquisition. Under the existing law, before a reference is made to the Court, three stages have to be gone through. The first stage is the notification under section 4 (1) followed by a preliminary investigation and the hearing of objections to the proposed acquisition. The second stage is the declaration under section 6 (I) after the Government decides upon acquisition. The third stage is the survey of the land, that is, demarcation, measurement and preparation of the plan (unless this has been done during the first stage), followed by notices to the persons interested, inviting claims and enquiry by the Collector to enable him to make the award. Whatever uncertainty there is in specifying a village as a locality, the vagueness in its description stands removed : - (i) When the Collector causes under section 4 (2), public notice of the substance of the notification to be given, at convenient places of the village, inviting objections from persons interested against the proposed acquisition under section 5-A ; (ii) at the time of the survey and demarcation of the land under section 4 (3), by the officer authorised in that behalf, to ascertain its adaptability for the purpose for which it is proposed to be acquired. These steps were admittedly taken in the case. It is, therefore, idle to contend that the alleged vagueness or uncertainty is one of substance which would nullify the acquisition proceedings ( 10. ) In Barkya Thakurs case (supra), there was no express mention of the nature of the public purpose for which the land was required in that case. Nevertheless, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have stated that such a defect in a notification under section 4 (1), was not fatal to the validity of the land acquisition proceedings. In that connection, their Lordships have observed- "It is not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land acquisition proceedings that the statement that the land sought to be acquired was needed for a public purpose should find a place in the notification actually issued. In that connection, their Lordships have observed- "It is not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land acquisition proceedings that the statement that the land sought to be acquired was needed for a public purpose should find a place in the notification actually issued. The requirements of the law will be satisfied if, in substance, it is found on investigation and the appropriate Government is satisfied as a result of the investigation that the land was needed for the purposes of a company, which would amount to a public purpose under Part VII." X X X X "The purpose of the notification under section 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is only under section 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that land with proper description and area so as to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for a company. What was a mere proposal under section 4 becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. Hence, a defect in the notification under section 4 is not fata) to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a Company and the purpose has to be investigated under section 5A or section 40 necessarily after the notification under section 4." If follows as a necessary corollary, that failure to specify the locality where the land is situate in a notification under that section would not affect its validity nor would the entire land acquisition proceedings thereby be vitiated. The answer to the third question is in the negative. ( 11. ) Lastly, it remains for me to deal with the second question referred, which really does not arise, in the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioner having been permitted to urge the objection at the hearing, and the question raised having been debated before the Court at a great length, without any objection, the petition cannot possibly be thrown out now on the ground that the point has not been taken. As a matter of practice, it is impracticable to lay down any rule of universal application. As a matter of practice, it is impracticable to lay down any rule of universal application. Each case must depend on its own facts. If the ground urged is a pure question of law or is one which goes to the very root of jurisdiction, then the Court may in its discretion allow a petitioner to urge such a question at the hearing. But, it would be otherwise, if the contention sought to be advanced involves a mixed question of fact and law. The procedure relating to applications under Article 226 of the Constitution, is regulated, as far as may be, by the Madhya Pradesh High Court Rules, Chapter 15, Rules 1 (a) (ii), 13 and 14 (a) Under rule 1 (a), a petitioner is required to state-(1) the grounds on which the relief is sought by him, and (2) also such material facts, as may be considered by him necessary, for a proper determination of the case. After a rule nisi is issued, a respondent is required to file a return showing cause against the entertainment of such a petition. Under rule 13, the Court has the power to require the parties to Furnish further and better particulars of their case. Rule 14 (a) further directs that all questions of fact arising for determination, shall ordinarily be furnished in affidavits. The powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ, direction or order are discretionary and such powers cannot be fettered by a rule. ( 12. ) The law has been stated with great clarity in Durga Das Basus Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th edition, Vol. 3, p. 403, in these words:- "I. The general rule is that a ground which has not been specifically taken in the application or the return shall not be allowed to be urged at the hearing. The reason is that a question of fact must be specifically pleaded, to enable the respondent to make a reply. It follows that a petitioner should not be permitted to raise a question which depends on facts which were not mentioned in his petition but were put forward in a rejoinder to which the respondents had no opportunity to reply. II. It follows that a petitioner should not be permitted to raise a question which depends on facts which were not mentioned in his petition but were put forward in a rejoinder to which the respondents had no opportunity to reply. II. To the above general rule, exception is made in favour of- (a) Grounds based on facts which are clearly on the record, particularly where the new plea is one of error of law apparent on the face of the record. (b) A plea going to the root of the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal and which is based on a decision of the High Court or Supreme Court which has been delivered subsequent to the filing of the writ petition. (c) A pure question of law." On these principles, the petitioner was clearly entitled to urge the ground as regards invalidity of the notification under section 4(1), although the point was not expressly taken in the petition. It was a pure question of law arising on a consideration of the notification in question and, therefore, aground based on facts which are clearly on record. The answer to the second question, if at all it arises, should be in the affirmative. ( 13. ) For the reasons stated by me, the answer to the reference should be as follows:- (i). The naming of a village as a locality is a sufficient compliance of the requirements of section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894, having regard to the smallness of the area ordinarily comprised in a village which, in the accepted meaning of the term, is a locality. It follows that the notification in question is, therefore, not invalid for want of specification of the locality where the land is situate. (ii). The petitioner, having been allowed to urge a ground as regards the alleged invalidity of the said notification under section 4 (1), viz., that the locality where the land is situate was not specified therein, the Court cannot now throw out the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, merely on the objection that the ground was not taken in the petition. (iii). The impugned notification not being invalid, the land acquisition proceedings arising therefrom, are not liable to be quashed by any writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Let the papers be now placed before Naik and Shiv Dayal, JJ. (iii). The impugned notification not being invalid, the land acquisition proceedings arising therefrom, are not liable to be quashed by any writ, direction or order under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Let the papers be now placed before Naik and Shiv Dayal, JJ. for the making of such directions as they may, in the circumstances of the case, deem fit. ORDER In accordance with the opinion of A. P. Sen, J., the petition is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. The amount of the security deposit shall be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.RAJESH