Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Naubat — 1969 DIGILAW 143 (ALL)

JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - In these 37 revisions, common questions of law and fact arise and it is convenient to dispose them of by one common judgment. 2. On January 1, 1956, the Jaswant Sugar Mills Limited, Meerut, the applicant before us, suspended 63 of its workmen on the charge of their indulging in "go slow." On January 9, 1956, the applicant held an inquiry and decided to dismiss all these workmen. As some industrial dispute was pending adjudication at that time between the applicant and its workmen, the applicant applied to the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut, for permission to dismiss the workmen. By order dated May 9, 1956, the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer granted permission in respect of 11 workmen but refused permission in respect of the remaining workmen. The applicant preferred an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal but the appeal was dismissed as incompetent on July 9, 1956. Thereafter the applicant obtained on September 10, 1956, from the Supreme Court of India special leave to appeal against the orders of the Regional Conciliation Officer and of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. By the order granting special leave, the Supreme Court also granted stay in the following terms : "That, subject to the condition that the petitioner-appellant herein pays to the 51 workers (respondents herein) ordered to be reinstated half of their wages from the date of this order or from such date on which they are expected to rejoin their duties, the implementation of the order dated 9-5-56 of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut in P. D. Case No. 15 of 1956 be and the same is hereby stayed pending the hearing and final disposal by this Court of the appeals by Special Leave above mentioned." The appeal was finally dismissed as incompetent by the Supreme Court on September 25, 1962. Thereafter the workmen, who are respondents in these revisions, applied to the applicant for reinstatement and payment of back wages but, by letters dated October, 3, 1962 and October 22, 1962, the applicant requested them to give it some time to consider over the matter. On October 12, 1962, the applicant filed a writ petition, being C. M. Writ Petition No. 3047 of 1962 before this Court, challenging the orders of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer and of the Labour Appellate Tribunal refusing to grant permission for the dismissal of the workmen. On October 12, 1962, the applicant filed a writ petition, being C. M. Writ Petition No. 3047 of 1962 before this Court, challenging the orders of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer and of the Labour Appellate Tribunal refusing to grant permission for the dismissal of the workmen. The writ petition was admitted on October 12, 1962. On November 1, 1962, this Court, after hearing both parties, passed the following order : "Until further orders, the respondents are restrained from enforcing the order of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut, dated May 9, 1956, provided the petitioner pays to the respondents-workmen half of the monthly wages from this month onwards by the 15th of every month. If half of the wages of the workmen for two consecutive months are not paid, the interim order shall stand automatically discharged." The writ petition was dismissed on December 18, 1962, on the ground of laches. Thereafter the workmen again demanded I reinstatement and payment of back wages I from the applicant but, by letter dated December 24, 1962, the applicant requested for some time to consider the matter. On January 14, 1963, the applicant dismissed all the workmen and refused either to reinstate them or to pay them their back wages. In the first and second weeks of June, 1963, 38 workmen filed applications under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, claiming wages for the period from January 1, 1956 to January 14, 1963. The applicant raised an objection that all these applications were time-barred. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Meerut, who is the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, held that the applications were time-barred, except for the period comprising Dec. 1962 and Jan. 1 to 14, 1963. He accordingly rejected all the applications in respect of the claims for the period from January 1, 1956 upto November 30, 1962, and issued notices to the applicant in respect of the remaining period only. Against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the 38 employees filed appeals before the appellate authority. The IInd Additional District Judget Meerut, who heard the appeals, allowed all the 38 appeals by his order dated August 3, 1965, condoning the delay in filing the claim petitions, and sent the cases back to the Sub-Divisional Officer for deciding them on merits. Against the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, the 38 employees filed appeals before the appellate authority. The IInd Additional District Judget Meerut, who heard the appeals, allowed all the 38 appeals by his order dated August 3, 1965, condoning the delay in filing the claim petitions, and sent the cases back to the Sub-Divisional Officer for deciding them on merits. Against the order of the IInd Additional District Judge, the appellant filed 38 revisions in this Court, One of the revisions, namely, Civil Revision No. 1540 of 1965 (Jaswant Sugar Mills, Limited, Meerut v. Bed Ram came up for hearing before Kirty, J. and he, by his order dated May 10, 1968, dismissed the revision. It was not brought to his notice that the present 37 revisions, which were connected with that revision, were also pending disposal. These 37 revisions then came up for hearing before Verma, J. He was inclined to disagree with the view taken by Kirty, J. but, feeling that it would not be proper for a Single Judge to take a contrary view on the same set of facts and on the same questions of law, he has referred these revisions for decision to a larger Bench. That is how these 37 revisions have come up before us for hearing. 3. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act provides for the appointment of an authority to hear and decide claims arising out of deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages. Sub-section (2), which is material, is in these words : "15 (2). Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under sub-sec. (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under sub-section (3) : Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages was made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be: Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period." It appears from this that the claim petition may be made in respect of deduction from wages or for delay in payment of wages and should be filed within six months of the date of the deduction or from the date on which the payment of wages was due. The second proviso permits the authority to accept an application even after the expiry of six months if there is sufficient cause for the delay. 4. The learned Advocate General, appearing for the applicant in all these revisions, has contended that the IInd Additional District Judge has condoned the delay when no cause had at all been shown by the employees for the delay. According to him, the right to the wages accrued to the employees first on 9-5-56, when the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer refused permission to dismiss them, and thereafter from month to month when the wages became due. He submits that, even if the periods of pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court and of the writ petition in this Court be excluded in computing the limitation, there is still no explanation - good, bad or indifferent - for the delay after 18-12-62, when the writ petition was dismissed by this Court. The explanation must be for the whole period and for each day of delay till the date of the filing of the applications. If there is no explanation, as in these cases, there is no jurisdiction to condone the delay. In the alternative, he submits that, in any case, the cause of action accrued to the employees on 25-9-62, when the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court, and from that date time started running. Once time starts running, it cannot be stopped or suspended by any disability or inability of the party. In the alternative, he submits that, in any case, the cause of action accrued to the employees on 25-9-62, when the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court, and from that date time started running. Once time starts running, it cannot be stopped or suspended by any disability or inability of the party. Therefore, the applications, which were not made within six months of this date (for the period from 1-1-56 upto 25-9-62), were clearly time-barred. 5. Learned counsel for the employees has not sought to justify the order of the IInd Additional District Judge condoning the delay. On the other hand, he contends that the applications were filed within time. His case is, and that was also the case set up in the applications under Section 15, that the employers made illegal deductions from the wages of the employees on 14-1-63 when, for the first time, they refused to pay their wages. The real question, which arises for determination in these cases, is as to on what date the cause of action for making the applications under Section 15 finally arose and from what date time started running. 6. It is the case of both the parties that, on the passing of the order of suspension on 1-1-56, the employees lost their right to wages, and the right accrued only when the order dated 9-5-56, refusing to grant permission to dismiss the workmen, was made. Admittedly, the right of the employees to their wages is entirely dependent on and flows out of this order. The right arose on 9-5-1956, the date on which the order was made, and on 9-7-1956 when the appeal against that order was dismissed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. No doubt, the applications under Section 15 (2) could have been filed after that date and within six months thereof but, before this period expired, the employers moved the Supreme Court and on 10-9-1956 obtained a stay order under which "the implementation of the order dated 9-5-1956 of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut" was stayed. What is the effect of this stay order? The stay order has to be read along with the order dated 9-5-1956. Under that oilier, the employees became entitled to: (i) claim reinstatement; and (ii) claim their wages. The Supreme Court stayed the implementation of this order. What is the effect of this stay order? The stay order has to be read along with the order dated 9-5-1956. Under that oilier, the employees became entitled to: (i) claim reinstatement; and (ii) claim their wages. The Supreme Court stayed the implementation of this order. The result was that the employees could, during the pendency of the appeal before the Supreme Court, neither claim reinstatement nor their wages. As a condition for granting the stay, the employers were directed to pay half the wages falling due to the employees. In effect, the stay order made inoperative the refusal of the permission to dismiss the employees and put the order dated 9-5-1956 in abeyance. The employees were relegated to the position in which they were before the order dated 9-5-1956 was passed, that is to say, their suspension continued subject only to this that they were to be paid half their wages. Upon the final decision of the Supreme Court depended the right of the employees to claim reinstatement and wages and till then the matter was to be treated as not decided at all. Even if any application under Section 15 (2) had been filed by the employees before the stay order was granted, they could not have been concluded successfully during the period the stay order remained in force; nor could any such applications be filed during that period. Virtually, the cause of action of the employees for making applications under Section 15 (2) was nullified by the stay order, as the order dated 9-5-1956, out of which this right flowed, was rendered inoperative and ineffective as from the date on which it was made till the final decision of the Supreme Court. When the cause of action is nullified, a fresh right of action accrues and a fresh period of limitation starts when the right revives. The right revived when the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, on 25-9-1962 a fresh period of limitation started running. 7. Again, the employees could have filed applications under Section 15 (2) on 25-9-1962 or within a period of six months from that date. The right revived when the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, on 25-9-1962 a fresh period of limitation started running. 7. Again, the employees could have filed applications under Section 15 (2) on 25-9-1962 or within a period of six months from that date. But, before this period of six months expired, the employers filed the writ petition before this Court and on 1-11-1962 a stay order was passed, restraining the employees and the authorities "from enforcing the order of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer, Meerut, dated 9-5-1956." The only way, in which the order dated 9-5-1956 could be enforced was by claiming reinstatement and wages before the appropriate authorities. This the stay order retained the employees from doing. If the employees had made any applications under Section 15 before the passing of the stay order, they could not have carried them to a successful conclusion during the period the stay order remained in force; nor could they file- any fresh applications during that period. ,This stay order also rendered the order dated 9-5-1956 ineffective and inoperative from its inception till the writ petition was dis- missed on 18-12-1962. The cause of action for making the applications under Section 15 (2) was thus again nullified and revived again on 18-12-1962. 8. The combined effect of the two stay orders is that the order dated 9-5-1956 remained ineffective and inoperative from the date it was made till 18-12-1982. During all this time the employees must be deemed to have remained under continuous suspension. It was on this date, namely 18-12-1962 that the order of 9-5-1956 really acquired vitality and force and the rights in favour of the employees started finally flowing from it. The right (cause of action) which the order sought to give to the employees, which had been nullified by the stay orders, was finally conferred upon them and limitation started running from this date. 9. The applicant's contention that once time starts to run, it cannot be stopped is based on the provisions of Section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which provides: "9. 9. The applicant's contention that once time starts to run, it cannot be stopped is based on the provisions of Section 9 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which provides: "9. Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to sue stops it: Provided that, where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the time prescribed for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues." It has been urged on behalf of the employees that Section 9 is applicable only to Courts and the authority under the Payment of Wages Act is not a Court. It is unnecessary to go into this controversy, as apart from Section 9, the Common law also recognises the principle that once limitation starts running, it cannot be stopped on account of the disability or inability of the parties. Disability or inability is something personal to the plaintiff or the applicant. Disability has been defined as want of qualification to act and inability as want of physical power to act; ' but lack or absence of the cause of action is neither disability nor inability. Section 9 as well as the principle of continuous running of time contemplate cases where the cause of action continues to exist. They cannot apply to cases where the cause of action is cancelled by subsequent events. The Courts have recognised the principle of nullification of the cause of action by subsequent events, wiping out the time which has run and the starting of the fresh period of limitation on the revival of the cause of action from the date of revival. 10. In Baijnath Sahai v. Ramgut Singh, (1896) ILR 23 Cal 775 (PC) the question arose whether a suit for cancellation of a sale , filed more than 12 months after the date of confirmation was within time. A mahal was sold by the Collector and purchased by one B on 24-9-1882. The proprietors applied to the Commissioner not to confirm the sale but on 25-1-1884 the Commissioner confirmed it. The proprietors went up in revision to the Board of Revenue. On 12-8-1884 the Board of Revenue set aside the order of the Commissioner and remanded the case back to the Collector. The proprietors applied to the Commissioner not to confirm the sale but on 25-1-1884 the Commissioner confirmed it. The proprietors went up in revision to the Board of Revenue. On 12-8-1884 the Board of Revenue set aside the order of the Commissioner and remanded the case back to the Collector. The Collector refused to confirm the sale and an appeal to the Commissioner against that order was dismissed as incompetent. An appeal was then taken to the Board of Revenue which held on 21-8-86, that its earlier order dated 12-8-1884 was without jurisdiction with the result that "the order of the Commissioner of 25-1-1884 became an operative order". The proprietors then filed a suit on 26-7-1887 for setting aside the sale. The suit was resisted, inter alia, on the ground of. limitation as it was filed beyond the period of limitation of 12 months from the date of confirmation of the sale by the Commissioner on 25-1-1884. The Privy Council held that the suit was within time. It observed: "Their Lordships are of opinion that there was no final, conclusive and definitive order confirming the sale, while the question whether the sale should be confirmed was in litigation, or until the order of the Commissioner of the 25th January, 1884 became definitive and operative by the final judgment of the Board of Revenue on the 21st August, 1886, or (in other words) that for the purpose of the law of limitation there was no final or definitive confirmation of the sale until that date In fact, their Lordships are of opinion that there was not during the period which had elapsed between the date of the sale and the 21st of August, 1886, any sale to set aside which a suit could have been brought by the present appellant and respondents." 11. In Muthu Korakki Chetty v. Mahamad Madar Ammal, A.I.R. 1920 Mad 1 (FB) the question, which arose for consideration, was whether an application by an auction-purchaser to be put in possession of the properties purchased by him was within time or not. The properties were purchased at a Court auction on 25-3-1913 and the sale was confirmed on 26-4-1913. After the expiry of the period of limitation, an application for setting aside the sale was filed. The properties were purchased at a Court auction on 25-3-1913 and the sale was confirmed on 26-4-1913. After the expiry of the period of limitation, an application for setting aside the sale was filed. The Court of first instance allowed the application in respect of part of the properties sold on 25-6-1915 and its order was upheld by the appellate Court on 13-5-1916. Thereafter an application was presented on 19-2-1917 by the auction-purchaser for delivery of possession over the properties purchased by him. The case was governed by Article 180 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provided a period of limitation of three years from the date when the sale becomes absolute. The application was clearly beyond three years of the date on which the sale was confirmed but was within time from 13-5-1916 when the final order on the application to set aside the sale was passed. A Full Bench of the Madras High Court held that the application was within time. Sada-siva Aiyar, J., in the course of his judgment, observed: "... . Whenever proceedings are being conducted between the parties bona fide in order to have their mutual rights and obligations in respect of a matter finally settled, the cause of action for an application or for a suit, the relief claimable wherein follows naturally on the result of such proceedings, should be held to arise only on the date when those proceedings finally settled such rights and liabilities." Seshagiri Aiyar, J. observed: ". . . . Subject to the exemptions, exclusion, mods of computation and the excusing of delay, etc., which are provided in the Limitation Act, the language of col. 3, Sch. 1, should be so interpreted as to carry out the true intention of the Legislature, that is to say, by dating the cause of action from a date when the remedy is available to the party," Jateendra Chandra v. Rebateemohan Das, A.I.R. 1935 Cal 333 is also a case of an application for delivery of possession by an auction-purchaser. In this case, a mortgage decree was passed on 3-12-1917. On 2-1-1925 a suit was filed for declaration that the mortgaged properties were not liable to be sold as the mortgagor had no title to them. During the pendency of the suit, the mortgaged properties were sold on 7-4-1926 and purchased by the decree-holder. On 10-5-1926 the sale was confirmed. In this case, a mortgage decree was passed on 3-12-1917. On 2-1-1925 a suit was filed for declaration that the mortgaged properties were not liable to be sold as the mortgagor had no title to them. During the pendency of the suit, the mortgaged properties were sold on 7-4-1926 and purchased by the decree-holder. On 10-5-1926 the sale was confirmed. On 23-8-1926 the decree-holder applied for delivery of possession. On account of obstruction, he was unable to obtain possession and the application was dismissed thereafter for default. The suit for declaration was decreed on 14-5-1928 and it was declared that the properties were not liable to be sold in execution of the decree. On 15-7-1931 an appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. On 8-10-1931 the auction-purchaser applied for delivery of possession over the properties purchased by him. The application was resisted, inter alia, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the application was not time-barred. During the course of its judgment, it observed: "The effect of the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, however, was that it was declared by a competent Court that the decree-holders had acquired no right on the basis of their auction-purchase in execution of the mortgage decree and consequently had no right to get possession. This decree was binding on the auction-purchasers until it was set aside by the Court of appeal. Consequently, the position is that there was a cancellation of the cause of action for delivery of possession by the decree of the Subordinate Judge on 14th May, 1928, operating to suspend the rights of the auction-purchasers- Consequently, they are entitled, on removal of the cancellation by the Court of appeal, to avail of a fresh cause of action, which arose by reason thereof." It was also observed in this case that Section 9 of the Limitation Act contemplates cases where the cause of action continues to exist and that it cannot apply to a case where the cause of action is cancelled by reason of subsequent events. 12. In Prabhakar Nilkanth v. Chandra-kant Narayanrao, A.I.R. 1943 Nag 178 the question of limitation arose in connection with a suit for a personal decree by the mortgagee for being deprived of a part of the security. 12. In Prabhakar Nilkanth v. Chandra-kant Narayanrao, A.I.R. 1943 Nag 178 the question of limitation arose in connection with a suit for a personal decree by the mortgagee for being deprived of a part of the security. Here one of the mortgaged plots was sold for default of the mortgagor to pay land revenue. The sale was confirmed on 31-8-1931. The mortgagee filed an application to have the sale set aside. The sale was set aside by the Deputy Commissioner and his order was upheld by the Commissioner but, eventually, the Revenue Member again confirmed the sale on 22-4-1933. The mortgagee thereupon filed a suit on 16-7-1938 for a personal decree against the mortgagor for being deprived of a part of the security. The suit was beyond time from the original order of confirmation which was passed on 31-8-1931 but was within time from the date of the order of the Revenue Member. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court held that the suit was within time and that a fresh cause of action was afforded to the mortgagee by' the order of the Revenue Member. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in A.I.R. 1935 Cal 333 (supra) was followed. 13. In Sri Niwas v. Baleshwar Prasad, AIR 1950 Allahabad 526 the question of limitation arose in a suit by the mortgagee for possession of the mortgaged property for failure of the mortgagor to pay interest. In this case, the mortgagor had stipulated that, iii case interest was not paid on the due dates, the mortgagee would be entitled to take possession of the mortgaged property. Defaults in payment of interest were committed but they were followed by the execution of sarkhats and payment of interest by such execution. Interest was paid in this way until 1937. In a suit by the mortgagee instituted in 1945 for possession, the question was whether the suit was barred by limitation because it was brought more than 12 years after the first default had been made in the payment of interest. It was held that it was not barred. The argument that under Section 9 of the Limitation Act, time having started to run, it could not be stopped was repelled by V. Bhargava, J. (as he then was) in these words:- "The principle laid down under Section 9 cannot be disputed but this principle is subject to certain exceptions. It was held that it was not barred. The argument that under Section 9 of the Limitation Act, time having started to run, it could not be stopped was repelled by V. Bhargava, J. (as he then was) in these words:- "The principle laid down under Section 9 cannot be disputed but this principle is subject to certain exceptions. Even where time has begun to run, it can be stopped, provided the cause of action, which had given the right to sue, is discharged or in any way disappears. If the cause of action is discharged, the right to sue no longer exists and consequently' the time will no longer continue to run." The last case to be noticed in this connection is Dwijendra Narain v. Joges Chandra, AIR 1924 Calcutta 600. In this case, A executed on 17-1-1913 certain pattas in favour of B but, on the objections of A, registration was refused on 7-5-1913. B filed a suit on 19-11-1913 to enforce registration. The suit was dismissed on 3-3-1915. Thereafter A executed pattas in respect of the same properties in favour of C. On 4-6-1918 the High Court allowed the appeal of B and decreed the suit. This decree was upheld by the Privy Council by its judgment dated 10-11-1920. Thereafter on 29-4-1921 B filed a suit for recovery of possession and for mesne profits against A and C. It was contended by the defendants that the suit for mesne profits in respect of periods beyond three years of the date of the filing of the suit was time-barred. This contention was repelled by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and it held that time started running from 10-11-1920 and the entire suit was within time. The Division Bench observed: ". .. . ordinarily limitation runs from the earliest time at which an action can be brought and after time has commenced to run, there may be a revival of a right to sue when a previous satisfaction of the claim is nullified with the result that the right to sue, which had been suspended is re-animated." It then cited with approval the observations of Sadasiva Aiyar, J. in A.I.R. 1920 Mad 1 (FB) (supra). It then went on to say: "The cause of action arises when and only when the aggrieved party has the right to apply to the proper tribunals for relief. It then went on to say: "The cause of action arises when and only when the aggrieved party has the right to apply to the proper tribunals for relief. The statute does not attach to a claim for which there is as yet no right of action and does not run against a right for which there is no corresponding remedy or for which judgment cannot be obtained. Consequently, the true test to determine when a cause of action has accrued is to ascertain the time when plaintiff could first have maintained his action to a successful result." The following principles emerge from an examination of the decided cases and of the provisions of law:- (i) That limitation can only run when there is a subsisting and enforceable cause of acton; (ii) when a claim is satisfied, nullified or rendered incapable of enforcement, no action can be taken in respect of it, because there is nothing which can be enforced; (iii) that the satisfaction or nullification of a claim or cause of action wipes out any time which may' have run before the satisfaction or nullification as thereafter no action can be maintained to a successful result and, for the same reason, time will not run thereafter; (iv) that if the satisfaction or nullification is set aside, the claim or cause of action revives and action can then be taken to enforce it; and (v) that time will start running afresh when the claim or cause or cause of action is revived by the setting aside or vacation of the satisfaction or nullification. 14. Reference may now be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Divisional Supdt., Northern Rly., Allahabad v. Pushkar Datt Sharma, (1969) 14 Fac LR 204 (SC). In this case, Sharma, who was an employee of the Northern Railway, was dismissed from service on December 23, 1947. He filed a suit, challenging the dismissal, which was decreed on 31-3-1951 and the dismissal was declared to be illegal. The Railway's appeal against this decree was allowed on 14-8-1952 and the suit was dismissed. Sharma then filed a second appeal which was allowed on 9-1-1962 and the suit was again decreed. He then filed an application under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act on 7-7-1962. The question was whether this application was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that it was filed within time. Sharma then filed a second appeal which was allowed on 9-1-1962 and the suit was again decreed. He then filed an application under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act on 7-7-1962. The question was whether this application was time-barred. The Supreme Court held that it was filed within time. It observed: ".. . . when the appellate Court dismissed the respondent's suit on August 14, 1952, it was not open to the respondent to apply under Section 15 (2), because the appellate Court had held that his dismissal was justified and valid. It was only when the second appeal was allowed on January 9, 1962, that the respondent had a cause of action." This decision, therefore, lays down: (i) That no application could have been made while the dismissal order remained in force; and (ii) that the cause of action for making the application under Section 15 (2) arose only after the dismissal order was finally held to be illegal and not at any earlier point of time even when the suit stood decreed by the trial Court. 15. The learned Advocate-General relied upon the decision of a Single Judge of this Court in Sheo Prasad v. Addl. District Judge, Moradabad, AIR 1962 Allahabad 144. In this case, an employee had been suspended on 14-3-1948 and removed from service on 21-6-1948 and his suit for declaration that the removal was wrongful was decreed on 21-9-1955. He filed the application under Section 15 (2) on 1-3-1956. The Single Judge held that the application was time-barred and observed: ".... as the petitioner was suspended and subsequently removed in the year 1948, it was obvious that wages were, in fact, due in the year 1948 on the footing that the removal was wrongful. The starting point of limitation for preferring the claim was, therefore, the date of suspension (or perhaps the date of removal) and not the date of decision by the Civil Court, although it may be that it was not practicable to put forward a claim for wages until a decision from the Civil Court was obtained." This decision is clearly against the decision of the Supreme Court and a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Kishore Sharma v. Addl. Dist. Judge, Saharanpur, 1969 All LJ 225 has overruled it. 16. Dist. Judge, Saharanpur, 1969 All LJ 225 has overruled it. 16. As already observed above, the effect of the stay orders granted by the Supreme Court and by this Court is that the order dated 9-5-1956 remained ineffective and inoperative till 18-12-1962 and during all this time, the employees must be deemed to have remained under continuous suspension. It was on 18-12-1962 that the suspension came finally to an end as the order dated 9-5-1956 became effective. Therefore, time for making the applications under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act started running from 18-12-1962. Even if the stay orders be construed as not suspending or nullifying the cause of action continuously from the beginning till 18-12-1962, the result will still be the same. On the granting of the stay order by the Supreme Court, the cause of action was nullified during the pendency of the appeal and revived on 25-9-1962 when the appeal was dismissed and a fresh period of limitation started running from that date. Before the period expired, the cause of action was again nullified by the stay order granted by the High Court. It revived on 18-12-1962 when the writ petition was dismissed and a fresh period of limitation started running from that date. The applications were admittedly made within six months of this date and were within time. In this view, it is unnecessary to consider the contention of learned counsel for Opposite Parties that there was no deduction of wages or delay in payment thereof till the employers refused reinstatement and wages on 14-1-1963. 17. Before concluding, the following observations of the Supreme Court in Divisional Superintendent, (1967) 14 Fac LR 204 (SC) (supra) may be quoted: "Besides, it is not easy to understand why the appellant should have come to this Court when it is now established by the final decision of the Allahabad High Court that the dismissal of the respondent was illegal. In view of that finding, it is plainly the duty of the appellant to pay the respondent all wages due to him." These observations are apposite to the present case also. 18. In the result, all the applications in revision are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.