JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS order will also govern the disposal of Civil Revisions nos. 422 to 425 of 1968, which were heard along with this revision, and of Civil revisions Nos. 430 to 436 and No. 457 of 1968 heard subsequently. These revisions by the Union of India, as representing the South Eastern Railways, under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1837, are directed against the judgments and decrees of the First Civil Judge, Class II, Seoni, empowered under section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1958, pronounced by him on diverse dates in March 1968, in suits for compensations brought by different consignees on account of damages to certain consignments of betel leaves resulting from alleged delay in transit. ( 2. ) WITHOUT adverting to the merits of the controversy between the parties in these suits, the suits have to be remanded for a re-trial because the procedure adopted by the learned Judge has been fundamentally defective. The material facts are these. The suits involved common questions of fact and law although the parties were different, and the learned Judge for his own convenience tried the suits together without any order for their consolidation and has chosen the device of recording all the evidence once in one of the suits and of writing the judgment in that particular suit. In recording the depositions of witnesses, he kept the appropriate places blank and later filled them up in the carbon copies of the depositions which have been placed in the other suits. What appears on the record are mere carbon copies of the depositions of witnesses with the blanks duly filled in. Even the names of the witnesses were kept blank and were subsequently inserted in the deposition-sheets in such a manner as to correspond with the names of the plaintiff concerned in the suit where the carbon copies were placed. Apart from this, what is more disconcerting is that the learned Judge has not written separate judgment in any of these suits. All that he did was to write the judgment in a particular suit and to place carbon copies of that judgment in the other suits. Apart from this, what is more disconcerting is that the learned Judge has not written separate judgment in any of these suits. All that he did was to write the judgment in a particular suit and to place carbon copies of that judgment in the other suits. The method adopted by him in preparing these judgments has also been the same, namely, he kept the appropriate places blank and later on, the blanks were filled up in the different suits keeping in view the transaction to which they relate. ( 3. ) AS a matter of construction of procedural laws, it is well established that procedure is mere machinery and its object is to facilitate and not to obstruct the administration of justice The Code should, therefore, be considered liberally and as far as possible technical objections should not be allowed to defeat substantial justice. A technical construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should be guarded against. The mere circumstance of there being an error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding in a suit is no ground for reversing or varying a decree in appeal, and much less in revision. It is with that object that section 99 of the Code has been designed to cure what is usually spoken of as a mere irregularity, but not one which affects the merits of a case or the jurisdiction of a Court, which is a material irregularity not curable The defects that appear in these suits were not mere defects of procedure but such as to vitiate the trial itself. ( 4. ) NOW, the trial of these suits is undoubtedly vitiated as the mode of trial adopted by the learned Judge was not one contemplated by the Code of civil Procedure. In the first place, the learned Judge has not complied with the requirements of Order XVIII, rules 13 and 14 of the Code in recording the evidence. Secondly, the judgments appearing on record of these suits are not in conformity with the requirements of Order XX, rule 4. Both Order XVIII, rules 13 and 14 as well as Order XX, rule 4, not being within the ambit of the order 50 of the Code, are necessarily applicable to a Court of Small Causes, constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The safeguards provided by these rules are not mere formalities. Both Order XVIII, rules 13 and 14 as well as Order XX, rule 4, not being within the ambit of the order 50 of the Code, are necessarily applicable to a Court of Small Causes, constituted under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The safeguards provided by these rules are not mere formalities. Although they are rules of procedure, nevertheless their requirements cannot be whittled down on the ground of mere inconvenience when the meaning of these is clear on the face of the statute. ( 5. ) THE importance of recording a memorandum of deposition of witnesses in non-appealable cases under Order XVIII, rules 13 and 14, can hardly be stressed Upon this depends the final adjudication of the rights of the parties. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that a Small Cause Judge should carefully comply with these salutary requirements because the Legislature has in its wisdom not allowed any further appeal from his judgment. Unless a rigid compliance of Order XVIII, rules 13 and 14, and of Order XX, rule 4, of the Code were insisted upon, the public confidence in the administration of justice would be impaired. When the issues were common, the learned Judge should have consolidated the suits with the consent of the parties and directed that the evidence in one shall be read in the other. There is, however, no such directions anywhere in any of the suits. The trial of these suits was, therefore, held in a manner different from that prescribed by the code of Civil Procedure. In that view alone, the trial of these suits must be held to be bad and altogether illegal: [see Haju Charan Ghosh v. Laxmi narayan and (I L R (1953) 1 Cal. 277.) and Nand Lal v. Pooran (I L R (1955) 5 Raj. 869.)]. ( 6. ) NOW, under the Code of Civil Procedure, the procedure regarding recording of evidence by Judges of Small Cause Courts is not substantially different from what otherwise prevails. Under Order XVIII, rule 13 of the code, applicability where of is not barred, the Judges are to make only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness. In stating these requirements, Chunder J. in Haju Charan Ghosh v. Laxmi Narayan Jana (cit. Under Order XVIII, rule 13 of the code, applicability where of is not barred, the Judges are to make only a memorandum of the substance of the evidence of each witness. In stating these requirements, Chunder J. in Haju Charan Ghosh v. Laxmi Narayan Jana (cit. supra) observed : "as regards the recording of evidence under the law, it seems not to have been discussed in any decision of this Court subsequent to 1904 when the old Civil Procedure Code, and not the present one, was in force. The question is how far the law still remains the same. Under section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, it is laid down that the procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure shall, save in so far as otherwise provided by that code or by this Act, be the procedure followed by a Court of Small Causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suits. When the old Code of Civil Procedure was in force, section 5 of that Act and section 189 laid down what procedure had to be followed by Courts of Small Causes in the Province. Now, section 9 of the present Code of civil Procedure of 1908 exempts Provincial Small Cause Courts from certain provisions of the code In section 9 no mention is made about the mode of recording evidence. Under Order L of the present Code of Civil Procedure an exemption is made in rule 1, clause (b), where it is said that Order XVIII, rules 5 to 12, shall not apply to Provincial Small Cause Courts. Therefore, it is evident that as far as recording of evidence goes, neither section-9 of the present code nor Order L exempts the operation of rule 13 of Order XVIII of the Code of Civil Procedure which will apply because of section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. Rule 13 of Order XVIII lays down that in cases in which an appeal is not allowed, the Judge is to make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence. In cases decided by the Courts of small Causes appeal is not allowed. Rule 13 of Order XVIII lays down that in cases in which an appeal is not allowed, the Judge is to make a memorandum of the substance of the evidence. In cases decided by the Courts of small Causes appeal is not allowed. Therefore, the law as it now stands is that Judges of the courts of Small Causes in the Province are required to make a memorandum of the evidence of each of the witnesses as the trial proceeds, and that it will form a part of the record after having been signed by the Judge. The law is not, therefore, substantially different from the law that prevailed before the present Code came into force." ( 7. ) AS already stated, the judgments in these small cause suits also do not comply with the requirements of Order XX, rule 4 of the Code inasmuch as (a) the findings reached by the learned Judge are based on no evidence and (b) there is no judgment written by him in the manner required by law. No doubt, the issues in these suits were common and perhaps the learned Judge felt that, for a speedier disposal of the work in his Court, he should try them together. Nevertheless, there is no order for consolidation of these suits under section 151 of the Code nor any direction given in any of these suits that the evidence recorded in one would be read in the other. In that s tuition, the findings are in reality based on no legal evidence because what appears on record are mere carbon copies of the depositions of witnesses in a particular suit with which the other suits were in no way related except that the issues were common. It is needless for me to stress the sanctity of judgments to be written by all Courts. It is needless for me to stress the sanctity of judgments to be written by all Courts. In Shaikh Abdulla v. Abdul Hatimkhan, (30 N L R 14.) this Court had strongly deprecated the use of a rubber stamp for impressing a judgment in a contested suit, stating: "the minimum requirements in a judgment of such a Court have been clearly explained in Hasankhan v Jasraj (7 N L R 146.) The judgment itself is not even written but consists of an impression from a rubber stamp which is obviously intended to be used when a claim is decreed ex parte or on confession since these alternatives are provided in the rubber stamp, and the intention is that in uncontested cases the inappropriate alternative should be scored out. In this case both the alternatives have been scored out and the rubber stamp has been used as a substitute for a written judgment. The use of a rubber stamp in a contested suit is most reprehensible. A judgment in a Court of Small Causes must specifically set out the points for determination and the decision thereon. This is patently impossible when a rubber stamp is used. Apart from the fact that the judgment contains no element from which the points for decision may be deduced, there is the added danger that such a stamp may, in stress of work, be mistakenly applied in a contested case. " There is, in my view, no difference in principle between a judgment impressed on a rubber stamp and judgments of the type with which I am concerned in these revisions. ( 8. ) FOR all the foregoing reasons, the revisions succeed and are allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the learned Judge are set aside and the suits are remitted for a re-trial according to law with advertence to the observations made above. There shall, however, be no order as to costs because the union of India apparently connived at the strange procedure adopted by the learned Judge for its own convenience. After all, its printed written statement in these suits, without advertence to other averments in the particular plaint, set the pattern of things to follow. Revision allowed.