Judgment :- 1. Precedents can make law a wilderness where courts, counsel and clients grope to find their path as this case has proved. 2. The suit out of which this revision has stemmed, was one for partition and recovery of possession of two items of property. We are concerned here only with item 1 and defendant No. 2. The plea of this defendant, who is not a sharer, is that he is a tenant of item No.1 and the plaintiffs case, on the other hand, is that he is just a caretaker of this property. The controversy therefore is as to whether the 2nd defendant is only an agent or a tenant. A petition had been filed by the 2nd defendant, as early as 1962, for fixation of fair real which was re-numbered as O. A. 3586 of 1964. The long lapse of 5 years has left this rather summary proceeding before a quasi-judicial authority still lingering in the trial stage. By way of aside, is it not true that such interminable delay breeds cynicism about justice, brings courts into disrepute and corrodes the very foundations of constitutional government? It may be good to recall the warning of Pope Paul, in opening the judicial year of the Sacred Roman Rota, that "culpable delay' in the tribunal's dispensing of justice is 'in itself an act of injustice' " 3. This limping litigation before the Land Tribunal for determination of fair rent has, however, been used by the 2nd defendant to contend, based on S.32 of Act 1/64 that the suit is not entertainable at all. 4. S.32 of the Act reads: "During the pendency of an application for determination of fair rent before a Land Tribunal no Court shall entertain any suit for eviction of the applicant from the holding to which the application relates, or pass any order of injunction prohibiting him from entering the holding or pass any order staying the proceedings before the Land Tribunal." This legislative mandate is motivated by the anxiety to protect cultivating tenants from the blackmail tactics of landlords by suing for eviction when the former applied for fixation of fair rent under S.31. It is not enough that agrarian legislation confers paper rights; it must ensure conditions for fearless enjoyment thereof by the tenantry. 5. It is not enough that agrarian legislation confers paper rights; it must ensure conditions for fearless enjoyment thereof by the tenantry. 5. The object of a statute is relevant to the construction thereof and it is legitimate to adopt a liberal construction that makes the provisions meaningful and effective. The law must be so interpreted as to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief which prorated the enactment, if need be even by departing from the dictionary meaning or the popular meaning of the words used. It is well settled that, while a rewriting of the section is not part of the judicial power, if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what commonsense would show as obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected, even if the same words in the same section and even in the same sentence have to be construed differently. It has been held that in order to give meaning to the intention of the legislature, some words may, in suitable cases, be read into the provision to avoid reducing them to an absurdity. I have said this much about the canons of interpretation of statutes for a proper appreciation of arguments addressed before me and the view I propose to adopt. 6. S 32, in terms, forbids the entertainment of "any suit for eviction of the applicant (before a Land Tribunal) from the holding". S.31 enables only a cultivating tenant or landlord to apply for determination of fair rent is respect of a holding. It is not as if a tenant who moves for fair rent fixation is, for ever, immune to eviction even where the landlord is entitled to resumption under the law. The embargo lasts only so long as the sensitive period during which a landlord may victimise a tenant by an eviction thereof and thus dissuade him from filing or proceeding with a fair rent petition. Thus a suit is liable to be rebuffed only if it is for eviction of a cultivating tenant from his holding and only so long as the proceeding under S.31 lasts. Let us be clear about the postulates for the application of S.32 and the legal consequence. Thus a suit is liable to be rebuffed only if it is for eviction of a cultivating tenant from his holding and only so long as the proceeding under S.31 lasts. Let us be clear about the postulates for the application of S.32 and the legal consequence. The suit must be for eviction of a cultivating tenant from his holding and there must be a fair rent petition pending; if so, the suit shall not be entertained what that means itself being moot. The defendant should be a tenant and not one who is only a caretaker or trespasser wearing the mask of a tenant and filing a fair rent application merely as a make-believe. Of course, S.32 is imperative that no Court shall entertain any suit for eviction from a holding during the pendency of an application for determination of fair rent. Not to entertain a suit may mean not to receive it at all or merely not to deal with it judicially by considering it on the merits. Here a petition for fair rent is pending. Even so, is the defendant a tenant of a holding? This depends, as I will presently explain, not on the averments in the plaint nor on the defence raised in the written statement but on the suit being one in fact for eviction of a tenant from his holding. All these three expressions project an image of tenancy, denoting one aspect and connoting the other aspects of a tenancy. 7. There are three views possible about the application of this provision. Firstly, in every case where the defendant pleads that he is a tenant and proves that a fair rent application at his instant is pending, the suit for eviction should not be entertained. Secondly, every suit purporting to be based on plaintiff's title for recovery of possession against a trespasser-defendant can be entertained unless the defendant establishes conclusively that he is a tenant. Lastly, irrespective of the wording of the pleadings, the defendant is entitled to contend that the suit is not entertainable if he makes out a prima facie case of tenancy, as distinguished from finally and definitely establishing it. All the three view points have had judicial champions in a sister statute, Act 12 of 1966. Madhavan Nair J. in 1967 KLT. All the three view points have had judicial champions in a sister statute, Act 12 of 1966. Madhavan Nair J. in 1967 KLT. 508 observed, while dealing with S.8 of that Act as follows: "It would not then be reasonable to hold that merely because the plaint in a suit for eviction of a tenant is framed as for eviction of a trespasser or a caretaker or a licensee, the section must be excluded. The nature of the suit, in the context of S.8 of the Act 12 of 1966, depends not on the averments in the plaint but on the controversy arising out of pleadings as to the status of the defendant concerned." His Lordship expressed himself in such manner as to mean "that the moment the defendant states that he is a cultivating tenant the Court has no option but to grant a stay under S.8 of the Act" The second view has appealed to Raman Nayar J., as he then was, in a reference order in CRP. 1019 of 1967. The learned judge expressed himself with reference to S.8 of Act 12 of 1966, in the following words: "Section 8 of Act 12 of 1966 does not say that a suit for eviction has to be stayed if the defendant claims to be a cultivating tenant any more than it says that it need not be stayed if the plaintiff avers that the defendant is not a cultivating tenant. It has first to be found that the defendant is a cultivating tenant before a stay is ordered." In the same strain a Division Bench of this Court, in 1958 KLT. 1048 (M.S. Menon and Vaidialingam JJ.) has held, with reference to a kindred statute, Act I of 1957, in these terms: "We are of the view that S.4 of Act I of 1957 does not debar the courts from considering the question whether a person who claims to be a tenant is a tenant or not. 1048 (M.S. Menon and Vaidialingam JJ.) has held, with reference to a kindred statute, Act I of 1957, in these terms: "We are of the view that S.4 of Act I of 1957 does not debar the courts from considering the question whether a person who claims to be a tenant is a tenant or not. It is only after a decision is arrived at finally regarding the rights claimed by him that the question of application of S.4 arises." A later Division Bench (M. S. Menon, C. J., and Govindan Nair J.) while disapproving of the stand taken by Madhavan Nair J. struck a middle path and disagreed with the view that "a Court should finally decide that the defendant is a cultivating tenant before a stay is ordered under S.8 of the Act All that is required is a prima facie satisfaction on the part of the Court that such is the case". It may be noted that there is no reference here to the Division Bench decision in 1958 KLT. 1048, which was rendered under a different but closely allied statute, though. 8. S.32 of Act 1 of 1964 itself has come up for consideration in three rulings of this Court two reported in 1965 KLT. 468 and in 1967 KLT. 335 and the third is in CMA. Nos. 96 and 97 of 1958. In the first Raman Nayar J., as he then was, ruled that "For S.32 of Act 1 of 1964 to apply so as to bar a suit there must first be a holding and, in the absence of any provision of law excluding its jurisdiction, the question whether the property in suit constitutes a holding so as to attract the bar is primarily a question for the Court in which the suit is brought to decide. I see nothing in S.32 which vests exclusive jurisdiction in the matter in the Land Tribunal or which otherwise bars the jurisdiction of the civil court either expressly or impliedly." His Lordship rejected the argument that a mere claim',by the defendant that he is a tenant of a holding is sufficient to repel the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and invite the operation of the embargo under S.32 and said: "It is said that the word 'holding' in the section must be read as 'alleged holding' so that the momenta person, even a rank trespasser, claims to be a tenant and makes an application to a Land Tribunal for determining the fair rent of his alleged holding, a suit for his eviction would be barred. I see no warrant for so altering the section and if that is what the legislature meant nothing would have been simpler for it than to say 'Land' instead of 'holding'. It is also said that unless the section is read as barring the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the question whether the land constitutes holding or not, the section would serve little purpose. I do not know whether that is so, but even if it were, that, by itself would be insufficient to imply an ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court." Thus, His Lordship took the view that the existence of a tenancy must be proved as a fact, like any other fact, without being carried away by the argument that if the defendant proves that he is a tenant, there is no need for reliance on S.32 because a suit for eviction will not lie under Act I of 1964 against a tenant, as fixity of tenure has been conferred upon all tenants under S.13, subject to a few exceptions. There is, however, something to be said for the view that it is unlikely that a provision would have been incorporated in the Act if it served no purpose. A construction which renders a section otiose and thus stultifies the statute should be avoided as far as possible. There is, however, something to be said for the view that it is unlikely that a provision would have been incorporated in the Act if it served no purpose. A construction which renders a section otiose and thus stultifies the statute should be avoided as far as possible. Nor am I able to see, if I may say so with great deference how the use of word 'land' in the place of 'holding' will make any change so long as there is the use of the word 'eviction' in the section; for, as I have pointed out earlier, 'eviction', by definition, not only denotes recovery of possession but also necessarily connotes a tenant and a holding. Whatever that be, there is now this definite ruling of our Court that before S.32 of Act I of 1964 can apply so as to bar a suit, there must be proof of the existence of a holding and therefore of a tenancy also. This decision as well as a recent ruling of His Lordship in CMA. Nos. 96 and 97 of 1968 deal with the question of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide whether the defendant is a tenant or not and whether there is a holding or not. It appears to me that the rea question is not whether the civil court has such, jurisdiction it has, for reasons fully set out in the judgment in CMA. Nos. 96 and 97 of 1963 but whether the civil court should apply S.32 of Act I of 1964 (or S.8 of Act 12 of 1966 or S.4 of Act 9 of 1967) only if there is clear and definite proof by the defendant of his status as tenant and of his land being a holding or is it enough if he satisfies the court prima facie that it is 'so. If we adopt the ratio of 1968 KLT. 23, no more than primafacie satisfaction on the point is necessary I am assuming that the similarity in the purposes of the enactments and the crucial words of S.8 of Act 12 of 1966 and of S.32 of Act I of 1964 justify assigning the same meaning for the words 'suit for eviction, holding and tenant'. If we hark back to 1958 KLT. 1048, the conclusion has to be just the opposite. If we hark back to 1958 KLT. 1048, the conclusion has to be just the opposite. Raman Nayar J. (as he then was) has stuck to this view both under S.32 of Act I of 1964 and S, 8 of Act 12 of 1966. Raghavan J., in 1967 KLT. 335 has gravitated towards the same judicial stance, although the approach made is as to whether the civil court has jurisdiction to decide the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant and not exactly whether if it has jurisdiction, as later laid down in 1968 KLT. 23 proof need be only of the lesser degree. It has been represented to me at the bar, and that accords with my experience that in application for stay under S.4 of Act 9 of 1967 the middle course suggested in 1968 KLT. 23 has been taken as laying down the guideline. 9. Of the three views, we may now take as untenable the contention that the mere plea of the defendant that he is a tenant instantly shackles the progress of the proceedings. Of the other two, the chief merit of the 'prima facie' theory is that it does and the weakness of the strict proof theory springs from the same argument'that it does not recognise the futility of a provision for stay of a suit on final proof of tenancy since, in that event, under the other provisions of Act I of 1964, the suit, in the large majority of cases, will be altogether dismissed. Then why stay? And what benefit does the defendant derive under this Act after having been put to the necessity of proving his tenancy under the existing law? 10. Speaking of Act 9 of 1967, if a literal interpretation were to be adopted, the "definite and final conclusion" theory must be regarded as right. If a liberal construction is to be adopted, bearing in mind the object of the Act as a temporary moratorium on all kinds of evictions and quasi-evictions till the contemplated, comprehensive legislation probably enlarging the categories of tenants, of course straining current legal concepts in the law of real property and restricting evictions by lopping off the few grounds left is processed and passed into law, the 'prima facie' theory may be certainly justified. 11. 11. Similarly, Act 12 of 1966 fulfils itself only if a definite and final conclusion by the Court as to whether the defendant is a cultivating tenant or not, before ordering a stay under S.8 of the Act, is not insisted upon, the object of the enactment being to enable defendants who need the assistance of a record of rights to evidence their very status as tenants at the final trial of the suit, being provided for by the machinery of S.B. Strictly speaking, I am not concerned with Act 12 of IS66 nor with Act 1 of 1957, nor with Act 9 of 1967 except for purposes of analogy in the light of the reasoning adopted by judges in decisions rendered on those provisions. Looking at the purpose of S.32, I think, the emphasis was not on a temporary halt to the dispossession of tenants and even quasi-tenants yet to be defined and conferred fixity so that such categories may survive on their lands till the permanent legislation (in the offing) is placed on the statute book as in the case of S.4 of Act 9 of 1567. Nor was the accent on rendering aid to the defendants in that very suit such as by giving opportunity to get a record of rights made out by an administrative Tribunal so as to prove their claim as tenants when challenged in a Civil Court, as in the case of S.8 of Act 12 of 1966. The scope and object of S.32 of Act I of 1964 must be clearly kept in view so that the correct perspective may be available while construing the provision itself. Let us remind ourselves that S.32 appears in a permanent statute and not in a temporary legislation which freezes a situation so as to prevent a subsequent permanent legislation being defeated. We must also remember that the whole object of S.32 is to insulate actual tenants against threats of eviction so that they may freely apply for fixation of fair rent of their holdings. Once fair rent is fixed, the need to shield them from suits for eviction does not exist, because there are other provisions conferring fixity of tenure and restricting the grounds for presumption. Once fair rent is fixed, the need to shield them from suits for eviction does not exist, because there are other provisions conferring fixity of tenure and restricting the grounds for presumption. The limited purpose of S.32 being only to ward off any in terrorem actions against actual tenants, it will be legitimate to hold that the provision is calculated to protect those tenants who are able to show to the satisfaction of a court that they possess that status. The latitude that probably S.4 of Act 9 of 1967 and S.8 of Act 12 of 1966 deserve in their construction is not called for in interpreting S.32 of Act 1 of 1964. I, therefore, hold that in a suit for eviction filed by a landlord, during the pendency of a fair rent application at the instance of the defendant the latter can urge that the suit is not entertainable, only if he proves and proves in the normal way as required by S.3 of the Indian Evidence Act that he is a cultivating tenant of a holding. It is not enough if he makes out a presentable case. He must establish that fact definitely. 12. Supposing a suit has been filed during the pendency of a petition for fair rent before the Land Tribunal, what should the Court do with that suit? The taboo is on entertaining the suit for eviction by the Court. Does this mean that the plaint should be returned on the basis that the word 'entertain' means receive, or is it enough if the court declines to try the suit on the construction of the word 'entertain' as meaning admitting to judicial consideration? The Supreme Court had occasion to consider this expression 'entertain' in relation to legal proceedings once in AIR. 1961 SC.93 and again in AIR. 1968 S.C. 488. On the first occasion, the question arose whether the Regional Transport Authority, acting under the Motor Vehicles Act, could reject or refuse to receive an application for renewal of a permit if a scheme has been approved by the Government and the routes is regard to which the renewal is applied for have been included in the said scheme. On the first occasion, the question arose whether the Regional Transport Authority, acting under the Motor Vehicles Act, could reject or refuse to receive an application for renewal of a permit if a scheme has been approved by the Government and the routes is regard to which the renewal is applied for have been included in the said scheme. Subba Rao J., as he then was, observed in that context: "It is contended that the word "entertain" refers to an application filed for the renewal of a permit after the scheme was approved and that the said provision has no relevance to an application for renewal made before that date. The word "entertain" may mean "to receive on the file or keep on file", and in that sense the Authority may refuse to keep an application on its file by rejecting it either at the time it is filed or thereafter. It does not connote any time but only describes the scope of the duty under that clause. It can only mean that the Authority cannot dispose of the application on mints but can reject it as not maintainable. Any other meaning given to this word leads to an anomalous position, for even if the approval of the scheme had been brought to the notice of the Regional Transport Authority, it would have to order the renewal of the permit and thereafter it would have to cancel the permit, presumably, on an application filed by the State Transport Undertaking. We do not think that the Legislature used the word "entertain" to bring about that result. A wider meaning of the word "entertain" would enable the smooth working of the provisions of the section and we have no reason to accept the narrower meaning suggested by the learned counsel. We, therefore, hold that the Regional Transport Authority had power under S.68F (2) of the Act in the circumstances of the case to reject the applications filed by the petitioner." The rejection by the Transport Authority was held to be valid in that case. In AIR. 1968 S C. 488, the maintainability of an appeal under the Uttar Pradesh Sales-tax Act came up for consideration. In AIR. 1968 S C. 488, the maintainability of an appeal under the Uttar Pradesh Sales-tax Act came up for consideration. The defect, according to the Assistant Commissioner, was that the memorandum of appeal (which had been filed well within time was not accompanied by the challan showing the deposit of admitted tax under S.9 of the Uttar Pradesh Sales-tax Act, 1948 The Appellate Authority rejected as defective the memorandum of appeal because S.9 of that Act provided that "no appeal against an assessment shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due " Their Lordships observed, while dealing with this order of rejection of the appeal: "To begin with it must be noticed that the proviso merely requires that the appeal shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the amount of tax admitted by the appellant to be due. A question thus arises what is the-meaning of the word "entertained' in this context? Does it mean that no appeal shall be received or filed or does it mean that no appeal shall be admitted or heard and disposed of unless satisfactory proof is available? The dictionary meaning of the word 'entertain' was brought to our notice by the parties, and both sides agreed that it means either "to deal with or admit to consideration". We are also of the same opinion. The question, therefore, is at what stage can the appeal be said to be entertained for the purpose of the application of the proviso? Is it 'entertained' when it is filed or is it'entertained* when it is admitted and the date is fixed for hearing or is it finally "entertained" when it is heard and disposed of? Numerous cases exist in the law reports in which the word 'entertained' or similar cognate expressions have been interpreted by the courts. Some of them from the Allahabad High Court itself have been brought to our notice and we shall deal with them in due course. For the present, we must say that if the legislature intended that the word 'file' or 'receive' was to be used, there was no difficulty in using those words. In some of the statutes which were brought to our notice such expressions have in fact been used. For the present, we must say that if the legislature intended that the word 'file' or 'receive' was to be used, there was no difficulty in using those words. In some of the statutes which were brought to our notice such expressions have in fact been used. For example, under 0.41, R.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is stated that a memorandum shall not be filed or presented unless it is accompanied etc., in S.17 of the Small Causes Courts Act, the expression is 'at the time of presenting the application'. In S.6 of the Court Fees Act, the words are 'file' or 'shall be received'. It would appear from this that the Legislature was not at a loss for words if it had wanted to express itself in such forceful manner as is now suggested by counsel for the State. It has used the word 'entertain' and it must be accepted that it has used it advisedly. This word has come in for examination in some of the cases of the Allahabad High Court and we shall now refer to them. xx x x (9) The word 'entertain' is explained by a Divisional Bench of the Allahabad High Court as denoting the point of time at which an application to set aside the sale is heard by the court. The expression "entertain" it is stated, does not mean the same thing as the filing of the application, or admission of the application by the court. A similar view was again taken in Dhoom Chand Jain v. Chamanlal Gupta, AIR. 1962 All. 543 in which the learned Chief Justice Desai and Mr. Justice Dwivedi gave the same meaning to the expression 'entertain'. It is observed by Dwivedi, J. that the word 'entertain' in its application bears the meaning 'admitting to consideration', and therefore when the court cannot refuse to take an application which is backed by deposit or security, it cannot refuse judicially to consider it. In a single bench decision of the same court reported in Bawan Ram v. Kunji Beharilal AIR. 1962 All 42 one of us (Bhargava J.) had to consider the same rule. There the deposit had not been made within the period of limitation and the question had arisen whether the court could entertain the application or not. In a single bench decision of the same court reported in Bawan Ram v. Kunji Beharilal AIR. 1962 All 42 one of us (Bhargava J.) had to consider the same rule. There the deposit had not been made within the period of limitation and the question had arisen whether the court could entertain the application or not. It was decided that the application could not be entertained because proviso (b) debarred the court from entertaining an objection unless the requirement of depositing the amount or furnishing security was complied with within the time prescribed. In that case the word "entertain" is not interpreted but it is held that the court cannot proceed to consider the application in the absence of deposit made within the time allowed by law. This case turned on the fact that the deposit was made out of time In yet another case of the Allahabad High Court reported in Haji Raham Bux & Sons v. Firm Samiullah and Sons AIR 1963 All 320 a Division Bench consisting of Chief I Justice Desai and Mr Justice S. D Singh interpreted the words of 0.21 R 90, by saying I that the word 'entertain' means not 'receive' or 'accept' but'proceed to consider on I merits' or adjudicate upon'. Ultimately, their Lordships expressed themselves as follows: "When the proviso speaks of the entertainment of the appeal, it means that the appeal such as was filed will not be admitted to consideration unless there is satisfactory proof available of the making of the deposit of the admitted tax." The entertainment of a proceeding, therefore means the point of time when it is being considered and the ban on entertaining a suit, therefore, operates at the point of time at which it is heard by the Court. One may reconcile both the decisions by taking the view that it is not obligatory on the Court to reject or return the plaint, merely because of the pendency of a fair rent application, but that it should not hear the matter, that is to say, try the suit, so long as the petition for fixation of fair rent is pending, The suit will remain immobilised during this appeal. 13. To sum up. It is open to a tenant to file an application for fixation of fair rent under S.3t of Act I of 1964 unafraid of threats of eviction through court. 13. To sum up. It is open to a tenant to file an application for fixation of fair rent under S.3t of Act I of 1964 unafraid of threats of eviction through court. But he must be a real tenant as defined in Act I of 1964 and not an ersatz or synthetic product yet in the process of legislative manufacture. The defendant must thus prove that he is a tenant and prove it clearly as he must any other fact in issue or relevant fact. It is not enough if he gives primafacie satisfaction to the Court that he has a well-grounded case of tenancy. Therefore, the Court will have to investigate this question of tenancy before deciding whether the suit should be entertained or not. If it holds that the defendant's status as a tenant has been proved, the Court will hold up the proceedings and decline to take it up for judicial consideration. 14. Another grievance has been voiced by counsel for the revision petitioner in this case. All his documents relating to proof of tenancy are in the Land Tribunal where the actual trial is going on and evidence is being recorded. He therefore pleads that he is unable to get'back his documents and prove the same fact before the Civil Court. Certainly the Munsiff's Court, after being satisfied that the Land Tribunal is going on with the heating at present, must give sufficient time for the defendant to get back his documents and produce them in the suit. It is not fair that the defendant should sustain prejudice on this score by any hurried or impatient disposal of the question without an effective opportunity being accorded to the defendant. Counsel went to the extent of contending that the suit should be stayed on the principle of S.10 CPC. While I am not inclined to accede to this argument, I certainly feel the force of the request that the Civil Court should wait till the parties are able to get back their documents from the Land Tribunal and produce them into the Court. In this view, I dismiss the Civil Revision Petition. No costs.