State of U. P. v. District Cooperative Bank — 1969 DIGILAW 142 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - These are nine connected special appeals arising out of nine writ petitions challenging the orders of the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, (exercising the power of the Registrar, Cooperative Societies) for suspension of nine societies registered under the Cooperative Societies Act 1912 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . The orders were passed under Rule 31 (a) of the Rules framed under the Act. In the case of some societies the orders were only under the main provision of Rule 31 (a) while in the case of others under the proviso to that rule as well, and in respect of all the societies some incidental orders provided for in the rule were also passed. The differences in the nature of the orders are not material for our purpose because the learned single Judge against whose judgments these Special Appeals have been filed dealt only with the questions of the validity of Rule 31 (a) and we too propose to deal with that question alone.. The grounds on which the orders of the Deputy Registrar were challenged before the learned Judge may be stated in his own words from the judgment in writ petition No. 1996 of 1967. (i) That Rule 31 of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Rules, 1936 is ultra vires the rule making power conferred by Section 43 of the Cooperative Societies Act 1912. (ii) That Rule 31 is void for delegation of legislative powers, beyond the constitutionally permissible limits. (iii) That Rule 31 violates Article 31 (a) and (2) of the Constitution of India. (iv) That the impugned orders do not satisfy the conditions precedent set out in Rule 31. (v) That the impugned orders have been passed mala fide with a view to sub serve the political interests of the Jan Sangh party which was a constituent of the State Government by ousting Congressmen who were in control of the committee's of management of the stores, (vi) That the notice contains vague charges and does not disclose the mate-rials which were treated as sustaining them. 2. The learned Judge accepted the first ground of challenge and held that Rule 31 was invalid. 2. The learned Judge accepted the first ground of challenge and held that Rule 31 was invalid. On the second ground he expressed the opinion that if Section 43 (1) were to be interpreted as authorising the framing of Rule 31 it will be invalid on the ground that it delegates to the State Government legislative powers beyond the constitutionally permissible limits, and the result would be that Rule 31 would be void. The third ground was not pressed before him on behalf of the petitioners, and on the remaining grounds he did not think it necessary to give any finding. On the basis of the findings on the first two grounds, all the writ petitions were allowed and the impugned orders were quashed. The State of U. P. and the authorities conceded have preferred these appeals. 3. The United provinces Cooperative Societies Rules which contained Rule 31 were made in exercise of the power conferred by Section 43 of the Act. The relevant portion of Section 43 is as follows: "43- (1) The State Government may, for the whole or any part of the State and for any registered society or class of such societies, make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power such rules may: (g) Provide for the appointment, suspension and removal of the members of the committee's and other officers, and for the procedure at meetings of the committee's, and for the powers to be exercised and the duties to be performed by committee's and other officers;" 4. The expression "Committee" occurring in clause (g) of Section 43 (2) has been defined in Section 2 (b) as The governing body of a registered society to whom the management of its affairs is entrusted. The Act does not, however, itself provide for the method of constituting the governing body nor for any other matter pertaining to it, and these things have been left to be provided for by rules. Rules 26 to 31 of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Rules are the rules which relate to the committee which has also been described in the rules as the Board of Management. Rules 26 to 31 of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Rules are the rules which relate to the committee which has also been described in the rules as the Board of Management. Rules 26 says that save as provided in Rules 31 and 37- a member of the committee (Board of Management) other than a nominated, cooped or ex officio member, shall be appointed, suspended or removed by only in a general meeting by the votes of a majority of the members. Rule 27 lays down the conditions of eligibility for membership of the committee. Rule 28 provided as to when a member of the committee shall cease to hold office. The powers of the committee are mentioned in Rule 29 and it says that subject to any regulation or restriction laid down by a society in a general meeting or in the bye-laws, the committee shall exercise all the powers of the society, except those reserved for the general meeting. Rule 30 enjoins that in the conduct of the affairs of a society, every member of the committee shall exercise the prudence and diligence of an ordinary man of business, and shall not perform any act contrary to the Act, the rules framed thereunder and the bye-laws of the society. Then comes Rule 31 which is in the following terms:- 31- (a) . Where the Registrar is satisfied that the members of the Committee of Managament of a registered society have, in spite of protests from an officer of the Cooperative Department, the Financing Bank, if any, or members of the society, persisted in conducting its affairs in a manner prejudicial to its interest and likely to end in disaster, he may communicate in writing the ground: of his finding and give the Committee reasonable time to show cause why it should not be stopped from functioning further. In case the explanation is unsatisfactory he may suspend the Committee in whole or in part as a temporary measure and arrange for the work, until the next Annual General Meeting is held. The Registrar may himself assume all the powers and functions of the Committee or he may appoint an Administrator or an ad hoc Committee or both to manage on his behalf the affairs of the society during such period. The Registrar may himself assume all the powers and functions of the Committee or he may appoint an Administrator or an ad hoc Committee or both to manage on his behalf the affairs of the society during such period. Such Administrator or ad hoc Committee will have all or any of the powers of the Committee of Management as the Registrar may direct: 5. Provided that in original case where the Registrar is satisfied that the need for suspension is immediate, he may pass an order suspending the Committee in whole or in part as a temporary measure, and may thereafter issue a notice to show cause why the Board of Management or the Executive Committee be not dissolved or altered in part or whole, and the order of temporary Suspension will remain in force till the committee has shown cause against the notice and a final order is passed by the Registrar in that respect. (b) Any party considering itself aggrieved may appeal to Government within one month of the communication to the society of the final order passed by the Registrar under this rule. NOTE:-The Committee of Management includes the Board of Directors or Managing Committee or Executive Committee or any Board or Committee entrusted with the duties and power of managing all or any of the affairs." 6. As we have indicated above, the learned single Judge has held that Rule 31 of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Rules is ultra wires the rule making power conferred by Section 43 of the Act. In his opinion Rule 31 is not sustainable either under sub-Sec. (1) or under sub-Sec. (2) of Section 43. The reason, according to the learned Judge, for its being unsustainable under sub-Sec. (1) of Section 43 is that the acts authorised by it do not carry out the purposes of the Act; and the reason why, in his view, it is unsustainable under sub-Sec. (2) of Section 43 appears to be that although a provision for suspension of the Committee may be made in exercise of the power conferred by Clause (g) of the said sub-section the other things for which provision has been made in the rule fall outside the clause. Sri S. C. Khare learned counsel for the respondents, however, contended before us that Clause (g) of Section 43 (2) does not even empower the making of a rule which may provide for suspension of the Committee as a body as distinguished from suspension of the members thereof. We have, therefore, to first examine the validity of Rule 31 with reference to Clause (g) of Section 43 (2) . 7. It has to be borne in mind that the Committee or the Board of Management has no separate and independent existence apart from the members who Constitute it. Under Section 18 of the Act it is the society which is rendered a body corporate by registration and no provision of the Act imparts that status to the Committee and makes it a legal entity. The distinction that the learned counsel for the respondent sought to draw between the committee and all the members thereof is, therefore, unreal. It cannot be disputed that if a rule providing for the suspension of the members of the committee is framed under Clause (g) of Section 43 (2) all the members of the committee would be liable to simultaneous suspension also under that rule. Rule 31, in so far as it deals with suspension, does nothing else but provide for the suspension of the members of the committee. It will be noted that under the main provision of Rule 31 as well as under the proviso thereto the power of suspension may be exercised in respect of the committee in whole or in part, and it is, therefore, obvious that in substance the rule provides for suspension of the members of the committee. The state of things which would call for action under Rule 31 will, in the majority of cases, require the suspension of all the members of the committee and, presumably, that is why the rule speaks in terms of the committee. It -40- does not, however on that account confer a power in excess of Clause (g) of Section 43 (2) . It -40- does not, however on that account confer a power in excess of Clause (g) of Section 43 (2) . In Hira Singh v. Deputy Registrar,Cooprative Societies, Fyzabadl, Writ Petition No. 259 of 1962 decided on December 13, 1962 decided by the Lucknow Bench of this Court, N. U. Beg, J. (as he then was) , dealing with the question which we are at present considering, observed : "The third argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that Rule 31 is ultra vires the State. In this connection the learned counsel referred to the provisions of Section 43 (2) (g) of the Act and has argued that this provision of law only entitles the authority concerned to suspend members of the Committee. In the present case all the members of the Committee have been suspended and the suspension of all the members of the Committee would not be warranted by the provisions of Section 43 (2) (g) of the Act. I am unable to accept this submission also. Section 43 (2) (g) of the Act States that rules could be made for the suspension of the members of the Committee.If all the members of the Committee could be suspended individually it necessarily follows that the Committee itself could be suspended." 8. With these observations the learned single Judge agreed and we too are in agreement. In so far, therefore, as Rule 31 authorises suspension of the committee or the Boarl of Management it is within the rule making power conferred by Section 43 (2) of the Act. 9. What has next to be considered is whether that part of Rule 31 which authorizes the Registrar to assume all the powers and functions of the committee or go appoint an administrator or an ad hoc committee or both to manage on his behalf the affairs of the Society during the period of suspension of the committee can also be justified under clause (g) of Section 43. Obviously it is not possible for the general body of the members of a society registered under the Act to conduct the affairs of the Society. The members of a society would ordinarily be large in number and they would mostly be agriculturists and artisans living in distant villages. Obviously it is not possible for the general body of the members of a society registered under the Act to conduct the affairs of the Society. The members of a society would ordinarily be large in number and they would mostly be agriculturists and artisans living in distant villages. They cannot be expected to assemble frequently and the task of managing the affairs of a society must, therefore, of necessity be performed by a small body of person or by an individual. As noted above, Section 2 (b) of the Act defines a committee as the governing body of a registered society to whom the management of its affairs is entrusted. Clause (b) of Section 43 empowers the making of rules providing for general meetings of the members and for the procedure at such meetings and the powers to be exercised by such meetings. Rules 17 to 25 of the Rules relate to general meetings and Rule 25 (iv) lays down that the annual general meeting shall elect the members of the committee or the Board of Management. The members so elected constitute the governing body to whom the management of the affairs of a society is entrusted, and under Rule 29 which is clearly covered by clause (g) of Section 43, which is the governing body shall subject to any regulation or restriction laid down by a society in a general meeting or in the Bye-laws, exercise all the powers of the Society except those reserved for the general meeting. If, therefore, a society is to continue functioning even after suspension of the committee and its work is not to be entirely paralysed some provision has to be made for the management of its affairs during the period of the suspension of the committee or the governing body. If this were not so, not only would suspension fall in its object but would make the situation worse. The power to make a rule providing for making arrangements for the work of the society during the period of suspension of the Committee has, consequently, to be regarded as being implicit in the power to make a rule providing for suspension of the committee. The power to make a rule providing for making arrangements for the work of the society during the period of suspension of the Committee has, consequently, to be regarded as being implicit in the power to make a rule providing for suspension of the committee. In this view of the power contained in clause (g) of Section 43 we are fortified by the principle laid clown by the Supreme Court in Bidi, Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants' Association Gondia v. Bombay State, A.I.R. 1962 SC 486. In that case the scope and effect of the doctrine of implied power has been explained by their Lordships as follows : "One of the first principles of law with regard to the effect of an enabling act, observes Sraes, is that a Legislature enables something to be done, it gives power at the same time by necessary implication to do everything which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purposes in view'. The principles on which this doctrine is based is contained in the legal maxim 'Quando Lex aliquid concedit concedare videtur et illud since quo res ipsa ease non potest'. This maxim has been thus translated by Broome thus : 'Whoever grants a thing is deemed also to grant that without which the grant itself would be of no effect'. Dealing with this doctrine Pollock, C. B. observed in Fenton v. Hampton, (1858) 117 RR 32 p. 41 : 11 Moo P.C. 347 it becomes therefore all important to consider the true import of this maxim, and the extent to which it has been applied. After the fullest research which I have been able to bestow, I take the matter to stand thus :-Whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as matter of duty, required to be done by law; and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done then that something will be supplied by necessary intendment.' This doctrine can be invoked in cases where an Act confers a jurisdiction it also confers by implication the power of doing all such act, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution'. In other words, the doctrine of implied power can be legitimately invoked when it is found that a duty has been imposed or a power conferred on an authority by a statute and it is further found that the duty cannot be discharged or the power cannot be exercised at all unless some auxiliary or incidental power is assumed to exist. In such a case, in the absence of an implied power the statute itself would become impossible of compliance. The impossibility in question must be of a general nature so that the performance of duty or the exercise of power is rendered impossible in all cases. It really means that the statutory provision would become a dead letter and cannot be enforced unless a subsidiary power is implied. This position in regard to the scope and effect of the doctrine of implied powers is not seriously in dispute before us. The parties are at issue, however, on the question as to whether the doctrine of implied powers can help to validate the impugned clauses in the notification." 10. We may also observe that the power to make rules "providing for suspension" is not to be construed as limited to the bare fact of suspension but comprehends all that is necessarily connected with it. Such a power includes the power to make rules providing for matters incidental to suspension. The making of rules as to the requisite conditions for suspension and as to the temporary arrangement for the work of the society consequent upon suspension falls squarely within the power of making rules providing for suspension. Rule 31 is thus justified by clause (g) of Section 43 both in regard to the power of suspending the committee and, the power of making arrangements for the work of the society concerned during such suspension. 11. The validity of Rule 31 may now be examined with reference to Section 43 (1) of the Act which authorises the making of rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. That in construing Section 43 (1) of the Act clause (g) and other clauses of Section 43 (2) have to be taken as illustrative and not as restrictive of the generality of the power conferred by Section 43 (1) cannot be doubted-vide Emperor v. Shibnath Banerji, A.I.R. 1945 Privy Council 156 and Afzal Ullah v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1964 SC 264. 12. 12. The purposes of the Act may firstly be gathered from the preamble of the Act which runs as follows : "Whereas it is expedient further to facilitate the formation of Cooperative Societies for the promotion of thrift and self help among agriculturists, artisans and persons of limited means, and for that purpose to amend the law relating to Co-operative Societies ; It is hereby enacted as follows :" 13. It is obvious that the Act is concerned not merely with bringing Cooperative Societies into existence but also with their proper functioning throughout their existence. The purpose that the Act has in view cannot be regarded as accomplished in respect of a society when it is incorporated and set going. Formation of a cooperative society is not an end in itself and it is done for "the promotion of thrift and self help among the agriculturists, artisans and persons of limited means." This is not an object which a cooperative society achieves as soon as it is formed but which it has to continuously subserve as long as it exists, and the sub serving of that object constitutes the very condition of its existence. The words used in the preamble show that the purpose of the Act is to enable the creation of Cooperative Societies and also to see that they serve the object for which they are created. 14. Then we examine the provisions of the Act for ascertaining the scope of its purposes. We need refer only to such provisions as deal with the control of the affairs of the society after it has come into existence. Section 11 makes a society's power to amend its Bye-laws subject to the satisfaction of the Registrar that the amendment is not contrary to the Act or to the rules framed thereunder. Section 11-A gives to the Registrar the power to require a society to amend its Bye-laws and on its failure to do so to himself amend the Bye-laws. Section 11-F provides that the final authority of a society shall vest in the general body of its members in the general meeting, but that provisions is subject to the condition that, in such circumstances as may be prescribed by the Registrar, the final authority may vest in the delegates of such members elected in the manner prescribed by the Registrar and assembled in the meeting of the general body. Sections 11-A and 11-F were inserted by the Cooperative Societies (U. P. Amendment) Act X of 1957 but they cannot on that account be ignored in determining the purposes of the Act. Under Section 17 the accounts of every society have to be audited by the Registrar or by some person authorised by him and, further, the Registrar, the Collector and any person authorised by the Registrar has access to accounts papers and security of a society, Section 29(2) prohibits a society with unlimited liability to land money on the security of immovable property without the sanction of the Registrar, and Section 29(3) empowers the State Government to prohibit or restrict the landing of money or mortgage of immovable property by any society. The transactions of a society with person other than members thereof are made subject to Section 31 to such prohibitions and restrictions as the State Government may by rule prescribe. Section 33 provides that in the case of a society with unlimited liability no distribution of profit shall be made without the order of the State Government. Under Section 34 the power of society to make contribution to charitable purpose is in certain circumstances subject to the sanction of the Regisrtrar. Section 35 authorises the Registrar to hold an inquiry or direct some person authorised by him in writing to hold an inquiry into the working of the financial condition of a society, and it casts upon all officers and members of the society the obligation to furnish such information in regard to the affairs of the Society as may be required in the inquiry. Under Section 36 the Registrar has, on the application of a creditors of a society to inspect or direct some person authorised by him in writing to inspect the books of a society. Then we come to the most stringent provisions of the Act. Under Section 36 the Registrar has, on the application of a creditors of a society to inspect or direct some person authorised by him in writing to inspect the books of a society. Then we come to the most stringent provisions of the Act. Section 39 confers upon the Registrar the power to cancel the registration of a society if after an inquiry under Section 35 or an inspection under Section 36 or on receipt of an application by three- fourth of the members of a society, he is of opinion that the society ought to be dissolved, Section 40 provides for cancellation of the registration of a society by the Registrar also when the member Of the members of a society which should consist of at least ten members has been reduced to less than ten. Section 41, says that where the registration of a society has been (cancelled the society shall cease to be 'corporate body. Under Section 42 the Registrar may upon the cancellation of the registration of a society appoint a competent person to be liquidator of a society. From the provisions noted above it is evident that the Act. aims not merely at 'bringing Cooperative Societies into existence but at other things as well. Its objects or purposes also are that societies which come into existence should really justify their existence and that throughout their career their affairs should be closely watched and their activities controlled by the Registrar and by the State Government. 15. It has now to be seen whether Rule 31 can be said to carry out the purposes of the Act. If the committee or the governing body of a society is persistently conducting the affairs of the Society in a manner prejudicial to its interest and likely to end in disaster, the prejudicial effect can be avoided and the disaster averted only by taking the management out of the hands of the committee or the governing body for the time being and placing it in some other hand. Suspension of the committee or the governing body is nothing but divesting the committee of the power of managing the affairs of a society. Suspension of the committee or the governing body is nothing but divesting the committee of the power of managing the affairs of a society. But suspension alone unaccompanied by vesting of the management of the affairs of the society in some other body or in some individual would not remedy the evil which made the suspension necessary, and it must have as a necessary adjunct the taking up of the management by some body else. Rule 31 is, therefore, fully covered by the rule making power conferred by Section 43 (1) . Even if clause (g) of Section 43 (2) has not given the power to make a rule proving for the suspension of the committee Section 43 (1) would have sufficed for supporting Rule 31; but clause (g) of Section 43 (1) specifically confers the power of making a rule providing for suspension of the committee and that clause by itself, and in any case read conjointly with Section 43 (1) puts the validity of Rule 31 beyond dispute. 16. For the meaning of the words "to carry out the purposes of the Act" the learned single judge relied on certain observations in Carbines v. Powell, 36 CIR 88 which were quoted with approval in the Full Bench decision of this court in U.P. State v. Murtaza Ali, A.I.R. 1961 Alld. 477. The observations emphasised that the grantee of a power to carry out or give effect to an enactment may complement but not supplement the granted power and were based on the distinction between complementing and supplementing a grant ed power pointed out in an earlier case. Stemp v. Australian Glass Manufactures Company, 23 CLR 226 where it was said : "It is not upon to the granttee of the power actually bestowed to add to its efficieney, as it is called by some further means outside the limits of the power conferred, for the purposes of more effectively copying with the evils intended to be met........ The authority must be taken as it is created, to the full but not exceeded. In other words, in the absence of express statement to the contrary, you may complement, but you may not supplement, as granted power." 17. The authority must be taken as it is created, to the full but not exceeded. In other words, in the absence of express statement to the contrary, you may complement, but you may not supplement, as granted power." 17. The question is whether the power of making temporary arrangement for the working of a society is a power which adds to the efficiency of the suspension of the committee or whether it is an incident of the power of suspension without which that power cannot at all be purposefully exercised. For the reasons which we have already discussed we find that the power is of the latter description and that it complements and not supplements the granted power. 18. Before us Sri S. C. Khare sought great support for his -argument from the Privi Council case of Utah Construction and Engineering Ply. Ltd. v. Janos Pataky, 1966 AC 629, but in our opinion the learned counsel can derive no assistance from that case. The Privy Council pointed out the distinction between a power related only to the means for achieving an end and a power related to the creation of an end and adopted with approval the following statement in the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Shanhan v. Scott, 96 CLR 245: "The result is to show that such a power does not enable the authority by regulations to extend the scope or generai operation of the enactment but is strictly ancillary. It will authorise the provision of subsidiary means of carrying into effect what is enacted in the statute itself and will cover what is incidental to the execution of its specific provisions. But such a power will not support attempts to widen the purposes of the Act, to add new and different means of carrying them out or to depart from or vary the plan which the legislature has adopted to attain its ends." 19. A provision for temporary arrangement of the working of a society whose governing body has been suspended is only an auxiliary or subsidiary provision and it is incidental to the specific provision in regard to suspension. Such a pro-vision does not create a new end but only provides a subsidiary means without which an end contemplated by the Act cannot really be achieved. 20. Such a pro-vision does not create a new end but only provides a subsidiary means without which an end contemplated by the Act cannot really be achieved. 20. In the reference, In re: Kerala Education Bill 1957, S. R. Das, C. J. while dealing with clause 36 of the Bill observed : "The power given to the Government by clause 36 to make rules is expressly stated, to be exercised for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act'. In other words the rules to be framed must implement the policy and purpose laid down in its long title and the preamble and the provisions of the other clauses of the said Bill." 21. In our opinion Rule 31 implements the policy and purpose of the Act as ascertainable from its preamble and its provisions. 22. Since the Act was intended to amend the law relating to cooperative societies and further to facilitate the formation of such societies, the learned single Judge has referred also to the preamble of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1904, which stated: "Whereas it is expedient to encourage thrift, self help and cooperation among agriculturists, artisans and persons of limited means, and for that purpose to provide for the constitution and control of cooperative credit societies, it is hereby enacted as follows ":- 23. Referring to the word "control" in the above preamble he has held that Rule 31 does much more than control cooperative societies and, in any case, it invents a new field and method of control altogether. 24. In connection with the first of the two above mentioned objections the learned Judge has referred to Shanti Swarup v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1955 SC 624 and to some observations of S. R. Das, J. (as he then was) in Dwarika Das v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., A.I.R. 1954 SC 119. To our mind these cases have no application to the instant question. As noted above Sri S. C. Khare gave up before the learned single Judge the objection that the impugned order infringed Articles 31 (1) and 31 (2) of the Constitution, and he did not press that objection even before us. Ltd., A.I.R. 1954 SC 119. To our mind these cases have no application to the instant question. As noted above Sri S. C. Khare gave up before the learned single Judge the objection that the impugned order infringed Articles 31 (1) and 31 (2) of the Constitution, and he did not press that objection even before us. We may also note that in Divendra Pal Singh v. Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, 1968 ALJ 43 it was held by the learned single Judge also that Rule 31 does not infringe Articles 31 (1) and 31 (2) of the Constitution. We have, then, to bear in mind a number of considerations. Firstly, we are not here called upon to determine the scope of a power which is limited to controlling. Control of societies formed under the Cooperative Credit Societies Act 1904 was only one of the purposes of that Act and the other purposes have to be gathered from its enacted provisions. Secondly, the Cooperative Societies, Act, 1912 may have wider purposes and also purposes other than those of the Cooperative Credit Societies Act 1904, and its purposes have to be ascertained from the entire scheme of the Act and its pro-visions. Thirdly, the power of control can have no fixed limits and the content and scope of that power have to be found out from the policy and the provisions of the Act and in the light of such powers as are specifically mentioned or provided for in, the Act. The Registrar,. as we have seen, plays a very important role in relation to cooperative societies 'and he has been invested with the powers. necessary for ensuring that the societies are functioning properly. Under the conditions laid down in Section 39 he has even the power, subject to appeal, to order the cancellation of the registration of a society, and the control over a cooperative society under the provisions of the Act thus extends even to making it cease to exist. necessary for ensuring that the societies are functioning properly. Under the conditions laid down in Section 39 he has even the power, subject to appeal, to order the cancellation of the registration of a society, and the control over a cooperative society under the provisions of the Act thus extends even to making it cease to exist. The power of making a rule providing for suspension of the governing body of a society having been specifically conferred by clause (g) of Section 43 (2) provides for temporary arrangement of the work of the society consequent upon the suspension of his governing body is not something outside the scope of that control of cooperative societies for which the Act provides Cooperative societies derive their existence and their powers from the Act. The members of the committee or the governing body are appointed and owe their powers to rules framed under the Act. Their right of managing the affairs of a society is not antecedent to their appointment for does it exist independently of the rules. In view of these considerations, the provisions made in Rule 31 for interim arrangement of the work of a society cannot be said to exceed the limits of the control aimed at by the Act. Dissolution of a society has been specifically provided for by the Act itself and rules for the suspension of the members of the governing body of a society have been authorised to be made. The provision for interim arrangement of the work of a society made in Rule 31, is, therefore, only incidental to the suspension of the governing body and does not create a new field or method of control. 25. For the reasons discussed above we hold that Rule 31 is sustainable both under clause (g) of Section 43 (2) and under Section 43 (1) , and it is not ultra vires the rule making power conferred by the Act. 26. Then remains the question whether the interpretation that Section 43 (1) em-powers the framing or Rule 31 will lead to the result that Section 43 (1) would itself be void. 26. Then remains the question whether the interpretation that Section 43 (1) em-powers the framing or Rule 31 will lead to the result that Section 43 (1) would itself be void. The view taken by the learned single Judge is that the power which is exercisable under Rule 31 is a power of requisition and if Section 43 (1) confers the power of making Rule 31 it delegates to the executive the power to legislate in the field of requisition. The basic premise of this line of reasoning is that the provision; contained in Rule 31 are provisions of requisition. We find ourselves unable to accept this premise as correct. The members of the committee or the governing body are appointed under the rules and manage the affairs of a society in exercise of the powers conferred upon them by the rules. If the rules also provide that the power of management will be subject to suspension in case it is not properly exercised it cannot be said that they provide for requisition. Is, then, an element of requisition introduced in Rule 31 on account of the provision relating to the arrangement for the work of the society during the period of the suspension of the committee or the governing body? The answer in our opinion should clearly be in the negative. The person or persons who may take up the work of the society under Rule 31 can exercise only such powers and functions till the next Annual General Meeting as the committee had and they will only be managing the affairs of the society. The right to manage the affairs of a society that the members of the committee or the governing body have is not a right to property. This seems to be indisputable in the light of the decisions of .the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibai College Delhi v. State of Delhi, A.I.R. 1962 SC 458, Sidh Raj Bhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1963 SC 540, and Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. The State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1964 SC 1501. It cannot, therefore, be said that if Section 43 (1) authorised the State Government to frame a rule like Rule 31, it gave to it the power to travel outside the field of cooperative societies and to operate in the field of requisition. It cannot, therefore, be said that if Section 43 (1) authorised the State Government to frame a rule like Rule 31, it gave to it the power to travel outside the field of cooperative societies and to operate in the field of requisition. Rule 31 is in furtherance of that control over the affairs of cooperative societies which the Act envisaged and it does not exceed the limits within which the Act was intended to operate. This conclusion is strengthened by reading clause (g) of Section 43 (2) along with and as illustrative of Section 43 (1) . The learned single Judge also observed that if Rule 31 is held to be within the rule making power conferred by the Act the legislative parted with its essential legislative function and conferred unfettered and uncontrolled power on the executive to be operative on the whole field on its behalf. We, however think that the preamble and the pro-visions of the Act discussed above gave clear indications of the legislative policy and laid down adequate standards for the guidance of the executive. In our opinion, by authorising the State Government to make a rule like Rule 31 the legislature was not delegating its essential legislative activity to the executive. It is true that in the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act No. XI of 1966 a specific provisions has been made in Section 35 for taking over the management of cooperative societies, but that does not effect the question of vires of Rule 31. The legislature might only have thought it proper to put the power of making rules for taking over the management of a cooperative society in a certain contingency beyond dispute by incorporating a provision to that effect in the Act of 1966. 27. In the judgment of the learned single Judge reference has been made to a number of authorities on delegated legislation. The principles laid down by those authorities are well established and are not at all in dispute. What has to be seen is whether those principles would be violated if the rule making power conferred upon the State Government is held to include the making of the Rule 31. As in our opinion those principles would not at all be violated, it is not necessary for us to refer to the said authorities. 28. What has to be seen is whether those principles would be violated if the rule making power conferred upon the State Government is held to include the making of the Rule 31. As in our opinion those principles would not at all be violated, it is not necessary for us to refer to the said authorities. 28. As a result of the above discussions we hold that Rule 31 is not ultra vires the rule making power conferred by Section 43 of the Act, nor is it void for delegation of legislative powers beyond the constitutionally permissible limits. Since the other objections raised against the impugned orders have not been decided by the learned single Judge the writ petitions have to be sent back to him for disposal. Sri S. C. Khare, contended that as with effect from January 26, 1968 the Act under which Rule 31 was framed was repealed and the new Act came into force the impugned orders have become ineffective in those cases in which no final order of suspension was passed and the appeals arising out of such cases have become infructuous. The reply of the learned Chief Standing Counsel to this contention was that the acts done under Rule 31 cannot become ineffective, on account of the repeal of the Act and, at any rate, this question is outside the purview, of the writ petitions which were filed when the Act was in force and challenged the vires of Rule 31. The argument as to the infructuousness of some of the appeals does not appear to have any substance. It is one thing that the impugned orders became subsequently ineffective on account of the repeal of the Act and it is quite another that they were void and ineffective from their inception. The learned single Judge held that on the first two grounds raised by the petitioners the impugned orders could not have been validly passed and it was the correctness of this view that was challenged in these appeals. .We do not, therefore, think that any of the appeals has become infructuous. How the repeal of the Act of 1912 and the enforcement of the new Act affects the impugned orders of the writ petitions will be determined by the learned single Judge if in his opinion the question calls for determination. 29. .We do not, therefore, think that any of the appeals has become infructuous. How the repeal of the Act of 1912 and the enforcement of the new Act affects the impugned orders of the writ petitions will be determined by the learned single Judge if in his opinion the question calls for determination. 29. All the special appeals are allowed, the judgments of the learned single Judge involved in these appeals are set aside and the writ petitions out of which the appeals have arisen are sent back to the learned single Judge for disposal. Costs of these appeals will abide the result.