JUDGMENT M. H. Beg, J. - The petitioner was the Principal of Rashtriya Inter College, Karamber, in the District Ballia. He alleges that his services have been wrongly terminated by the Managing Committee of the College, opposite party No. 1. He asserts that he was a victim of a plan to oust him from his post because the Manager of the College, one Jagannath Shukla wanted to dislodge the petitioner somehow in order to make room for the manager's brother-in-law, Krishna Deo Pandey, who was an assistant teacher in a Higher Secondary School. Although the petitioner alleged, in paragraph 26 of this petition, that the Managing Committee, after passing a resolution on 10-7-1966, sent a communication to the District Inspector of Schools, opposite party No. 3, on 13-7-1966, recommending the termination of services of the petitioner, yet, he has come to this Court on the assumption that be has been actually punished. His complaint is that the procedure laid down in Regulations 35 to 37, which applies to cases or punishment, was not followed by the Managing Committee of the College. 2. It was recently pointed out by me, in Sri Ganga Prasad Singh v. The, Regional Appellate Committee, Civil Misc. Writ No. 4217 of 1964. decided on 6.2.1969 that the procedure for a termination of service by notice is different from procedure for punishment. If, as the petitioner alleged, the management had only recommended, and, presumably proposed, the termination of petitioner's services by notice, the procedure found in Regulation 35 to 37 was not applicable at all to the petitioner's case. The petitioner has not alleged, in his petition, that conditions necessary for a valid notice of termination of service, either found in Regulations 25 to 28 of Chapter III of the Regulations dealing with conditions of service, or in some contract of service, had not been fulfilled. The letter of the District Inspector of Schools to the petitioner dated 17-12-1966 also shows that approval was given to a proposed termination of the petitioner's services as required by Section 16-G (3) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) . The Deputy Director also dismissed the petitioner's appeal against an order "approving the termination of services of Sri S. P. Tewari, Principal, Rashtriya Inter College, Karambar, Ballia." 3. The Deputy Director also dismissed the petitioner's appeal against an order "approving the termination of services of Sri S. P. Tewari, Principal, Rashtriya Inter College, Karambar, Ballia." 3. I do not think that the order of approval could be vitiated merely because it was made by the Deputy Director after an apparently detailed inquiry into charges and references made to some disciplinary proceedings, which are not necessary at all in a simple case of termination of service by notice but which seem to have been taken by the Managing Committee against the petitioner. The petitioner does not seem to have alleged before the Deputy Director that he was being really punished in the garb of a notice of termination of service. Nor has such a case been specifically set up in this Court. His petition is based on the assumption that Regulations 35 to 37 of Chapter III, mentioned above, should have been applied to his case by the Managing Committee of the College as he was punished. The petitioner's real grievance is against the Managing Committee, and he has applied for writs of certiorari to quash the resolution of committee passed on 10-7-1966 as well as the orders of approval passed by the District Inspector and the Deputy Director of Education. 4. An objection. in the nature of a preliminary objection to the petition may, be mentioned here. It is that a writ of certiorari does not issue against a private institution merely because it is regulated by an Act and the Regulations framed thereunder. The petitioner has not even alleged that the college is administered under a scheme of administration enjoined by the Act. But, even assuming that it is governed by such a scheme, the Act and the Regulations merely provide a pattern and its requirements under the law. Article 226 of the Constitution no doubt extends to issuing suitable writs or orders to "any person or authority, including in appropriate cases a Government" for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose. But, the very nature of the writs and orders contemplated by Article 226 of the Constitution and the purposes for which they can be granted pre-suppose that the person against whom or authority against which a writ or order under it is sought has a public and official character. Statutory bodies have such a character. But, the very nature of the writs and orders contemplated by Article 226 of the Constitution and the purposes for which they can be granted pre-suppose that the person against whom or authority against which a writ or order under it is sought has a public and official character. Statutory bodies have such a character. But, private institution cannot be equated with statutory bodies or official organs or agents of the State simply because there are statutory provisions and regulations to govern their operations. Even citizen is governed by laws contained in statutes, but that does not make him amenable to the writ issuing jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Article 226 is intended for the issue of high prerogative writs in extraordinary cases involving grievance of citizens against the State or statutory bodies created by the State or against their agents exercising powers entrusted to them so as to be exercised properly on behalf of the State or of statutory bodies. Mere regulation of an institution by statutory provisions does not convert it into a statutory public body. Nor does the mere fact that it is open to or serves members of the public make any difference. Such a body stands on no different footing, in the eye of law. then a private citizen of a company or a registered society. Suits could be filed in civil courts against such persons or bodies but high prerogative writs or orders under Article 226 of the Constitution could not be issued against them. The most that could be done under Article 226, so far as such persons are concerned, is that orders or directions may be given to them incidentally or as a necessary consequence of orders of writs issued against State organs or statutory bodies or their agents. These were weighty objections, on behalf of the State, which the learned counsel for the petitioner could not overcome. 5. Mr. S S. Bhatnagar, appearing for the State, relied on Suraj Prasad Saxena v. Manager, A.I.R. 1961 Alld. 282, A. R. H. S. School where a passage from Halsebury's Laws of England Vol: II page 84 was cited: "A writ of mandamus is passed against a person directing him to do some particular thing specified in the order which appertain:; to his office and is in the nature of public duty. 282, A. R. H. S. School where a passage from Halsebury's Laws of England Vol: II page 84 was cited: "A writ of mandamus is passed against a person directing him to do some particular thing specified in the order which appertain:; to his office and is in the nature of public duty. "It was held there that a writ of mandamus against the manager of a private institution would not issue as the manager did not hold it public office. This case was sought to be distinguished on tic ground that it writ of mandamus stands on a separate footing. So far as persons against whom or authorities against which writs or or (lets can issue under Article 226 the principle applicable is the same irrespective of the nature c.f writ or order sought. 6. As is well known, a writ of certiorary originally issued. in England, from the High Court to "the judge or other officer of an interior court of record" so that, the record of proceedings may be transmitted to High Court in order to be dealt with there (See: Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd ed., Vol. II p. 124 part 230. Subsequently such writs were extended to statutory bodies, such as the Electricity Commissioners in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, (1924)(I.K.B. 171) performing quasi-judicial functions. They do not however, issue to private bodies or individuals, such as companies or registered societies or educational institutions which are only regulated but not created by statute, even though they may have to perform quasi-judicial functions in punishing their employees. 7. The Supreme Court, in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 440 at p, 443, after referring to the history and principles for the issue of writs of certiorari, evolved in England, observed; "In view of the express provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases by English Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of 'certiorari' in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the board and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law." 8. In T.C. Basappa's4 case the Supreme. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of 'certiorari' in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we keep to the board and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law." 8. In T.C. Basappa's4 case the Supreme. Court indicated the fundamental principles governing the issue of writs of certiorari by High Court under our Constitution. It is one of these basic principles that the jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 is supervisory. Such supervision is, however, exercised by High Courts directly over actions of organs of State or of statutory bodies created by statute. There are appropriate authorities set up, under the law, for direct supervision over the actions of nonstatutory private organisations or authorities. The Labour Court, exercising supervision through industrial adjudication provide an instance of such control. This Court can and does certainly supervise or superintend the proceedings of Labour Courts but not of private industrial organizations directly. Similarly, this Court superintends the proceedings and actions of State organs and educational authorities authorised by statutes to 'look into grievances of employers of private educational institutions, but it cannot usurp the functions of these authorities or give relief directly by means of writs and orders issued under Article 226. This is not a purpose which Article 226 of the Constitution was meant to serve. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of my learned brother Satish Chandra, J. in Shri Sobran Singh Jain v. Managing Committee, Shri Ratan Muni Jain Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyala, C.M.W. No. 2267 of 1969 decided on 11.3.1969 where a resolution passed by the Managing Committee of an educational institution was quashed. The objections taken before me do not appear to have been raised there at all. No decision on any such objection is found there. I, therefore, did not think that the decision can help the petitioner in a case in which the objection has been specifically taken as it is before me. If the objection had been raised there and a contrary view had been taken on the question by my learned brother, I would have referred the question to a larger bench as I was disposed to do in this case at one stage. If the objection had been raised there and a contrary view had been taken on the question by my learned brother, I would have referred the question to a larger bench as I was disposed to do in this case at one stage. It, however, appears to me that the principle on which the objection is based is so well recognised that no reference to a larger bench is called for on this question. 10. Learned Standing Counsel for the State also relied upon Vidyodaya University of Ceylon v. Silva, 1964 (3) All Eng. Reports 865, where the Privy Council had allowed an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Ceylon on the ground that an alleged breach of a teacher's contract by the institution employing him gave rise to only an ordinary civil liability for which a suit for damages lay but a writ of certiorari could not issue. It was contended there, as it was contended before me, that the position of the petitioner as well as of the institution are governed by statutory provisions so that the contract between them was not of the ordinary kind. Despite this feature which, as their lordships observed, attract ed "a strong statutory flavour to the plaintiff's contract," the Privy Council held that the case could not be said to raise anything more than a dispute between a master and a servant for alleged breach of contract for which a suit for damages in an ordinary civil court was the proper remedy. 11. The provisions of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder certainly govern the college concerned and the petitioner in the case before me. Section 16A of the Act provides for a scheme of administration for all the educational institutions to which the Act applies. Chapter I of the Regulations framed in order to carry out the purposes of Section 16 A and 16-B and 16-C of the Act lay down the constitution and the powers and duties of the Managing Committees as well as of the Principals and Headmasters of such institutions. The mere fact, however, that the institution is regulated by statutory provisions and Regulations would not, in my opinion, convert it into a public or statutory authority amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The mere fact, however, that the institution is regulated by statutory provisions and Regulations would not, in my opinion, convert it into a public or statutory authority amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the positions of the District Inspector and the Deputy Di rector of Education, Opposite Parties 3 and 4, are different. They represent the authority of the State conferred by statute. They are public servants amenable to our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 12. The provisions of Section 16-G make it clear that every case of proposed termination of service as well as of proposed punishment must be referred to the District Inspector of Schools. The Inspector is then required either to approve or disapprove of the proposed action. He is required to give an opportunity to the Principal or the teacher concerned to show cause why the proposed action should no be approved only when a punishment is to be inflicted. In other words, a bare notice of termination of service is not treated as a punishment in the eye of law. Even in cases of punishment, the power of the Inspector is confined to according approval or disapproval after holding a summary inquiry of the nature which appears to have been held in the present case. The decision of the Inspector is subject to an appeal which now lies to the Deputy Director of Education who may hold such further inquiry as he considers necessary before confirming or setting aside the approval or disapproval of the Inspector to the proposed action or punishment. This was also done in the present case. 13. An argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner was that, as the jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court to inquire into the legality of termination of service is barred by the provisions of Section 16-G (4) of the Act, this Court should consider this matter under Article 226 of the Constitution. I am unable to construe Section 16-G (4) of the Act so widely. Provisions barring jurisdiction of ordinary courts are to be strictly and narrowly construed. It seems to me that Section 16-G (4) only prevents an ordinary civil court from questioning the propriety of the approval or disapproval and of any consequential direction given by educational authorities. I am unable to construe Section 16-G (4) of the Act so widely. Provisions barring jurisdiction of ordinary courts are to be strictly and narrowly construed. It seems to me that Section 16-G (4) only prevents an ordinary civil court from questioning the propriety of the approval or disapproval and of any consequential direction given by educational authorities. It protects the actions of the authorities functioning under Section 16-G but not the action of the institution complained against. The decisions given by the Inspector or the Appellate Authority do not have the force of res judicata binding upon parties in a civil suit. An action for a breach of contract and damages by an aggrieved party against an institution could not be barred by the provisions of Section 16-G(4). This was the view which I took also in Munna Lal Agarwal v. State of U. P., W.P. No. 832 of 1965 decided on 28.1.1969. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. v. Ghanshyam Das, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110 to contend that Courts should interfere if rules of natural justice are violated. Such a complaint could be inquired into, as explained above, under Article 226 of the Constitution, only against the Inspector and the Deputy Director of Education in the present case. From the orders of the Inspector of Schools, and, thereafter, of the Deputy Director of Education, in the case before me, it appears that the petitioner was given due opportunity to be heard by them. The petitioner has not established that these authorities contravened any rules of natural justice. 15. The petitioner has made a number of allegations against the Committee of Management and the way in which his case has been dealt with by it and the manager in particular. I must say that although the manager of the institution, who happens to be an advocate. filed a counter affidavit reply to the petition. the only specific denials made by him relate to the allegation of mala fides and the appointment of his brother in-law in place of the petitioner. There are also other suspicious features about which I abstain from making further comments as the petitioner is left to his remedies by means of a civil suit where all the disputed questions of fact. involving examination and cross examination of witnesses, can be satisfactorily tried. There are also other suspicious features about which I abstain from making further comments as the petitioner is left to his remedies by means of a civil suit where all the disputed questions of fact. involving examination and cross examination of witnesses, can be satisfactorily tried. The petitioner has not even set up legal defects, if any, in the termination of his services by notice. The allegation that he was not given adequate opportunity to defend himself, if he was actually punished, is also disputed. All these questions are left open for trial in such civil suits as the petitioner may be advised to file. 16. In the result, I dismiss this writ petition. But, in the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs. A copy of the judgment Will be given early to the petitioner on payment of necessary charges.