JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, J. - The accused-Respondent was prosecuted under Rule 10 of the Orissa Terminal Tax Collection Rules, 1951, framed u/s 23 of Bihar & Orissa Pilgrimage Act, 1920. 2. The prosecution report filed by the clerk, Banshidar Das, p.w. 1, Lodging House Fund with the sanction of the Magistrate in charge of the said fund, has set out a description of the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused in para 7 thereof. It is stated there that the accused failed to deposit the road terminal tax which he had collected from passengers travelling in his vehicle O.R.C. 280, during the months of November and December, 1963, and also defaulted to submit returns in respect of such collected tax and thereby contravened the rules 6 and 7 of the Orissa Road Terminal Tax Collection Rules, 1951. Accordingly, he is liable to be punished under Rule 10 thereof. 3. It is further alleged that the bus of the accused was plying between Puri and Konarak; he had collected terminal tax amounting to Rs. 89.40 during the month of November, 1963, and he was liable to credit Rs. 86.51 after deducting his collection expenses to the Lodging House Fund. He similarly collected Rs. 48.36 as terminal tax in the month of December, 1963, and was liable to pay Rs. 46.80 after deducting the collection expenses. 4. Section 20 of the Bihar & Orissa Pilgrimage Act, 1920, provides for constitution of a Lodging House Fund in any area to which this Act applies and in pursuance thereof, the Puri Lodging House Fund was constituted for Puri town, and a Magistrate was put in charge of the said fund. Rule 6 of the Orissa Terminal Tax Collection Rules, 1951, enjoined upon the accused to credit to the Puri Lodging House Fund the terminal tax collected by him during the months of November and December, 1963. Rule 7 thereof also obliged the accused to submit a return in the form annexed to the Rules. He defaulted in carrying out his obligations under both those rules and therefore, he was liable to be punished under Rule 10. 5. The prosecution report was filed before the S.D.M., Puri, on 2-9-1966. Rule 7 thereof also obliged the accused to submit a return in the form annexed to the Rules. He defaulted in carrying out his obligations under both those rules and therefore, he was liable to be punished under Rule 10. 5. The prosecution report was filed before the S.D.M., Puri, on 2-9-1966. Cognizance was taken on that day and the subsequent procedure adopted by the Magistrate was as if it was a complaint case and the complainant was described to be Banshidhar Das, clerk of the Lodging House Fund, Puri. 6. The trying Magistrate found, as a fact, that the accused had collected the tax during the months of November and December 1963, and he failed to deposit the same to the credit of the fund. He was thus liable to be punished, but he acquitted him on the ground that the prosecution had not been legally launched. The clerk who filed the complaint had no authority to file it, nor the Magistrate who sanctioned the prosecution had any authority or power to sanction such prosecution. He, therefore, concluded that the prosecution report had not been filed by proper authority or officer who had power to do so and as such it was bad in law. 7. A large number of cases besides the one under consideration had been filed by the clerk of the Lodging House Fund against the accused for infringement of various rules and for his default to credit the terminal taxes realised by him. If this view of the Magistrate were correct, then all those prosecutions must necessarily fail. This decision therefore had assumed a great public importance. Accordingly, the Government instructed the Advocate-General to file an appeal from the order of acquittal in this Court. 8. In the memo of appeal filed by the state the Lodging House Fund, Puri, has been described as the Appellant, though the real Appellant is the State and an application has been filed subsequently on 8-5-1969 for amending the memo of appeal by deleting the name of the Lodging House Fund and substituting the name of Orissa State as the Appellant. Another application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed to condone the delay in bringing this application. 9. Another application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed to condone the delay in bringing this application. 9. Though this is a complaint case, nevertheless Sub-section (1) of Section 417, Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the State Government to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court. In acting in exercise of this power under Sub-section (1) of Section 417 an appeal was filed. The State Government is, therefore, competent to present an appeal from an order of acquittal passed in this case. 10. The irregularity to which exception was taken by counsel for the Respondent which had been committed by describing the Appellant as the Puri Lodging House Fund has been removed by the subsequent application for correcting the memo of appeal. After bearing both parties on these two petitions filed by the State I accord my permission to amend the memo of appeal and the delay in filing the appeal is also condoned. The appeal is, therefore, now properly constituted. 11. The next question for consideration is whether the Magistrate is right in holding that the launching of the present prosecution is bad in law. Breach of the rules 6 and 7 of the Orissa Road Terminal Tax Collection Rules, 1951, is an offence within the meaning of definition of the word "offence" u/s 4(0) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Section 190(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, or upon a report in writing of such facts mode by any police officer or upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed. "Complaint," has been defined in Section 4(h) of the Code as meaning an allegation or allegations made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking section under the Code that some person whether known or unknown, has committed an offence. It therefore, appears from these provisions that any person who acquires knowledge of commission of any offence may pet the law in motion by filing a complaint even though he is not personally injured or affected by the said offence. 12. It therefore, appears from these provisions that any person who acquires knowledge of commission of any offence may pet the law in motion by filing a complaint even though he is not personally injured or affected by the said offence. 12. There is nothing in the Code restricting filing of complaints to persons who are directly injured as a result of the commission of an offence. Even a person who has no direct knowledge of the acts or omissions constituting an offence may file a complaint and thereby set the law in motion. The Code, however, recognizes certain exceptions to the general rule that any person can set the law in motion against an offender by filing a complaint before a competent Magistrate. These exceptions are provided in Sections 195, 196, 198, and 199 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The present case is not one which is covered by those sections. Accordingly, there appears to be no legal bar to the clerk of the Lodging House Fund, Puri, filing the complaint petition which is the prosecution report in the present case. The fund is in charge of the Magistrate who by his order of sanction is deemed to have authorised his subordinate clerk to lodge the complaint with the Magistrate. I am, therefore, quite convinced that the launching of the prosecution is quite legal and valid. The Magistrate was, therefore, in error in acquitting the accused on this ground. 13. The Respondent has argued against the finding of the Magistrate on facts in this appeal. After going through the evidence, I am inclined to hold that the finding of the Magistrate that the tax has been collected and not credited to the Fund is not sustainable. 14. The prosecution has examined four witnesses. P.W. 1 is the clerk of the Puri Lodging House Fund. He is not a competent witness to prove the factum of collection of terminal tax by the accused during the relevant months. He has fairly disclaimed any knowledge on this point. P.W. 2 is a checker of the terminal tax collections. There is a check-post at Kumarpara outpost maintained on behalf of the Puri Lodging House Fund. This witness says to have been present at that outpost during the relevant months of November, and December, 1963. He has fairly disclaimed any knowledge on this point. P.W. 2 is a checker of the terminal tax collections. There is a check-post at Kumarpara outpost maintained on behalf of the Puri Lodging House Fund. This witness says to have been present at that outpost during the relevant months of November, and December, 1963. He and one P.K. Das had the duty of making necessary entries in Terminal Tax Registers maintained in respect of the bus D.R.C. 280 at the check post. Ext. 2 is such a register for the month of November, 1963, and Ext. 3 is for the month of December, 1963. After making necessary entries in those registers, the driver of the bus for the time being was made to sign against such entries. But he is also categorical that he has not seen the actual collection of the taxes by the accused. In view of this statement of p. w. 2, the entries made in Exts. 2 and 3 regarding collection of terminal tax can have no more value than mere hearsay. P.W. 3 is the driver of the bus belonging to the accused. His evidence is that he has seen the terminal taxes being collected from the taxable passengers. It appears as if he had also taken part in the said collection, but in cross-examination he is compelled to admit that he had not seen the terminal tax being collected as such. His further evidence is that fare was collected by Banshidhar Das, p.w. 1. The latter, as already seen, has flatly denied it and thereby contradicts this witness. P.w. 1 being the clerk of the Lodging House Fund can have no right to collect fares from the, passengers. Duty to collect terminal tax as part of the fare is squarely laid by law on the owner of the bus. Therefore, p.w. 3 obviously is not speaking the truth when he says, that p.w. 1 was collecting the fare. Thus, it appears that he was completely in the dark as to who was collecting fare and if terminal tax was being collected at all as part of the fare. His evidence, accordingly is useless for the prosecution. P.w. 4 is another driver of the vehicle of the accused. He has also signed the registers, Exts. 2 and 3 maintained at the check-post. His evidence, accordingly is useless for the prosecution. P.w. 4 is another driver of the vehicle of the accused. He has also signed the registers, Exts. 2 and 3 maintained at the check-post. According to him, he collected the fares for seven days only, but not the terminal tax from the passengers. He does not know who fixed the fares for those days. Obviously therefore, he cannot say if terminal tax was part of such fare. No reliance can be placed on him for holding that any terminal tax was collected on those days. Exts. 2 and 3 show that there were four drivers of the bus, one was Maheswar Satpathy, the second was p.w. 3, the third was p.w. 4, and the fourth was one Chintamani Padhi. Maheswar Satpathy and Chintamani Padhi are not coming forward in support of the prosecution case. Further, Exts. 2 and 3 do not appear to have been kept in regular course of business. This evidence is provided by those documents themselves. There are two columns in those registers. Col. 11 is meant for putting in the ticket number, and Col. 12 is intended for making an entry of the number of the book, presumably the ticket book. Those two columns in those registers have not been appropriately filled up. Col. 12 is completely blank. In Co1. 11 under the heading 'ticket no' entries "up and down" have been made indicating the directions in which the bus plied in between puri and Konarak. On a scrutiny of the entries, I am convinced that they are wrong in many places. By way of illustration, I would cite one instance; that is, the entries against date 4-11-1963 in Ext. 2. There are two entries against this date. The first entry shows running of the bus O.R.C. 280 from Puri to Konarak and Bhubaneswar. Against that entry in Co1. 11 it is noted up and down. Therefore, the second entry against the same date in 001. 11 becomes meaningless because the entry there is "down". This entry "down" is obviously inappropriate because the down bus has already been noted in the first entry. 15. Thus, the material entries in Exts. 2 and 3, relevant to the prosecution case are based on hearsay information, and Exts. 2 and 3 do not appear to have been regularly and properly maintained which affects their probative value considerably. 16. This entry "down" is obviously inappropriate because the down bus has already been noted in the first entry. 15. Thus, the material entries in Exts. 2 and 3, relevant to the prosecution case are based on hearsay information, and Exts. 2 and 3 do not appear to have been regularly and properly maintained which affects their probative value considerably. 16. The notification which has imposed the terminal tax provides two rates of taxes, one for class II passengers and the other far class III passengers. Rate for class II passengers is 12 paise and the rate for class III passengers is 19 paise. No standard, however, has been laid down there for classification of passengers for purposes of imposition of tax. Exts. 2 and 3 show that the bus had only two classes, viz., lower and upper. There is nothing in the evidence to indicate if these lower and upper class passengers would be covered by the classes of passengers designated in the notification. Of course, from the amount of terminal tax collected as mentioned in that column it appears that this lower class is equivalent to second class of the notification. But that is not enough to solve the problem. There must be evidence to show what the second class means and what a third class passenger means in the Government notification prescribing the rates of tax to be collected from the different classes of passengers. It is to be seen from this notification that first class passengers are exempted from payment of terminal tax. It is clearly the duty of the prosecution to establish beyond any reasonable doubt that the notification was attracted to the present case. Any collection of tax made by the accused on an assumption that the passengers of his bus fell under one category or other of the notification, would not relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove that the notification applied. We cannot assume anything. In these circumstances, it is quite clear that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused that the' passengers who were travelling in the bus of the accused during relevant period were taxable passengers and that he had collected terminal tax. Rules 6 and 7 cannot be held to have been breached by the accused in this case. The finding of the Magistrate therefore is not correct and must be reversed. Rules 6 and 7 cannot be held to have been breached by the accused in this case. The finding of the Magistrate therefore is not correct and must be reversed. The net result is that even though the ground on which the acquittal has been made is found to be unsustainable, yet the order of acquittal must be maintained, because on facts I am convinced that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the accused.